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 This dissertation examines how ethnological knowledge conditions the 
possibilities of rights, recognition, and belonging in the nation-state for the peoples of 
Darjeeling. Fueled by longstanding anxieties over their place in India, ethnic groups 
have increasingly turned to ethnology to reconstitute themselves as acknowledgeable 
communities. These techniques have proven instrumental to these groups’ quests for 
recognition as Scheduled Tribes of India, and to broader efforts to bring ethnic-based 
sovereignty to Darjeeling as either a separate state or a ‘tribal area’ as per the Indian 
constitution. The effects of these ethnological initiatives, however, extend well beyond 
recognition. In time, they have fundamentally reshaped the political, social, and 
subjective contours of ‘identity’ itself. This dissertation accordingly focuses on the 
dynamics by which the people of Darjeeling have taken up—and taken on—normative 
ethnological forms to achieve their twinned objectives of ethnic revitalization and 
formal recognition from the Government of India. 
 The research is based primarily on ethnographic and historiographic work 
conducted in India in 2006-7. Historically, it interrogates: (i) the (post)colonial pasts 
through which ethnology came to structure modern systems of recognition in India; 
and (ii) the local, affective histories of Darjeeling, which engendered these 
communities’ desires for recognition. Ethnographically, the analysis angles into the 
present via a multi-tiered approach involving: (i) work with the ethnic associations and 
 political outfits stewarding ethnic makeover in Darjeeling, (ii) a village-based study of 
the effects of these movements on everyday life, and (iii) an ethnography of the state 
anthropologists who were tasked with formally recognizing these groups. 
 Through this design, the research ventures a critically historical and 
phenomenological understanding of the myriad subjects of ethnological knowledge 
today. Constituting a broader case study in ‘found’ anthropology, then, these findings 
accordingly raise timely questions about the particular kinds of anthropological 
knowledge being circulated, produced, and practiced in the social world beyond the 
academy. Specifically, this research asks how ethnological knowledge continues to 
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PREFACE: NOTES TO THE READER 
Transcription and Translation. 
 This research was conducted in Nepali and English. Given the subject matter 
of my work, these languages frequently intermingled during my conversations with 
the people of Darjeeling—not merely for the sake of mutual intelligibility, but also 
because English anthropological terms are now in widespread circulation throughout 
Darjeeling. For instance, people often used the English term ‘culture’ and its Nepali 
equivalent sanskriti interchangeably. Likewise, people would switch back and forth 
between ‘identity’ and it local synonyms astitwa/chinhāri. Jāt was often ‘caste’; 
dharma was often ‘religion’. ‘Tribe’ increasingly became synonymous with adivasi (a 
term used throughout India and Nepal meaning ‘autochthonous or original inhabitant’) 
and/or janājāti (which loosely translates as ‘indigenous nationality’ or perhaps 
‘ethnicity’). The variegated circulation of English anthropological terminology proved 
an important facet of my research, but the frequent intermingling and substitution of 
English and Nepali made for difficult transcription. To make the translated portions of 
this text more reader-friendly, I have opted to translate them fully into English (adding 
Nepali terminology where relevant) rather than try to depict the complicated linguistic 
interplay that so many of my conversations entailed. 
 I have transcribed Nepali words according to Turner’s Comparative and 
Etymological Dictionary of the Nepali Language (1931/2001), with certain 
modifications. To comply more with phonetic pronunciation, Turner’s ‘c’ is here ‘ch’; 
his aspirated ‘ch’ is here ‘chh’. Turner’s ‘ś’, ‘ṣ’, and ‘s’ are here rendered simply ‘s’. 
For proper nouns such as the names of organizations, I have used the given 
organization’s own renderings. With commonly transcribed terms such as ‘Dasain’, I 
have followed conventional transcription without diacritics. Where necessary, I have 
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pluralized Nepali terms by adding an ‘s’, as is done in English. Non-English words are 
italicized when they first appear, and again if they have not appeared in many pages. 
 My research assistant provided invaluable assistance in helping me translate 
and transcribe the many hours of digital voice recordings I collected during the course 
of this research. I, however, accept full responsibility for any and all linguistic 
shortcomings of the work presented here. 
Citations. 
 All primary sources (archival files, periodicals, etc) are referenced in full in the 
footnotes. Secondary sources are only cited in the footnotes, with full bibliographic 
information available in the Bibliography that follows the Conclusion of the 
dissertation. 
Pseudonymity. 
 My research protocol has been to render all individuals and sensitive places 
pseudonymous. Thus, for instance, the name of the village where I lived in Darjeeling 
has been rendered by a pseudonym, as have all of its residents. However, some public 
officials and figures, due to their unavoidable (and unabashedly public) notoriety, are 
here depicted by their proper names. Ethnic organizations and government 
departments are presented by their official names. 
 Throughout this research, I worked with numerous ethnic groups. Wherever 
possible, I have tried to accurately portray the given group by using their common 
ethnonym. However, because many of the groups I worked with currently have 
Scheduled Tribe applications pending with the Government of India, and because 
much of my attention focused on these processes of recognition, I have, when 
 xiv 
necessary, either omitted the ethnic group’s name or used a pseudo-ethnonym. The 




THE AGE OF ETHNOLOGY 
Exempli Gratia. 
 On July 18th, 2006 a team of anthropologists arrived in Darjeeling, India to 
conduct research on several ethnic groups. I was not one of them. They were civil 
servants of the Government of West Bengal—the Cultural Research Institute (CRI), 
itself a subsidiary of the Backward Class Welfare Department, to be exact. They had 
been sent to Darjeeling to perform an official ‘Ethnographic Survey’ to determine the 
eligibility of ten ethnic groups seeking to become Scheduled Tribes (ST) of India. 
Much like the other ethnicities that constitute the ‘Gorkha’ community of the hills,1 
these groups had recently applied to become STs—a designation that affords 
affirmative action benefits, what in India are known as reservations. And like these 
other groups, attaining ST status was to be the crowning achievement of their ongoing 
ethnic renaissance. 
 The day of their arrival, the anthropologists held a closed-door meeting with 
local ethnic association leaders to outline the week’s proceedings. Each ethnic group 
was to take the research team to a ‘model community’ of the association’s choosing, 
where they would be given one day to demonstrate their ‘tribal’ traits. The 
ethnographic data would be recorded and brought back to Kolkata where it would 
cross-checked with the written application materials furnished by the applicant groups, 
as well as with available scholarly and governmental literatures on the groups in 
question. The CRI would then draft an official Ethnographic Report, which would be 
                                                 
1 For the reader familiar with the history of the British Empire, the term ‘Gorkha’ may have a familiar 
ring. Following conventional spellings, I use ‘Gorkha’ to refer to the Nepali-speaking community of 
Darjeeling—itself made up of numerous ethnicities of Nepali origin. ‘Gurkha’ (with a ‘u’) refers to the 
legendary Nepali troops of the British Indian army. I discuss the problematic slippage of these terms in 
Chapter II.  
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circulated through the government where it would play a pivotal role in determining 
whether or not these groups would be conferred ST status. Having been briefed, there 
was only one thing left for the ethnic leaders to decide and that was which group 
would be studied when. They drew straws. 
 At 8pm that night, a small van slipped out of town to begin a long journey 
through heavy monsoon rains. The road would go from bad to worse as the van plied 
through the darkness, slowly making its way to a remote corner of the district. Inside 
rode several leaders of the Lekh Hitkari Ethnic Association (LHEA).2 They were on 
their way to the distant village of Laharā Gāũ, the ‘model community’ they had 
selected for the next morning’s Ethnographic Survey. (They drew first.) The van 
would stop several times en route to pick up others to help with the preparations. 
News of the Lekh’s draw had already been relayed from the central offices in 
Darjeeling to the branch leaders in Laharā Gāũ. Work was therefore already underway 
organizing the requisite displays. Together, these association leaders and the villagers 
of Laharā Gāũ would work through the night preparing for their moment of 
recognition. 
 Back in Darjeeling town, a leading Lekh intellectual woke at 5am in order to 
put the final touches on a memorandum that his organization was to submit to the 
government along with their ethnographic presentations. The document bore the title 
“A Prayer for Inclusion of All the Unit Tribes of GORKHA Tribal Community into 
the Scheduled Tribe Status- with a fresh set of proofs and the causes why this should 
be done.” Written on behalf of not only the Lekh, but all “left-out” [read non-ST] 
communities of the hills, the 30-page essay laid out the tribal qualities of these groups 
in great detail. The “fresh set of proofs” called upon native and western 
                                                 
2 The ST applications of all the “left-out” communities are still pending (and promise to be for a long 
time). To protect the identity of these groups, I have chosen in such instances to use pseudonyms. 
‘Lekh’ is accordingly a pseudonymous ethnonym. Fully translated into English ‘Lekh Hitkari Ethnic 
Association’ would be ‘Lekh Welfare Ethnic Association’. 
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anthropologies, colonial ethnologies, and census data to bolster its claims. It 
furthermore cited a litany of ancient texts (including the Mahabharata and the Puranas) 
in tracing out the primordial, authentically ‘tribal’ history of these groups. The 
memorandum argued that these communities did not migrate from Nepal, as is 
commonly held, but in fact were true “sons of the soil”—true adivasis—of India.3 
Blending anthropology, history, and a dose of political vitriol, the document claimed 
definitively, “The Gorkha community as a whole [and thus the ethnicities within it] 
has been and is a purely tribal community having a definite tribal, socio-cultural, and 
distinct tribal ethnic background.” Failure to recognize the left-out communities as 
Scheduled Tribes would thus be a “great political blunder and a constitutional 
crime”—-one that would lead to “inevitable unrest” and “chaos” in the hills. This 
being the case, the memorandum put the onus of recognition squarely on the state’s 
shoulders—albeit in the most personal terms, viz: 
“So, now your honourable self has the duty to properly represent our 
community’s worthiness to fulfill all the criteria to be constitutionally 
scheduled as a Tribe. So that the people will not loose the faith in the 
government but get strengthened in the belief that our government is the one 
who gives impartial and equal opportunity to all the people and the citizens of 
the country, specially so to the sons of the soil and is truly working along the 
lines of fulfilling the just dreams and the rights of the citizens of India.” 
The memorandum concluded by “anticipating a prompt and just decision and action 
from your side on this burning and seriously sensitive matter.” 
--- 
 Despite the urgency of the situation, by 8am the memorandum is not yet 
complete. Minutes after the hour, I arrive to the cramped LHEA offices to find the 
                                                 
3 Reliable historical sources and popular understandings in Darjeeling maintain that these groups 
migrated from Nepal following the British acquisition of Darjeeling from Sikkim in 1835. British 
sources from that time reported the primary inhabitants to be the Lepchas and Bhutias—each of whom 
were granted ST status in the original list of Scheduled Tribes (1950). The Lepchas are considered the 
primary autochthons of the region. I discuss this history later in the Introduction. 
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author seated amid an array of opened books, scribbling his final revisions. His 
colleagues bid me welcome in whispered hellos, letting me know he is not to be 
disturbed. The frantic pace at which he works belies the smooth figure he cuts with his 
fine suit and tie, oiled back hair, and laptop bag at his side. His eyes dart from one 
book to another, cross-referencing sources, then back again to the memorandum. He 
makes a slight change. Someone checks the clock, as beads of sweat begin to stand up 
on his nose. It is getting late. If he and his colleagues are to make it to Laharā Gāũ in 
time, they must leave now. So he waits for the whiteout to dry, then pencils in one last 
citation. 
 Minutes later, three suit clad men hurry out of the office with the completed 
memorandum in tow. Knowing I am an anthropologist, they have invited me along for 
the day, so I do my best to keep pace as they navigate their way through the crowded 
bazaar in search of their hired van. We find it idling nearby, and quickly climb in to 
begin the same arduous journey that their colleagues made the rainy night before. As 
the van sputters out of town, the men inside can only hope that their written 
representations correspond with the preparations made by their colleagues in Laharā 
Gāũ. The day demands a perfect similitude between what their memorandum says and 
what their people do, and thus everything must be in order. After all, they will be 
tested. 
 Because, at that very moment, somewhere along the same road plies a 
government-hired jeep heading for the same model community. Inside ride the 
government anthropologists armed with clipboards, criteria, and questionnaires. The 
ethnographic data to be gathered will be a determinative factor in whether the Lekh 
become a Scheduled Tribe (ST), thereby qualifying its members for the reservations 
and affirmative action benefits that, ostensibly, might lift them from their ‘backward’ 
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condition. Having sweated out the final draft of their document and left just in time, 
the ethnic leaders believe they are one step ahead of the anthropologists. 
 As the ethnic leaders’ vehicle lurches down the heavily eroded road, 
conversation meanders from theories of primordial ethnic history, ‘tradition’ and 
‘culture’ to related concerns of ‘backwardness’ and ethnic ‘uplift’. The subject matter 
is eerily familiar to me, yet, as per my training, also problematic. They are keen to 
hear my thoughts, and being their guests, I weigh my words carefully, mindful of all 
that hangs on the day’s events. Finally, after three grueling hours, we arrive at a small 
hamlet straddling the now dwindling road. Gathered is a community bedecked in their 
most traditional attire—men to one side, women to the other—waiting to perform, 
waiting to convince whomever that they are proper ‘tribal’ subjects. As the van parts 
the throng of people, uneasy faces peer in. Just then one of the suit-clad men inside 
looks out and declares with relieved satisfaction, “Ahhh… you see. There is a tribal 
community!” 
 Within minutes the government anthropologists arrive and the community 
springs into action transforming this hillside village into a veritable anthropological 
lollapalooza. Folksongs waft across carefully arranged ‘primitive’ artifacts. Women 
dance and serve ‘indigenous’ foods. Drums roll, as shamans shake and hover 
erratically over their full array of ritual paraphernalia. There is exorcism and sacrifice, 
even blood drinking, not to mention bows, arrows, and troops of adolescents howling 
savage cries into the thick monsoon skies. All the while, the LHEA leaders, clad in 
suits and armed with cell-phones, roam the perimeter orchestrating the encounter. 
These men make sure the anthropologists are looking in the right direction at the right 
time and speaking only with the right people. They peer over the anthropologists’ 
shoulders, sneaking peeks at their ethnographic notebooks so as to be sure that the data 
is being properly recorded. If necessary, they pull aside the anthropologists to clarify 
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any ‘misunderstanding’. Since these association leaders are far more educated than the 
residents of Laharā Gāũ, they serve as interpreters, translating the Bengali of the 
anthropologists into the Nepali of the locals and back again. In the heat of the 
ethnographic moment, they often intervene to speak on behalf of the locals, displacing 
their agency for the ‘good of the constituency’. With so much at stake, they must 
provide the perfect representation of the ‘tribal’ subject. 
 The encounter is loud and chaotic, yet the anthropologists set to their work in a 
mechanical procedure befitting their bureaucratic duties. There are requirements to be 
fulfilled, criteria to be checked, interviews to be conducted, forms to be completed, 
and data tbe gathered. They have their own research agenda. At times, it meshes with 
the script put forth by the ethnic leaders. At other moments, tempers flare as the 
anthropologists express their contempt for their gaze being steered this way and that. 
 Somewhere in the middle of this delicate tussle of attention are the subjects of 
Laharā Gāũ. Hand-selected by the ṭhulo mānches (big men) of the LHEA, they have 
been placed under the anthropological looking-glass of the Indian state—specimens, 
as it were, of the purportedly ‘backward’, ‘isolated’, ‘distinct’, ‘primitive’, and 
certifiably ‘tribal’ culture of the Lekh. Yet many of these villagers are only vaguely 
aware of the stakes of their performance and the conceptual forms that they 
supposedly evince. At the center of it all, and yet somehow at a remove from the 
know, they are held forth as the embodiments of the ‘tribal’ ideal-type. Neither wholly 
of the class of the particular nor the general but somehow both, they are to serve as the 
ethnological example4—figures in which there is no agonism between the empirical 
                                                 
4 I am working here with Agamben’s consideration of the ‘example’, about which he writes: “In any 
context where it exerts its force, the example is characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the 
same type, and, at the same time, it is included among these. It is one singularity among others, which, 
however, stands for each of them and serves for all. On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a 
real particular case; but on the other, it remains understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. 
Neither particular nor universal, the example is the singular object that presents itself as such, that 
shows its singularity.” See “Example” in Agamben 1993: 10-11. 
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and the conceptual. As per the logics of recognition, they are the living, breathing 
‘tribals’. In them, the empirical and conceptual dimensions of knowledge collapse. 
Through them, ethnological knowledge realizes its singular veracity. 
 —E.g. “Ahhh…you see. There is a tribal community!” 
Rethinking Anthropology. 
 This dissertation seeks to tell a different story—or rather a set of stories—of a 
people and a kind of knowledge. The kind of knowledge that concerns me here is 
anthropological knowledge, or, more specifically ethnological knowledge. That there 
should be a relation between an ethnic people and ethnology has become something of 
a truism in today’s world. Western, academic ethnology has by now made the rounds 
in pursuit of the last of the unstudied ‘ethnicities’, ‘tribes’ and the like. But this is not 
the brand of anthropology that I am immediately concerned with in this thesis—
although certainly it is implicated. My concerns lie elsewhere: in the offices of ethnic 
associations, in the corridors of the state, in struggles for autonomy, in village tea 
stalls, and in the experiences of everyday life in Darjeeling. In these realms, particular 
paradigms of ethnological knowledge have gained extraordinary traction. In India 
especially, certain logics and practices of ethnological distinction cannot be extricated 
from the very political possibilities of communities. They have become normative—at 
once loaded with history, possibility, and seemingly unarguable socio-political 
sanction. Today, these paradigms continue to creep into the lifeworlds of 
contemporary subjects, reconfiguring socialities and subjectivities along the way. 
 This research focuses on these linked social, political, and subjective lives of 
ethnological knowledge. I analytically locate these dynamics within a broader 
problem-space of ‘found’ anthropology. In contradistinction to the academic discipline 
of anthropology, I define ‘found’ anthropologies as those forms of anthropological 
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knowledge being circulated, produced, and practiced in the social world beyond the 
academy. As this thesis will show, many (but not all) of the paradigms that have 
become central to modern identity formation and its recognition in Darjeeling have 
their origins in disciplinary pasts. Once the professed domain of academic 
anthropology, particular classificatory schemas, logics of ‘culture’ and ‘ethnicity’, and 
techniques of knowledge production, have now taken on a life of their own. In 
Darjeeling, they are to be ‘found’—as it were—co-mingling with, contesting, and 
oftentimes overwriting alternative schemas of socio-cultural life. Focusing 
ethnographic attention on the actual people who wield this kind of knowledge, as well 
as those who become its objects, this research explores the social processes through 
which particular forms of anthropological thought and practice—namely those of the 
ethnological variety—are articulated and translated across various discursive and 
sociological levels. 
 Pursued accordingly, anthropological knowledge comes into view not as the 
sole provenance of an academic discipline, but rather as a general field of knowledge 
production—at once heterogeneous, uneven, and inclusive of a range of subjects 
(academic and otherwise). Comprising this field in Darjeeling are civil servants, 
politicians, ethnic association leaders, everyday citizens, and the occasional academic 
anthropologist like myself—all of whom arrive at the subjects of Darjeeling with their 
own political, social, and epistemic commitments. Honoring their participation within 
this general field of knowledge production, this thesis pushes the bounds of what is to 
be recognized as anthropological. Doing so, it advances a more deprovincialized 
understanding of anthropological knowledge than is conventionally accepted within 
the academy. Deprovincializing anthropological knowledge means here: creating a 
space for engaging with the diverse knowledge-agents and knowledge forms that 
constitute this broader field of anthropological knowledge. Equally, it means coming 
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to terms with the specific strands of anthropological thought that, for better and for 
worse, shape the contemporary. 
 Recent decades have seen an explosion of interests within academic 
anthropology. Today the discipline has become a veritable mosaic of attentions, 
techniques, and specializations. Beyond the academy though—and in Darjeeling 
specifically—, the spectrum of anthropological knowledge looks radically different. It 
is, after all, not just any form of anthropological knowledge that has captured the 
imagination of the people of Darjeeling and conditioned their entry into India’s liberal 
order. Instead it is ethnological knowledge that has almost singularly (re)set the terms 
of ‘identity’ and its politics in the hills. Today particular paradigms of ethnological 
and neo-ethnological thought quite literally rule the day in Darjeeling. To understand 
how this has come to be, we must probe what might be deemed the ‘ethno-logics’ of 
late liberalism in India. Elizabeth Povinelli sets for us a powerful analytic example 
along these lines. But it will not be enough to question only the “intercalation of the 
politics of culture with the culture of capital,” as she writes.5 If we are to understand 
how and why ethnology has risen to prominence in Darjeeling, we must question also 
the very epistemic constitution of such concepts as ‘culture’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘identity’, etc 
and the ways that these ideational forms do (and do not) map to the local, affective 
histories of the given populations. As the following chapters will show, it is from this 
conjunction of history, affect, and the logics of late liberalism that ethnology has made 
its uncanny return in Darjeeling. 
 From an academic perspective, the predominance of ethnological thought in 
places like Darjeeling may seem a stark contrast to the plurality of intellectual 
attentions within academic anthropology today. Yet, there is, I believe, an important 
and alternative history of ‘anthropology’ to be gleaned from the dynamics at hand. 
                                                 
5 Povinelli 2002: 17. 
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The anthropological practices and logics of ethnic association, ‘tribal’ certifiers, and 
everyday citizens in Darjeeling ask us to ponder an altogether different proliferation of 
anthropological knowledge over the past several decades than the one expressed in the 
mosaic that is current academic anthropology. The reckoning at hand concerns, rather, 
the ongoing pluralization of the agents of anthropological knowledge and the domains 
where it is to be found. Deprovincialized accordingly, it is necessarily within this 
unbounded, heterogeneous, and uneven field that my ethnography finds it ‘object’ and 
stakes its claim. 
--- 
 The project of ‘finding’ anthropology gains a particular footing in 
contemporary India, where the collusions of the academic discipline and governance 
run deep. Since the pioneering work of Bernard Cohn on ‘colonialism and its forms of 
knowledge’, there is now a well-charted history of the discipline of anthropology in 
India (and indeed throughout much of the postcolonial world).6 Cohn argued 
convincingly that anthropology functioned as an investigative and enumerative 
modality of British rule over the subcontinent.7 Nicholas Dirks went a step further in 
deeming the British Raj an ‘ethnographic state’.8 In time, other scholars would take up 
this ‘know and rule’ argument, fleshing out the entanglements of anthropology and 
governance in various ways. These studies have set important precedents for the work 
I take up here. By effectively taking anthropological knowledge as an object of 
historiographic analysis, they have shed valuable light on the discipline of 
anthropology’s troubling legacy in India and beyond. 
                                                 
6 Historiographies of the colonies and of the discipline have exposed the problematic collusions of 
western anthropology and colonial governance with great acumen. See for instance: Asad et al 1973; 
Bremen & Shimizu et al 1999; Cohn 1987, 1996; Dirks 2001, 2004; Dudley-Jenkins 2003; Haller 1971; 
Pels & Salemink et al 2000; Pinney 1991; Uberoi, Sunar, & Deshpande et al 2008; Young 1995. 
7 Cohn 1996: 5-13. See also related chapters in Cohn 1987. 
8 Dirks 2001, 2004. 
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 These skeletons in a discipline’s closet are perhaps easier to recognize than the 
ghosts among us today. Excellent studies on the proliferation of ethnicity over the past 
60-odd years have recognized the residual effects of colonial categories and ethno-
logics in the identity politics of today.9 Through these studies we can begin to 
understand the historical baggage that categories like ‘race’, ‘tribe’, ‘caste’, and 
‘ethnicity’ bring with them into the present—where for better and worse they have 
come to be vested with exceptional social and political potential. Tracing the social 
life of these categories—and for that matter, ‘culture’—the problematic pasts of 
academic anthropology are not easily put to rest. 
 Other academic disciplines have come to terms with similar phenomena. 
Prasenjit Duara’s aptly titled Rescuing History from the Nation signals as much.10 In 
India specifically, Sudipta Kaviraj has argued that the 19th century was a time when 
“history breaks out everywhere’’. As Kaviraj explains, it was then that, “History 
becomes the great terrain of politics. Because history is a way of talking about the 
collective self, and bringing it into existence.”11 Today, there is something similar 
afoot in Darjeeling—only it is anthropology—and ethnology, in particular—that has 
become the knowledge of choice for talking about the collective self and bringing it 
into political existence. This particular form of anthropological knowledge has quite 
literally “broken out everywhere.” In Darjeeling, this entails more than the 
opportunistic use of categories like ‘race’, ‘tribe’, and ‘ethnicity’ to announce a 
community and its claims upon the nation-state. It entails more than ‘culturalism’, 
‘indigenism’, and related tropes of ethno-political mobilization. The ‘outbreak of 
                                                 
9 On India, see for instance Chakrabarty 2002 (Chap. 6: Governmental Roots of Modern Ethnicity); 
Chatterjee 1993, 2004; Dirks 2001; Washbrook 1982. Important studies conducted along these lines 
elsewhere include: Ranger 1982; Binsbergen 1985; Fardon 1987; William 1989, 1991; Trouillot 1991, 
1995; Malkki 1995; Werbner & Ranger et al 1996; Munasinghe 2001. 
10 Duara 1995. Along similar lines, see Munasinghe’s “Rescuing Theory from the Nation” (2008). 
11 Kaviraj 1995: 108. 
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anthropology’ in Darjeeling involves decidedly ethnological practices aimed at, and 
often carried out by, ethnic subjects themselves. 
 Importantly, the people of Darjeeling often refer to this kind of knowledge 
practice as ‘anthropology’ or its Nepali equivalent (mānavsāstra). Tellingly, the 
English term is more common. Even if we were to blind ourselves to the striking 
similarities between these academic and non-academic ways of making knowledge 
about ‘culture’, ‘religion’, ‘ritual’, ‘tribes’, ‘castes’ and all the rest, even if we were to 
jettison the overt histories of anthropology on the subcontinent, the ‘native voice’ 
makes its own case for a deprovincialized understanding of what constitutes 
anthropological knowledge. 
--- 
 To date, the social sciences have yet to thoroughly question how communities 
are turning anthropological lenses upon themselves. Postcolonial critiques of colonial 
governance and ‘its forms of knowledge’ have shed important light on the genesis of 
these classificatory schemas and the enduring trace of anthropological pasts in modern 
systems of recognition. Yet at present, we have little sense of how groups are taking 
up disciplinary knowledge as a means to unlock the potential vested in these systems. 
Recent work on indigenous rights movements and Native heritage projects have 
provided a toe-hold of sorts, by questioning the types of knowledge produced and 
mobilized by these movements.12 Methodologically, the trend here has been to work 
backward from the knowledges produced—be it from the testimony in indigenous land 
claims, the exhibitions in Native museums, or the literatures of ‘native’ intellectuals. 
                                                 
12 For studies that engage these types of questions to varying degrees, see, on indigenous rights 
movements: Beteille 1998; Clifford 1988; Field 1999; French 2009; Hale 2006; Kapila 2008; Kuper 
2003; Li 2000; Povinelli 2002: 188-233; Turner 1991. On Native heritage projects and questions of 
autoethnography, see Clifford 2004; Ericksen 2002, 2004; Handler 1996; Philips 2003.Along related 
lines, Jean and John Comaroff’s recently published book, Ethnicity, Inc (2009), raises a series of 
important questions about the modular corporatization and commodification of ethnicity across the 
globe.  
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My concern is that by overlooking the real-time dynamics of knowledge production, 
this approach is likely to miss the very real politics of representation, authenticity, and 
exclusion that shape such renderings of communities.13 In Darjeeling, removing from 
view or otherwise manipulating those who do not comply with the normative 
prescriptions of the ‘authentic ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ subject has become an integral 
component of communities’ quests for Scheduled Tribe status specifically, and ethnic 
revitalization more generally. In these politics of representation, we encounter one of 
the more troubling facets of ethnic renaissance in the hills.14 What is needed more 
generally then in the study of indigenous rights movements, Native heritage projects, 
and the like is focused ethnographic attention to the ineluctably social dimensions of 
ethnological knowledge production among aspiring communities. 
 Along these lines, dynamics of ‘found’ anthropology’ call upon the 
ethnographer to study outwardly issues that have typically been associated with the 
inward, ‘reflexive’ gaze.15 Indeed, this is one of the project’s unique promises. The 
kinds of anthropological knowledge practiced by and upon the people of Darjeeling—
whether at the hands of ethnic associations or government anthropologists—make 
clear the socio-political impacts of epistemic choices. And not unlike the project of 
academic anthropology, they are shot-through with various forms of material, 
political, and representational power. The question thereby becomes not how ‘we’ as 
academic anthropologists manage the tensions between conceptual schemas and the 
vagaries of socio-cultural life, but how ‘they’ do so. As the people of Darjeeling seek 
                                                 
13 Dombrowski 2004. 
14 Kirk Dombrowski has raised a similar point in his thoughtful critique of James Clifford’s work on 
Native heritage projects in Alaska. Noting how Clifford passes over the social dynamics through which 
theses ostensibly ‘collaborative’, ‘multivocal’ knowledges of the ethnic self are constituted, 
Dombrowski argues that to ethnographically engage with these social facets of knowledge production is 
“to take seriously the fact that the articulation of a particular cultural vision requires the indirect, often 
unwilling cooperation of some whose role may be simply to drop off of the ethnographic radar.” See 
Dombrowski in Clifford 2004: 23. 
15 The iconic works along these lines are, of course, Hymes’s edited volume Reinventing Anthropology 
(1972) and Clifford & Marcus’s edited volume Writing Culture (1986). 
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to remake themselves pursuant to normative ethnological forms, how they do (and do 
not) negotiate the agonisms between conceptual and empirical form has become a 
matter of profound consequence. 
 Instrumentalist theorists of ethnicity would rightly point out the political utility 
of these anthropologies of the ethnic self.16 As the aspiring ‘tribals’ of Darjeeling 
know well, (re)presenting the ethnic self in particular ways is essential if they are to 
secure the material and political advantages of positive discrimination. Demonstrating 
compliance with the ‘tribal’ ideal-type has become a gateway to liberal rights and 
recognition for these groups. But to think beyond the political instrumentality of the 
resulting anthropologies of the ethnic self: what remains to be sufficiently questioned 
is how exactly these auto-referential knowledge forms are reworking communal and 
individual socialities and subjectivities. The deployment of ethnological knowledge in 
Darjeeling is now about more than mobilizing and representing a population group for 
political purposes. It is also fundamentally about discovering, knowing, and re-making 
ethnic communities and the individual subjects who, in theory, comprise them. 
 As this dissertation intends to show, ethnological knowledge has come to 
shape far more than minorities’ prospects of positive discrimination. It has reworked 
how people interact with, and conceive of, one another. It is here at the level of the 
everyday—of sociality, subjectivity, and even embodiment—that I believe we find the 
deepest reaches of this knowledge form. No longer confined to the realms of 
description and ideal-types, particular paradigms of ethnological distinction have 
become prescriptive of what constitutes a viable ‘ethnic’ subject—whether a 
community or an individual. In many ways, ethnological knowledge has begun to 
recondition people’s very ways of being-in-the-world. 
                                                 
16 A. Cohen’s models of ethnicities as ‘interest groups’ are relevant here (1974). I engage the literatures 
on ethnicity in the following section. 
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 From an academic perspective, these dynamics may be fascinating, 
unsettling—even uncanny. The ways in which the people of Darjeeling have taken up 
and taken on particular paradigms of anthropological thought and practice prompt a 
critical rethinking of anthropology’s traditional relationship to its object. They, in turn, 
ask that we redraw the lines of what constitutes anthropological knowledge and where 
it may be found. Refiguring anthropological knowledge as an object of ethnographic 
attention here becomes not only analytically viable, but also timely. Whether carried 
out in Darjeeling or elsewhere, the study of ‘found’ anthropology provides an 
opportunity to think carefully, and ethnographically, about the different kinds of 
anthropological knowledge being mobilized in the world writ large, as well as their 
imminent possibilities and impossibilities. 
--- 
 Along these lines, the aforementioned Ethnographic Survey provides a 
working example of what I am calling ‘found’ anthropology. Certainly, the practices 
of the CRI research team were anthropological. After all, these were civil servants 
trained in anthropology and related social sciences carrying out established research 
protocols. Yet if we look to the other side of this ethnographic encounter, we find that 
the representational practices of the Lekh Hitkari Ethnic Association (LHEA) were 
also anthropological. These ‘tactics of the studied’, as it were, developed in specific 
response to the system of recognition at hand—itself an assemblage of ethnological 
categories, logics, and institutional practices born out of anthropology’s history on the 
subcontinent. The tactics of the LHEA were thus anthropological not so much in the 
transcendental sense of Man making knowledge about Man, but in the disciplinary 
sense. We need not look further than the array of scholarly books laid out before the 
Lekh intellectual as he frantically inked his final revisions before the Ethnographic 
Survey to appreciate the involution of academic knowledge in this subject matter. In 
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their presentations to the Indian government and to their own constituents, ethnic 
association members draw heavily upon academic literatures to (re)present and 
remake the recognizable, authentic ethnic subject. Academic anthropology carries 
exceptional authority on both sides of ‘tribal’ recognition. Aspiring STs and state 
anthropologists alike model themselves, their anthropological practices, and their 
arguments on these received knowledges, reaping great credence from the authority 
vested in these formalized, expert realms of anthropological knowledge. 
 In India, drawing a line between these formalized realms of knowledge and 
public, informal classificatory schemas proves exceptionally difficult. Through time, 
particular disciplinary paradigms have come to saturate governmental policy and 
popular imagination. Later in this dissertation, I explore the co-mingling of these 
formal and informal realms through a history of ‘tribal’ recognition on the 
subcontinent. Ethnographically though, as Dominic Boyer points out, “What is still 
largely missing in the contemporary research on social identities and alterities is 
focused ethnographic attention on the complex of institutions and practices that 
mediates the cross-fertilization of everyday categories of cultural difference and expert 
knowledge of cultural difference.”17 In light of Boyer’s point, the current dynamics of 
‘tribal’ recognition—and in particular that of the Ethnographic Survey—become 
exemplary objects of ethnographic attention. Turning the ethnographic lens upon 
ethnographic interface itself, we can begin to appreciate how bodies like the LHEA 
mediate between governmental classificatory schemas and those of everyday life in 
Darjeeling. Although such mediation can be instrumental in bringing rights and 
recognition for aspiring minorities, this confrontation of formal versus everyday 
knowledges has engendered profound political, social, and subjective tensions among 
the people of Darjeeling. These tensions beg ethnographic attention in their own right 
                                                 
17 Boyer 2001: 460-1. 
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 The Lekh’s bid for ST status is but an apercu of the salience of ethnological 
knowledge in Darjeeling today. The chapters that follow promise a deeper analysis of 
the ways in which this form of knowledge continues to shape life in Darjeeling. 
--- 
 For academics, these findings are certain to challenge conventional 
understandings of ‘anthropology’. Stalwarts of the discipline may rightly contest the 
recognition of these knowledge practices as ‘anthropological’: surely, there is more to 
what ‘we’ do and who ‘we’ are as professional anthropologists than is to be found in 
Darjeeling. I concur. Academic anthropology’s spectrum dwarfs the ethnological 
fixation of Darjeeling. And even within the academic sub-field of current ethnology, 
the means of knowledge production differ in profound ways with those I ‘found’ in 
Darjeeling. However, such arguments will be hard-pressed to make a convincing case 
without detailed analysis of the epistemic similarities and differences of their 
anthropologies versus those of non-academic subjects. Here we ought to consider also 
the divergent social and political contexts of our respective knowledge productions. 
The exigencies of recognition have proven largely generative of the particular 
epistemic commitments with which the people of Darjeeling have made themselves 
the subjects and objects of the anthropological gaze. By design then, this research—
and the project of ‘finding’ anthropology more generally—is about coming to terms 
with the diverse social, political, and epistemic grounds of anthropological knowledge 
in the world today. 
 As I can attest from my own research experiences, one of the more eerie 
questions facing ethnographers of ‘found’ anthropology is the degree to which 
semblances of the disciplinary self are to be found lurking in the other. These affinities 
can provide a convenient point of ethnographic entrée, as subject communities may be 
eager to have a professional anthropologist in their midst. However, in places like 
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postcolonial India these affinities can be exceptionally problematic. As the history of 
‘tribal’ recognition illustrates, the similarities between academic and ‘found’ 
anthropology are not, after all, coincidental, but rather the offspring of historical 
homology. Given the rich, yet problematic history of the discipline on the 
subcontinent, India has therefore proven an acute context in which to study ‘found’ 
anthropology. As I discovered early in my work, elements of the discipline were 
present in the ‘field’ long before I arrived to conduct this research. Enquiries 
elsewhere may expect to find different anthropological pasts alive in the present. 
 Ethnographically engaging with these ‘species of the familiar’ in no way 
entails the ceding of a critical edge.18 To the contrary, questioning ‘found’ 
anthropologies through systematic research may actually sharpen our ability to 
distinguish between the various kinds of anthropological knowledge being produced in 
the world—including our own. In this regard, the project offers what Ricoeur has 
famously called a “comprehension of the self via the detour of the comprehension of 
the other.”19 Perhaps through this reckoning, grounds will be found for a discrete and 
decidedly academic identification. Either way the exercise should be worthwhile. In 
the meantime, the people of Darjeeling have their own ideas about what anthropology 
is and what it can do for them. 
--- 
 “Towns, you must come to the Ethnographic Survey,” a high-level bureaucrat, 
and himself an ethnic association leader, told me exuberantly just days before the 
government anthropologists were to arrive, “All of the ethnic groups will be there 
demonstrating their cultural traits. You just come. I will get you in. You are an 
anthropologist. You must come! It will all be there for you served up on a platter!” 
[holding up both hands as though offering a platter to me]. 
                                                 
18 As Freud notes, the uncanny is “in some ways a species of the familiar.” 2003 (1919): 134. 
19 Ricoeur 1969: 20. Translation available in Rabinow 1977: 5. 
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 To a certain extent ‘it’ was. What unfolded during the Ethnographic Survey 
was an ethnological extravaganza. The array of authentic ‘tribal’ traits, unique 
‘culture’, the tell-tale signs of ‘animism’, ‘primitiveness’, and ‘backwardness’ served 
up by the aspiring ethnic groups were the type of data that would—and indeed did—
flood ethnographic notebooks. By design, it was an ethnologist’s dream. And yet, so 
much of that consummately ethnological stuff that made its way into the notebooks of 
the government anthropologists, into the memorandums of supplicant ethnic groups, 
and into the displays of their constituents is presented somehow differently in the 
pages of this dissertation. For many of the people with whom I worked—some of 
whom call themselves ‘anthropologists’, but most of whom do not—I wonder if this 
dissertation shall even be recognizable as anthropology. Where is the ‘culture’, the 
‘custom’, the ‘animism’ and all the rest that they showed me? Where is the 
anthropology that their sources showed them? I fear that the differences between my 
anthropology and theirs may seem unbridgeable in their eyes. 
 I do not see it that way. I am as interested in our similarities, our historical 
homologies, and our shared concerns as I am in our epistemic differences. These were 
the commitments that guided me through my study of the anthropologies of others. At 
once haunted and fascinated by the eerie familiarity of my own subject matter, this 
research became for me an extended encounter with the uncanny. What follows marks 
the beginning of a open-ended coming to terms with various forms of anthropological 
knowledge that are to be found ‘out there’ in the world. And so for the myriad 
anthropologists and anthropologies I encountered in Darjeeling, Kolkata and beyond, 
it is my hope that this work may help shake up the notion of what anthropology is and 
can be. Should this be the case, then their encounter with my anthropology shall 
adequately mirror my encounter with theirs. 
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Problems of the Literature. 
 The attentions of this research were developed in concert with the dynamics of 
Darjeeling, where ethnological knowledge has become integral to the pursuits of 
rights, recognition, and a secure sense of belonging within India. That said, this study 
of knowledge and belonging has also taken shape in dialogue with particular research 
concerns within the social sciences. Insofar as my research attentions emerge from—
and speak to—particular bodies of literature, it is worth briefly sketching the academic 
roots of this study’s concerns. 
 It has becoming something of a rite of passage for students of ethnic identity to 
familiarize themselves with the Primordialist, Situationalist/Instrumentalist, and 
Constructivist theories of ethnicity. These respective schools of thought have each 
argued for the primacy of various facets of ethnic identity: the Primordialists have 
emphasized the traditional and affective solidarities of ethnic communities; the 
Situationalists/Instrumentalists have pointed to the strategic, circumstantial nature of 
ethnic ascription; while the Constructivists have stressed the social and conceptual 
processes of ethno-genesis.20 The debates are well chronicled and exhausting—some 
                                                 
20 The body of literature on ethnicity is too expansive to allow a comprehensive survey here. The 
following denotes exemplary studies from the various schools of thought. On the primordialist view of 
ethnicity, see Shils 1957; Geertz 1973; and Isaacs 1975. On situational and instrumental ethnicity, see 
Barth et al 1969; A. Cohen 1974; R. Cohen 1978; Fox, Cimino, & Aull 1981; Glazer & Moynihan 
1975; Horowitz 1975; Keyes 1981; Nagel 1994; Nash 1989; Okamura 1981. On the constructed nature 
of ethnicity, see Anderson’s work on imagined communities (1983) and seriality (1998), Hobbsbawm 
and Ranger’s edited volume on ‘invented tradition’ (1983), and Fardon (1987) and Roosen’s (1989) 
work on ‘ethnogenesis’.  
 I should reiterate that none of these works rests perfectly within its respective classification. 
For instance, while Geertz’s argument of the ‘integrative revolution’ points to the primordial ties of 
traditional communities (linguistic, racial, religious, cultural, etc), it is nevertheless the emergence of 
the nation-form (particularly with decolonization) that reworks the terrain of ethnic identity and its 
politics to produce the proliferation of ethnicity in the 20th century. (Geertz argues that it is the 
integration of these primordial forms into the arena of the nation-state that spawns the rampant 
proliferation of ethnicity and ethnic politics.) Thus while Geertz posits a primordialist essence to 
ethnicity, its modern emergence is nevertheless circumstantial—thereby blurring the distinction 
between Primordialist and Situationalist camps. Likewise, Weber’s thoughts on ethnicity cannot be 
placed within any one of these distinctions. Weber emphasizes the situational conditions of ethnic 
identification, but notes that it is often primordial-like attachments to linguistic, racial, and cultural 
markers that serve as fodder for classificatory distinction. Whether or not these forms are contrived 
 21 
might even say exhaustive. (As a professor of anthropology once responded to me 
when I told him of my research interest: “Hmmm…and what new could you possibly 
say about ethnicity?”) The exclusionary rubric through which the debate has come to 
be known is neither extremely helpful in navigating the literature on, nor the 
phenomena of, ethnicity. One simply cannot find a case of ethnicity, or a theory of 
such, which doesn’t entail crucial overlaps among these rhetorical divisions. To tarry 
on these divisions would be to miss the contributions these literatures have left us. 
                                                                                                                                            
and/or constructed is of less concern for Weber; in either case they may prove generative of the 
subjective cohesions of political communities (1998). 
 It should also be noted that the Primordialist, Situationalist, and Constructivist schools of 
thought are by no means internally uniform. Important debates have emerged from within each camp—
some of which bear directly upon my research in India. Take, for example, Barth’s seminal study of 
ethnic boundaries (1969). Barth and his colleagues focused on the social processes through which 
ethnic boundaries are maintained. In this regard, it is a classic Situationalist study. However, the 
Barthian approach has been significantly critique from within the Situationalist/Instrumentalist ranks. 
A. Cohen (1974) rightly contested the taken-for-granted status that ethnic distinction enjoys in Barth’s 
analysis. The boundaries are always-already there to be maintained, irrespective of the given situation 
within which they are evoked. Not only are they taken-for-granted, they are seemingly a-historical. 
Cohen argues furthermore that Barth and his colleagues subsequently fixate on the empty ‘vessel’ of 
ethnic identity at the expense of the cultural and affective content of its form. A. Cohen and others 
(Eriksen 1992; R. Cohen 1978) would go on to note that while Barth’s analysis may have been 
situational in an inter-ethnic sense, it neglected the influence of other factors (ideological, historical, 
etc) that impinge upon the dynamics of ethnic ascription.  
 Gradually, anthropology developed greater interest in broader contextual considerations of 
ethnic identification—an intellectual shift noted by R. Cohen (1978). The nation-state’s role in effecting 
ethnic identity drew increased attention (Balibar 1991; Brass 1985; Fox, Cimino, & Aull 1981, Glazer 
& Moynihan 1975; Herzfeld 1997; Munasinghe 2001, 2002; Rothschild 1981), as did the mediating role 
of ethnic elites in shaping the contours of ethnic politics (Brass 1976, 1985; Colson 1968; Fardon 1987; 
Fox, Cimino, & Aull 1981; Gutierrez 1999; Lomnitz 2001; Washbrook 1982). Pushing the study of 
ethnic identity toward a critical consideration of the politics of classificatory moment, Brackette 
Williams’s work on the ideological conditions of identification and recognition refigured the relations 
of nation, culture, and ethnicity (1989, 1991). Questions over how the nation manages purity/impurity, 
histories of domination, and criteria of human difference began to be explored by scholars such a Liisa 
Malkki (1995), Viranjini Munasinghe (2001, 2002) and others. With the debates having shifted from the 
earlier models of primordial cohesion, boundary maintenance, and ‘interest groups’, the discussions of 
ethnicity took a somewhat darker tone. Gilroy’s work on ‘ethnic absolutism’ is indicative (1990) of the 
growing skepticism. See also Appadurai 1999. Concerns over multiculturalism and hybridity (Bolland 
1992; Brah & Coombes 2000; Gunew 2004; Munasinghe 2001, 2002; Puri 2004; Williams 1989; Zizek 
1997) and the politics of recognition (Taylor 1992; Povinelli 2002) began to expose the paradoxical 
circumstances of various liberal orders. Particularly the emerging concern with recognition shed crucial 
light on the conditions imposed upon populations seeking rights and recognition as a recognizable 
community—ethnic or otherwise. No longer merely a question of how, why, and when ethnic groups 
choose to identify themselves, the study of ethnicity now came to question how the very possibilities of 
identification were always-already conditioned by greater systems of material, political, and symbolic 
power. Throughout this dissertation, I engage more fully with specific facets of these literatures when 
and where relevant. Citations provided here are exemplary only. 
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 While I will steadfastly disagree with those who claim there is ‘nothing new to 
say about ethnicity’, the overly inscribed lines of the Primordialist-Situationalist-
Constructivist debate have, I also believe, hampered the emergence of a more dynamic 
set of questions. Here I will concur with Arjun Appadurai’s claim that, “It will no 
longer serve to look at ethnicity as just another principle of group identity, as just 
another cultural device for the pursuit of group interests, or as some dialectical 
combination of the two. We need an account of ethnicity that explores its 
modernity.”21 Taking up the linked questions of ‘found’ anthropology and belonging, 
this study aims to provide one such account. 
 However, in examining some of the most cutting-edge practices through which 
populations are refashioning themselves into recognizable ‘ethnic’ subjects, this study 
does not sever its ties to earlier debates. To the contrary, it emerges largely from a 
particular dissatisfaction with their analytic occlusions. One of the problematic after-
effects of the storied debates between the Primordialists, Situationalists, and 
Constructivists is that they have left us lacking in approaches capable of exploring the 
constitutive links between the affective, contextual, and conceptual conditions of 
ethnic identity formation. 
 Seeking out these constitutive links, the questions I raise in Darjeeling are 
threefold. First, how have anxieties over belonging in India, coupled with exigencies 
of ‘tribal’ recognition, precipitated the recent turn to anthropology as a means of 
reconstituting the ethnic self? Second, how have normative paradigms of 
anthropological distinction, along with affective longings for rights, recognition, and 
belonging, conditioned these minorities’ entry into Indian political society? Third—
and perhaps most profoundly—to what extent can governmental recognition and the 
epistemic practices of anthropology generate new senses of belonging within the 
                                                 
21 Appadurai 1996: 139. 
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nation-state, within one’s community, and even within one’s individual self? Through 
these questions I pursue a more dynamic, more dialectical, understanding of the 
‘modernity’ of ethnicity in the Darjeeling hills.22 
--- 
 In his celebrated work Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson opined, 
“Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style 
in which they are imagined.”23 At that point in his career, Anderson was mainly 
interested in the ‘style’ of the nation. Imagined Communities subsequently 
concentrated on the histories through which it became possible to “think the nation”. 
Later, Anderson turned his attention to the rise of what he would call ‘unbound and 
                                                 
22 Questions of ethnicity and ‘identity’ have been central to the existing literature on Darjeeling. Most 
of this has focused on the historical constitution of the ‘Gorkha’ community in Darjeeling leading up to 
and through the Gorkhaland Movement of the 1980s. The study of Nepali-Indians (in Darjeeling and 
beyond) has largely been pioneered by Tanka Subba and A.C. Sinha, whose work has been instrumental 
in establishing the groundwork of the history and politics of these groups throughout the 19th and 
particularly the 20th centuries (Subba 1985, 1989, 1991, 1992, 2003, 2009; Sinha 1981, 1983, 1993, 
2009). Roderick Chalmers has provided excellent work on ethno-linguistic identity formation and the 
constitution of the public sphere in Darjeeling in the early to mid 20th century—although most of his 
research to date is unpublished (Chalmers 2002, 2003, 2009). Michael Hutt’s seminal article, “Being 
Nepali Without Nepal: Reflections on a South Asian Diaspora” (1997) paved the way for understanding 
the populations as part of a Nepali diaspora—a term that by his own admission is somewhat 
problematic given the histories at hand. Studies of the Gorkhaland Movement include: Lama 1996, 
1999; Magar 1994; Samanta 2000; Sarkar 2000; Timsina 1992. Of late, other scholars have become 
interested in the identity question in Darjeeling, but most of these studies, again, have focused on the 
issues surrounding Gorkhaland (see for instance, Nepal, Nepal, Sinha, & Subba et al 2009). Ample 
attention has not yet been directed at the post-Agitation identity politics of Darjeeling. A notable 
exception would be Sara Shneiderman’s cross-border work with the Thangmi of Nepal and Darjeeling 
(available primarily in her recent dissertation, “Rituals of Ethnicity: Migration, Mixture, and the 
Making of Thangmi Identity Across Himalayan Borders,” 2008) , as well as a brief overview article on 
ST recognition in Darjeeling and Sikkim published by Shneiderman and Turin in 2006, (see also 
Middleton & Shneiderman 2008) . My research owes a considerable debt to all of the scholars who 
have helped develop the study of Darjeeling. The research presented here pushes the scope of 
Darjeeling Studies to engage with some of the most recent, and I believe fascinating, efforts to establish 
a secure sense of ‘identity’ and belonging in India. 
 For the most part, my study’s attention does not cross the border into Nepal. While I maintain 
that the dynamics I consider must be understood primarily within the context of postcolonial India, 
there are certainly links and compelling comparisons to be made with recent politics of identity in 
Nepal. Arjun Guneratne’s (2002) work with the Tharu of southern Nepal affords a comparative look at 
how other groups whose heritage spans the Nepal-India border are laboring for rights and recognition in 
Nepal and India. Studies such as Fisher 2001; Gellner et al 2003, 2007; Hangen 2007; Tamang 2008 
provide further reference on projects of ethnic revival and contemporary ethnic politics in Nepal.  
23 Anderson 1983: 6. 
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bound serialities’, within which fell the problem of ethnicity.24 Ethnicity, he argued, 
was a classic case of ‘bound seriality’. Ethnicities came to be imagined as 
recognizable, clearly delineated, indivisible, totalities. Ethnicity, in other words, 
became a ‘style’ in which communities came to be imagined. Importantly, Anderson 
rooted this ‘style’ to systems of modern governance and the material histories of 
capital. As he writes: 
“We are all only too aware of how incessantly people speak, not merely of 
‘seeking’ ‘roots,’ but of ‘exploring,’ ‘finding,’ and alas, ‘coming close to 
losing’ their ‘identities.’ But these searches, which rhetorically move inward 
towards the site that once housed the soul, in fact proceed outward towards real 
and imagined censuses, where, thanks to capitalism, state machineries, and 
mathematics, integral bodies become identical, and thus serially aggregable as 
phantom communities.”25 
Critiques of colonial knowledge and governmentality have tended to uphold this 
general line of thought.26 In fact, a great deal of postcolonial theory has revolved 
around the question of epistemic dominance—with arguments explicating both the 
power and limits of colonial knowledge forms in shaping colonial and now 
postcolonial life.27 
 In the context of South Asian studies, Anderson’s emphasis on modular styles 
of ‘community’ has proven especially contentious. In a seminal response to Imagined 
Communities, Partha Chatterjee famously argued, “If nationalisms in the rest of the 
world have to choose their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms already 
made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to 
                                                 
24 See The Spectre of Comparisons (1998), particularly Chapter I. 
25 Ibid: 44. 
26 In India, see for instance: Cohn 1996; Dirks 2001; Kaviraj 1992. Generally speaking, much of this 
postcolonial critique has developed through the optics of Foucault’s conceptualization of knowledge-
power and governmentality. Foucault 1979; 1980. See also Scott 1995.  
27 Seminal works include: Fanon 1967; Said 1985; Chatterjee 1986; Mitchell 1988; Guha 1989; 
Chakrabarty 2000. 
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imagine?... Even our imaginations must remain further colonized.”28 In response to 
Anderson, Chatterjee charted what he called the outer domain of nationalism—that of 
the economy, statecraft, etc—versus the spiritual ‘inner’ domain, where the 
“‘essential’ marks of cultural identity” reside. The inner domain, Chatterjee argues, is 
where, “Nationalism launches its most powerful, creative, and historically significant 
project: to fashion a ‘modern’ national culture that is nevertheless not Western. If the 
nation is an imagined community, then this is where it is brought into being.”29 With a 
masterful stroke of analytic ambivalence, Chatterjee argues that while nationalism in 
India may inevitably be a “derivative discourse”, national identity nevertheless finds 
its own form.30 
 In subsequent works, Chatterjee would go on to elaborate his argument for the 
(relative) autonomy of community and ‘identity’. This included a similar response to 
the publication of Anderson’s second major work, The Spectre of Comparison.31 As 
Anderson’s modularity argument morphed from ‘styles’ of national community into 
questions of ‘bound and unbound serialities’, his emphasis on the emergence of 
normative, conceptual forms of community remained, however, largely the same. 
Once again, Chatterjee took issue with Anderson’s formulations of these ostensibly 
global epistemologies of identity, as well as his claims of an attendant spread of 
“profoundly standardized conceptions of politics.”32 Chatterjee argued that these 
modular forms of community and politics exist only in the abstract realm of “empty 
homogenous time”. But, as he notes, “People can only imagine themselves in empty 
homogenous time. They do not live in it… The real space of modern life consists of 
heterotopia…Politics here does not mean the same thing to all people. To ignore this 
                                                 
28 Chatterjee 1993: 5. 
29 Ibid, 6. 
30 On nationalism as a derivative discourse, see Chatterjee 1986. 
31 Chatterjee 2004 on Anderson 1998. 
32 Chatterjee 2004: 6. 
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is, I believe, to discard the real for the utopian.”33 Chatterjee’s argument carries with it 
an appreciable ethnographic imperative. Leveraging ethnography against the 
universalist claims of Anderson, Chatterjee beckons us into the fray of modern life, 
where we are to recognize populations producing their own kinds of community, their 
own forms of identity, and their own kinds of politics—even if ‘derivative’ of 
normative discourses and real forms of governmentality.34 
 The debate between Anderson and Chatterjee has left an indelible mark on the 
study of identity in South Asia. The arguments have in many ways polarized academic 
discussions over how Western knowledge-power, governmentality, modernization, 
and the circulation of global capital has and has not shaped notions of community and 
identity in places like India. Generally speaking, the debate has been fruitful, if 
unnecessarily polarizing. In a moment I will explain why I think it is necessary to find 
space for both of these arguments. But before charting a possible way out of this 
stalemate, let me note two more specific concerns. First, while Chatterjee is right in 
questioning Anderson’s assertions of global epistemologies of identity, ethnographic 
engagement with ‘real’ subjects does not in and of itself relegate modular forms of 
community to the realm of ‘empty homogenous time’ from whence Chatterjee would 
have us believe they came. To the contrary, ethnography may actually affirm the ontic, 
social existence of these abstract, ‘modular’ forms among ‘real’ subjects. Plunging 
into the lifeworlds of Darjeeling, we find ‘modular’ identity forms to be present and 
impressed with palpable socio-political sanction. The prescriptions of ‘tribal’ identity 
are a case in point. 
 This brings me to my second point. By artificially dividing the world into the 
‘utopian’ realm of ‘empty homogenous time’ versus the realm of the ‘real’, we are 
                                                 
33 Ibid: 6-7. 
34 Much of Chatterjee’s recent writing has worked to rethink the notion of ‘political society’. His model 
of ‘political society’ is of special importance to this study. I discuss it in detail in Chapter I. See 
Chatterjee 2001, 2004, 2004a. 
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unable to see how the evocation of universality itself becomes a mechanism of class, 
political, and intellectual inequalities. In Darjeeling, the champions of ‘tribal’ identity 
and ‘ethnic’ rebirth reap considerable credence from the ostensible universality of 
these anthropological paradigms. Typically well educated, wealthy, and politically 
adept, these ethnic leaders are able to operationalize ethnological discourses and 
practices that may strike the common man as quite literally foreign. This is to say 
nothing of the power that inheres in the government’s reckoning and administration of 
human difference. Though espoused under the pretenses of universality, these 
respective programs to ‘uplift’ and transform the ethnic subject are actualized through 
obvious relations of local, regional, and national power. In such circumstances, 
universality itself may function as a potent alibi for the reproduction of historically 
entrenched systems of power. In this way, ‘modular’ forms of community are pressed 
upon ‘real’ subjects—individuals who sometimes do, but more often do not, have the 
capacity or will to stand up to these normative prescriptions. Contra the optimistic 
suggestions of Chatterjee, ethnography here brings us face to face with a darker side of 
‘identity’ and its politics in the modern world.35 
 These specific concerns point to a greater challenge: namely, how to account 
for the imposition of modular forms of community, while simultaneously attending to 
the inherent potentiality, contingency and creativity of modern identity formation. 
There is, I believe, considerable ethnographic space for doing so. Darjeeling provides 
a working example. On the one hand, the carrot and stick dynamics of positive 
discrimination have transformed life in the hills in undeniable ways. At the same time, 
people’s empirical, embodied, and emergent ways of life continue to challenge and 
                                                 
35 Chatterjee would himself likely recognize these dynamics as the ‘darker’, less known side of political 
society (2004: 75-6). As will become clearer in Chapter I, many of these issues may be fruitfully 
pursued through Chatterjee’s model of political society. My ethnographic engagement in Darjeeling, 
however, has proven to be a more sobering methodology than as presented by Chatterjee in The Politics 
of the Governed. That said, I second his call for ethnographic engagement with emergent identity forms 
and their politics. 
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perturb the anthropological prescriptions of community and ‘identity’ in significant 
ways. To stress either one of these contending forces would be to miss their fraught 
interplay in the lives of the people of Darjeeling. Rather than argue either for or 
against the imminence of modularity, a more promising way forward is to focus on the 
tensions that arise when modular, ostensibly ‘universal’ forms of community are 
brought to bear on the lived realities of contemporary subjects. The tensions that arise 
concern not only the disjunctions between conceptual and empirical forms. When 
pressed upon the social world, modular forms also meet pre-existing schemas of socio-
cultural life that contest these normative prescriptions with varying capacities. Such 
tensions lie at the core of ‘tribal’ recognition and ethnic renaissance in the hills. How 
they are negotiated has proven largely determinative of the political, social, and 
subjective consequences of these movements. Developing an awareness of these 
tensions and their social effects has therefore been central to the design of this study. 
 Through the optics of knowledge and belonging, this research re-engages the 
‘identity’ question in fresh light. While this study is situated at the intersection of the 
anthropology of knowledge and the anthropology of identity, here ‘identity’ comes 
into view not as the mystified, felicitous unity of modern communities, but instead as 
a figment of inherently fraught and uneven processes of subject formation. In this 
regard, Derrida’s intervention into the debates over ‘identity’ is particularly 
instructive. By pointing out that, “No, an identity is never given, received or attained; 
only the interminable and indefinitely phantasmatic process of identification endures,” 
Derrida steers our attention away from the problematic notion of ‘identity’ and toward 
the knowledge practices of identification.36 For the purposes of this study, this shift 
                                                 
36 Derrida 1998: 28. 
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couldn’t be more important: it refigures the very issue of ‘identity’ as an apt problem 
for the anthropology of knowledge.37 
 Pursued accordingly, this study focuses not merely on the styles in which 
communities are imagined, but also on the practices through which modern 
communities are fashioned. As I shall show, anthropological knowledge has become 
integral to these fashionings. In its ‘found’ forms, though, anthropological knowledge 
seldom moves only in the spirit of thick description; in places like Darjeeling, it has 
become prescriptive of what it means to be a viable ethnic subject. Grappling with the 
fascinating (if unsettling) questions of ‘found’ anthropology is therefore necessary if 
we are to arrive at a new understanding of not only the problem of ‘identity’ in the 
hills, but also its pending solutions. 
Histories of Hybridity and their Undoing. 
 Ethnic renaissance and the quests for ‘tribal’ status have emerged out of—but 
also in many ways turned against—the history of ‘identity’ and its politics in 
Darjeeling. When Darjeeling passed into British hands in 183538, the region was 
reported to be sparsely inhabited by two ethnic groups—the Bhutia and the Lepcha.39 
If the British were to realize their designs of transforming the rugged topography into 
a hill-station sanatorium (and some years later, into a tea producing region), they 
would require far more labor than these groups could provide. The British found an 
ideal labor pool in neighboring Nepal, where thousands of ‘sturdy hillmen’ proved 
ready and willing to leave the feudal conditions of 19th century Nepal in order to sell 
                                                 
37 I explain my approach to the anthropology of knowledge later in the introduction. 
38 The Raja of Sikkim deeded Darjeeling to the East India Company in 1835. Prior to that, the territory 
had briefly come under control of an expanding Nepal at the turn of the 19th century, only to be returned 
to Sikkim (through the British) via the Treaty of Segauli (1815/6) and the Treaty of Titalia (1817). On 
the unification of Nepal and its effects on eastern Nepal and into Darjeeling, see Pradhan 1991; 
Whelpton 2005: 57. 
39 The Lepcha are commonly held to be the region’s truest indigenes. The Bhutia are a mongoloid group 
that appears to have migrated out of Tibet in the 17th century. 
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their labor in the emerging markets of Darjeeling.40 Particularly with the advent of 
Darjeeling’s tea industry in the 1850s, droves of migrants from Nepal flooded across 
the border to work and eventually settle in Darjeeling. Through time, these groups 
established themselves as the region’s majority, thereby putting a Nepali signature on 
this cultural landscape.41 
 Yet despite tacit encouragement by the British, the legality of the Nepalis’ 
migration was dubious at best, as was their status as British subjects. They were 
subsequently given work, land, and shelter, but never were afforded the kind of 
security and rights they longed for. From the start, their dwelling in India was liminal. 
Linguistic, cultural, and racial distinctions only further set them apart from the Indian 
others they encountered in Darjeeling and the plains below. Marginalized on 
territorial, nationalist, and ethno-racial registers, the people of Darjeeling have 
historically been painted into a figurative and quite literal corner of the nation. (See 
Figure 1.) Uncertainties over of ‘identity’ and national belonging have developed 
accordingly.42 
                                                 
40 On the factors driving the 19th century migration from Nepal to Darjeeling, see Hutt 1997: 109-113; 
Pradhan 1991; Samanta 2000: 20-22; Sinha & Subba et al 2003: 14-17. Also relevant here is Holmberg 
& March’s (1999) work on forced labor regimes in Nepal. I examine these dynamics of migration in 
greater detail in Chapter II. 
41 We know little about the demographics of Darjeeling prior to 1835. Because the region was briefly a 
part of Nepal toward the end of the 18th century and into the early years of the 19th, and also due to the 
fluid nature of Himalayan trade, there was in all likelihood a smattering of representatives of other 
ethnic groups living amongst the Lepchas and Bhutias. The pre-British history of Darjeeling has 
become a major concern of ongoing historical revisionist projects in Darjeeling, as was apparent in the 
aforementioned memorandum’s claims that all Gorkhas are ‘sons of the soil’. To date, these revisionist 
claims to autochthony lack compelling evidence. And moreover, they contradict the family histories of 
migration shared by the public more generally. Though the pre-British period remains hazy, census 
figures tell us that by the 1870s there were well over a hundred tea gardens in the area, and the Nepali 
population had grown to almost 40,000. By the turn of the century, the number of Nepalis in the 
Darjeeling district had swelled to 152,000. Consolidated census data available in Samanta 2000.  
42 Left map: Copyright Compare Infobase Pvt. Ltd. 2005;  
Right Map: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Darjeeling_District_Map.gif 
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Figure 1. Map of South Asia and Darjeeling, West Bengal. 
 Importantly, when groups such as the Tamangs, Gurungs, Khas, Limbus and 
others began migrating to Darjeeling, they did so with relatively discrete socio-cultural 
and linguistic traits. They were, as modern academics would have it, distinct culture 
bearing ‘ethnic groups’. Yet once settled in Darjeeling, these populations began to mix 
and amalgamate in unprecedented ways. Gradually, these groups began to ‘lose’—as 
they now say—much of the linguistic and socio-cultural distinctiveness of their 
ancestors and ethnic contemporaries in Nepal. The inter-ethnic conditions of colonial 
life, however, proved fertile ground for hybrid social forms. Nepali quickly became 
the lingua franca among these communities, and slowly a conglomerate ‘identity’ 
began to take form. First articulated as that of the ‘hillmen’ and later organized under 
the banner of the ‘Gorkha’, this newfound identification reflected at once the organic 
processes of hybridity developing on the ground, and these groups of Nepali heritage’s 
need for a unified, political voice in India. 
 By 1917, the Hillmen’s Union (representing the Nepali, Bhutia, and Lepcha 
communities of Darjeeling) were justifying their quests for self-governance on the 
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grounds of the shared geographic, racial, historical, religious, and linguistic traits of 
the hill peoples. “No real affinity exists between the peoples of this Himalayan and 
sub-Himalayan region and those of the plains of Bengal,” they argued to the British 
Indian government, “The evolution of our political life should be towards a distinct 
local government of our own.”43 Subsequent organizations like the Hill People’s 
Social Union (est. 1934), and the All India Gorkha League (est. in Darjeeling in 1940) 
would take up the cause in later years, sustaining the arguments of the socio-cultural 
distinctiveness of the Nepali-Indian44 community of the hills and their political 
readiness for self-governance. 
 In the postcolonial era, the championing of a hybrid identity gained steam, as 
inter-ethnic solidarity deepened and political frustrations mounted. In the 1970s, the 
Akhil Bharatiya Nepali Bhasa Samiti (All Indian Nepali Language Association) began 
a protracted movement to have Nepali recognized in the Eighth Schedule of the Indian 
Constitution as a national language of India. The movement would eventually succeed 
in 1992, but only after a telling rebuke in 1976 by then-Prime Minister Morarji Desai, 
who publicly rejected the bid, noting callously, “Nepali is a foreign language spoken 
by foreigners in India.”45 Though Indian citizens by law, Desai’s comments, once 
again, exacerbated the people of Darjeeling’s anxieties over belonging in India. 
                                                 
43 The prevailing historical narrative of ‘identity’ in Darjeeling generally posits the formation of the 
Hillmen’s Union as the first step on the road to the Gorkhaland Movement. These popular 
historiographies have tended to flatten the history of identification, at once failing to recognize the 
contradictory claims that pepper the archive, while cobbling the various appeals to self-governance into 
a teleological narrative. My archival findings suggest a more contentious and contradictory history of 
identity politics in Darjeeling. The narrative provided in this Introduction is intended as but a brief 
examination of the historical backdrop to the contemporary dynamics addressed throughout this thesis. 
Sources pertaining to this history are listed in an earlier footnote. 
44 ‘Nepali-Indian’ does not connote a transnational identity. The ‘Nepali’ in this hyphenated 
construction instead distinguishes these communities more along the lines of culture, language, and 
heritage. The term is used in Darjeeling, as is ‘Indian Nepali’; however, people prefer the term 
‘Gorkha’. All of these, of course, entail problematic slippages, which I take up in Chapter II. 
45 On the language movement in Darjeeling, see forthcoming dissertation by Chelsea Booth, Rutgers 
University.  
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 The trajectory of the hybrid Nepali-Indian identity—or what was increasingly 
coming to organize under the banner of the ‘Gorkha’—came to a head in the 1980s, 
when the Gorkha National Liberation Front (GNLF) launched a guerilla-style 
insurgency to achieve a separate state of Gorkhaland within India. Spearheading the 
‘Agitation’ was the eccentric and charismatic young leader, Subash Ghisingh. Playing 
upon the people’s longstanding doubts over their own ‘identity’ and belonging in 
India, Ghisingh and his GNLF cadres promised “nothing short of a separate state” in 
their quest for a homeland for the people of Darjeeling. “Consider our situation,” 
Ghisingh pleaded to the nation in a 1986 edition of Frontline: 
“Morarji Desai [when he was Prime Minister of India (1977-9)] described us 
as foreigners and said were welcome to go back to Nepal. According to Nepal, 
we are Prabashis (domiciles). Such irresponsible talk is possible because we 
do not have a home. Hence our demand for Gorkhaland in an area which has 
historically been our land, which we brought into India….We Indian Nepalis 
who have nothing to do with Nepal are constantly confused with ‘Nepalis’, that 
is, citizens of Nepal, a foreign country. But if there is Gorkhaland, then our 
identity as Indians belonging to an Indian state will be clear.”46 
Ultimately, Gorkhaland was never achieved. After three years of violence, a 
conciliatory reward was granted in the form of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council 
(DGHC), a supposedly semi-autonomous local administration that was to remain 
within the state of West Bengal. Ghisingh assumed the helm of the DGHC, but the 
luster of the makeshift Gorkha administration was short-lived. The anxieties over 
belonging remained, as did the people’s desires for rights, recognition, and a secure 
sense of ‘identity’ in India. 
 In the wake of the traumatic failings of the Gorkhaland Movement, individual 
ethnic groups like the Tamangs, Limbus, Gurungs, and others began seeking 
alternative routes to rights and recognition in the nation-state. These they found in the 
                                                 
46 India Today. 66 October 31, 1986. 
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Government of India’s affirmative action system for Schedule Tribes. Throughout the 
1990s, bids for Scheduled Tribe status catalyzed a sweeping ethnic renaissance among 
these groups that has continued into the 2000s, significantly re-figuring the socio-
political possibilities of ‘ethnicity’ along the way. Significantly, this shift away from 
the composite ‘Gorkha’ identification and to notions of discrete ‘ethnic’ or ‘tribal’ 
communities has entailed more than political opportunism. While the movements for 
ethnic revitalization and Scheduled Tribe status are overtly shaped by the exigencies 
of positive discrimination, to reduce these movements to political instrumentality 
would be to miss their experiential impacts. The ethnic associations, political leaders, 
and various other champions of ethnic rebirth spearheading these movements have 
demanded people transform their cultural practices, and even their patterns of 
sociality. These intended transformations of socio-cultural life are part and parcel to 
these movements’ political aims. For individuals, the shift in the preferred ‘style of 
identity’—as it were—has subsequently come to involve a whole suite of political, 
cultural, and unavoidably social considerations. 
 Crucially, this turn toward individual ethnic revitalization and ST status has 
cast these re-emergent groups at odds with the prevailing history of ‘identity’ and its 
politics in Darjeeling. Whereas identity politics throughout the 20th century was 
dominated by the hybrid, composite identity of the ‘Gorkha’, ethnic renaissance—and 
ST recognition in particular—has called for hybridity’s undoing. To realize these 
goals, aspiring groups like the Gurungs, Lekh, and others would necessarily have to 
extract their ‘lost’, discrete identities from what was in effect an already-melted 
melting pot. By its very nature, that endeavor would tear at the seams of the Gorkha 
community writ large, and the histories of hybridity from which it spawned. 
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The Sixth Schedule: A Second Front. 
 These histories of hybridity have made the quests for ethnic rebirth and ST 
status inherently fraught affairs—both in a conceptual and socio-political sense. The 
circumstances grew all the more perplexing when, in 2004 Subash Ghisingh began 
publicly discussing the possibility of the region becoming a ‘tribal-area’ as per the 
Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. A qualified form of ethnic-based 
sovereignty, the Sixth Schedule was originally designed for the ‘tribal’ populations of 
India’s northeast. It allows for existing ‘tribal’ political institutions to be incorporated 
into autonomous District Councils with powers to regulate forest and property rights, 
social customs, and local administrative structures (for instance, the appointment of 
headmen and chiefs).47 Were Darjeeling to become a Sixth Schedule area it would 
remain within the state of West Bengal, but it would enjoy greater autonomy to govern 
itself—and, for the people of the hills, this was its greatest promise. 
 By 2005, bringing Sixth Schedule status to Darjeeling had become the primary 
political agenda of Subash Ghisingh and his ruling party, the GNLF. In December of 
2005, Ghisingh, the Government of West Bengal, and the Centre signed an “In 
Principle Memorandum of Settlement” (MoS) declaring their mutual intention along 
these lines. But the details of the plan were not yet finalized. Increasingly it became 
clear that there were significant obstacles to be overcome were this form of ‘tribal’ 
sovereignty to dawn upon the hills. Most pressing was the fact that to date, 
Darjeeling’s population was just over 32% ‘tribal’—that is, officially recognized STs. 
                                                 
47 On the Sixth Schedule, see Articles 244(2) and 275(1) in The Constitution of India. Antecedents to 
the ‘tribal’ based exceptionalisms of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules include: the Scheduled Districts Acts 
of 1874; The Government of India Act of 1919 (Sec. 52-A(2) that established ‘Backward Tracts’; and 
The Government of India Act of 1935 (Sec. 91 & 92) that demarcated ‘Excluded’ and ‘Partially 
Excluded Areas’. These acts based the need for special forms of governance on the purported 
aboriginal, frontier, and/or ‘backward’ conditions of the said areas. Importantly, Darjeeling has 
traditionally fallen within this ambit of exceptionalism. Darjeeling was declared a Scheduled District 
under the 1874 act, a ‘Backward Tract’ in the 1919 act, and a ‘Partially Excluded Area’ under the 1935 
act. A useful synthesis of these policies, as well as those pertaining to Scheduled Tribes may be found 
in Ghurye’s The Scheduled Tribes of India (1963). 
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If Darjeeling was going to be granted Sixth Schedule status, that number, it was 
presumed, would have to be increased dramatically. 
 This was where individual ethnicities’ bids for ST status and the prospects of 
the Sixth Schedule—the two fronts of ‘tribal’ becoming, as it were—converged. On 
the first front, individual ethnic groups were actively pursuing their goals of ethnic 
rebirth and ST recognition. This front was constituted by individual ethnic groups and 
the ethnic associations stewarding their ST applications. The second front—that of the 
Sixth Schedule—concerned the designation of the region (not the people) as a ‘tribal 
area’. Propagated by Ghisingh’s administration, the DGHC, this front focused on 
making the region ‘tribal’. It therefore pertained to the general Gorkha public. The 
relationship between the two fronts was never exactly clear, but commonsense held 
that the Sixth Schedule hinged on more individual ethnicities attaining ST status. 
Likewise, the Sixth Schedule accentuated the desires for ST status, as non-STs feared 
being ‘left out’ of the special provisions to be provided for STs in the soon to be ‘tribal 
area’. Developing on two fronts simultaneously, by 2006 then, making Darjeeling 
more ‘tribal’ had become the order of the day. 
 Interestingly, just twenty years earlier (in 1986) Ghisingh had scoffed at the 
idea of Sixth Schedule claiming, “We are not tribals…Such a status is bestowed upon 
people who are uncivilized, very backward, whose men go around naked and whose 
women go bare breasted. But we are advanced people. We are civilized. Look at me, I 
wear a three-piece suit and shoes.”48 At the time of this rebuke, Darjeeling was in the 
throes of the Gorkhaland Movement. As the leader of the GNLF, Ghisingh made it 
clear that the Sixth Schedule was an unacceptable, insulting compromise to the 
people’s desires for a separate state. 
                                                 
48 Frontline Aug 9-22, 1986. This and other primary sources from the Gorkhaland Movement available 
in Lama’s compendium, 1996. 
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 Two decades later though, Ghisingh and the GNLF had yet to deliver the 
autonomy they promised. What is more, the Gorkha community was beginning to 
atomize as its constituent populations ventured their own politics of identity (viz: the 
individual ethnic groups’ bids for ST status). This being the case, Ghisingh performed 
an about-face on his earlier statements regarding the ‘tribal’ character of the hills. 
With the signing of the MoS in 2005, the propaganda machine of the GNLF heralded 
the Sixth Schedule as a boon for the people of Darjeeling. But the proposal faced 
numerous complications. Raising the percentage of STs in the area from the current 
32% mark would take time. The Tamangs of Darjeeling, for instance, struggled for 22 
years to attain ST status, which they were eventually conferred in 2003 along with the 
Limbu.49 The applications of the Gurungs and Rais had been pending since the 1990s. 
Many more had been submitted only in the last several years. Further complicating 
matters was the fact that Darjeeling lacked any traditional form of ‘tribal’ governance, 
itself a prerequisite for Sixth Schedule status. Despite the initial enthusiasm that 
surrounded the proposal, the Sixth Schedule appeared to be a classic cart before the 
horse situation. 
 There were complications at the national level as well. Conferring Sixth 
Schedule status on the dubiously ‘tribal’ contexts of Darjeeling would require time-
consuming bureaucratic labor, political legwork, and very loose interpretations of the 
Constitution’s parameters. The members of the state and central governments that I 
interviewed spoke of the government’s growing reluctance to doll out any more 
‘tribal’ recognitions—whether in the form of the Sixth Schedule or ST status. There 
were already over 700 Scheduled Tribes of India, and there were rumored to be more 
than 1000 communities with ST applications pending. The politics of ‘tribal’ 
recognition were, moreover, becoming increasingly volatile.  
                                                 
49 The Tamang and Limbu of West Bengal were written into the Constitution as Scheduled Tribes (ins. 
Act 10 of 2003). 
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 In 2007, the Gujjar agitation swept across Rajasthan and beyond, leaving 26 
dead in its wake. Frustrated by unrequited demands for ST recognition, Gujjar 
protesters met grave ends as police opened fire on the crowds. The violence soon 
struck a communal chord, causing more casualties as Gujjars clashed with Meenas, a 
dominant ST community opposing Gujjar demands for ST status. In November 2007, 
the issue erupted again in Guwahati, Assam, when a mob turned on adivasis 
demanding ST status after the protesters went on a vandalizing rampage. When order 
was finally restored, hundreds lay injured in the streets with at least two dead. The 
carnage was the latest in a litany of troubles stemming from the policies of reservation 
in India.50 Insofar as these instances once again thrust the problems of ‘tribal’ 
recognition to the fore of national attention, the prospects of a back-door deal to 
quickly schedule the aspiring STs of Darjeeling and thus push through the Sixth 
Schedule, seemed less and less likely. 
 In the meantime, Ghisingh ramped up his efforts to convince not only the 
Government of India, but also the people of Darjeeling themselves of their ‘tribal’ 
character. He turned to his own administration to realize his anthropologically 
influenced political visions. Predictably, it was the Department of Information and 
Cultural Affairs (DICA) that became the primary agency of Ghisingh’s 
anthropological agenda. 
 To give but one example: on the occasion of Bhadra Purnimā 2006, DICA 
organized a massive celebration of the Darjeeling’s shamanic traditions. (At the time 
these were being cobbled together under the banner of the ‘bon’/’bonbo’ tradition—
itself a confounding use of the term.51) Annually, it was a tradition for the various 
                                                 
50 Passage sampled from Middleton & Shneiderman 2008. 
51 The terms ‘bon’, ‘bonbo’, and ‘bombo’ are sources of great confusion in Himalayan Studies. In Tibet, 
‘bon’ is typically understood to be a pre-Buddhist religion entailing more shamanic and/or sacrificial 
qualities. Today, bon still thrives in cultural Tibet, where it has a rich monastic tradition—not unlike the 
four other schools of Tibetan Buddhism proper. Ethnic groups such as the Gurungs and Tamangs of 
northern Nepal classify certain shamanic figures as bonpo and bombo respectively; however, the 
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shamans of the area (dhāmis, jhankris, mātās and others) to gather at various temples 
to celebrate their craft; drums would be heard stirring from various holy spots around 
town; and shamans would occasionally be seen moving through town in their ritual 
attire. Traditionally then, it was a scattered, relatively low-key celebration of shamans 
and their craft. This year, however, the circumstances demanded a more spectacular 
celebration. Political pressure and the considerable resources flowing from the coffers 
of the DGHC ensured it would be so. 
 As the site of their unequivocal display of the ‘tribal identity’ of all the 
region’s peoples, DICA commandeered the town square known as Chow Rasta. A 
stage was decorated in the classic animistic décor of natural foliage. A large 
performance area was cordoned off with rope at the center of Chow Rasta, just in front 
of the stage. Plush chairs were brought in for the VIPs (the local administration would 
be out in full-force). And a P.A. system was set up with enough power to rattle 
windows across town. 
 The spectacle was observed by thousands, as shamans (many of them present 
at the behest of the GNLF) recited their chants, pounded their drums, and shook 
violently to the power of the gods that possessed them. As tourists, journalists, and the 
greater public took in the sights and sounds, DICA officials watched over the event 
with a careful eye. Proper orchestration was imperative. To conclude the festivities a 
high-ranking DGHC official (and GNLF party member) took the stage to say a few 
                                                                                                                                            
specific links to the bon tradition are hazy in both a historical and contemporary sense. What is 
particularly interesting about the current articulation of ‘bon’ in Darjeeling is the way in which the term 
is co-opted as a way to represent the self as primitive, pure, and distinct from the major religions of 
Buddhism and especially Hinduism. (I explore the reasons for this distancing in Chapter III). Insofar as 
it has not been a traditional term used in Darjeeling, its current invocation was a source of widespread 
confusion among the populations of Darjeeling. For a helpful overview of bon in Tibet, see Samuel 
1993; Lopez 1998, 1998a and Kvaerne 2000 in Karmay and Nagano’s edited volume New Horizons in 
Bon Studies (2000). On bonpos among the Gurung, see Mumford 1989. On Bombos among the 
Tamang, see Holmberg 1989, 
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closing words. Making the claim that all of Darjeeling’s people (i.e. all “Gorkhalis”) 
were ‘tribal’, his message to the public warrants a lengthy quotation: 
“Our way of life, and our ways of worship are related to nature, so through this 
bonbo festival, we know this. Our Gorkhalis’ dharma is the bonbo dharma. 
These days we have drifted from nature and from our bonbo dharma. This 
bonbo festival of ours here today gives us our identity (chinhāri)… The rituals 
and practices that you have witnessed here today give us our identity as tribals 
(adivasi janājātiya chinhāri). Our Mr. Subash Ghisingh has ensured that we 
understand and learn our customs and traditions and our identity; he is teaching 
us these things with this program. So what is important is to get research done 
on our bijuwās, ojhās, and jhankris [traditional healers, sorcerers, and 
shamans]. We would like to tell the intellectuals to take up this research and 
tell us about them and their existence in different places… We should research 
these matters. We have drifted away from our identity. We have to know 
ourselves. We haven’t been able to recognize ourselves. We haven’t been able 
to recognize ourselves as tribals.. (Hāmile hāmi āphailai chinna sakeko 
chhainau. Hāmile hāmi janājāti bhanera hāmile āphai chinna sakeko 
chhainau.) That is why the Sixth Schedule is a great opportunity for us to 
understand our identity and our customs and traditions…All along we have 
adopted the traditions and customs of other communities due to which reason 
we have lost our own identity…. Now, the Sixth schedule will definitely give 
us an opportunity to protect and preserve our culture and tradition. We need to 
help each other. We need to get deeply into this. There are great mysteries 
hidden within, and these mysteries are to be revealed. (Yesmā ṭhulo rahāsya 
lukeko chha, ra yo rahāslai khuṭyāunu…)We must make efforts in this 
direction. In this context, this bonbo festival, our ethnic identity, the different 
festivals which we have been celebrating all are great opportunities provided to 
us by our mahāmahim [supremo, i.e. Ghisingh]. For this we thank him and 
would also like to announce the conclusion of this festival.” 
With regards to the research interests of this dissertation, the speaker articulates key 
facets of the salience of anthropological knowledge in Darjeeling: the familiar 
language of lost ‘identity’; the lure of positive discrimination; the lingering questions 
of syncretism amid systems of recognition that privilege singularity; the overt call to 
research and knowledge as a means to revealing the “mysteries hidden within”; and 
the unabashed politics of socio-cultural understanding. But in reviewing these 
pronouncements of why and how “we must know ourselves,” what is more striking is 
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the speaker’s peculiar message that “We have not been able to recognize ourselves.” 
And more than that, “We have not been able to recognize ourselves as tribals.” Here 
he captures what may well be the crux of ethnic renaissance in Darjeeling—namely, 
the ability and/or willingness of subjects to recognize themselves in normative 
anthropological forms. As he put it, it was not just a matter of recognizing the self, but 
recognizing the self as ‘tribal’. 
 This has proven to be something more than a matter of discourse. Ethnic 
associations and the local administration have deployed decidedly anthropological 
practices in order to advance their programs of ethnic revitalization. Ethnographic 
delegations have probed the interiors of Nepal in search of the ‘pure’ (suddha), 
‘authentic and original’ (maulik) culture of their ancestors. Intellectuals and study-
teams have combed through secondary-source materials. Libraries have been 
constituted. Documentaries have been shot. Essays have been written. But crucially, 
these anthropological techniques of self have not been deployed solely for descriptive 
purposes. They have also been implemented with the sometimes-heavy hand of socio-
cultural prescription. 
 The DGHC and various ethnic associations alike have turned to social-cultural 
engineering to fashion their constituents into the form of properly recognizable ethnic 
(or better yet, ‘tribal’) communities. Cultural purification programs have aimed to 
eradicate the syncretic trace from socio-cultural life—particularly that of Hinduism, 
which is now framed as an oppressive, corruptive historical influence. Rules of 
authentic ritual practice have been administered. Dress codes have been mandated; 
performances of ‘ethnic culture’ (janājātiya sanskriti) demanded; and unorthodox 
traditions tacitly degraded, if not attacked outright. All of this with palpable social and 
political sanction. 
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 In no sense of the word have these endeavors been ‘academic’. They are 
instead social and deeply political—at once the fodder of the press, the grist of local 
politics, and the subject matter of everyday debate on the street. Marshall Sahlins may 
be right that ‘culture’ is indeed “the word on everybody’s lips,”52 but in Darjeeling the 
inroads of anthropological knowledge go much deeper. Particular paradigms of 
anthropological knowledge—viz: ethnological paradigms—have now penetrated the 
most political, social, and subjective spaces of life. As they have taken root in the 
lifeworlds of the people of Darjeeling, these logics and practices of ethnological 
thought have reconfigured not only how notions of the self, other, and ethnic 
difference are known; they have reconfigured the very ways that ethnic difference is 
made and lived. 
 It is these inroads that concern me most in the chapters that follow.53 
The Design of the Research. 
 Two preliminary research visits to Darjeeling established the groundwork for 
this study. The first inquiries were conducted in the summer of 2004. At this point, 
ethnic renaissance was well underway in Darjeeling. With multiple ethnic groups 
seeking ST status and ethnological knowledge in high demand, it was immediately 
clear that something was afoot on the horizons of ethnic possibility. I made a second 
                                                 
52 Sahlins 1993: 3. 
53 As I make clear in Chapter I, my anthropology of knowledge concentrates on knowledge in its 
epistemological construal (ala Kant). However, in investigating the production and social life of 
epistemic forms, my main ethical concern lies with the way particular epistemic forms and practices are 
coming to affect more social and embodied aspects of life in Darjeeling. In later chapters I will have 
more to say about the various philosophical construals of knowledge (ranging from Aristotle to Kant, 
Heidegger and Taylor) and their place within this ethnographic study. Let me note briefly here how I 
am using several terms. ‘Epistemology’ is used in the traditional sense of: the study of how we know 
what we know through knowledge. I use ‘epistemological’ in reference to Kant’s construal of 
knowledge as a system of cognitive-discursive, representational forms. ‘Epistemic’ is used in the sense 
of: in relation to knowledge. Thus, when I speak of ‘epistemic commitments’, I am referring to the 
‘rules’ and logics through which people construct knowledge of the world. ‘Epistemic qualities’ 
accordingly refers to the characteristics of a given knowledge form. 
 43 
trip to Darjeeling in December of 2005 to attend The Second International Tamang 
Conference. Having recently attained ST status, the Tamangs of Darjeeling played 
host to thousands of Tamangs from across India, Nepal, and beyond. Honored guests 
included politicians, notable ethnic leaders, native intellectuals, and the western 
anthropologists. The latter was principally constituted by David Holmberg and 
Kathryn March, who were treated as virtual celebrities for their lifetime of work with 
the Tamangs of Nepal. The gathering entailed more than the celebration of Tamang 
culture and achievement, though. It was also a working session. On Day Four for 
instance, Tamang leaders took the stage to field written questions submitted by the 
audience about proper Tamang socio-cultural practice. One by one, these cultural 
experts fielded the queries, rendering there and then the singular details of authentic 
Tamang ethnic practice. These intercalations of anthropological expertise and socio-
cultural life provided an apt prelude of what was to come as I headed into more 
extended ethnographic engagement with the circumstances in Darjeeling. 
 The main fieldwork for this study was carried out over fifteen months of 
research in India in 2006 and 2007.54 During this time, I relied upon an ever-evolving 
mix of ethnographic and archival techniques, which split my time at roughly a 2:1 
ratio. Archival work was conducted in: The West Bengal State Archives, The National 
Library of India, and the Asiatic Society in Kolkata; The National Archives of India in 
New Delhi; and The India Office Records at the British Library in London. My 
ethnography consisted of a three tiered approach designed to track the circulation and 
practice of anthropological knowledge across diverse socio-political strata. 
                                                 
54 Extended fieldwork began in May of 2006. A short research visit to Nepal was made in November of 
2006, and I spent much of the winter of 2007 in Kolkata (although I made frequent visits back to 
Darjeeling). I returned to Darjeeling for the Spring of 2007. I left India in May of 2007, stopping off in 
London for two weeks of archival work, and then returned again to India in September, spending 
several weeks in the National Archives of Delhi. The remainder of the Fall, I spent in Darjeeling, finally 
concluding my fieldwork late in November of 2007. 
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 On the first tier, I engaged with several ethnic associations that stood at the 
fore of ethnic revitalization in Darjeeling. Working with these organizations in their 
offices and in the ‘field’ where they interacted with their constituents, I concentrated 
on the techniques used to refashion, represent, and when necessary engineer socio-
cultural practice in order to attain the twinned goals of ethnic awakening and ST 
recognition. This work cast me into the social world of the wealthy elites, politicians, 
bureaucrats, and public intellectuals who typically comprise the leadership of these 
organizations. These men were in a sense the culture makers of ethnic ‘identity’ and 
its politics in the hills. But as I soon came to discover, the work of these ethnic 
associations was nested within complex networks of local politics. The agendas of 
these ethnic associations (particularly their bids for ST status) were becoming 
increasingly entangled in the prospects of the Sixth Schedule. This being the case, I 
quickly realized the need to engage with the local administration and its tactics of 
socio-cultural regulation. I was subsequently able to gain access into the 
anthropological inner-workings of the DGHC—primarily through work with the 
Department of Information and Cultural Affairs (DICA). Overall, this work with 
DICA and various ethnic associations focused largely on the politics of public culture. 
However, this tier of research is best understood not so much as an ethnography of the 
public sphere in the Habermasian sense,55 but rather as an ethnography of ‘political 
society’, as has been charted by Partha Chatterjee in his recent work.56 This was a field 
of operation in which the ideals of democratic participation, communication, equality, 
                                                 
55 Habermas 1989. 
56 With his notion of ‘political society’ Chatterjee has sought to reframe the classical distinction 
between civil and political society. Political society, as Chatterjee frames it, “involves what appears to 
be a constantly shifting compromise between the normative values of modernity and the moral 
assertions of popular demands. Civil society then, restricted to a small section of culturally equipped 
citizens, represents in countries like India the high ground of modernity. So does the constitutional 
model of the state. But in actual practice, governmental agencies must descend from that high ground to 
the terrain of political society in order to renew their legitimacy as providers of well-being and there to 
confront whatever is the current configuration of politically mobilized demands.” (2004: 41). I engage 
more fully with Chatterjee’s notion of political society in Chapter I.  
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and citizenship give way to the hard realities of class, politics, popular demands, and 
the perduring logics of ethnological classification in postcolonial India. These were 
the effected conditions through which ethnic possibility would necessarily be attained 
in the hills. 
 To gauge how these programs of ‘ethnic uplift’ were reworking the dynamics 
of everyday life, I lived in a tea-estate village throughout my time in Darjeeling. My 
goal in doing so was to understand the ways that ethnological cum political agendas 
were pressed upon and negotiated by average people, and how these people, in turn, 
came to appropriate, embody, or resist such objectification. The village of Bidhuwā 
Busti57 proved an apt site to research these matters. Situated about an hour’s walk from 
Darjeeling Town, the village abutted the tea estate where many of its inhabitants 
worked. It was far enough removed from town to pose recognizably different socio-
economic conditions, yet also close enough to afford ample (and for some, like 
myself, almost daily) interactions with the thriving public arenas of Darjeeling Town. 
Internally, the village consisted of about 60 homes, divided roughly equally between 
Tamang and Gurung families.58 Important to my work was the fact that the dominant 
ethnic organizations of both the Tamang and the Gurung (and with whom I was 
working in Darjeeling Town) were especially active in the village. From this setting, I 
sought to understand how ethnic revitalization was being experienced at the local 
level. This second tier was accordingly designed as an ethnography of the everyday. 
 Though unplanned, a third ethnographic tier emerged out of the 
aforementioned Ethnographic Survey of 2006. The Survey itself offered its own 
unique ethnographic perspective—specifically, the chance to take the ethnographic 
interface between the Government of India and the people of Darjeeling as an object 
                                                 
57 A pseudonym. 
58 Though dominated by Gurungs and Tamangs, the village was home to several families from other 
ethnic groups.  
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of my own analysis. But the event also served as a point of entry into the world of 
state anthropology. Upon the invitation of the government anthropologists, I became a 
frequent visitor to the CRI offices in Kolkata, from where I was able to observe their 
handling of the cases of the aspiring STs with whom I was working in Darjeeling. 
Through this ethnography of the state, I chronicled the social production of 
anthropological knowledge within the Indian government, along with the post-
production life of this soft-science in the hard world of public policy. Carried out 
concurrently with my work in Darjeeling, this ethnographic work provided a balanced 
look at the politics of recognition as they developed from both sides of the interface 
between the Indian government and the people of Darjeeling. 
Knowledge: an unconventional ‘field’. 
 Coupled with my archival work, this three-tiered ethnographic approach made 
for a somewhat unorthodox field site. The ground that I covered in this research—
much of it steep and seemingly far afield—was largely dictated by the attentions of the 
research. Rather than delineating the frames of my inquiry in concert with the 
professed boundaries of any given ‘ethnicity’, I chose to work across communities and 
sociological strata (as is indicated by my three-tiered ethnography). Deploying 
ethnographic and archival methods at multiple levels, I tried to avoid relying upon 
concepts like ‘ethnicity’ and ‘identity’ as heuristic requirements of my research.59 
                                                 
59 Along with Judith Butler, I believe it is worth considering if and how the social sciences, along with 
reifying particular classificatory categories such as ‘race’, ‘tribe’, and ‘ethnicity’, have contributed to a 
greater reification of the idea of ‘identity’ itself. She writes, “Above all, we might expect from the 
consideration of identity a sense of cultural specificity, and we may turn to identities to deliver that 
specificity in order to counter certain false and exclusionary generalizations of ‘man’. But here we tend 
to run into another quandary, for it seems that what we expect from the term identity will be cultural 
specificity, and that on occasion we even expect identity and specificity to work interchangeably.” 
Given that it is now commonplace within academic anthropology to understand ‘culture’ as inherently 
contingent, negotiated, and dynamic, this ‘interchangeability’ should prove untenable. The challenge as 
Butler frames it is thus to get beyond “identity as a heuristic requirement”. I return to these issues in this 
dissertation’s Conclusion. Butler 1995: 441, 446. 
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Instead, I sought to know if and how particular paradigms of anthropological thought 
have come to constitute the very problems themselves. This became simultaneously, a 
historiographic and ethnographic concern. 
 This line of questioning posed a number of methodological and 
epistemological problems—not the least of which was the issue of terminology. 
English terms such as ‘culture’, ‘tribe’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘religion’, and ‘identity’ enjoy 
widespread circulation in Darjeeling. Moreover, these terms are frequently used 
interchangeably with their Nepali equivalents. Throughout my research, the people of 
Darjeeling frequently substituted ‘culture’ and sanskriti for one another. Dharma was 
often ‘religion’; just as jāt was often ‘caste’. ‘Tribe’ increasingly became synonymous 
with adivasi (a term used throughout India and Nepal meaning ‘autochthonous or 
original inhabitant’) and/or janājāti. In both Nepal and Darjeeling, janājāti (as 
opposed to jāt) has become the term of choice to designate the various non-caste 
ethnicities of the region. In Nepal, it is typically translated as ‘indigenous nationality’. 
However, it is used in Darjeeling more along the lines of ‘ethnicity’. That said, over 
the course of the bids for ST status and the Sixth Schedule, janājāti increasingly came 
to mean, in particular, ‘tribe’.60 (For instance, ‘Scheduled Tribe’ was frequently 
referred to as anusūchīt janājāti.) ‘Identity’ was most commonly referred to as astitwa 
or chinhāri, though the English term was used as well.61 These terms were frequently 
coupled with the term janājāti to yield janājātiko astitwa or janājātiya chinhāri, 
which in Darjeeling best translate as either ‘ethnic identity’ or ‘tribal identity’ 
depending on the context. 
                                                 
60 In her recent work on ST recognition amongst the Gaddhi of North India, Kapila focuses on how the 
meaning of the category ‘tribal’ shifts as it moves from anthropological, official and popular discursive 
realms. On this specific point—and regarding ST recognition in India more generally--Kapila’s work 
presents a useful comparison for the dynamics I address in Darjeeling. See Kapila 2008. 
61 A less commonly used local equivalent for ‘identity’ was pahichān. Astitwa connotes something 
more along the lines of ‘essence’ or ‘essential identity’, whereas chinhāri (like the verb chinnu: to 
recognize or distinguish) connotes ‘identity’ in the more mundane sense of ‘identification’.  
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 Although I have tried to avoid using ‘ethnicity’ as a framing device for my 
methodology, I do use the term in this thesis. When and where I use ‘ethnicity’ or 
‘ethnic group’ (such as in the statement, “The individual ethnic groups that comprise 
the composite Gorkha community…”), I follow traditional emic articulations in 
Darjeeling whereby ethnonyms like ‘Tamang’, ‘Gurung’, and ‘Newar’ have served to 
connote lineage-based social units. When they first migrated from Nepal, these groups 
more closely fulfilled the idealized form of an ethnicity as a distinct, culture-bearing 
social unit. However, due to the histories of hybridity charted earlier, these groups 
have since ‘lost’ much of their socio-cultural distinctiveness. While the Barthians 
among us might harp upon the classificatory utility of ‘ethnicity’, for the people of 
Darjeeling the crux of cultural revitalization and ‘tribal’ recognition remains: how to 
fill the empty ‘vessel’ of ethnicity with the kind of socio-cultural content that modern 
recognition demands.62 This would require exceptionally fraught negotiations of local, 
embodied histories on the one hand, and normative paradigms of ‘identity’ and 
recognition, on the other. 
--- 
 Ethnological knowledge comes at, and emerges from, the subjects of 
Darjeeling at various angles and in multiple registers. Tracing these trajectories of 
influence and emergence has proven an inherently variegated endeavor. It has led me: 
from the logics of 19th century labor migration to the perduring affects of social 
precarity in the tea-estates; from the checkered history of colonial classification to the 
most current practices of the postcolonial ‘ethnographic state’; and from the ideal-
types of academic and juridical writings to the people of Darjeeling—the real-types, as 
it were, in this ‘age of ethnology’. The chapters that follow try to capture some of the 
                                                 
62 Barth notes, “Ethnic categories provide an organizational vessel that may be given varying amounts 
and forms of content in different socio-cultural systems.” (1969: 299) Though this may be true in a 
general sense, the politics of identity and recognition in Darjeeling suggest more formulaic—and indeed 
normative--standards of what that socio-cultural ‘content’ should be. 
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complexity with which anthropology, and ethnology in particular, has affected life for 
these people. By necessity, the fields of inquiry are varied and multi-sited. 
 It is tempting—and not without analytic gain—to think about these findings 
through the terms of knowledge-power, biopolitics, governmentality, and the like.63 
But these Foucauldian understandings also involve important degrees of analytic loss. 
The difference is largely a matter of the scale at which we evaluate the salience of 
anthropological knowledge in the world today. Viewed from on high, modern systems 
of recognition like those of India appear not unlike a grid of intelligibility or a regime 
of anthropological truth.64 These classificatory schemas function in many ways as a 
modality for knowing and regulating populations. For the people of Darjeeling, they 
have largely set the terms of ethno-political possibility. However, and this is 
methodologically crucial, when we enter into the fray of ‘found’ anthropologies, we 
find contexts teeming with contingency and contradiction. Especially at the level of 
the subject, there is no singular story to tell of how individuals are finding relation to 
forms of anthropological knowledge in Darjeeling—only stories. To argue otherwise 
would be to join a problematic chorus of fundamentalist presumptions about the 
singular ways knowledge can—and must—affect people’s ways of living. 
 My approach to the study of knowledge owes much to the Marxian tradition of 
the sociology of knowledge—specifically that of Karl Mannheim, who showed the 
necessity of understanding the nuances of epistemic forms within the socio-political 
contexts of their production.65 However, I have tried to incorporate into this 
methodological outlook an attention to the more phenomenological dimensions of 
                                                 
63 I address these Foucauldian ideas at greater length in Chapters I, III, & IV. On knowledge-power, see 
Foucault 1980, 1983; on governmentality, Foucault 1979; on biopower and biopolitics, Foucault 1978; 
1988; 1994. 
64 Foucault 1980. 
65 Mannheim 1952, 1955. The bases of the Marxian sociology of knowledge are to be found in The 
German Ideology, and select passages of The Grundrisse (1978).  
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knowledge.66 In Darjeeling, this means (a) evaluating the systems of recognition 
within which these communities are ensnared while (b) retaining a sensitivity to the 
experiential dynamics through which individuals are becoming both subjects and 
objects of anthropological knowledge production. To take a certain disciplinary liberty 
with Marx’s aphorism: the circumstances in Darjeeling remind us that while modern 
communities may make themselves and their own anthropology, “They do not make 
[them] under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly 
found, given and transmitted from the past.”67 This thesis accordingly seeks to 
explicate certain angles and registers through which anthropological knowledge 
conditions the possibilities of the subject in Darjeeling, while simultaneously honoring 
the intriguing ways that subjects themselves are taking up anthropological paradigms 
as ways to represent and remake themselves. 
 While I believe the optic of ‘found’ anthropology sheds fresh light on the 
fabled ‘identity’ question, there are certain things that an attention to knowledge 
simply cannot tell us about life in Darjeeling. Through this optic we may be able to 
decipher how these knowledge forms have reshaped what it means to be an ethnic 
subject in the hills, but a sole attention to knowledge can offer us little understanding 
of how it feels to be a subject—‘ethnic’, ‘tribal’, ‘Gorkha’, or otherwise. To offset this 
methodological deficiency, something else is necessary. This is why I have taken a 
                                                 
66 Here I am influenced in different ways by the phenomenologies of Alfred Schutz (1967) and Frantz 
Fanon (1967) among others. 
67 Initially, it would seem that Marx is talking solely about the events of history with his aphorism: 
“Men may make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please…” (1978/1852: 595). But 
when we read further we see that ‘history making’ in this sense also involves the articulation of 
historical consciousness: viz-- “And just when they seem engaged in revolutionizing themselves and 
things…they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, 
battle slogans, and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this time honoured 
disguise and this borrowed language.” (emph added: 1978: 595.) Here we may infer a certain entwining 
of (what in English, we might call) ‘history’ and ‘historiography’ within Marx’s mention of ‘history’. 
On the one hand, he is referring to the events of history, but the making of that history, he explains, is 
inexorably entwined with the historical knowledge/consciousness. This entwining may be productively 
translated into the circumstances of contemporary Darjeeling, where man is currently trying to remake 
the ethnic self and his/her anthropology under specific conditions and terms ‘transmitted from the past’.  
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special interest in the question of social belonging. In formulating this multiattentional 
method,68 I take my cue from the people of Darjeeling, many of whom hail 
‘anthropology’/’mānavsāstra’ as a conduit to newfound senses of belonging within 
one’s community, within the nation-state of India, and even within a rediscovered 
notion of the ethnic self. To borrow words from the speaker quoted earlier, 
anthropological inquiry has become a way to understand the “mysteries hidden 
within.” 
 As they are trumpeted throughout the hills, these logics of ethnic 
transformation are alarmingly simple. My findings suggest exceedingly more 
complicated dynamics at play. For some, anthropologies of the ethnic self have 
spawned the most radiant sensations of ethnic rebirth. For others, gut wrenching 
disdain. The phenomenological variance depends largely on how individuals find 
relation to what is ostensibly ‘their’ anthropological depiction. Importantly, how 
subjects do (and do not) ascribe to these depictions of the ‘authentic’ ethnic or ‘tribal’ 
subject involves more than the epistemic qualities of the knowledges proffered. In 
other words, it is not merely a matter of whether or not the representation adequately 
portrays the self. People’s allegiance to one vision of the ethnic subject over another 
also concerns the political capabilities of these anthropological renderings, and the 
experienced social pressures through which they are impressed upon the given 
individual. While many speak of finding themselves through these knowledges, for 
still many others the compulsion to recognize the self in normative anthropological 
forms has proven inherently fraught, confusing and alienating. Recalling the insight of 
the young Marx who warned that objectification is itself the practice of alienation,69 
we may see this ‘age of ethnology’ in Darjeeling to be as marked as much by the 
promises of rights, recognition and belonging, as by varying degrees of alienation. 
                                                 
68 On multiattentional methodology, see Boyer (2010). 
69 Marx 1843 (1978): 52. 
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 Importantly, it was Fanon more than Marx who most poignantly expressed the 
deleterious effects that classificatory schemas can have on one’s ability to produce 
themselves in ways they see fit.70 For Fanon, the racialized classificatory systems 
imposed upon him were a source of deep alienation. They constrained his very being.71 
Thinking through these critical insights of Marx and Fanon, it is important to consider 
how knowledge systems—especially those concerned with the objectification of 
Man—can serve as a means to produce the self, while simultaneously engendering 
feelings of alienation, unhomeliness, and non-belonging for those who fall under their 
sway. Moving these concerns into the contexts of Darjeeling, the challenge that this 
research methodology sets for itself is therefore: how to account for the real political, 
social, and subjective promises that ethnological schemas have offered (and in some 
cases fulfilled) for the people of Darjeeling, while simultaneously remaining sensitive 
to the inevitable distortions, disavowals, and constraints that these knowledges 
continue to level upon people’s ways of being-in-the-world. 
 As an ethnographer with my own humanist concerns for anthropology’s effects 
on the world, I believe that there is no single, appropriate starting point for a 
compassionate critique of the dynamics ‘found’ in this study, only multiple starting 
points. These lie with the people of Darjeeling and the diverse ways they are finding 
relation to their own anthropologies. 
                                                 
70 Fanon 1967. Chapter I offers more discussion of Fanon and Darjeeling. 
71 Fanon’s self-described “psychoexistential” approach was overtly concerned with the question of 
human’s being-in-the-world. Charles Taylor echoes these ideas in writing of how a people’s sense of 
self can “suffer real damage, and real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to 
them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or 
misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, 
mode of being.” 1992: 25. 
 53 
Outline of the Chapters. 
 Each chapter of this dissertation offers a particular way of understanding the 
salience ethnological knowledge in Darjeeling. They do not form a linear argument or 
narrative, but instead angle into the contemporary with specific analytic attentions. 
 To begin, Chapter I: The Ethnologies of the Governed takes a closer look at the 
dynamics of ethnic renaissance in the hills and how ethnological knowledge has 
become integral to these movements. Along with providing an overview of the general 
dynamics in Darjeeling, the chapter fleshes out the problem of ‘found’ anthropology. 
In this regard, the chapter is foundational. Here I explore the anthropological demands 
placed upon minorities seeking rights, recognition, and social belonging in India, and, 
in turn, how the anthropology of the ethnic self has emerged as a political technology 
of communities. Importantly though, there are limits to how these knowledge 
techniques effect the ethnic subject. By taking a more phenomenological look at how 
subjects effectively ‘live’ these prescriptive knowledges, the chapter demonstrates the 
contingent ways ‘found’ anthropology has come to influence subjectivities and social 
practice in Darjeeling. 
 If the first chapter analyzes the exigencies of recognition in modern India, 
Chapter II: Anxious Belongings moves along a different dimension of social life in 
asking why anthropological knowledge has become so meaningful to the people of 
Darjeeling. Here I explore the affective histories of these groups, where transnational 
migration, enduring marginalization, and even the most recent events have long denied 
them a secure sense of being-in and being-of the nation-state of India. These anxieties 
of non-belonging have, in turn, fueled these groups’ quests for rights and recognition. 
Historical and contemporary events show the issue of ‘identity’ to be an exceptionally 
charged issue in Darjeeling. By raising the question of affect—and in particular, 
anxieties about belonging—this chapter seeks to understand the nature of that charge. 
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Affect emerges here as something other than knowledge. It is beyond knowledge—
that is, beyond the semiotic, semantic, epistemic, etc. However, as is made clear by the 
histories at hand, these dimensions of social life do not operate in isolation. Their 
relationship is mercurial, but mutually constitutive nonetheless.  
 Focusing on questions of knowledge and belonging respectively, Chapters I 
and II establish the principle optics of this research. Chapters III and IV form a second 
pairing. At once historical and ethnographic they further explore the dynamics of this 
‘age of ethnology’ in Darjeeling. 
 Chapter III: Durga and the Rock tacks between the present and the past in an 
effort to rethink the history of ‘tribal’ recognition in India. There is little doubt that the 
category has its roots in colonial governance. But its current articulations ask us to 
think twice before positing a monolithic understanding of colonial knowledge and its 
residual effects on the contemporary. Retraining our eyes to questions of knowledge 
and affect, we see that colonial anthropology was fraught with doubts and epistemic 
anxieties about the abilities of anthropological taxonomies to accurately know and 
enumerate India’s diverse peoples.72 These misgivings continually upset the enterprise 
of colonial anthropology—at once undermining it and instigating its ever-evolving 
forms. Importantly, the category of the ‘tribal’ was at the center of these epistemic 
concerns. In its governmental form, the category today is far more ossified than it ever 
was in the colonial era. As this chapter shall show, this has much to do with the 
anthropological persuasions through which India was refashioned—in both policy and 
mind—as an independent nation. To understand the specifics by which ethnological 
distinction has become a platform for liberal rights and recognition in modern India 
we must therefore critically engage the dynamics of postcolonialism and its forms of 
                                                 
72 Here I take a cue from Ann Stoler’s recent work on colonial knowledge and epistemic anxiety. Stoler 
2009. 
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knowledge. Only then can we appreciate the seemingly peculiar ways that the category 
of the ‘tribal’ has come to affect life in Darjeeling. 
 Chapter IV: Across the Interface of ‘Tribal’ Certification shifts attention to the 
front edge of anthropology’s legacy in India. Taking as my ethnographic object the 
Ethnographic Survey of 2006, this chapter ventures what I shall call a meta-
ethnography of the state. Moving back and forth across this ethnographic interface 
between the Government of India and the people of Darjeeling prompts a timely 
rethinking the proverbial meeting of the ‘anthropologist and the tribals’. For the 
communities under investigation, the Ethnographic Survey was a climactic day. It is 
presented in likewise accord here. Indeed, the dynamics of ‘tribal’ certification 
recapitulate many of the themes developed throughout this thesis. That ‘tribes’ could 
be certified at all, I shall argue, is a possibility unique to the anthropologically-effected 
present in India. It begs extended consideration of the inherently social and 
unquestionably political contexts of ethnographic knowledge production. Here I am 
concerned as much about what happened during the Ethnographic Survey as I am with 
what happened after. Tracking the post-field production and subsequent circulations of 
state anthropology through the government raises unsettling questions about the nature 
of the postcolonial Indian state and the dubious fate of anthropological knowledge in 
the stark corridors of governance. These findings ultimately raise broader, more 
reflexive questions about the capabilities and uses of various kinds of anthropological 
knowledge in the world today. 
 The dissertation concludes with some open-ended thoughts on what all of this 
might mean for the discipline of anthropology and for the people of Darjeeling. As 
uncanny as it may be, ‘found’ anthropology offers us the unique opportunity to think 
ethnographically, historically, and reflexively simultaneously. Coming to terms with 
not only the social life, but also the troubling perpetuation of certain paradigms of 
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anthropological thought in Darjeeling, provides a chance for anthropologists—all of 
us: academics, civil servants, ethnic leaders, and everyday citizens—to work through 
the ways that anthropological knowledge is conditioning the possibilities of modern 
day communities and individuals. Looking ahead, the lessons at hand also ask us to 
think critically and creatively about how anthropology (however conceived) might 
serve as a means to recognize and forge a more humanist future. 
 For now though, the anthropological present. 
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CHAPTER I. 
The Ethnologies of the Governed: 
On the Terms and Possibilities of the Ethnic Subject in Darjeeling. 
Introduction. 
 Since the Gorkhaland Agitation of the 1980s, ethnic politics in Darjeeling have 
taken a marked turn. The Gorkhaland Movement premised itself on a ‘Gorkha’ 
identity shared by the various Nepali-speaking ethnicities of the region. However, in 
the wake of the Agitation’s failure to achieve a separate state of Gorkhaland, the 
composite Gorkha community began to atomize. Individual ethnic groups increasingly 
sought alternative ways to secure rights and recognition within the Indian nation-state. 
With historically rooted anxieties about belonging in India unquelled and the traumas 
of the Agitation fresh at hand, these communities found potentially viable legal 
channels in the form of India’s reservation system for Scheduled Tribes (STs). 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, individual communities began mobilizing for ST 
status.1 These newfound forms of engagement with Indian political society2 galvanized 
                                                 
1 In 1950, when the original list (The Constitution Scheduled Tribes Order) was published, four 
communities (Bhutia, Lepcha, Sherpa, Yolmo) out of the approximately 20 ethnicities that make up the 
Gorkha community were afforded this designation. In 2003, two more (the Tamang and Limbu), were 
written into the Constitution as Scheduled Tribes (ins. Act 10 of 2003). And by 2006, all remaining 
‘left-out’ communities were actively seeking recognition as officially recognized ‘tribes’ of India. 
These included: Gurung, Rai, Magar, Sunwar, Khas, Damai, Kami, Sarki, Thagmi, Newar, Bhujel, 
Thakori. 
2 Throughout this chapter, I work with Chatterjee’s recent formulations of political society (2002, 
2004). For Chatterjee, the classic models of state versus civil society hold up only as ideals in places 
like India. Most citizens of India, he argues, are only ambiguously members of civil society, which, 
following Hegel and Marx, Chatterjee sees as fundamentally bourgeois society. He claims that while 
such a civil society exists in institutions and small demographic portions of India, the rest take up 
overtly political relations to the state. These politics of the masses, Chatterjee argues, spawn from 
governmentality. Here democratic politics in India comes into view as the ‘politics of the governed’. 
Following Gramsci, Chatterjee sketches political society as zone of mediation between civil society and 
the state, through which populations seek rights and justice, and effectively negotiate how they are to be 
governed. Classic texts on civil society, the state, and political society include Locke’s Second Treatise 
on Government (1690) Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (1991) and Marx’s The German Ideology (1978). 
On Gramsci’s notion of political society, see The Prison Notebooks (1971). On governmentality, see 
Foucault 1979. 
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a budding ethnic renaissance among these groups. These ethnic makeovers took form 
through unmistakably ethnological concepts and practices. This was due in no small 
part to the fact that these communities’ entry into political society was conditioned by, 
indeed was contiguous with, the ‘tribal’ ideal-type. To reconstitute themselves as 
acknowledgeable ethnic communities, these groups increasingly turned to colonial 
ethnology, academic anthropology, and to ethnological techniques of self to meet the 
requisite demands of recognition. In turn, ethnological self-concern reached 
unprecedented heights. For these aspiring minorities, efforts to know, (re)present, and 
remake themselves pursuant to normative paradigms of ‘community’ became 
instrumental politically and subjectively as these newly constituted knowledges of self 
initiated sweeping sensations of ethnic rebirth among their constituents. 
 In this chapter, I ask how ethnological paradigms and practices condition the 
political, social, and subjective possibilities of the contemporary ethnic subject in 
Darjeeling. Continuing this dissertation’s concern with ‘found’ anthropologies, I 
examine the dynamics through which ethnic groups come to practice—and at times, 
impose—ethnology upon themselves. In doing so, I ‘find’ ethnology at the heart of 
ethnic revitalization in Darjeeling. The circulation of ethnological knowledge among 
these communities cannot be divorced from formal and informal systems of 
recognition in postcolonial India. For the aspiring minorities of Darjeeling, the 
ethnology of self has become an invaluable mechanism for navigating the exigencies 
of Indian political society. In a certain regard, these ethnological techniques are an 
innovative response to governmentality—or as Partha Chatterjee would have it, they 
constitute a facet of ‘the politics of the governed’, a tactical way “to give the empirical 
form of a population group the moral attributes of a community.”3 
                                                 
3 Chatterjee 2004: 57. 
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 Sustaining this line of thought, this chapter unravels the entwinings of state 
and ethnic subject formation in order to demonstrate how ethnological knowledge 
shapes ‘identity’ and its politics in postcolonial India. However, I argue that any 
attempt to understand this phenomenon solely through the lenses of governmentality is 
destined to provide only a partial understanding of the currency and credence of 
ethnology in Darjeeling. What is called for in addition is a more phenomenologically 
attuned engagement with the social and subjective dynamics of this knowledge form 
in the lives of everyday subjects. For it is here, at the level of sociality and 
subjectivity, that the interface between the conceptual and the experiential unfolds. As 
I aim to show, such an approach at once confirms the penetrative depths of normative 
paradigms of ‘community’ (especially those sanctioned by the state), yet also 
challenges any unilateral models of subject formation. By honoring the complex 
contingency of ethnic subjects, this ethnographic study shows ethnic rebirth in 
Darjeeling to be indeed political, but always much more. The question for the people 
of Darjeeling, and for this study, then is the degree to which ethnological knowledge 
practices can remake the contemporary ethnic subject as one endowed with rights, 
recognition, and a sense of belonging to oneself, one’s community, and the Indian 
nation-state. 
Ethnic Rebirth. 
 In a dirt-floored schoolhouse on the Singtom Tea Estate, fifteen Tamang 
villagers have gathered for their monthly ethnic association meeting. It being Sunday, 
the day of rest on the estate, their neighbors are likely down the hill watching the 
week’s football match, or perhaps tucked away in a plantation watering hole sipping 
locally made raksi (liquor). Yet, as they do once a month, these Tamangs again have 
made their way from surrounding villages to deliberate the nuances of Tamang 
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‘culture’ (sanskriti) and its ongoing revitalization. Inside the small corrugated 
aluminum building these men and women sit at crudely fashioned wooden desks too 
small for adults. At the front of the classroom, facing them, sits an older gentleman 
wearing a pin-stripped suit, a pressed cotton shirt and polished leather boots. He is an 
elite Central Committee (CC) member of their ethnic association, the All India 
Tamang Buddhist Association (AITBA). As a CC member, his periodic visits to local 
branch meetings such as this represent an integral part of AITBA’s vastly successful 
apparatus of ethnic mobilization. Stretching across India and beyond, AITBA’s 
organizational structure, political wherewithal, and cultural acumen have made it the 
flagship organization of ethnic rebirth in the hills. Though visibly uncomfortable, the 
CC member commences the meeting in business-like fashion. It mustn’t run late. After 
all, his car and driver are waiting. 
 As is the general rule in these meetings, the highest-ranking member begins 
with a formal opening-statement. Accordingly, the CC member embarks on a 
longwinded introduction. Once he is finished, protocol is thwarted, however, as local 
members raise complaints about the association’s entanglements with local politics. 
For the past year, the political boss of the Darjeeling region, Subash Ghisingh, himself 
a Tamang, has accused AITBA of dividing the conglomerate Gorkha community 
through their go-it-alone programs of ethnic ‘uplift’.4 Ghisingh’s verbal assaults and 
                                                 
4 Ghisingh leveled direct criticism at AITBA and more veiled threats, even going so far as to allude to 
the possibility that groups like AITBA, who he claimed were trying to ‘communalize’ the Gorkha 
peoples, were linked to the Pakistani Intelligence Agency. His most direct threat came on Feb 23, 2006 
when he was speaking of the ethnic mobilizations of the Tamang and the presence of Asok 
Bhattacharya (West Bengal Urban Development Minister and adversary of Ghisingh) as their guest of 
honor at their recent ethnic convention; “‘Asok Bhattacharya is finished as he too had donned that 
headgear [of the Tamangs],’ said Ghisingh. In a veiled threat to the Tamangs, he said, ‘If the people get 
excited and attack you [AITBA members], I don’t know. Surely you remember that we had the Gorkha 
Volunteer Cell and the 14-inch khukuri [knife] during the agitation’. Passage quoted from “Ghisingh 
sees hat trick in culture shift” in The Statesman, Feb 24, 2006. Other articles charting Ghisingh’s 
critiques of AITBA include: “GNLF talks tribal rule” The Statesman. Jan 2, 2006; “Tamangs Defy 
Ghisingh Identity Whip” The Telegraph. Feb 6, 2006; “Lochar goes on despite Ghisingh” The 
Statesman. Feb 6, 2006; “Chowrasta Chatter” & “Tamang raise Ghisingh hackles” The Statesman. Feb 
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veiled threats have cast AITBA and its members into an awkward relationship with the 
ruling GNLF party. The CC member tries to stymie the villagers’ complaints, but is 
unsuccessful. They quickly segue into concerns about AITBA’s controversial cultural 
regulations, and the emergence of a rival faction known as the Tamang Buddhist 
Gedung, which was founded upon more tolerant principles. (Not coincidentally the 
Gedung was founded by members of the GNLF).5 
 In response, the CC member tries to appease his audience by stressing the 
importance of a unified political and cultural front. He and AITBA speak from 
experience. It took them two decades to secure Scheduled Tribe status for the Tamang 
community.6 Their quest included bandhs7, hunger strikes, and 77 delegational visits 
to Delhi alone. To achieve ST status, the association initiated extensive cultural 
engineering programs to revitalize the ‘pure’, ‘original’ form of Tamang culture. 
These focused primarily on the elimination of Hindu elements from their socio-
cultural repertoire and the accentuation of uniquely Tamang, Buddhist attributes. Thus 
for instance, popular holidays of Hindu origin like Dussehra (Dasain, Durga Puja) and 
Diwali were banned among AITBA’s constituents.8 Those who violated these 
                                                                                                                                            
24, 2006; “Tamang ire at Ghisingh” The Telegraph. Feb 25, 2006; “Hill Tamangs Blink First” The 
Telegraph. April 3, 2006. 
5 The Tamang Buddhist Gedung (TBG) was founded in 1994 to provide an alternative to AITBA. A 
smaller faction was founded in Kalimpong on Dec 4, 2006 known as the Gorkha Tamang Gedung. 
Though only consisting of 43 families at its time of inception, the statements of the chief guest, Mr. 
Mani Kumar Ghisingh, signal the contention within the Tamang community: “They [AITBA] are 
adopting foul policies by crushing the ethnic beliefs of the masses. We have equal rights to follow any 
faith…. The Tamangs have been terrorized with fines ranging from Rs 501 to Rs 10,001 if found 
celebrating Dussehra. This is ridiculous.” Passage quoted from The Statesman Dec 5, 2006. To date this 
small faction has yet to achieve much stature. Instead, it is AITBA and the TBG that dominate the intra-
ethnic politics of the Tamang. 
6 AITBA’s first memorandum for inclusion as a Schedule Tribe of India under Article 342(a) of the 
Indian Constitution was submitted to the Centre on November 24, 1981. The bill establishing their 
inclusion as STs passed Parliament on December 19th, 2002. They were officially scheduled shortly 
thereafter via Act 10 of 2003. 
7 Bandhs are strikes mandated upon the general population, which shut down all infrastructure and 
economic facilities. They are common throughout South Asia. 
8 Such holidays were banned by AITBA since 2001, spawning perennial controversy. “Durga Pujā 
boycott triggers row.” The Statesman. Oct 4, 2003; “Tamangs split over Dasain celebrations.” The 
Statesman. Oct 7, 2003; “Diwali splits Tamang Community.” The Statesman. Oct 24, 2003; “Tamangs 
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mandates were socially ostracized, and in some cases even fined. Augmenting these 
austere measures, AITBA committed itself to recuperating the ‘lost’ attributes of 
Tamang culture by sending ethnographic delegations to Nepal, establishing Tamang 
language training programs, providing authentic Tamang dress, and implementing 
cultural awareness programs of various kinds. These endeavors proved instrumental to 
their ST certification in 2003 and to their sustained ethnic revitalization. 
 As he pontificates on the inseparability of political solidarity and cultural 
singularity, the CC member makes a strong case: for unity, Tamangs must have one 
culture. This is precisely why the association has implemented such strict rules as to 
what is proper cultural practice. Those who are still unsure of Tamang religious 
practice (dharma sanskār), language (bhāsā), script (lipi), tradition (paramparā), attire 
(bhesh-bhushā), festivals (chāṛ) and folk culture (lok sanskriti) may refer to the 
plethora of DVDs, books, magazines, and notices put out by the association 
documenting what it means to be a true Tamang. Who is it, he asks the meeting, that 
has brought the ST status to the people? Who has re-awoken Tamangs’ sense of 
identity? What has the Gedung [the rival association] accomplished? They are but a 
small local faction. We are All-India! We are international! Who brought thousands of 
Tamangs from all over the world to Darjeeling for the International Tamang 
Convention (December 2005)? Look, this man here [gesturing to me] came all the way 
from America for this great event! Culture should be a source of pride, not tension, he 
reminds them. May they thus set their differences aside. 
 The conversation carries on for some time, ultimately ending with the CC 
member’s standard invitation for the villagers to form a delegation and visit the central 
offices with their concerns. The villagers express doubts whether they will be given an 
audience. Then, realizing the meeting is running over, they quickly shift to local 
                                                                                                                                            
split over Lochar Celebrations.” The Statesman. Dec 12, 2003; “Tamangs debate over Lochar.” The 
Statesman. Nov 29, 2005. 
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matters. On the docket: an invitation for all local Tamangs to worship in the newly 
constructed Gurung gomba (monastery) in the neighboring village.9 To which a spry 
70-year-old gentleman proclaims with sarcasm, “So they have built their own Gurung 
gomba. This is all very good. But what? They bring in Tamang lamas to do the pujās 
and then invite us, the Tamangs, into ‘their’ gomba? Before the Gurungs weren’t even 
using lamas!” This more authentic-than-thou reproach elicits considerable laughter 
among the group. As they move on to other local matters, the CC member recedes 
from the conversation. The moment the last announcement is made, he grabs his coat 
and sneaks away. 
 Afterward, when the CC member returns to town via car, several others and I 
begin a long walk back down into the recesses of the tea estate. As we descend past 
the momo shops and liquor stalls that line the steep road, our numbers dwindle until it 
is just myself and my friend Pemba, an ardently born-again Tamang. Pemba has 
invited me to accompany him as he makes his rounds through the tea estate, and 
therefore we do not stop as we pass through the village of Bidhuwā Busti, where we 
both live. Passing the tea weigh-station at the center of Bidhuwā Busti, where the 
average day ends for so many of our neighbors, we leave the ‘coolie lines’ of the 
village and plunge into the geometric greenery of the tea fields below. As we stroll 
down through the tea fields, Pemba points out a footpath that once led to his natal 
village. He explains to me that his home there was razed during the GNLF agitation of 
                                                 
9 The Pema Choeling Gurung Buddhist Monastery (inaugurated in 2006) was built by a local branch of 
the Gurung ethnic association, the Tamu Choj Din. Similar to the Tamangs, the gomba was part of the 
Gurung’s respective ethnic renaissance. Hailed as the first ever ‘authentic’ Gurung gomba in 
Darjeeling, the construction of the temple evinced a similar shift from Hinduism to Buddhism, which 
also tied into the Gurung’s quest for ST status. Gurung leaders have been repeatedly advised by their 
sources within the government to avoid any sort of ascription to Hindu belief. As one resident 
intellectual explained: “So we must be a Buddhist to show the government that we are Buddhist, but in 
the reality, we may not be Buddhist; even I am not a Buddhist. You see? So to show the government 
that we are Buddhist, you have to have a monastery, a cultural center.” I have written about the temple 
elsewhere (2007).  
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the 1980s.10 As he would tell me on numerous occasions, it was this trauma that 
initiated the tailspin of his life, which culminated in alcoholism, unemployment, and 
his failings as a father. And it was Buddhism and his rediscovery of Tamang culture 
that saved him and gave him the ‘ujyālo’ (brightness) of his being today. 
 Down we walk, past the factory where the tea is processed before being 
shipped to the international auction houses of Kolkata. Down we walk, into villages 
tucked into the forested wastelands of the estate. Down into different degrees of 
poverty. As we descend, Pemba stops along the way to share with Tamang friends and 
families the main points of the meeting. He speaks with remarkable eloquence and 
passion, yet as he disseminates the niceties of AITBA’s brand of Tamang culture, all 
traces of the dissent that colored the meeting drop out of his narrative. His phrases and 
tenor are uncannily like that of the Central Committee member. Time and time again 
we stop to say hello to fellow Tamangs, and time and time again, Pemba relays the 
message before heading further down. The repetition gives these informal 
conversations a deliberate bent. Thus, we carry on. 
 Down to his parent’s home, a porous thatched hut, standing wearily on a small 
plot of precious level ground. Pemba invites me in. Yet when I step inside, I 
mistakenly see his mother’s withered body, shirtless, and bent from years of plucking 
in the fields. His father, racked by years of alcoholism sits, toothless, on a bed in the 
back corner of the hut watching our embarrassing encounter. Realizing we are 
unexpected guests, we continue on. Down, through more forests dotted with Hindu 
mandirs (temples). Down past the football game, the P.A. system blaring a crackled 
play-by-play, as six-man teams try to keep the ball in play on a miniature field that is 
but an extended terrace carved into the edge of the hillside. As we skirt the field and 
                                                 
10 I have been unable to pinpoint which anti-Gorkha forces burned the village. The Border Security 
Forces (BSF), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and CPI-M para-military forces were all active 
in combating the Gorkhaland Movement. 
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the hundreds who have gathered to cheer on their boys, a wayward kick sends the ball 
vanishing over the field’s edge. The game breaks while the ball is recovered, so we 
proceed. Down through a mostly Tamang village, their prayer flags flying atop their 
homes. Down past the Tamang gomba (monastery) built in 1951 by a resident lama.11 
And down to the newer, more extravagant one built in 2000 by AITBA. 
 Established on September 24th, 2000, the Dinchen Tanshi Choeling Gumba is a 
local showpiece of AITBA’s outreach programs. The seemingly unfinished concrete 
and corrugated aluminum building sits on a manicured parcel of land overlooking the 
river-valley below. Its appearance is unmistakably new. Both practically and 
symbolically, it serves as a locus of Tamang rebirth. Having arrived here, Pemba 
fetches the family who lives nearby and oversees the gomba. A middle-aged woman 
emerges and shuffles across the courtyard, the keys in hand, to open the door. As the 
heavy door creeks open, Pemba launches into an unsolicited lecture on the vitality of 
Tamang culture: (For hundreds, if not thousands of years, the Tamangs have followed 
their own original form of Buddhism. We are highland people of the Himalayas. And 
living high in the mountains we have retained the purest forms of our culture and 
religion—this, despite the tireless oppression of Hindu rule. Today, we are reviving 
this pristine culture. Like last year, when hundreds came to this very temple to 
celebrate our very own Tamang new year. We call it Lochar…..etc). 
 For ten minutes he rhapsodizes. It is difficult to tell whether his speech is 
directed at me or the woman who so graciously opened the temple for us. Standing 
there in the door, echoes of the CC member resonate in my memory as Pemba waxes 
on about Tamang unity, their achievements, the details of their ‘authentic’, ‘original’, 
‘pure’ culture (maulik, paurāṇik, suddha sanskriti), the history of AITBA, etc. My 
attention slips. Meanwhile the woman stands speechless, trapped on the threshold. 
                                                 
11 The Buddhist Pema Tshoiling Monastery, est. 1951. 
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Uncertain whether she is the target of his persuasion or whether it is me, she is unable 
to either come or go. Her eyes cast me a sideways glance from time to time, as though 
desperate for some sort of freeing interlocution. I can offer her no respite. For indeed, 
I am implicated in this articulation. There is no doubt that my presence as an 
anthropologist interested in Tamang ‘culture’ is egging him on, yet to whom he 
preaches is unclear. His thoughts stream on in what seems to be an almost automated 
delivery, one after another, fact after so-called fact. As Pemba rambles on, she 
continues to nod silently, hapless. At the receiving end of this cascade of identity-
speak, there is little we can do but wait for it to reach its own denouement. 
Finding Anthropology. 
 Throughout my time in Darjeeling, I heard hundreds of such narratives 
championing the unalienable links between ‘culture’ (sanskriti) and ‘ethnic identity’ 
(janājātiya astitwa/chinhāri). With relentless repetition, this theme would be played 
upon: in the cultural awareness programs of ethnic associations; at ethnic conventions 
where ‘authentic’ ‘tribal’, janājāti, and adivasi culture was danced away; in essays 
submitted to the government explaining the certifiably ‘tribal’ characteristics of a 
community; in cultural engineering efforts such as those of AITBA; and in the village 
tea stall where ‘culture’ or its native equivalent was indeed the term on everyone’s 
lips.12 But there was more at play in these dynamics than mere forms of culturalism. 
Beyond concerted attention to one’s ‘culture’ or sanskriti (notably, both the English 
and Nepali terms are used), these movements of ethnic rebirth were structured 
according to unmistakably anthropological techniques, paradigms, and practices, 
principally of an ethnological nature. Experts were designated within ethnic 
associations to make ethnographic and archival inquiries in order to fill specific 
                                                 
12 Sahlins 1993. 
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anthropological forms (for instance those of distinct ‘culture’, ‘custom’, ‘religion’, 
‘ritual’, ‘death rites’ etc) with socio-cultural content. These initiatives were conducted 
both for the purposes of gaining ST recognition and to mitigate the ‘cultural loss’ that 
these groups had accrued through generations of syncretism in colonial and 
postcolonial India. Ethnic associations searched for ‘model villages’ untouched by the 
tainting hand of modernity, assembled cultural artifacts, collected oral histories, and 
documented their findings ad nauseum. Unsatisfied by local subjects, they reached out 
to their counterparts in Nepal (who have supposedly endured less ‘cultural loss’) to 
codify socio-religious practice in native ethnological literatures and languages in 
native dictionaries.13 While it was primarily the educated elites of ethnic associations 
who drove these initiatives, these knowledges were articulated into daily life by a 
variety of knowledge-agents, ranging from native intellectuals, ethnic leaders, and 
designated ‘cultural experts’ to branch organizers, local members, and born-again 
ethnics like Pemba. 
 Significantly, these knowledge practices were pushed beyond the realm of 
literary representation to be mapped onto human subjects. Heavy-handed ethnological 
cum political agendas were pressed upon the populace. Subaltern subjects were hand-
selected by ethnic elites to become objects of the ethnographic gaze of the Indian 
state—living, dancing embodiments of ‘backwardness’ and pristine ‘tribal’ culture. 
And ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, and even history were re-worked in compliance with 
normative criteria of ‘community’. Nowhere were these ethno-logics and techniques 
more rigid or conspicuous than when practiced in conjunction with respective 
communities’ quests for Scheduled Tribe recognition. However, as I studied these 
practices further, it became clear that these ethnological techniques of self exceeded 
any conventional ideas of what could be conceived of as a political tactic. Individuals 
                                                 
13 On the codification of language within these movements, see Shneiderman & Turin 2006. 
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increasingly abandoned family traditions in favor of those espoused by cultural 
experts; neighbors became ethnic others; and ethnic groups divided internally, as 
debates raged about what exactly constituted ‘authentic’ culture. As I carried out this 
research, it became increasingly clear: the production and impact of ethnological 
knowledge were to be found in all walks—if not all arenas—of life. 
 This chapter is dedicated to understanding certain aspects of these ‘found’ 
anthropologies. I take particular interest in the transformations and translations of 
ethnological knowledge forms across a series of social and conceptual domains. 
Socially, I examine this knowledge form as it is actualized across class strata, across 
inter-ethnic boundaries, and between citizens and the state. Conceptually, I examine 
how the practice of ethnological knowledge mediates between the realm of normative 
ideal-types and the often-messy contingency of actual subjects. In tracking 
ethnological knowledge across these social and conceptual terrains, my approach to 
the anthropology of knowledge owes much to the work of Karl Mannheim, who 
showed the value of interrogating simultaneously the socio-material contexts of 
knowledge production and the internal, epistemic facets of knowledge forms 
themselves.14 In Darjeeling, coming to terms with these epistemic qualities holds an 
                                                 
14 My invocation of Mannheim signals my debt to the Marxian tradition of the sociology of knowledge 
and those thinkers who have elaborated it in various ways (e.g. Gramsci 1971; Lukacs 1971; Boyer 
2005; to name a few). I believe, however, that to date the sociology (and anthropology) of knowledge 
suffers a certain methodological lacuna on account of its sustained interest in the dominant purveyors of 
knowledge. This concentration on ‘intellectuals’-- be they as stewards of nationalism (Boyer and 
Lomnitz 2005; Giesen 1998; ) or their role in the spheres of politics (Gramsci 1971; Lomnitz 2001), 
culture (Hannerz 1990: 247; Marcus 1997), or their own professional field (Bourdieu 1984; Eyerman 
1994; Gramsci 1971; Merton 1972)—has yielded valuable insight into the social mechanisms through 
which expertise is concentrated and constituted in particular types of individuals. Like Radin (1927) I 
am interested in subjects’ relation to knowledge, yet I seek to redress the aforementioned deficiency by 
honoring the capacity of subjects of all socio-political positions to produce anthropological 
knowledge—albeit with mixed efficacy.  
 As will become clear in the following sections, I also owe a qualified debt to the Foucauldian 
tradition and its concern with knowledge-power. Especially in the context of postcolonial India, 
Foucault’s insights shed considerable light on the collusions of political rationality, anthropological 
classification, and the micro-processes of governmentality through which normative strictures of 
recognition have come to shape the social and political horizons of the ethnic subjects in contemporary 
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important key to understanding how these forms of anthropological knowledge bear 
upon ethnic subjects—socially, politically, and subjectively. 
 In taking ‘found’ anthropology as an object of ethnographic study, this work 
speaks to emerging academic conversations over ‘para-ethnographic’ knowledges.15 
These discussions highlight those forms of ethnographic-like knowledge that 
increasingly circulate in the world beyond the university. With these studies, my work 
partakes in a certain deprovincialization of anthropological knowledge. I do so by 
recognizing and studying the production of anthropological knowledge by institutions 
and individuals beyond the domain of academic anthropology. However, for reasons I 
intend to make clear momentarily, the forms of anthropological knowledge that are at 
the center of identity politics in Darjeeling are not para-ethnographic, even though 
they may occasionally claim ethnographic constitution. In fact, they are often hyper-
representational forms of knowledge that obviate—both passively and actively—the 
imperatives of empirical investigation. In modern India, where ethnological distinction 
has been transformed into a platform for liberal rights and recognition, these forms of 
anthropological representation carry enormous socio-political capabilities. Indeed, for 
the people of Darjeeling, ethnological techniques of self have proven to be of 
exceptional political expediency. However, as I will demonstrate here, so too can their 
flight from empiricism affect questionable social and phenomenological 
consequences. 
                                                                                                                                            
India. See especially Foucault 1979, 1980, 1988. Exemplary applications of models of knowledge-
power in India include Chatterjee 1986, 2004; Cohn 1996; Dirks 2001; Scott 1995. 
15 On para-ethnographics, see Boyer (2010); Holmes & Marcus 2005, 2006, w/ Westbrook 2006; 
Westbrook 2008. Lomnitz’s work (2001) also addresses the anthropological practices of non-academic 
intellectuals. Gilroy (2000) has similarly written of anthropological forms beyond the academy. I return 
to Gilroy’s notion of a “postanthropological humanism” in the conclusion of the dissertation. I engage 
with the debates on para-ethnography again in Chapter IV. 
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Ethnologies of the Governed. 
 “There must be ‘attraction’. We have to create ‘attraction’. If the ‘attraction’ is 
there…,” the man breaks off realizing his associates are nodding in full agreement. 
 On an otherwise quiet afternoon in the offices of AITBA, six men discuss the 
details of a proposed Tamang calendar, replete with visual representation of authentic 
Tamang dress, ritual schedules, and the like. Sitting in an office teeming with 
magazines, books, and stacks of mailers awaiting the week’s round of dissemination, it 
is clear they are no strangers to documentation. But these ethnic leaders face certain 
challenges in representing their community. 
 The president raises the tricky issue of language, “If we put it in Tamang, who 
will have learned the Tamang to be able to read it?” 
 With rare exceptions, the Tamangs have collectively lost their native tongue 
since migrating from Nepal. For these stewards of ethnic reawakening, it is an 
inconvenient truth. They therefore decide the calendar will be printed in both Tamang 
and Nepali, their lingua franca. More importantly, one of the men reasserts, “The 
calendar must go in each and every home. For there, it will bring ‘knowledge’.” 
 This matter resolved, conversation turns to a more ambitious project, the 
making of an ethnographic film to document Tamang culture. The circumstances that 
spawned this idea are noteworthy. Earlier that year, in an effort to bolster the case for 
Darjeeling being declared a ‘tribal area’ under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian 
constitution,16 the local administration (DGHC) headed by Subash Ghisingh had begun 
to make a film documenting the cultural traits of the various ethnicities that make up 
the Gorkha community. Each ethnic group was to be featured wearing their respective 
dress and performing their unique ‘tribal’ customs. The film was then to be sent on to 
Delhi, where it would presumably help convince the central government of the ‘tribal’ 
                                                 
16 For an explanation of the movement for Sixth Schedule status, please see Introduction and Chapters 
III and IV. 
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character of the Gorkha peoples writ large. After hearing rumors of this film, the 
leaders of AITBA were furious that (a) they had not been consulted during the making 
of the film and that subsequently (b) Tamangs were shown singing and dancing 
wearing daurā suruwāl and chaubandi choli, which are not AITBA-sanctioned, 
‘authentic’ Tamang attire. With their cultural authority circumvented and their people 
misrepresented, the leaders of AITBA felt compelled to set the record straight. 
 Not coincidently, this was also the time when the rift between AITBA and 
Ghisingh’s party was growing deeper on account of AITBA’s refusal to participate in 
DGHC-mandated cultural performances exhibiting the ‘tribal’ traits and unity of the 
Gorkha peoples. The DGHC insisted these cultural displays would behoove their 
chances of winning Sixth Schedule status for the hills. Already recognized as STs, 
AITBA wanted no part.17 After all, they had struggled for over two decades to attain 
this coveted form of recognition. Helping others would only diminish the Tamangs 
hard-earned slice of the proverbial pie. What is more, by charting their own politics of 
identity, AITBA was actively trying to distance itself from Ghisingh, the DGHC, and 
the failed politics of the Gorkha ‘identity’. Though Ghisingh’s mandated ‘style’ of 
identity had shifted from Gorkha to ‘tribal’, it made little sense for them to contribute 
to a pan-ethnic ‘tribal’ identity of the hills. As per AITBA’s logic, the Tamang already 
had their own ‘identity’, their own recognition, and their own politics of identity. 
These were to be guarded tightly. Such were the politics of representation at the time. 
 Within two weeks, the film project was formally proposed at AITBA’s Central 
Committee Executive meeting, where 15 elites (again all men) from Darjeeling, 
Kalimpong, and Sikkim discussed the prospects of the film. The president introduced 
                                                 
17 This was holiday season (Fall) of 2006. The DGHC’s mandates included participation of ethnic 
groups in processions and public rituals, as well as dress codes banning any ‘Hindu’ attire. For more 
detailed ethnographic accounts of these events, see Chapter III and Conclusion. 
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the idea by noting the contentious field of identity politics in Darjeeling. His 
introduction began as follows: 
“Because of all the hooliganism (guṇḍāgari) here, it is difficult to make any 
statement at the moment. And there are other hurdles too. That is why we 
ought to preserve and conserve our culture. And we should promote our 
culture. Some Tamangs have been forced from above to put ṭikā on their 
foreheads and celebrate Dasain [a veiled stab at the rival faction, the Gedung]. 
We, the Tamangs, will not even mention the ‘D’ of Dasain, and this has to be 
enforced very strongly, and totally, and should be disseminated by all the 
different branches…We must make a CD, a cassette, or a picture based on our 
complete dharma and traditional dress. We have our own dress. Our own 
festivals too.” 
 “Yes,” another man chimes in, “It should be fully technical. From the technical 
point of view , we should shoot it. From the time before our child’s birth. According to 
our culture and tradition, what kind of practices, from the name giving ceremony, 
marriage, and things like that.” 
 “Yes,” another opines, “It is a time to bring our own fellows into 
understanding, to instill communal feeling (jātitwa). With the help of our culture, let 
us instill jātitwa among our fellows!” 
 For two hours, these men discuss the details of the script and its potential to 
awaken jātitwa among the Tamangs of India. But the film is not only to be for Tamang 
viewers; it is also to serve political purposes. 
 As a representative from Sikkim makes clear, “Over all of India and in the 
interest of all Tamangs, decisions have to be taken. We can create, whatever you may 
call it, a think-tank, an intellectual (buddhijibi) group. It could be you all! Even now 
when I look at it, this high command body, why don’t we meet the Chief Minister of 
West Bengal?… If we make this film, then why can’t we meet this high body? We can 
go as a delegation. We can talk to the Government of West Bengal, the Chief 
Secretary, the Home Secretary, and show them exactly what we are. This is the big 
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thing, the Government of India. To send it to the Government of India. It can convince 
the government.” [emph. added] 
 AITBA has been in the business of “convincing” for a long while now. In fact, 
such forms of ethnological representation were integral to their successful attainment 
of ST status. Over that 22 year span, they produced countless media forms, essays on 
the distinct customs, language, religions, and rituals of the Tamang people, and 
countless performances of Tamang ‘identity’, none of which were more important 
than when they became the objects of their official Ethnographic Survey by the 
anthropologists of the Government of West Bengal. All of these techniques were 
aimed at showing the government, and indeed, the Tamangs of Darjeeling, exactly 
what they were. 
 AITBA pioneered ethnic renaissance in Darjeeling through both their 
ethnological and political savvy. In the course of their successful struggle for ST 
recognition, the leaders of AITBA became adept at navigating the bureaucratic 
channels of government, as well as the more informal channels of political society. 
Their extensive correspondences with the central and state-level governments, their 
ability to recruit the services of the Chief Minister of Sikkim (who many believe 
ultimately pushed through their ST application), and their vividly remembered hunger 
strike at the foot of Parliament all demonstrated their learned abilities to navigate 
Indian political society. By staking their claim in places like Kolkata and Delhi, which 
are typically perceived to be socially and politically unfriendly climes for people of 
the hills, AITBA won considerable admiration from fellow ethnic associations in 
Darjeeling. Yet AITBA guarded their ‘trade secrets’ closely, prompting one 
organization to break into their offices in hopes of literally stealing their tactics.18 As 
the Tamang’s ST application progressed through the 1990s, other ethnic groups would 
                                                 
18 See Middleton & Shneiderman 2008. My thanks to Shneiderman for sharing this story with me. 
 74 
follow in their footsteps, borrowing organizational, political, and representational 
techniques to advance their own bids to become Scheduled Tribes of India. While the 
Tamang, along with the Limbu19, achieved ST status in 2003, to date none of the 
remaining ‘left out’ communities has achieved tribal status. Their applications remain 
pending.   
 AITBA’s successes depended largely on their abilities to negotiate the 
demands of ST recognition, on the one hand, and the empirical realities of life in 
Darjeeling on the other. When groups like the Tamang, Gurung, Rais, and others 
migrated from Nepal in the 19th century, they did so with relatively discrete socio-
cultural repertoires. Yet these systems gradually amalgamated throughout the 20th 
century as inter-ethnic settlement and labor on the plantations stirred the cauldrons of 
syncretism. As this conglomerate community took social and political form—
eventually coming to be known by the ‘Gorkha’ appellation—the constituent groups’ 
respective native languages and discrete cultural practices were “lost” (harāyo), as 
people now say, with the passing of generations. And yet, these were precisely the 
ethnological attributes that ST recognition in the 21st century demanded in no 
uncertain terms.  
 Established by Advisory Committee on Revision of SC and ST Lists (Lokur 
Committee) of 1965, the official ST criteria are as follows: 
  a) Indication of primitive traits, 
  b) Distinctive culture, 
  c) Geographical isolation, 
  d) Shyness of contact with the community at large, and 
  e) Backwardness. 
                                                 
19 Though my work with the Limbu community was limited, it seems they largely piggy-backed on the 
efforts of AITBA to secure their ST status. The Tamang are the largest ethnic group in Darjeeling. 
Thanks in large part to the work of AITBA over the past two decades, they have been able to generate 
funds and support that dwarf those of many of the smaller ethnicities in the hills. 
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Note the ways in which Requisites B and C—’distinctive culture’ and ‘geographical 
isolation’—inscribe strict logics of cultural singularity and purity. Meeting these 
conditions would seem nearly impossible for the ethnic groups of Darjeeling, for 
whom plantation life has historically been a crucible of hybrid forms. Whereas the 
dominant identity politics in the hills throughout the 20th century organized under the 
banner of the ‘Gorkha’, a hybrid identity if there ever was one, the new trajectory of 
ethnic renaissance (and the prospect of ST recognition at its core) demanded 
hybridity’s undoing. The efficacy of ethnic revitalization, in other words, hinged upon 
these respective communities’ abilities to extract their so-called ‘identities’ from an 
already melted melting pot.20 How then did organizations like AITBA attempt do this? 
Epistemic Techniques. 
 In large part the terms of ethnic revitalization were already set. Normative 
ethnological paradigms of community (especially those enshrined in the positive 
discrimination policies for Scheduled Tribes) offered ready-to-hand conceptual forms 
into which ethnic associations could press cultural—and purportedly empirical—
content. Yet the hybrid, indiscreet socio-cultural attributes of these communities 
proved unruly when mapped into the prescriptive categories and logics of the 
                                                 
20 For additional readings on the tensions between purity and hybridity (especially within the 
frameworks of multiculturalism and the nation-state) see Bolland 1992; Brah & Coombes 2000; 
Cornwell & Stoddard 2001; Garcia-Canlini 1995; Gedalof 1999; Gunew 2004; Munasinghe 2001, 2002; 
Povinelli 2002; Puri 2004; Shaw 1994; Stewart & Shaw 1994; Stewart 1999; Werbner & Modood 1997; 
Williams 1989, Young 1995; Zizek 1997. 
It is also worth noting how (as per Requisites A and E) ‘tribes’ are to have ‘primitive traits’—that is, 
characteristics not of this time. Furthermore, they are to exude ‘backwardness’—in other words, 
attributes counter-posed to the standard alignments of the modern day. ‘Backwardness’ here marks the 
‘tribal’ subject as s/he who has not as of yet progressed into the normative arenas of rationalism, 
education, democratic participation, etc. Like the requirements of cultural distinctiveness, these criteria 
pose practical problems for ethnic groups aspiring for ST status. As I will elaborate further in Chapter 
IV, the ethnic associations of Darjeeling went to great lengths to feature their most ‘backward’ 
constituents, while hiding their modern attributes. Along with pressing these groups into a 
representational bind, these official criteria encourage the primordialist bent of these programs of ethnic 
revitalization. I have written about these issues more in Middleton (forthcoming). 
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postcolonial Indian state. The quests for ST recognition and ethnic revitalization 
subsequently involved a curious reconciliation of ideational and empirical forms on 
the part of the ethnic associations leading these movements. The agonistic tensions 
between these two registers, in turn, encouraged the production of particular kinds of 
anthropological knowledge that, thanks to work of ethnic associations, have become 
central to these movements. Yet when we stop to examine the inner-workings of these 
articulations, we see that they are of peculiar epistemic qualities. In particular, these 
professed ethnologies of self have been cast in a strange relation to their purported 
referent, the people of Darjeeling. This strangely devised referentiality has, in turn, 
cast the people of Darjeeling into awkward relation with their supposed ethnology. 
These epistemic peculiarities have proven largely determinant of these knowledge 
forms’ political, social, and subjective implications. 
 In teasing out these epistemic qualities, we may turn to Kant’s Critique of Pure 
Reason to garner some useful analytic frameworks. In particular, Kant’s explication of 
the relation of knowledge to experience provides an inroad to exploring the epistemic 
qualities of ‘found’ anthropology through ethnographic means. For Kant, “Cognition 
commences with experience, yet it does not on that account all arise from 
experience.”21 As opposed to ‘empirical’ judgments, which are based on 
intuition/experience, Kant presents ‘pure’ judgments, which admit nothing empirical 
whatsoever. However, the relation of empiricism to pure reason in Kant’s model of 
knowledge is a tricky one. On the one hand, Kant must refute Hume to show that 
objective knowledge can exist and be valid irrespective of individual experience. Yet 
at the same time, he sees inherent dangers in the dogmatic practices of idealism 
(whether of Descartes or Berkeley), and thus retrieves empiricism-with-qualification 
as a way to check the hubris of reason, to restrain against the tendency of reason to go 
                                                 
21 Kant 1998: 136. 
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beyond the world which it ostensibly represents; in other words, to ground reason in 
the world.22 Pure reason and experience thereby enter into a mutually necessary, 
mutually critical relation to one another. Kant goes on to explore where imbalances in 
this relation would necessarily lead: either to a world without knowledge or a world 
perpetually thinking beyond itself. In the Critique, the consequences are of 
metaphysical proportions. In Darjeeling, they are more human. 
 ‘Homegrown’ anthropology lies at the core of ethnic renaissance in Darjeeling. 
Yet these knowledges of the purported ethnic self are as marked by their colorful 
depictions of ethnic subjects, as they are by their misrepresentation. Obviously, no 
semiotic representation can perfectly capture its referent, especially when that referent 
is something as contingent and mystified as human ‘identity’. As Elizabeth Povinelli 
points out, “In their nature as socially produced and negotiated abstractions, all 
identities [and their representation] fail to correspond fully with any particular social 
subject or groups.”23 However, as Povinelli goes on to explain, “All failures of identity 
are not the same; they are not related to state and capital institutional structures in the 
same way, and they do not produce the same discursive and affective results.”24 
Broadly speaking, the “failures of identity” of which Povinelli speaks may be 
considered a fundamental aspect of reflexive knowledge production and identification 
writ large. In Darjeeling, however, the misrepresentation of ‘identity’ has become an 
acute social problem. 
 Often the projected referents of these knowledges (i.e. the people of 
Darjeeling) bear little resemblance to their semiotic representation. Recall AITBA’s 
calendar or its video: the content for these portrayals was to be gleaned from Tamangs 
                                                 
22 Justus Hartnack’s Kant’s Theory of Knowledge (2001) provides a helpful overview of the Critique. 
For a more extended secondary engagement, see Adorno lectures on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason 
(1995). 
23 Povinelli 2002: 55. 
24 Ibid. 
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in Nepal, not India. Since their migration from Nepal, most Tamangs in India have 
‘lost’ many of the socio-cultural attributes that would typically earn them ethnological 
distinction (distinct language, religious practice, custom, dress, etc). Tamang culture in 
Nepal is thus heralded as the ‘pure’ (suddha) and ‘original/authentic’ (maulik), while 
that of India is somehow ‘diluted’ (dhamilieko) or ‘impure’ (asuddha). This idea is 
widespread among Darjeeling’s various ethnic communities, not just the Tamangs. 
Anxieties over hybridity, genuine curiosity, and the exigencies of recognition have 
prompted numerous ethnographic trips into the ‘interior’ of Nepal to gather 
information about the supposedly pure and original practices of these ethnic 
communities. The data acquired is precisely the type that becomes the content of 
media like the calendar, the documentary, the impassioned narratives of the CC 
member and Pemba, etc. These are ethnographic endeavors and thus bespeak an 
empirical element. However, and this is crucial, when brought back to the context of 
Darjeeling, these representations obtain a different intentionality;25 they come to refer 
not to subjects in Nepal, but instead to subjects in Darjeeling itself. In this way, ethnic 
associations have been able to furnish the cultural stuff of ethnic rebirth—at once 
filling politically normative ethnological forms with socio-cultural content, while 
supplying the informational scaffolding for the reconstruction of ethnic selfhoods 
among their constituents. Accordingly, this referential sleight of hand has proven 
mutually instrumental in achieving both ST recognition and ethnic jātitwa. 
 Recall AITBA’s branch meeting at the tea estate schoolhouse. The CC 
member’s pedantry walked a slippery slope between ethnology-as-worldview (the 
world as it is) and ethnology-as-ethos (the world as it should be): the Tamangs are 
Buddhists; the Tamangs wear such and such dress, practice such and such rituals, etc; 
when, where and for whom this is not the case, it should and must eventually be. The 
                                                 
25 Intentionality: the pointing to/aboutness of knowledge. Brentano 1874; Husserl 1900.  
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ethical imperative established, the issue of referentiality—that is, the question of 
which Tamangs he is actually speaking about when he spouts off ethnographic fact 
after ethnographic fact—goes unchallenged. 
 What I found most remarkable as I accompanied Pemba on his relay of 
AITBA’s message down through the estate was the issue of which elements remained 
in Pemba’s narrative versus which elements dropped out. Out was the locals’ concern 
with the political entanglements of AITBA; in was AITBA’s political achievements. 
Out was the locals’ dissatisfaction with AITBA’s cultural mandates; in was the ad 
nauseam litany of ethnographic ‘facts’. Here we see a decidedly local, informal 
iteration of the technocratic dispensations of AITBA. Whether in the form of 
documentaries “shot from the technical point of view” or in detail-ridden narratives of 
cultural singularity, AITBA has made exactitude a powerful tool for convincing 
people who they are and what they should be. But this exactitude is a matter of the 
detail and surety of the representation itself, not its referential accuracy or descriptive 
veracity. 
 In their renderings of ‘pure’ Tamang culture, the referentiality question has 
been largely obfuscated by a fog of ethnographic ‘facts’. For some like Pemba, these 
‘facts’ have condensed into resplendent streams of ethnic consciousness. For others, 
they remain a cloud hanging over everyday life—at once confusing, disorienting, and 
alienating. These varying degrees of subjectivation26—that is, how the subject finds 
relation to the discursive form—depend upon the ability, or at least the willingness, of 
the subject to recognize and/or identity his/her self in these anthropological 
constructions. Despite their purported attributes of ethnographic verisimilitude, the 
impositions of these ethnologies on the people of Darjeeling entails a necessary 
                                                 
26 Translations of Foucault use both this term as well as ‘mode of subjection’. For Foucault, mode 
d’assujettisement “is the way in which the individual establishes his relation to a rule and recognizes 
himself as obliged to put it into practice” (1986: 27). 
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disavowal of what Kant would call the empirical—or what everyday citizens might 
simply see as lived tradition or the realities of daily life. 
 And yet there is no denying the political efficacy of this referential sleight of 
hand and the pretense of exactitude with which it is enacted. Ethnological self-
representation is a crucial aspect of the ST application process. Ethnic associations are 
tasked with providing specific information about their socio-cultural, economic, 
educational, and demographic attributes. Accordingly, the essays submitted to the 
government are laden with ethnographic details, academic citations, and an 
overarching positivist bent (matched only by that of the government itself). The 
information provided plays a crucial role in augmenting and corroborating the findings 
of the all-important official ‘Ethnographic Survey’ of the groups in question, when 
and where that happens.27 
 As I learned from observing the Ethnographic Survey of 2006, these 
classificatory moments put the organizational structures of ethnic associations to the 
test.28 In the days and hours leading up to their respective study in 2006, operatives 
worked under great duress: trying to glean tips from their sources as to how to present 
themselves; traveling hundreds of kilometers to prepare localities for the day’s 
showing; and pulling all-nighters to ensure the nearest possible correspondence 
between their documents and their people. Because the selection of the site falls to the 
ethnic groups, the most remote and ‘backward’ villages were selected for study, and 
their denizens coached into the proper performance of ‘tribal culture’. As I will show 
in Chapter IV, when the ethnographic moment came to perform for the state, the 
aspiring communities went to astounding lengths to insure compliance with the criteria 
                                                 
27 The Government of West Bengal has the capabilities to conduct such ethnographic surveys of 
prospective ST communities. In states without Tribal Research Institutes (or their equivalents) ST 
certification may occur without an ethnographic survey (viz. Sikkim).  
28 Please see Chapter IV for extended discussion of the Ethnographic Survey and the dynamics of 
‘tribal’ certification. 
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of recognition. Subsequently, the ethnographic encounter became a decidedly stilted 
affair. 
 Interestingly, the people who are compelled to perform the prescribed 
ethnological forms often do so with only a vague understanding of their political 
consequences. About a year after the Ethnographic Survey of 2006, I returned to one 
of the remote villages where the study was conducted in order to explore the villagers’ 
memory of the Survey. They recalled the ethnic leaders arriving in the dead of the 
night before to coach them; the frantic assembly of their primitive artifacts; the 
beckoning of ethnic peers throughout the area; the details and embarrassment of the 
daylong performance; and the probing interviews conducted by the government 
experts who could not speak Nepali. Yet when asked why these government officials 
were gathering this information, the villagers expressed uncertainty. With about 20 of 
us crammed into a room to watch videos that I had brought with me of the Survey, my 
research assistant, Prakash, broached the subject: 
Prakash:  So what were they taking the information for? 
Older Man:  It could be that we, the ones who are here, are the ‘backward’ 
community. 
Prakash:  You mean as an OBC, an Other Backward Class [an official 
minority designation]? 
Older Man: No, not the OBC.....ahmmmm....What is it 
called?......ahmmm....’tribal’....for the ‘tribal’! 
Towns: And for the ‘tribal’, what does a community have to be or have? 
In other words, what are the criteria for being a ‘tribal’? 
Older Man:  For becoming ‘tribals’, what is there with the government, we 
cannot say. 
Prakash: So they didn’t tell you what the requirements were? 
Older Man: No, they didn’t tell us anything. Even if they did, they might 
have only told our big shots. 
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Prakash: [to the group] So you all don’t know what it takes to be ‘tribal’? 
[to which two middle age women respond in frustration] 
Woman A: We are tiny, insignificant little bugs (bhusunā). We wouldn’t 
know! 
Woman B: We were told “You should do all of these things.” So in one day 
we brought all of these things from our houses and did it. 
Right? [to the group for affirmation] 
[they affirm] 
Near the end of my fieldwork (late in 2007), I was already well familiar with the 
interleavings of class and the politics of ethnic representation that this conversation 
seemingly articulated. Yet I left this interaction particularly struck by the woman’s 
comment about she and her fellow villagers being ‘bugs’ (bhusunā). Identifying 
herself and her peers as but insects removed from the know of Indian political society 
seemed to me to be a most telling articulation of subalternity. Thrust into the 
ethnographic spotlight, yet kept in the proverbial dark, the people of Laharā Gāũ were 
made, at once, ‘tribal’ recognition’s examples and its subalterns. Neither of the class 
of the particular nor the universal, but somehow both, they were held forth as the 
embodiments of the ‘tribal’ ideal-type.29 And yet, in my conversations with them, 
these purported examples of the ‘distinct’, ‘isolated’, ‘primitive’, ‘backward’ culture 
of the Lekh could articulate neither the category (‘tribe’) nor the criteria that it entailed 
and they (ostensibly) evinced. As they themselves said, “We are tiny, insignificant 
little bugs (bhusunā). We wouldn’t know!” These testaments of subalternity prompted 
                                                 
29 Further developing a point I made in the Introduction (concerning the exempli gratia logics of ethnic 
revitalization and ‘tribal’ recognition), here I am once again working with Agamben’s consideration of 
the ‘example’, about which he writes: “In any context where it exerts its force, the example is 
characterized by the fact that it holds for all cases of the same type, and, at the same time, it is included 
among these. It is one singularity among others, which, however, stands for each of them and serves for 
all. On one hand, every example is treated in effect as a real particular case; but on the other, it remains 
understood that it cannot serve in its particularity. Neither particular nor universal, the example is the 
singular object that presents itself as such, that shows its singularity.” See “Example” in Agamben 
1993: 10-11. 
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me to revisit Partha Chatterjee’s thoughts on the ways in which political society entails 
the mediation of “domains that are differentiated by deep and historically entrenched 
inequalities of power.” And they made me think further about what role ethnological 
knowledge plays in mediating “between those who govern and those who are 
governed”.30 
 The processes of ‘tribal’ recognition clearly cast the people of Laharā Gāũ into 
specific relations with the state and the Lekh community writ large. Yet these relations 
were marked not so much by free association and communication as by significant 
degrees of mediation—themselves involving carefully calibrated dynamics of 
representational exclusion and inclusion. Understood accordingly, my conversation 
with the people of Laharā Gāũ signaled the uneven ways that knowledge gets 
translated across social and conceptual strata in Darjeeling. For ethnic associations and 
their constituents, translating particular ethnological schemas from the realms of 
‘pure’ theory into the lexicons of daily life has indeed proven a key dynamic of ST 
recognition and ethnic rebirth. But these dynamics of translation involve more than 
simply changing the linguistic terms by which socio-cultural practices are known. 
They also involve translating—or rather, transforming—conceptual schemas into 
empirical practice. In this regard, it is especially telling that the subjects in which the 
conceptual and the empirical dimensions of knowledge were to converge would 
themselves be unable to communicate the terms of their performance. 
 Articulated and performed at various levels, anthropological concepts and 
logics clearly mean different things to different people in Darjeeling. And, as we see 
with the people of Laharā Gāũ, sometimes those meanings are notably lacking, veiled, 
unclear, confusing, etc. In such instances, it is not only the dynamics of translation that 
call for ethnographic attention, but also translation’s apparent failures. Here we must 
                                                 
30 Chatterjee 2004: 66. 
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ask not only how particular kinds of anthropological knowledge translate across 
social, empirical, and conceptual levels, but also how they have not. After all, to focus 
our ethnographic attention solely on the question of translation would be to miss what 
is perhaps most telling about my conversation with the people of Laharā Gāũ: namely, 
their inability to speak the language of their reckoning. 
On ‘Pure Identity’ 
 Shortly after the Ethnographic Survey in 2006, the Government of West 
Bengal sent the applicant communities a request for further information. The enclosed 
‘Census Form’31 asked for data on a litany of demographic topics ranging from 
population distribution; marriage, divorce, and widowhood rates; to literacy, 
occupation, income figures, etc. The request effectively transferred the onus of 
enumeration from the state back to its supplicant communities. For the ethnic 
associations handling the ST bids, this presented both a bind and an opportunity. 
Urgent meetings were held between and within ethnic groups to discuss the means 
through which such data could be gathered, and ultimately what kind of data they 
should provide. In one such meeting, held at the Department of Information and 
Cultural Affairs (DICA) of the DGHC, a representative (who not incidentally was also 
a high-level DGHC official) explained that the local Block Development Offices 
(BDOs) did not have the required information on these groups (since they were not 
already STs). However, he went on to explain how, if the ethnic groups were clever, 
they could have the BDO stamp the forms, thereby giving the forms the appearance of 
being official. He ended his instructions with an important coda: “There is one very 
important thing about Hinduism. If we are ‘tribals’ then we should not put down that 
we are followers of Hinduism.” 
                                                 
31 ‘Census Form’ is how the document came to be known by the ethnic groups in question. The actual 
form was titled, ‘Particulars Required by the Members of the Cultural Research Institute’. 
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 Later, conversation shifted to the ways they should respond to the questions 
about education and economic status, in light of the prerequisites of backwardness. 
“For the education question,” one leader opined, “We should be 95% backwards, at 
least!” Then sarcastically, “What does this term ‘illiterate’ mean anyhow?” His joke 
elicited laughter, but also hinted at the imminent doctoring of information that was to 
occur later in the offices of these respective ethnic associations. 
 For those ethnic associations that had previously endeavored to enumerate 
their local populations, only minor tweaking would be required to fill out the 
government’s form. Others used what little census information could be derived from 
local voter registers and then added an estimated population growth rate to arrive at 
current numbers. To fill in other fields of the Census Form, many simply made up 
numbers to match what they perceived to be the appropriate profile. During one of 
these doctoring-meetings, I pulled the newly appointed “demographer” of the given 
ethnic group aside shortly after he had presented his figures to the association. Having 
heard him lament the “technical difficulties” of understanding the Census Form itself 
and filling out its fields, I was curious to know how he had gone about ascertaining the 
required information. “So were you going village to village?” I asked him. 
 “No, I was just doing the math. We just had to make the numbers work out 
perfectly,” he responded with a wry grin—the implication being the numbers were 
completely fudged. His number crunching served his community well, as their 
information was accepted by the government. Others who were less careful with their 
numeric pandering to ideal-types were punished for their lack of calculation. When 
government statisticians caught the inconsistencies in their figures, their forms were 
sent back for further correction. Their demographic profile of ‘backwardness’ literally 
did not add up. 
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 Manipulating numbers was but one of the many tactics used by aspiring ethnic 
groups to conform to established ideal-types. These tactics made extensive use of 
‘pure reason’ to do so. Recall from Kant, that as opposed to the ‘empirical’, the ‘pure’ 
was that which admitted no experience, no empirical knowledge whatsoever. 
Mathematics is the classic example: 2+2=4 does not necessarily derive from 
experience, but holds for all future experiences. The demographic fabrication of 
‘backwardness’ was therefore largely a figment of ‘pure’ identity—that is, one devoid 
of empirical grounds. 
 Yet, if we look deeper into these tactics, we encounter a second form of ‘pure’ 
identity—namely, one cleansed of the polluting trace of hybridity. Indeed, ‘pure’ here 
serves as a productive double entendre. The champions of ethnic rebirth in Darjeeling 
advocated ‘pure’ identity in both senses of the term. As per their logics: the 
consummate born-again ethnic subject was predicated on the recovery of ‘pure’ 
(suddha) and original (maulik) culture, religion, language, etc. And this predication 
itself involved a flight from empiricism, a referential sleight of hand, through which 
the purported referents of this knowledge (i.e. the people of Darjeeling), were obviated 
from the representation. The rendering of ‘pure’ ethnic identity was, in other words, 
largely an exercise of ‘pure’ reason. 
 Relevant here are the socio-cultural engineering programs and knowledge 
practices through which all traces of hybridity, syncretism, and the like are 
representationally disavowed and/or forcibly exterminated in the name of producing 
cultural purity. These cultural purification programs are said to serve two purposes. 
They restore the ‘pure’, ‘original’, and ‘distinct’ ethnic practices that were ‘lost’ 
(harāyo) since migrating to India from Nepal—thereby enabling subjects to recover 
their ‘true’ ethnic identities. Second, they are a means of achieving compliance with 
the ethnological requisites of ST recognition. When we examine the criteria and 
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demands of ST recognition, we see that groups’ prospects of attaining liberal rights 
and recognition hinge precisely on these kinds of ‘pure’, ‘distinct’, and certifiable 
ethnological qualities.32 Subsequently, the use of ideal-types and establishes schemas 
of anthropological knowledge have thereby become a viable way for populations to 
represent and constitute themselves as morally and politically endowed communities. 
The anthropology of ethnic self has accordingly emerged as an effective political 
technology of communities through which groups may establish a sense of identity, at 
once unto themselves and within the nation-state.33 
 But due to the epistemic peculiarities discussed earlier, these ways of 
representing and remaking the ethnic subject involve marked degrees of 
misrepresentation, distortion, and compulsion. As they are propagated these 
(mis)representations carry their own imperatives of ascription. For the linked purposes 
of ethnic rebirth and ST status, subjects are asked not only to recognize themselves in 
‘their’ anthropologies, but, more than that, to take on these prescribed ethnic forms in 
their daily lives. These imperatives can cause significant problems for the people, who 
wittingly or unwittingly have become the objects of anthropological knowledge—-and 
yet are hereby burdened with the task of managing the discrepancies between these 
‘pure’ anthropological forms and the empirical, ever-contingent conditions of their 
daily lives. 
 The official delineations of the ‘tribal’ ideal-type (along with all the perceived 
criteria that attend it in the postcolonial imagination) have become a template for the 
refashioning of ethnic identity in the hills. By a strangely perverse logic then, the 
                                                 
32 I address these matters in greater detail in Chapters III and IV. 
33 This formulation is derived from Foucault’s notion of the ‘political technologies of individuals’, 
which he explains partly as “the way by which… we have been led to recognize ourselves as a society, 
as part of a social entity, as a part of a nation or of a state” (1988: 146). For the people of Darjeeling, 
anthropologies of the ethnic self have likewise become a way for people to recognize their collective 
(and individual) selves as part of an ‘ethnic’ community, itself a legitimate constituent of the nation-
state. 
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anthropological techniques of the ‘self’ have proven to be highly inductive affairs. 
They have largely involved finding, identifying, or otherwise creating socio-cultural 
content to fill preconceived conceptual forms. Throughout these auto-representational 
practices, established ethnological paradigms have enjoyed nearly complete epistemic 
privilege. Of the hundreds of conversations I had about ethnic revitalization and ST 
status during the course of my research, I can recall exactly two individuals who ever 
questioned the category of ‘tribal’ itself. I recall no unsolicited instances when the 
‘culture’ concept was subjected to critique—and certainly not the kind of which it has 
undergone in academic anthropological circles over the past several decades. The de 
facto credence of these anthropological forms (along with their rampant circulation), I 
believe, calls for a renewed questioning of the specific histories through which 
particular paradigms of anthropological distinction have come to structure the 
contemporary.34 
 As I came to appreciate and loath through this research, disciplinary histories 
are constantly articulating themselves in the identity politics of Darjeeling—often 
times in ways that professional anthropologists today may find unsettling, if increasing 
familiar. But, so too are other histories—lived histories of hybridity, prejudice, and 
anxieties over belonging in India, which may or may not be reconciled through these 
anthropological techniques of self. In this regard, ethnic groups’ engineering of 
cultural singularity, their ethnological submissions to the government, their stilted 
ethnographic performances, and their crunching of numbers to fit the bill of the 
certifiably backward ‘tribal’ ideal-type necessarily involve the fraught negotiation of 
both national and local histories. From the former spawns the ethnological schemes 
that have come to structure the prospects of ethnic renaissance and ‘tribal’ recognition. 
                                                 
34 This is the project of Chapter III. 
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From the latter, spawns the empirical realities of history and contemporary life that 
prove so unruly when pressed into the former’s ideational mold. 
 As groups like the Tamang know well, the political viability of ethnological 
self-representation in large part hinges upon the ability to at least provisionally 
reconcile the tensions between these conceptual and empirical domains. Yet in 
weighing the social and epistemic strategies through which this is attempted, we must 
remember that these anthropological reconstructions of the ethnic self are intended for 
more than just political purposes; they aim to fundamentally refashion the social and 
subjective lives of ethnic subjects. That such ‘pure’ renditions of the ethnic subject 
would be propagated as assertoric (actually true), or even apodictic (necessarily true)35 
not only to the Government of India, but also to the very constituents they ostensibly 
claim to represent both politically and conceptually, is a dynamic that raises serious 
questions about what happens when a provisionally deductive, descriptive enterprise 
such as anthropological knowledge-making becomes prescriptive of people’s ways of 
living. Here the question of the ‘ethics of anthropological knowledge’ refigures itself 
as an object of ethnographic attention in its own right—one to be pursued beyond the 
university, or wherever anthropological knowledge is making its mark. Significantly, 
in places like Darjeeling, the debate itself is found to be notably lacking. 
Beyond Governmentality. 
 Questioning the histories through which ethnological forms of anthropological 
knowledge have come to condition minorities’ prospects of attaining rights and 
recognition in India is beyond the scope of this chapter. (These matters are addressed 
in Chapter III). But for present purposes, suffice it to say that the official systems of 
recognition in India today have emerged out of a complex interplay of colonialism, 
                                                 
35 These are some of Kant’s ‘categories’. Along with ‘problematic’ (merely possible), ‘assertoric’ and 
‘apodictic’ fall under the heading ‘Modality’. Kant 1998: 206-212. 
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disciplinary anthropology, state formation, and the development of liberal thought on 
the subcontinent. Even a cursory glance over these colonial and postcolonial histories 
shows ‘tribal’ recognition to be a conspicuous means of classifying and governing 
populations. In this regard, ‘tribal’ recognition remains a mechanism of 
governmentality.36 The anthropologies of ethnic self taken up in Darjeeling have 
subsequently developed as an innovative response to the demands and opportunities 
created by the Government of India’s policies of positive discrimination. They are, as 
Chatterjee would have it, a facet of the ‘politics of the governed’. As such, one of their 
signature functions–and indeed one their greatest challenges—then is mediating 
between the idealist logics of the secular nationalist project and the day-to-day 
realities of ethnic subjects.37 
 The Foucauldian overtones are undeniable. India’s systems of positive 
discrimination are saturated with ethnological paradigms of both an informal and 
formal/disciplinary variety. The politics of recognition have subsequently become an 
arena for obvious exercises of anthropological knowledge-power. Here we may look 
to the articulations of the Indian government and its anthropologists, as well as those 
of Darjeeling’s ethnic associations and the individuals that comprise their 
membership. And as we saw earlier, normative ethnological forms makes their way 
‘down’ into localities through branch meetings and knowledge-agents like AITBA’s 
Central Committee member and even Pemba, who so passionately convey the message 
of ethnic revitalization. Here we might profitably recall Foucault’s critical insight that 
“the individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle,” in order to 
appreciate how the people of Darjeeling have become both the subjects and objects of 
                                                 
36 Foucault 1979. 
37 Chatterjee 2001, 2004. 
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anthropological knowledge—at once turning ethnological lenses upon themselves in 
response to the logics of liberal governance.38 
 As we make our way ‘down’ further and further into the lifeworlds of everyday 
subjects, again we find anthropological knowledge-power at work in subtle, ever-more 
diffuse forms. And again the Foucauldian analytic seems apt. Along similar lines, the 
overt effects that these ethnologies of the governed have had on people’s socialities 
and sensibilities brings to mind Corrigan and Sayer’s critical consideration of the ways 
in which state formation works at the level of the “constitution and regulation of social 
identities, ultimately of our subjectivities.”39 These insights shed light on how even the 
most intimate aspects of ethnic rebirth in the hills tie into greater systems of state 
formation and liberal governance, manifest most palpably in the policies of secular 
nationalism in India. 
 Thinking historically about the socio-political efficacy of ethnological 
techniques of self today, we might therefore draw a line from the governance of 
colonial India, through the policies of the Nehruvian developmental state, through the 
emergence of contemporary Indian political society, all the way to today’s born-again 
ethnic subject. Following Foucault, we might furthermore recognize this line as the 
penetrating trajectory of governmentality. Adding to this genealogy the allure of 
rights, recognition, and positive discrimination, we can understand the political 
compulsion of populations like those in Darjeeling and beyond to announce 
themselves in such exacting and singular anthropological forms. Tracing this line 
further down into the subjects par excellence of ethnic rebirth, we might even come to 
see Pemba’s shining subjectivity as the embodiment of a greater apparatus of 
epistemic forms and political rationality. By way of this line, even the very feeling of 
                                                 
38 Foucault 1980: 99. On liberalism and ‘the cunning of recognition’, see Povinelli 2002. 
39 Corrigan & Sayer 1985: 2. 
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ethnic rebirth may be reduced to an ‘effect’ and ‘articulation’ of anthropological 
knowledge-power. 
 However, and this is ethnographically crucial, when we begin to explore the 
interiorities of ethnic subjects further, we find a more complex picture. Upon entry 
into the domain of individuals, our line begins to break up, diminish, refract, scatter. 
For even in the shining subjectivity of the born-again ethnic subject, there is always 
more to the story. There are always other lines. 
 Ethnographic engagement with the people of Darjeeling shows clearly that not 
all terms and conditions of the ethnic subjects may be reduced to an effect of 
anthropological knowledge-power. What is needed in addition to a sustained concern 
with the regulatory effects of anthropological knowledge-power is an ethnographic, 
phenomenological appreciation of the contingencies through which subjects are 
finding relation to the normative anthropologies of the day. The following section 
ventures such an analysis. 
Fathomable Interiorities 
 For days, villagers have made their way to Pemba’s home. In each hand they 
carry a plastic bag: one a kilo of sugar, the other a kilo of flower. In Bidhuwā Busti, 
this is the standard neighborly donation upon the death of a family member.40 Two 
weeks earlier Pemba’s ailing mother had passed away. During her life, she had 
considered herself a Hindu, yet since her death Pemba has taken care to assure that 
every detail of her passing is attended to in the proper Tamang Buddhist way. It being 
the 16th day since her death, the lamas who had taken up residence for the past several 
days have finally completed their duties. As I approach, the house seems to lack its 
usual cheer. Outside I do not see the goat hides drying in the sun, soon to become the 
                                                 
40 Augmenting these, the village samaj and the local branch of AITBA contributed funds to offset the 
expenses of the funeral rights. 
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heads of one of Pemba’s illustrious and veritably ‘authentic’ Tamang ḍamphu drums. 
I call into the house to find Pemba alone. With his wife in the tea fields plucking her 
daily quota and the kids off at school, there is a solemn stillness inside the home. I 
wonder if I am intruding on the quietude of his mourning. 
 He greets me with warmth, and I offer him my apologies for being unable to 
attend his mother’s ghewā (funerary rite). As always, he welcomes me into his home, 
and I offer him my two plastic bags. I notice right away he lacks his usual zeal. His 
mannerisms are unmistakably demure. He speaks in hushed even tones. Yet something 
else is different. There is something about his appearance that doesn’t ring true. He 
seems somehow younger, frailer, smaller than the boisterous Pemba of before. I 
wonder if the grief could have taken a toll so quickly on his countenance. Then I 
realize: he has recently shaved his head. His once close-cropped hair is now but 
stubble. When I ask him about it, he explains that he has shaved his head to mark the 
mourning of his deceased mother. This practice upon death is commonplace in Hindu 
homes. So why has Pemba—a born-again Buddhist, done so? 
 Pemba needs little prompting to explain the apparent contradiction. Pemba 
describes that he was uncertain whether or not he should shave his head. Particular 
family members and neighbors believed he should do so. They pressured him 
accordingly, he tells me. His explanation then wanders into a longwinded history of 
the Tamang, and how upon the death of Nepal’s king, all subjects would be required 
by law to shave their head. This practice was part and parcel of the religious mandate 
in the Hindu kingdom, Pemba explains, “It did not exist in our Buddhist dharma. But 
what to do now? It has become tradition (paramparā). That is why. If I don’t shave off 
my hair my friends in the village will say, ‘Your mother has died, at least shave off 
your hair.’ This is all. More and more, the people debate. Somebody says one thing 
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and somebody else says another. The most important thing: what I wish to state is that 
our heart must be pure. If this is pure then the soul will pass away peacefully.” 
 What is particularly interesting about Pemba’s explanation is that the 
embodied history—or as he frames it, the ‘tradition’ (paramparā)—that he calls upon 
to justify the shaving of his head is in fact the very history of Hindu ‘oppression’ and 
sanskritization that he and his AITBA cadres rail against with such conviction. In fact, 
their cultural purification programs have been implemented with the expressed design 
of ridding and thereby reversing this history of Hindu influence. And yet, here Pemba 
elicits this very history to justify his action. This was one of the many contradictions 
of his explanation. At one point he alluded to the troubling history through which 
Tamangs were forced to take up this practice;41 at another, he offered veiled references 
to the pressures of local tradition; still at others, he reverted back into his familiar 
idiom of identity-speak, reeling off a litany of ethnographic facts about how true 
Tamangs care for their dead—‘facts’ seemingly torn straight from the proverbial pages 
ethnic rebirth. 
 I found Pemba’s narrative exceptionally difficult to follow. Ricocheting from 
one point to another, he seemed unable to justify his decision in any coherent matter. 
Clearly, he was torn between two traditions—one, the lived tradition of his family, 
friends, and neighbors for whom the shaving of one’s head was a routine marker of 
grief; the other, the reconstructed ‘tradition’ of AITBA which so stridently espoused 
the return of the Tamang’s original (maulik), ‘pure’ (suddha), and even ‘primordial’ 
(pauranik) ‘religion’, ‘culture’, and the like. Sitting through his painful search for 
                                                 
41 David Holmberg notes that Tamangs in Nepal still will shave their head upon the death of a family 
member. However, the meanings attributed to this act differ from those commonly held by Hindus. 
Nevertheless, these practices seem to emerge out of sustained histories of sanskritization. Holmberg 
notes that Tamang death rites stress social solidarity and inclusion, whereas Hindu rites stress pollution 
and social separation. In his narrative, Pemba speaks about pollution, but beyond that mention, it is 
difficult to locate his understanding of his shaven head and related acts within the spectrum Holmberg 
speaks of. (Personal correspondence with Holmberg). 
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reason, I also began to sense the shame and confusion this decision had engendered for 
my friend.42 
 Pemba’s dilemma signaled many of the conditions and paradoxes of ethnic 
rebirth in Darjeeling. Along these lines, his narrative affords a poignant window into 
the phenomenology of ‘found’ anthropologies as they are experienced in Darjeeling. 
Step by convoluted step, Pemba walks us through the frameworks of his decision. In 
doing so, he explicates what the phenomenologist Alfred Schutz would refer to as “the 
criterion by which [he chose] one interpretive scheme…out of the many that [were] 
available when the moment [came] to explicate a given lived experience.”43 What I 
found most remarkable listening to Pemba was how he formulated the tension he felt 
between the lived tradition of his family on the one hand, and the reconstructed 
‘tradition’ of Tamang rebirth on the other. These contending interpretive schemes 
were clearly pulling him in opposite directions. What is more, he formulated them as 
just that—contending schemes. To express his grief via an ostensibly Hindu act or via 
the prescribed acts of a ‘pure’, reconstructed Tamang Buddhist tradition: this was the 
troubling question. Coming from a syncretic family tradition and pressured from all 
sides to do what was culturally right, Pemba in the end chose the interpretive scheme 
of lived tradition. But while that choice may have satisfied his family members who 
pressured him to do what had always been done, for him the choice clearly engendered 
misgivings about his personal commitment to Tamang ethnic rebirth. 
                                                 
42 Thinking back upon this conversation, I cannot help but wonder the extent to which my presence and 
identity as an academic anthropologist affected its course. Though I broached the subject of his shaven 
head, Pemba clearly felt compelled to explain his act. And he did so with remarkable historical and 
ethnological awareness. Pemba’s flagging search for a coherent justification to his rather simple act 
poses the questions: Why did he feel so compelled to explain himself in the nuanced (if contradictory) 
way he did? Did he see me, the anthropologist, as an arbitrator of his own ethnic authenticity? In this 
instance, I have no definitive answers to these questions. I do, however, take up this general reflexive 
concern with ‘finding’ anthropology in the section titled “A Foreign Presence” of Chapter IV. 
43 Schutz 1967: 85. 
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 Precisely because it was fraught with social, political, and analytic tension, 
Pemba’s decision to shave his head exemplifies the ways ethnic revitalization is 
increasingly being experienced in the hills. At one level, the circumstances of his 
dilemma (the social pressures, the political implications, the subjective loyalties, etc) 
signal the inherent contingencies through which the subjects of ethnic revitalization—
even the most committed among them—are coming to terms with the anthropological 
imperatives of these movements. At another level, the entire moment is indicative of 
the doubts and difficult decisions that ethnological knowledge has imposed upon 
people’s socio-cultural practice. Whether it is a question of how one expresses grief, 
how one celebrates a given holiday, or with whom one associates, defining the self vis 
a vis ethnological paradigms has become an increasingly compulsive practice in and 
of itself. More so than the choices individuals make in a given instance, it is this very 
compulsion to render the self and the other in particular anthropological ways that 
most comprehensively marks the encroachment of this modern knowledge form into 
the lifeworlds of everyday subjects. 
--- 
 Pemba’s personal investment in Tamang ethnic rebirth created for him a 
difficult decision at an especially difficult time of his life. We must remember that the 
time around his mother’s death was by all accounts a period of intense mourning. In 
evaluating the nuances of his decision, it is therefore important to think 
compassionately about the more affective dimensions of his dilemma. With his 
mother’s soul passing through the bardo and he and his family experiencing the pain 
of losing a loved one, Pemba’s decision carried with it its own intensity. It is difficult 
to ascertain exactly how the affects of the moment animated, shrouded, and charged 
Pemba’s negotiation of lived versus reconstructed ‘tradition’. The anguish of his 
dilemma, however, was readily apparent to me as I sat with him through his befuddled 
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account of his own mental life. These traces of affect were conveyed as much through 
his gestures, body language, and emotional expression as they were through the words 
by which he tried to make sense of his decision. 
 As we saw with his proselytizing down in the tea-estate, Pemba was certainly 
one to trumpet the logics of ethnic rebirth. Tamang Buddhism, as he was wont to tell, 
had completely revolutionized his being, transforming him from a deadbeat alcoholic 
into a respectable, employed father and leader of ethnic renaissance within his 
community. Yet despite the fact that the discovery of Tamang ‘culture’ and Tamang 
Buddhism had given him what he called the brightness (ujyālo) of his being, he 
seemingly betrayed his own story of ethnic makeover—arguably when it mattered 
most. Amid the grief and social pressures of his mother’s death, Pemba was unwilling 
to turn his back on lived tradition. Certainly, it would have been easy for both he and I 
to discard the shaving of his head as an erratic byproduct of a grief-ridden 
circumstance, but as his searching explanation made clear, he himself was unsettled by 
his self-contradictory decision—especially so, in the presence of me, a friend but 
always-also an anthropologist. In trying to explain himself, he in many ways seemed 
to be coming to terms with the limits of his own ethnic makeover. In this regard, his 
decision and his struggles to make sense of it, shed revealing light on the limits of 
anthropological schemas in (re)forming the ethnic subject. Admittedly, I learned a lot 
by asking him about his shaven head. Regrettably, I caused him added despair by 
doing so. Were I somehow able to return to this conversation, I would wish to tell him 
that a perfect rationale was not necessary. Considering his grief, perhaps neither was it 
possible. 
--- 
 For this study, the question of affect has significance beyond Pemba’s 
mourning. Throughout this dissertation, affect stands as an important counter-attention 
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to the question of knowledge. While the study of ‘found’ anthropology can be a 
powerful analytic for exploring the dynamics of ethnic ‘identity’ in Darjeeling and 
beyond, a sole attention to knowledge cannot adequately understand the intensity of 
the ‘identity’ question in Darjeeling. ‘Identity’ or astitwa/chinhāri as it is also known, 
is a uniquely charged, and deeply historical, issue in the hills. As I argue in the 
following chapter on Anxious Belongings, affect is that charge. Anxieties about 
belonging in India have largely precipitated these groups’ turn to ethnological 
knowledge as a means to constitute themselves and their place in the nation-state. So 
too have these affective longings for rights, recognition, and a secure sense of self 
animated their anthropological makeovers with palpable intensity. In this research, 
affect must therefore be considered alongside the question of ‘found’ anthropologies. 
Through this multiattentional method44, the ethnic subject comes into view as always 
the embodier of alternative dimensions of social and subjective life. His/her 
ethnography, as I aim to show throughout these chapters on knowledge and belonging, 
can thereby make for a more spirited anthropology of knowledge.45 
 To return to Pemba and the limits of his own ethnic makeover: even if we were 
to jettison the influence of affect and focus exclusively on the question of knowledge 
per se, Pemba’s phenomenology still challenges any unilateral models of subject 
formation—especially those that focus exclusively on the generative capacities of 
knowledge-power. His decision was shot-through with multiple, contending lines of 
anthropological knowledge—most notably, those of lived tradition and those of 
                                                 
44 Boyer 2010. 
45 I use ‘spirited’ here to suggest the dialectical counter to what might be deemed the ‘system’ of 
ethnological knowledge-power in India. In doing so, I borrow insight from Boyer’s work on dialectical 
knowledge, Spirit and System (2005). Though I believe knowledge-power is a powerful optic for 
studying ‘found’ anthropology in Darjeeling, the optic (both descriptively and methodologically) 
wrongly diminishes the dialectical nature of ethnological knowledge production in Darjeeling. Raising 
the question of affect/belonging is, I believe, a productive way of attending to the role that potentiality, 
creativity, and subjective agency plays in shaping the contours of ‘found’ anthropology and ethnic 
renaissance in the hills. 
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(re)constructed ‘tradition’. The intersection of these ‘lines’, itself involved its own set 
of contingencies: the social pressures exerted on him by his family members and 
friends, the imperatives of ethnic rebirth championed by AITBA, or the affects of his 
personal grief, to name a few. In this way, Pemba’s seemingly simple but subjectively 
vexed decision typifies the experiential dynamics of ethnic renaissance in the hills. 
 A Foucauldian concern for knowledge-power might rightfully scale back and 
point to the exigencies of ST recognition in shaping Pemba’s subjectivity, as well as 
the pan-ethnic dynamics of rebirth within which Pemba has allegedly re-found 
himself.46 But such an approach would be hamstrung in accounting for the social and 
subjective contingencies through which individuals—even those born-again—are 
                                                 
46 A note here on those models that see recognition as the moment par excellence of modern identity 
formation: Scholars of various intellectual traditions corroborate this view of recognition. Judith Butler 
goes so far as to claim, “Recognition is not conferred upon the subject, but forms that subject.” Here, 
recognition obtains a seemingly monopolistic hold over the subject; “it forms the subject” (1993: 225). 
Empirically, this logic echoes with that of the leaders of ethnic revival who insist that recognition—
whether that of the State, or that of the subject who recognizes his/her true ethnic self in their 
anthropology—holds the key to ethnic uplift. The community will be whole, will be validated, if they 
can only achieve recognition---be it through ST status, the Sixth schedule, a separate state of 
Gorkhaland, or the inter-subjective resonance of jātitwa. Recognition, in both these etic and emic 
views, shores up what Taylor deems the “supposed links between recognition and identity” (1992: 25). 
My data challenges this logic.  
 In fact, I will maintain that an over-attention to recognition has particularly adverse affects for 
the study of ethnic subject formation and/or ‘identity’. First, the monopolistic notion that recognition 
forms the subject grants undue authority to the power of discourse to effect subjects. It circumscribes 
the ontology of the subject by assigning him/her only discursive potentiality. Second, it brackets out the 
inherent social and subjective complexity of the subject by pursuing his/her formation through the 
prefigured analytic of recognition. By way of gross inductive reasoning, such a view mistakes the 
conditioning terms of the circumstance of recognition for the qualities of those subjects who inhabit it. 
The subject’s heterodoxic attributes suffer a double negation—originally by the empirical strictures of 
recognition, and then again in the interpretation. My concern is that any study that approaches the 
question of identity and/or subject formation through an expressed attention to recognition will 
inevitably be steered into a blinkered understanding. Moments of recognition are by definition 
prefigured social scenarios in which particular discursive forms are automatically privileged. When 
examined in the context of state systems of recognition, their over-determined social constitution 
prefigures our findings of governmentality. In other words we are left to see what was already 
presupposed in the social scenario itself—governmentality.  
 For various construals of recognition and its relation to subject formation, see Althusser 1971 
(especially the ‘hailing vignette’). Weedon (2004) provides an accessible commentary on this aspect of 
Althusser. Bourdieu and Boltanski 1975: 8 (translated by Thompson 1984: 46 and also cited in 
Williams 1991: 247) provides a more ideologically concerned model of recognition and subject 
formation. On these themes, see also Elizabeth Povinelli 2002 and Charles Taylor 1992. 
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finding relation to the discursive (re)formations of ‘identity’ in Darjeeling. As Pemba 
might attest, these dynamics can be neither drawn nor lived by a single line. 
--- 
 Pemba now carries with him a certificate denoting his designation as a member 
of a Scheduled Tribe of India. The advantages he and his family will receive as STs 
will in all likelihood improve their quality of life. He, moreover, has seemingly found 
in ethnic revitalization a sense of purpose, identity, and belonging that long eluded 
him. Many of his neighbors have not—either because of their respective ethnic 
association’s less adroit maneuverings of political society; because of their individual 
refusal to recognize themselves in the image of the revitalized ethnic subject; or 
because of their unwillingness to change themselves and their social world in 
accordance to such ethnological prescriptions. Here the achievements of ethnic ‘uplift’ 
are tempered by the messy experiential dynamics that accrue in the shadows of ethnic 
rebirth. Nevertheless, as ethnological self-awareness continues to seep into all walks 
of life, it is clear that the interwoven power of state and ethnic subject formation 
continues to reconfigure how individuals understand, relate, and experience their 
socio-cultural practice, their community, and their selves. 
 That said, Pemba’s story suggests that ethnological knowledge works as much 
to form and reform the ethnic subject as it does to divide his/her subjectivity. Thinking 
through the fraught, ever-tenuous circumstances of Pemba’s ethnic makeover, as well 
as those of the Darjeeling populace writ large, we can begin to appreciate how the 
linked power of state and ethnic subject formation “works through the way it forcibly 
organizes, and divides, subjectivities, and thereby produces and reproduces quite 
material forms of sociality.”47 Importantly, it is not merely those who contest ethnic 
                                                 
47 Sayer 1994: 374. 
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revitalization that confirm Sayer’s notion of divided subjectivities, but also those who 
epitomize ethnic revitalization. 
 The following section takes a deeper look at how ‘found’ anthropological 
knowledge is being actualized in socio-cultural practice. After all, in the context of 
Darjeeling, the turn to ethnological knowledge is not merely about representing 
subjects, it is also about making and remaking them in particular ways. It is worth then 
considering further how this comes to be. 
Living Knowledge. 
 “No, you’re doing it wrong. Like this, like this!” a voice exclaims from the 
corner of the barren concrete gomba. 
 Having just meandered in, Anju freezes in her tracks, then looks left to see her 
uncle seated in the rippling light of 109 butter lamps. “What?” she says to him. 
 “Like this” Again bringing his hands to prayer position at his forehead and 
then lowering them to his chest, as he bends slightly forward in his chair. Anju mimics 
along, and then stops. 
 Everyone is watching. 
 “Like this?” She pauses to ask, her hands still held in prayer position. 
 “No. Now prostrate! Go down.” 
 “What?” 
 “Down! Down!” 
 “Down?” 
 “Yes, go down!” Still seated, he guides her by again bending forward slightly. 
 Standing there just a few steps inside the gomba threshold, she is clearly on 
stage. Everyone bites their lips to hold back laughter. After all, this is supposed to be a 
somber occasion. She hesitantly starts lowering her body toward the concrete floor, 
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looking left for approval that she is indeed doing it right. A nod of approval. She 
continues moving to the floor in hesitant, segmented movements. Finally her chest 
touches down and she stretches her body out toward the newly minted Buddha statue 
that presides over the temple. Once fully prone, she hears approval from the five or six 
relatives in the room and quickly returns to her feet with a smile. Now confident with 
the sequence, she hurriedly proceeds through the final two of three prostrations. 
Having passed the test, she holds back an embarrassed grin and sneaks, relieved, to the 
side of the room, joining the relatives who have gathered for the 49th day funerary rites 
of their recently deceased ancestor. Slowly, other Gurungs begin to trickle into the 
half-finished gomba to attend the ghewā. 
 Ten years ago, the death of a Gurung in Bidhuwā Busti would have typically 
been marked by a rite of the Hindu tradition, but today this family has chosen that of 
Buddhism. Since early morning, the local branch leaders of the Gurungs’ ethnic 
association, the Tamu Chhoj Dhin (TCD)48, have been preparing the temple, along 
with several Buddhist monks who have been hired for the day. Unfortunately, the 
monks are not Gurungs, but these Tamang lamas will have to do until the Gomba 
Management Committee can afford to sponsor a Gurung lama to live in the village and 
see after the temple. The temple itself, which doubles as a Gurung ‘cultural center’, is 
the pride and joy of the local TCD members. In fact, their grassroots initiative to build 
the Guru Pema Choeling Gomba (est. 2006) has earned the local branch much repute 
among Gurung communities stretching across the Darjeeling, Sikkim, Kalimpong and 
beyond.49 For the Gurungs of the hills, and especially for those of this village, the 
                                                 
48 The TCD’s registered English name is: The Darjeeling Gurung (Tamu) Welfare Association. 
49 For the temple’s inauguration in 2006, thousands descended on the village from Sikkim, Kalimpong, 
and Darjeeling. 
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gomba, even in its incomplete construction, is an important symbol of their ethnic 
revitalization.50 
 Still, the entire setting is somewhat unfamiliar for the family who has gathered 
on this particular morning. The warmth of the butter lamps, the wafting smoke of 
juniper, the cadence of the lamas chanting a foreign tongue are all part of a Buddhist 
religious tradition that until very recently had far less traction in the religious practices 
of the village. That Anju would be so unsure of the proper Buddhist practice upon 
entering the new temple thus occurred through no fault of her own. In fact, her uncle 
who coached her through the routine movements had just perfected them himself 
minutes earlier. Nevertheless, they were there as a family making a conscious decision 
to relinquish the Hindu tradition of their past—marked by what they now saw as the 
snobbish Brahmans with their inscrutable Sanskrit, exploitative fees, and oppressive 
histories—so as to embrace the questionably ‘original’ religion of the Gurungs, 
Buddhism.51 That a departed soul hung in the balance only upped the stakes of their 
                                                 
50 Elsewhere, I have written about this temple and its relation to ethnic revitalization. See Middleton 
2008. A similar sea-change toward Buddhism among Gurungs in Nepal is noted by Ernestine McHugh 
(2006). 
51 The debate over what is original and/or authentic Gurung culture rages in Nepal as well, where 
numerous ethnic associations of Gurungs represent different viewpoints. These are in Pokhara, Nepal: 
Tamu Dhin Kaski; Tamu Chhoj Dhin; Tamu Pye Lhu Sangh; and at the national level: The Gurung 
National Council; the Nepal Gurung (Tamu) Mahila Sangh (a women’s association); the Nepal Gurung 
Yuva Sangh (youth association). The Syarlo Tamu Pye Lhu Sangh represents Gurungs living in the 
eastern portions of Nepal. These groups are divided according to the demographics of their constituency 
(age, region, gender), political leanings, but also very deeply by divergent opinions as to what 
constitutes ‘original’ Gurung socio-cultural and religious practice. The main cleavage has organized 
around the place of Hinduism in Gurung socio-cultural practice. In this sense, the Gurungs reflect the 
growing historiographic conciousness among Nepal’s janājāti communities that Hindu was imposed 
upon them by the central powers Hindu monarchical state. While certain groups have accepted this 
influence as an indelible part of their contemporary socio-cultural practice and tradition, others have 
turned against these histories of Hindu ‘oppression’ in order to reconstitute themselves as culturally and 
politically distinct from the ruling high-caste majority. Studies that have dealt with these histories and 
their contemporary effects include Levine 1987; Onta 1996; Pfaff-Czarnecka & Gelner et al 1997; 
Whelpton 2005; Hangen 2005, 2007; Tamang 2008. 
 There has been occasional communication between the Gurungs of Darjeeling and these 
associations in Nepal (including research delegations sent from Darjeeling and Sikkim and cultural-
troops sent from Nepal to India for the purposes of raising cultural awareness), but they have yet to 
constitute formal and sustained cross-border relations.  
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conscious decision to choose a new, supposedly old, tradition. Part and parcel of a less 
than pacific sea change within Gurung communities, they were participating in a 
movement toward their ‘original’ (maulik) culture, their ‘ancient’ (pauranik) religion, 
their ‘pure’ ethnic identity (suddha janājātiko astitwa.) 
 Like their Tamang neighbors, the Gurungs of Bidhuwā Busti and Darjeeling 
more generally have been enmeshed in an ethnic makeover contemporaneous with 
their quest for Scheduled Tribe status. Yet unlike the Tamangs whose socio-religious 
practice was and remains predominantly Buddhist with Hindu traces, Gurung 
syncretism was of a strong Hindu persuasion. While there have always been Buddhist 
Gurungs in Bidhuwā Busti, it has only been in the last five to ten years that the 
Gurungs have shifted in mass to the Buddhist tradition. As the major proponent of 
Gurung renaissance, the TCD has encouraged this shift, especially since their initial 
application for ST status was denied on the grounds of too much Hindu assimilation. 
Gurung efforts at cultural purification have followed a similar trajectory as that of the 
Tamangs, however they have been exercised with less of a fundamentalist bent. As the 
TCD president put it, they have instead decided “to simply offer the people the 
knowledge and let them make their own decisions.” Thus, while Gurung cultural 
awareness programs have generated ample confusion in the details of socio-cultural 
practice, the Gurungs of Darjeeling have by and large averted the schisms that have 
divided the Tamang community.52 
--- 
                                                 
52 This only holds within Darjeeling and Kalimpong. In Sikkim, two factions have emerged within the 
Akhil Sikkim Gurung (Tamu) Boddha Sangh (The All -Sikkim Gurung Buddhist Society) One advocates 
only Buddhist practice. The other is more accommodating of syncretic and alternative religious 
practices. The principle issue dividing these factions is the question of Hindu syncretism, with one 
group insisting on cultural purification and the other accepting of Hinduism’s influence in 
contemporary Gurung practice. This factionalization has created significant tension within the 
association, as well as within the Gurung community of Sikkim. 
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 Generally speaking, there is nothing unusual about Anju’s and her uncle’s 
interaction. Especially in ritual scenarios, but also in cultural practices more generally, 
human subjects are constantly analyzing their actions, constantly taking themselves 
and others as objects of understanding, just as the uncle did of Anju and she, in turn, 
did of herself. Specifically though, insofar as this moment is fraught with reflexive 
analytic attention, social pressure, and anxiety, this exchange is emblematic of the 
social and subjective manifestations of ‘found’ anthropology in Darjeeling today. 
Precisely in its otherwise routine qualities it typifies the way the question of ethnic 
identity is increasingly being experienced in the hills. This rather simple moment 
therefore poses a challenge for the ‘finding’ of anthropology in Darjeeling: how to 
weigh the general human capacities for anthropological knowledge against its specific 
actualizations in the lifeworlds of the people of Darjeeling? The social 
phenomenology of Alfred Schutz can help us gain some footing to pursue this 
question.53 
 Upon entering any temple, practitioners of variations of Tibetan Buddhism 
(such as the Tamangs and Gurungs) typically prostrate three times before the Buddha. 
Once the devotee has decided to perform the act, the minutia of the action is fluid and 
virtually automatic. It is part of what Bourdieu, following Mauss, might deem a 
religious habitus—an embodied disposition that constantly meanders between the 
realms of conscious and unconscious action.54 Yet we see something very different 
upon Anju’s entry into the temple. She wanders in, unaware of what is expected of 
her. Just over the threshold, in the empty space of the half-finished temple, she is 
stopped dead in her tracks by her uncle’s directive. Put on the spot, and with everyone 
                                                 
53 The italicized terms in the following paragraph are technical terms of Schutz’s social 
phenomenology. Many of them are self-explanatory. That said, I have included technical elaborations 
of each in footnotes. All notes refer to Schutz’s Phenomenology of the Social World, 1967. 
54 Mauss 1973: 97-104; Bourdieu 1977: 73; 1987: 77, 130-1. 
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watching, her presence can no longer be taken for granted.55 Caught off-guard and 
suddenly embarrassed, she is called upon to there and then reflect upon herself and 
even her most subtle actions.56 From that moment on, her every movement is analyzed, 
calculated, hesitant, uncertain. With the prodding of her uncle, she is compelled to 
conceptualize herself in relation to a hitherto unknown act—step by painful step.57 
Never mind that many of her consociates in the temple are equally as unfamiliar with 
the act of prostration. The social pressure to enact the proper form is palpable. She 
hesitantly lowers her torso to the floor, performing piecemeal the elemental actions of 
the act of prostration. Once her chests touches the concrete floor and she hears the 
approval of her peers, she realizes the proper form. She is able to synthesize the 
elemental actions as a single act. More importantly for her at that moment, it means 
that she can perform the act herself—and quickly! And so, she races through her final 
two prostrations and sheepishly scurries from the impromptu stage of their attention 
and her chagrin. 
 In turning her analytic attention upon herself, Anju performs the enabling 
move of reflexive knowledge production. Schutz would call this stepping outside the 
                                                 
55 “The taken-for-granted is always that particular level of experience which presents itself as not in 
need of further analysis” (74).  
56 Schutz would say that Anju has been ensnared in the “net of reflection”, which he explains as the 
cognitive practice of stepping outside the stream of consciousness to reflect upon and cognitively 
objectify action. (45) Working with Husserl’s idea of ‘attentional modification’ (in other words, the 
stepping-outside-to-reflect-upon), Schutz suggests that “We must therefore distinguish between the pre-
empirical being of the lived experience, their being prior to the reflective glance of attention directed 
toward them and their being as phenomena. Through the attending directing glance of attention, the 
comprehension, the lived experience acquires a new mode of being. It comes to be ‘differentiated’, 
‘thrown into relief’, and this act of differentiation is none other than being comprehended, being the 
object of the directed glance of attention” (Schutz 1967: 50) Schutz goes on to explain that these 
moments of differentiation need not be monumental. For in fact it through these ‘transformations of 
attention’ that experiences are made meaningful. On ‘attentional modification’ see Husserl (1931: 267), 
discussed in Schutz (69).  
57 The distinction between action and act is crucial. Action refers to the actual phenomenon, the 
practice, movement, etc. “In contrast to act, action is subject bound” (39). Act on the other hand is the 
concept of a given kind of action. It is action conceptualized, objectified. Projections of acts guide 
action. “What distinguishes action from behavior is that action is the execution of the projected act. 
And we can immediately proceed to our next step: the meaning of any action is its corresponding 
projected act....An action, we submit, is oriented toward its corresponding projected act” (61). 
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stream of consciousness.58 Through this phenomenological movement, the self is then 
understood in relation to and through conceptualized acts (in this case, the proper 
Buddhist prostration). These discursively construed acts are ready-at-hand—that is, 
available to be brought to bear on experience. As concepts they give experience 
meaning and direct further action. These are general dynamics of reflexive knowledge 
production. Framed as such, they do not yet demonstrate the specifics of the ‘age of 
ethnology’ in Darjeeling. For that, we must query the discursive ensemble and socio-
political milieu from whence the act of prostration impinges on this social 
circumstance. That this act, the death rite of which it was a part, the temple in which it 
was held, etc., hung together in a relational web of ‘authentic’ ethnic practice; that 
these were seen as crucial facets of a return to ethnic roots and purity; that these facets 
were inexorably linked to governmental systems of recognition; that this day was an 
emblematic part of an ethnic renaissance sweeping across the hills: it is in these 
qualities that we can begin to glean the specificity of not just reflexive knowledge, but 
ethnological knowledge—and not just in the world of Man, but in the lives of the 
people of Darjeeling. 
Knowledge and its Realizations. 
 Whether imposed through the guṇḍāgari politics of the DGHC, AITBA’s fog 
of ethnographic ‘facts’, or the casual social pressure of Anju’s relatives, these 
ethnological techniques of self have pressed upon the ethnic subject not only particular 
conceptual forms, but also an accentuated compulsion to take oneself as an object of 
particular kinds of knowledge—namely those forms of ethnology sanctioned by the 
state and championed by ethnic associations. However, in crucial ways, the 
                                                 
58 On stepping outside: “I who have been living within the social world can also turn my attention to it 
by stepping outside and transforming it into an object of observation or thought” (157). Schutz later 
goes on to note the homology between this normal cognitive dynamic and the project of the social 
sciences more generally (140, 220). 
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compulsion to step outside one’s practice and to rethink oneself and perhaps revalue 
ones experience of tradition in light of these normative ethno-logics, has been met 
with mixed response on the ground. Born-again ethnics like Pemba are hallmarks of 
ethnic revitalization, yet the preeminence of their story belies the complexity and 
contention of ethnic revitalization and its politics. 
 For the Tamangs and Gurungs of Bidhuwā Busti alike, their concurrent 
programs of ethnic revitalization and uplift have dramatically affected their sociality. 
For instance, since 2003 the Tamang’s ST designation has increasingly set them apart 
from their neighbors such that their inter-ethnic relations are now often marked by 
competition, resentment, and jealousy. Unbending definitions of ‘culture’ have 
sharpened what earlier were much more fluid distinctions between the Tamangs and 
other communities. Neighbors who once celebrated popular holidays like Dussehra 
together now refuse to join one another. The logics of ethnic rebirth have rendered 
their alterity in new, normatively ethnological ways. As ethnic others, they are now 
held at a discernable social distance at such times. These are the kinds of inter-ethnic 
dynamics that ethnic revitalization and the quests for ‘tribal’ recognition have 
introduced into daily life in Bidhuwā Busti. This is not to say that these movements 
and the ethno-logics at their core have created difference out of thin air. The Tamangs 
and Gurungs of Bidhuwā Busti—and indeed groups from across the ethnic spectrum 
of Darjeeling—have retained awareness of their ethnic distinction through the 
generations. However, the recent programs of ethnic revitalization and ‘tribal’ 
recognition have significantly reworked how those distinctions are known and lived. 
The issues to be considered here concerns not so much the existence of ethnic 
difference per se, but rather the nature of that difference and the degree to which 
normative ethno-logics transform modes of social differentiation for everyday 
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subjects. Currently, these are questions still being worked out in the inter-ethnic 
spaces of life in Darjeeling. 
 Meanwhile, the imperatives of cultural singularity and purity have created rifts 
within ethnic communities where bitter disputes over what constitutes ethnic culture 
have sent schisms racing through the social fabric. The strident agendas of ethnic 
associations have pushed many of Bidhuwā Busti’s residents away from becoming 
members. What is more, the logics that these bodies disseminate into the village have 
created confusions, disagreement, and tensions within the Gurung and Tamang 
communities of Bidhuwā Busti. Cultural practices—be it the observation of certain 
holidays or one’s dress—have become a signal of individuals’ and families’ ascription 
to the logics of ethnic revitalization—and to the given ethnic association in particular. 
On Diwali, homes that used to glow through the night now go dark. Even families 
have been torn apart by divergent ethnological persuasions. Here the politics of culture 
play out in the most socially intimate of spaces. 
 On the register of subjectivity too, the effects have been mixed. For some, 
these ethnological makeovers have enabled a cherished understanding and 
refashioning of the ethnic self. For others though, the pressure to constantly analyze 
oneself through socio-politically loaded categories, concepts, and rationales has 
engendered a massive complex bordering on cultural neurosis. Some have openly 
resisted such ethnological agendas. Others seem to suffer a form of cultural paralysis-
through-analysis. Still others have learned to cope by simply subscribing to the 
‘proper’ forms in public, while retaining their lived traditions in their private lives. 
Whatever the case, what is increasingly clear for everyone is that particular domains 
of socio-cultural practice simply can no longer be taken for granted.59 
                                                 
59 These domains of concern will look familiar to anyone familiar with the history of anthropology: 
ritual, dress, religion, dance, music, festivals, marriage practice, funerary rites, etc. 
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 This is not to presuppose that the people of Darjeeling were at some earlier 
point in their history not inimically concerned about their cultural practice. Such a 
view would belie the contested nature of culture. (Moreover, the archive shows 
various identity claims being made by the people of Darjeeling on grounds of shared 
language, custom, etc, since the early decades of the 20th century.) Rather, what 
distinguishes the contemporary ‘age of ethnology’ in Darjeeling is the degree, 
compulsion, and styles of self-awareness that shape life in the hills. That particular 
aspects of socio-cultural practice have become hyper-reflexive can be divorced neither 
from the exigencies of recognition in India, nor from the articulations of ethnic rebirth 
at the most local of levels. 
 These dynamics of ‘found’ anthropology have spurred a marked shift in the 
experiential balance of embodied versus representational knowledge. In the logics of 
ethnic renaissance, being an ethnic subject is less about embodied know-how and 
more about orienting oneself in relation to discursive renderings of proper ethnic 
practice—the logic being that anthropological knowledge provides the conceptual 
wherewithal for people to become ‘authentic’, practicing ethnic subjects. The 
anthropology of the ethnic self has thus become largely a prescriptive enterprise. In 
the classic Geertzian terms, it is not so much a ‘model of’, but rather a ‘model for’ 
socio-cultural practice.60 This curious referential logic gives rise to equally curious 
social and subjective dynamics—not unlike those of Pemba, Anju, and others. For the 
study of knowledge, it also raises important questions about the very nature of 
knowledge and what exactly we are trying to study when we take ‘knowledge’ as an 
object of research. 
 There are, of course, long-running debates within the discipline of philosophy 
about what exactly knowledge is and how to define it. Rehashing these debates is not 
                                                 
60 Geertz 1973: 93. 
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needed. However, if we return to Anju’s awkward prostration, we can glean some of 
these different philosophical construals at play in her rather embarrassing moment in 
the gomba. Through Kantian lenses, the proper act of Buddhist prostration may be 
viewed as a facet of what may be called an epistemological construal of knowledge.61 
The conceptual form of the act is projected onto Anju’s bodily action. Knowledge here 
consists of an ensemble of epistemic forms operating at an ontological removal from 
its object (what Kant would call the-thing-itself). Critics of the epistemological 
construal (Heidegger, Merlau-Ponty, Wittgenstein, and Charles Taylor to name 
several), argue that knowledge is first and foremost about bodily engagement or 
embodied know-how.62 Through this view, we see that Anju does not yet have the 
                                                 
61 My use of ‘epistemological’ here follows Charles Taylor’s use of the term, whereby 
‘epistemological’ refers to the general model of knowledge advanced by the ‘epistemological’ tradition 
of Kant, Descartes, Locke, and others. Taylor sums of this construal of knowledge as that in which 
“knowledge is to be seen as correct representation of an independent reality.” 1995: 3. 
62 As a philosophical question, knowledge has been variously construed. For Aristotle, coming to 
understand an object involved sharing something of its essence. The object gave forth its understanding; 
knowledge was born out of the union between the subject and object. Charles Taylor has called this 
Aristotelian construal ‘participatory knowledge’. With Kant we find a different view. Kant’s 
epistemological construal focused attention on the cognitive processes through which objective 
knowledge of the world could be possible at all. For Kant the thing-in-itself was not knowable, except 
through our own cognitive faculties. These faculties thus became the subject of his decidedly 
epistemological engagement with the question of knowledge. Kant thus jettisoned the ontological 
question of the ‘world out there’, and offered instead a critique of the human ability to formulate 
(accurate) judgments of it. Unlike Aristotle’s participatory knowledge, Kant posited knowledge at a 
remove from the world; it pointed to/represented something ‘out there’; it bore intentionality; it was 
representational knowledge. In the 20th century, the epistemological construal of knowledge would 
undergo numerous attacks under the auspices of thinkers like Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, 
and others. Heidegger would reinsert the ontological question as necessarily prior to the epistemological 
one—that is, the question of how there is a subject to know must precede the question of how that 
subject knows. Whether or not this truly undermines the epistemological construal is irrelevant for our 
concerns. Where the critique of epistemology becomes relevant though is in how it demarcates 
knowledge.  
 For Taylor (following Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty), knowledge is embodied. It is bodily 
know-how. (Taylor 1995) Take the example of riding a bicycle: we know how to ride a bicycle through 
an embodied knowledge of riding a bike. Once bike riding has been bodily experienced, we ‘know’ 
how to do it—(thus the phrase “It’s like riding a bike”). When riding, we are not consciously thinking, 
‘I am balancing’, ‘I am braking’, ‘I am turning left’, etc. We instead are oriented within the riding 
process itself, and thus that orientation precedes any reflective Kantian moment that might arise in 
traffic (i.e. ‘If I lean left, the bike will go left. I am turning left,’ etc). For Taylor, knowledge is the way 
of riding the bicycle, not merely the reflexive mental representations of that practice which we 
formulate when we conceptualize ourselves as riding the bicycle (which would be an epistemological 
construal of knowledge).  
 112 
bodily know-how to perform the requisite acts of ‘authentic’ Gurung ethnic practice. 
In the logic of her uncle’s intervention—and indeed, in the logic of ethnic 
revitalization throughout the hills—knowledge in its purely conceptual form (ala 
Kant) was to be the conduit for knowledge in its embodied form. The 
anthropologically recovered act was to provide the template for newly reformed ethnic 
practice. Anju’s prostration, like the greater funerary rite of which it was a part, was 
thus, in principal, conceptually construed. In no way did it emerge out of embodied 
socio-cultural know-how or tradition. 
 This tension between what Taylor would call embodied and epistemological 
knowledges—or what elsewhere may appear as the tension between empirical and 
conceptual forms—remains a lynchpin of ethnic revitalization in Darjeeling. Chapters 
III and IV discuss how these tensions play out in the dynamics of ‘tribal’ recognition 
specifically. In the phenomenologies of Pemba and Anju though, we see the 
experiential ramifications of these tensions. At once emblematic and specific, the 
accounts of Pemba and Anju signal the often-fraught ways in which subjects in 
Darjeeling are finding relation to the normative—and decidedly ethnological—forms 
of ‘community’ available to them in postcolonial India. These phenomenological 
analyses are not intended as ways of knowing fully the subjective interiority of the 
other; instead, they aim to chart a phenomenological terrain within which we can 
conceptualize the encounters, conflicts, appropriations, and negotiations of particular 
interpretive schemes with one another. From this phenomenological terrain, we may 
then begin to see how these knowledges are affecting people’s practices, as well as 
their experiences of themselves and their worlds. 
                                                                                                                                            
 In my discussion of ethnic renaissance, I have referred to this distinction as embodied 
knowledge (embodied know-how) versus representational/epistemological/discursive knowledge. 
Charles Taylor’s “Overcoming Epistemology” (1995) provides a helpful synopses of these 
philosophical debates over what is knowledge. Taylor’s “To Follow A Rule” also in Philosophical 
Arguments (1995) provides a clear depiction of bodily know-how versus representational knowledge. 
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 Pemba and Anju’s respective troubles and successes in finding themselves in 
these schemas of ethnic rebirth bespeak the lived complexity and contingency of real 
subjects—human beings who sometimes do, and sometime do not, inhabit the ideal-
types of the ‘backward’, ‘primitive’, ‘culturally distinct’ ‘tribal’; or the practiced, 
‘authentic’, or even recognizable, ethnic subject. Their stories put pressing questions 
to this study of anthropological knowledge, political society, and the ‘identities’ that 
emerge out of their entanglement: How do normative paradigms of ‘community’ 
(especially those sanctioned by the state) impress upon the lives of citizens? Through 
what techniques are the tensions between these forms of ‘pure’ ethnological reason 
and the empirical complexities of socio-cultural life mediated? Who mediates? Who is 
mediated? And what roles do the dynamics of Indian political society play in shaping 
the limits and possibilities of the contemporary ethnic subject? 
 Through these glimpses of ethnological knowledge at work in the lives of the 
people of Darjeeling, I have tried to offer partial answers to these provocative 
questions. And yet, examining the question of identity through the optic of ‘found’ 
anthropology leaves profound questions unanswered: How does it feel to be a born-
again ethnic? What might it feel like for someone like Pemba to find himself in these 
knowledges of the ethnic self—to realize rights, recognition, and a sense of belonging 
through these discursive forms? And conversely, what degrees of misrepresentation, 
alienation, and disavowal do such forms of ethnological distinction bestow upon their 
subjects? Such questions push the study of ‘found’ anthropology beyond the pale of 
representational knowledge. They ask how anthropological knowledge can affect 
people’s senses of belonging and their very ways of being-in-the-world. 
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In Lieu of a Conclusion, Fanon. 
 Knowledge and Belonging? This is a question taken up with considerable force 
by Franz Fanon in his celebrated critique of the ‘Fact of Blackness’.63 In lieu of a 
conclusion, it is worth considering an extended passage of this riveting account. Note 
in particular the traces of affect that inflect Fanon’s narrative of his own 
objectification: 
 “‘Dirty Nigger!’ Or simply, ‘Look a Negro!’ 
 I came into the world imbued with the will to find a meaning to things, 
my spirit filled with desire to attain to the source of the world, and then I found 
that I was an object in the midst of other objects. 
 Sealed into that crushing objecthood, I turned beseechingly to others… 
 I thought that what I had in hand was to construct a physiological self, 
to balance space, to localize sensations, and here I was called on for more. 
 ‘Look a Negro!’ It was an external stimulus that flicked over me as I 
passed by. I made a tight smile. 
 ‘Look, a Negro!’ It was true. It amused me. 
 ‘Look a Negro!’ The circle was drawing a bit tighter. I made no secret 
of my amusement. 
 ‘Mama, see the Negro! I’m frightened’ Frightened! Frightened! Now 
they were beginning to be afraid of me. I made up my mind to laugh myself to 
tears, but laughter had become impossible. 
 I could no longer laugh, because I already knew that there were 
legends, stories, history and above all else historicity…It was not that I was 
finding febrile coordinates in the world. I existed triply: I occupied space. I 
moved toward the other…and the evanescent other, hostile but not opaque, 
transparent, not there, disappeared. Nuasea… 
 On that day, completely dislocated, unable to be abroad with the other, 
the white man, who unmercifully imprisoned me, I took myself far off from 
my own presence, far indeed, and made myself an object…. But I did not want 
this revision, this thematization. All I wanted was to be a man among other 
men. I wanted to come lithe and young into a world that was ours and help 
build it together.” 
                                                 
63 Chapter V of Black Skin/White Masks (1967). 
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Yet for Fanon, that possibility was qualified by racialized classificatory systems. 
Explicating that qualification, here Fanon directs our attention to the impress of 
classificatory systems upon the subject. He does so with palpable attention to these 
knowledge systems’ affective and ‘psychoexistential’ ramifications.64 
 For Fanon, it is the social dynamic of recognition—the “Look a Negro!” 
moment—that engenders his angst. At once he recognizes himself as the object of the 
statement, yet this recognition is simultaneously a betrayal of his self—an over-
determined reflection, a misrecognition—that then initiates his subjective search for 
self through a hall of distorted mirrors. It is through this Hegelian moment of double 
recognition65—when the little girl recognizes Fanon as ‘the Negro’, and he recognizes 
himself in her epithet—that Fanon experiences the affective weight of what it means 
to be a black man. This compounded objectification, this “unwanted revision and 
thematization”, renders him nauseas and alienated from his self. His potentiality to be 
a “man among other men” suffers an ontological disavowal. It is precisely the 
psychoexistential disjunctures between his subjectivity and this racialized schema of 
meaning—or to put it another way, the disjuncture between his felt potentiality and the 
social conditions of his subjectification—that engenders the turmoil of unhomeliness 
and unbelonging for Fanon—and by extension, for the ‘black man’ in postcolonial 
society more generally.66 
 Fanon was specifically concerned the experiential dynamics of racial 
classificatory logics. However, his thoughts on the distortions that colonial 
misrepresentations impose upon the subject bear strongly upon current identity politics 
                                                 
64 Fanon variably referred to the orientation of his work as ‘psychoexistential’ or ‘psychopathological’ 
(1967). 
65 Throughout Black Skin/White Masks, Fanon references Hegel’s ‘master-slave dialectic’. The most 
extensive treatment comes in Chapter VII: “The Negro and Recognition, specifically in Section B. The 
Negro and Hegel” (216-222). On the ‘master-slave dialectic’ see Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, 
“Lordship and Bondage” (1977: 111-119). 
66 ‘Turmoil of unhomeliness and unbelonging’ phrasing borrowed from Gunew’s reading of Fanon 
(2004: 99)  
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in Darjeeling. As I will outline in Chapter III, many of the anthropological paradigms 
that have come to structure ethnic revitalization emerged out of colonial systems of 
recognition and governance. Having become constitutive of the postcolonial state’s 
policies of positive discrimination, these forms of knowledge today constitute a 
platform for much needed rights, recognition, and political justice. While appreciating 
that promise, Fanon asks us to consider also how such classificatory rubrics condition 
and limit the possibilities of the subject. Along these lines, we may question if and 
how schemas of recognition over-determine the terms and conditions of 
identification—at once dictating the avenues to socio-political becoming, while 
simultaneously devaluing and/or stymieing other ways of socio-cultural being. Though 
a notably different approach than the psycho-existentialism of Fanon, ethnography can 
generate unique insights into intended and unintended effects (and affects) that 
systems of classification level upon individuals and communities. Ultimately, 
venturing these considerations means probing further the shadows of postcolonial 
political society and modern identity formation.67 
 In taking up this Fanonian concern for postcolonial systems of recognition, it is 
worth pausing to ask whether this issue of phenomenological distortion is, in fact, 
inherent to discursive identification more generally. In expressing something as 
intimate as ‘identity’, is the moment of semiotic capture not inherently partial, 
unstable, and incomplete? Do the experiences of Fanon and the people of Darjeeling 
not at least partially affirm Marx’s point that objectification itself is a practice of 
alienation?68 Can that illustrious moment of recognition of the self-in-the-knowledge 
form ever surpass the representational verity of the uncanny? If not, then what may be 
said about the similitudes of knowledge and belonging? Thinking more pragmatically: 
                                                 
67 Chatterjee sees the ‘dark side’ of political society as marred by violence and crime. Here, my interest 
in the shadows and shadow-effects of political society concentrates on more subtle dynamics.  
68 From “On the Jewish Question” (1843/1978: 52). 
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how might an attention to these issues restructure social scientists’ ability to 
simultaneously honor and critique the phenomenological incoherencies of ‘identity’ 
and the dead certain ways they are redressed in the world?69 
 There is no denying that Fanon’s politics raise the specter of violence. Yet in 
his analytics we find the traces of a more humanistic approach to the question of 
identity. Fanon uses phenomenological insight to direct our attention to the affective 
(im)possibilities of belonging to and within knowledge forms. His project to “liberate 
the black man from himself”, to recuperate him from his “zone of non-being”, asks us 
to fathom a subject with interiorities beyond the immediate pale of discourse, and to 
subsequently consider not only what it means but also how it feels to become at once a 
subject and object of anthropological judgment. The question he raises for the 
anthropology of identity—and especially for this thesis—then is nothing less than the 
question of (the) being within the subject. 
 By reprising the conjoined issues of epistemology and ontology, Fanon returns 
us to the question of knowledge. While certain champions of ethnic renaissance in 
Darjeeling preach a rather Aristotelian notion of knowledge through which 
ethnological techniques of the self are practiced as way of revealing the hidden 
essence of a people, my findings cannot corroborate such a construal. Against the 
Aristotelian ideal of an essential union between the thing-in-itself and the knowledge 
of it, the self-contradictions of Pemba, the hesitancy of Anju, and the cultural 
confusions of the Darjeeling populace writ large suggest this relation between the 
                                                 
69This project joins the work of Paul Gilroy in harboring an empirically-based skepticism towards the 
more orthodoxic forms of identity that have taken root in the modern era. Gilroy’s notion of a 
‘postanthropological humanism’ is extremely provocative. However, as I will discuss in the conclusion 
of this dissertation, the issue is less getting past anthropological/ethnological construals of identity (i.e. 
postanthropological), and more shifting the kinds of anthropology that render identity. My optimism 
stems from anthropology’s potential to recognize emergent and alternative forms of community, 
solidarity, and belonging that could become constitutive of a more humanist future. See Gilroy’s 
Against Race (2000), especially his seminal chapter on “Belonging, Identity, and the Critique of Pure-
Sameness”.  
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subject and his/her anthropological representation is rather one haunted by ontological 
disjuncture, socio-political power, and varying degrees of (un)homeliness. 
 Evoking Fanon, it is thus through my own humanistic concerns for people’s 
ways of being-in-the-world that I focus on the relations of subjects to their 
anthropological depiction. This study of knowledge is necessarily shaped by a Kantian 
construal of knowledge, which posits a fundamental ontological distinction between 
knowledge-as-representational-form and that which is known. Such a model does not 
obviate the importance of embodied ways of being-in-the-world. Quite clearly, neither 
does it deny the way knowledge can transform its object.70 To the contrary, I believe 
that it is precisely through an attention to practices of representational knowledge that 
we can begin to understand the impact of anthropological knowledge on the past, 
present, and future ways-of-being an ethnic subject. Balancing our engagement with 
the discursive facets of knowledge with a complementary attention to the affective 
dimensions of social life, the ontological distance between knowledge and the thing-
in-itself comes into view as a site of social and subjective potentiality where we find 
both the penetration and limits of knowledge-power in effecting—and affecting—the 
contemporary ethnic subject. Maintaining this space we are able to weigh the social, 
political, and subjective consequences of epistemic forms, while simultaneously 
preserving a space for the acknowledgment of alternative forms of embodied 
knowledge and/or belonging. Posing the question of ‘found’ anthropology in all 
walks, but not all ways of life, opens up the possibility of an ethnographic critique of 
‘pure’ identity, the findings of which can empirically check the hubris and veracity of 
‘identity’s’ perennial claim in the world today. It holds open a space for the telling of 
the stories of those who lack the technical armatures of the anthropologically 
construed ethnic subject, and a space from which to inquire into how their ways of 
                                                 
70 This is a point made with great acumen by Timothy Mitchell in his work on cartographic knowledge 
production in Egypt. Mitchell 2002. I engage with Mitchell more fully in Chapter III. 
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being are faring in this ‘age of ethnology’. Thinking ahead, these findings ask us to 
critically consider how the criteria and politics of recognition today are prefiguring the 
belongings of tomorrow. More than that, they invite us to ponder what role 
anthropology (however construed) might play in charting the future possibilities and 
politics of belonging. 
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CHAPTER II. 
Anxious Belongings: Affect and History in the Darjeeling Hills. 
 Hours after dark, I find the village samaj president, squatting on his haunches 
over a small fire, seething with anger at the anthropologist in his midst. His shifty eyes 
cast me a sideways glance as I approach, then turn with sudden revulsion back to the 
fire. In his hands is a dead chicken. There are feathers everywhere. Some stick to his 
calloused fingers plucking at the bird, others float seemingly suspended in the tense air 
between us. Even as I squat down beside him, he refuses to look at me. I remain quiet, 
watching as the flames ribbon over the deep lines in his face and graze his wild head 
of hair, before leaping into the night. He appears to be trembling. 
 “Sir,” I say humbly, “I heard you came to my house this afternoon looking for 
me.” 
 He shoots a look of disgust into the fire, sucks through his teeth and responds 
gruffly, “No.” 
  He works the bird with redoubled vehemence. Turning its limp body over in 
his hands, its charred head hangs flaccidly above the flames, burning black. I try 
again. “But sir, my landlord told me you came.” 
 Another look of disgust. “No, I didn’t come!” he snaps back, now shaking, still 
staring into the fire. 
 This is, of course, a lie, yet in his ire he cares not whether we both know it to 
be so. To admit even this much, would be to acknowledge me, would be to establish 
the grounds for communication, and that for him, at this moment, is far too much. 
 But I am going nowhere. I will wait him out. His efforts to dismiss me—his 
refusal to make eye contact, his expressions of contempt, his lies—are futile. My 
words, demeanor, and action, my very presence, beg him to come off his anger, to 
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engage me as something other than the object of his wrath, to explain to me what I had 
done to so upset him. For, I still do not know. So I wait… 
 As he plumes the last feathers, I engage him once again, “I heard there was 
some problem with my survey…?” 
 And at that he begins to speak. “What is this survey?... You come here and ask 
these questions: When did your family migrate from Nepal? Why did they come? How 
long have they lived in this village?” Suddenly, his upwelling anger cuts off his 
speech. 
 “No, no, no…let’s talk about this. I didn’t mean to upset anybody. Why are 
you so upset?” 
 “I am the president. This is the samaj of the village [the village association]. If 
you want to ask questions about the village this is fine, but these questions of ‘When 
did you come? Why did you come?’: I am the president of the samaj….If you want to 
ask these questions, you can’t!” 
 Suddenly, it all starts to make sense to me. “Please forgive me. I did not know, 
but now I understand that I should have cleared this survey with you. You are the 
samaj president and I should have worked through you.” 
 “Oh, yes…that is right, you should have…but this business of ‘When did you 
come to Darjeeling? From where in Nepal?’ You can’t ask these questions.” His 
temper resurging, his tenor again becomes aggressive. I seem to be losing ground to 
his anger. He goes on, scoffing with sarcasm “‘Why did you come from Nepal? For 
how many generations have you lived here?’” 
 ‘Enough!’ I tell myself; I won’t give anymore ground. 
 “Wait!” I say assertively, “What’s the problem? Listen, you and I both know, 
we all know: the people here, their ancestors came from Nepal.” 
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 His roughshod antagonism suddenly checked, he is taken aback. He begins 
shaking his head back and forth begrudgingly before conceding. “Ok, Ok…..We 
know, we know that but…you can’t ask these questions…That would be proof, you 
see, if we put our signature here….. [inscribing his signature on his hand like it was 
paper]…That would be proof!” 
 And at that—the slightest explanation of his anger—the tension dissipates, and 
the interaction warms. At one point I even get him to crack a modest smile. But this is 
not the time to hash out these matters in full, so we agree to a meeting the next 
morning with the samaj council. For me it promises to be a tribunal of sorts with the 
leaders of the village, but as I stand up from the fire to leave, it is not dread I feel, but 
relief—relief to have connected with him through his anger, relief to have an inkling 
of an idea of the crisis I had caused. 
 As we part, I reach out and place my hand on his shoulder assuring him, 
“Don’t worry, tomorrow morning we will talk with everyone and work this all out.” 
 He nods in affirmation and I leave…with much to understand. 
--- 
 Village darkness can feel especially dark when one is alone and in trouble. On 
the clock and with the imperatives of apology pressing upon me, I began a frenetic 
search for understanding. Moving about the village long after gates had been latched 
and doors locked, I was able to reconstruct piece by piece what had happened earlier 
in the day to spark the crisis I now faced. The sequence of events I was able to string 
together seemed like a rather inadequate back-story to the sheer intensity I had just 
encountered, but nevertheless this much was certain: 
 In the morning, on my way up to town, I had met a freshly graduated 19 year-
old who I was enlisting to help me administer a simple survey of the village. The 
survey itself consisted of a two-page questionnaire on basic demographic information 
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along with several seemingly innocuous questions on family history.1 Having lived in 
the village for seven months, I assumed it would be a simple project. I left the forms 
with my newly hired assistant, and told him to wait further instruction. Apparently, he 
did not. Unbeknownst to me, my eager assistant had set straight to work, handing the 
survey out to 39 houses without incident. It was only when he reached the president’s 
home that things went awry. The president, a man with a reputation for being a prickly 
leader, saw something alarming, and immediately put out a gag order, which quickly 
spread across the village, banning any response to the questionnaire and eliciting 
distress along the way. This was all I knew as I laid my head down that night. 
--- 
 Minutes before my tribunal the next morning, I am pacing nervously near the 
village temple when I run into several neighbors. Perhaps it is my own paranoia, but 
they seem aloof. Among them is my friend Deepak, who works for an insurance 
company in town and is thus among the more affluent people of the village. 
Fortunately, he also serves on the samaj council. I cut straight to the chase: “Deepak, 
what happened?” 
 “You see,” he says in a soothing tone, “Its all fine, there is just that one 
question that is a problem.” 
 “Which one?” I ask, pulling the form from my bag. 
 Scrolling down the questions with his finger, “This one: How many 
generations ago did your family migrate from Nepal? You see this is the one that 
caused the trouble. You see the people around here are scared. They are scared what 
                                                 
1 The particularly problematic questions were: On household ownership: In what year did you acquire 
this property? From whom did you acquire this property? On family history: For how many generations 
has your family lived in Bidhuwā Busti? Where did your family live before coming to Bidhuwā Busti? 
Which year did your family arrive in Bidhuwā Busti? How many generations ago did your family 
migrate to Darjeeling from Nepal? From where in Nepal did they migrate? Why did they migrate to 
Darjeeling? Estimated year of migration from Nepal?  
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will happen to this information. If we put our signature on this here, then people are 
scared it will be proof, and if the government gets it, they will send us back to Nepal.” 
 “No! That’s impossible!” 
 “You see Towns, this is a political thing. We had the Gorkhaland Agitation 
where we tried for our own state. The people of India think we are foreigners. Now we 
have the Sixth Schedule. So there is history there. There is a lot of discrimination from 
the people of the plains. They think we [i.e. the general Nepali-speaking populace of 
Darjeeling] are foreigners…If we give this information, it will be proof that we came 
from Nepal.” 
 “But Deepak, everyone’s ancestors came from Nepal, right?” 
 “Yes, but we can’t say that. People think we are foreigners. Like you know the 
situation with the Bhutanese refugees that got sent back to Nepal. If the Ministry of 
External Affairs somehow gets hold of this form and it has all of our information: 
where we came from, when we came…. People think they could send us back.” He 
breaks off to check his watch. Its 10:15. We’re late. 
--- 
 The meeting commenced with far less intensity and confrontation than the 
night before. The hours I had spent preparing my case and honing my apology served 
me well. I was clearly guilty on two counts: first, for circumventing the samaj’s 
leadership; and second, for violating a people’s sensitivities. The latter was clearly the 
more grave, more vague offense. I therefore began the meeting with an earnest and 
longwinded apology. Having heard my side of the story, the council members were 
quick to reciprocate in likewise apologies for their overreaction to what was now 
clearly an honest, yet insensitive, mistake. My remorse and embarrassment I wore on 
my sleeve; theirs were more inflected. With the situation diffused and an awkward 
shame lingering among us, conversation happily shifted to more mundane matters. 
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More so than the change of topics, this shift of communicative registers from that of 
grassroots jurisprudence to that of friendly neighbors was the most reassuring. It was a 
closed case, like we all wanted it to be. But my understanding could never be the 
same, not after that night. In that moment of raw inter-subjective intensity, a window 
was opened into a depth of historical being that could in no way be jettisoned from the 
ethnographic present, but which remained steadfastly opaque, even haunting. 
History and Affect. 
 As Deepak so succinctly pointed out during those anxious minutes before the 
meeting, the question of the Gorkha people’s place in India remains a “political thing” 
with a real—and at times, frighteningly present—history. His breathless mention of 
the Gorkha National Liberation Front agitation of the 1980s, the pending Sixth 
Schedule bid for Darjeeling which would be the “full and final settlement” to the 
question of ethnic-based sovereignty in the hills, the prejudice Nepali-Indians face as 
‘foreigners’, and the spectral threat of extradition back to Nepal despite generations of 
inhabitance in India index key facets of the historical being of the peoples of 
Darjeeling. That he would link these touchstones with such ease and eloquence—even 
as anxiety reverberated all around us—suggests that his spur-of-the-moment answer 
was anything but spontaneously constructed. Indeed, the explanation Deepak 
articulated to me in his soothing tone was a narrative ready-at-hand for a people ill at 
ease in a nation where they were not yet securely home. Spoken just moments before I 
was to engage these historical sensibilities head-on, Deepak’s back-story to a back-
story could not have come at a better time. 
 Having focused my research on the knowledge practices through which the 
peoples of Darjeeling were staking an ethnic claim in India, I was keenly aware of 
much of what Deepak referenced in his explanation. The recent, violent history of the 
 126 
1980s agitation, in which villages were burned and bodies dismembered, all in the 
name of the Gorkha ethnicity2; the sustained prejudices and paradigmatic stereotyping 
of ‘hill-people’ versus ‘plains-people’; the ongoing efforts to bring ‘tribal’ recognition 
to the populations of Darjeeling: all of these had proven fertile sites for the study of 
‘found’ anthropology. And yet now, in the crucible of anxiety, the grounds of 
understanding had suddenly morphed, making the limits of my own knowledge (along 
with the methodologies and epistemologies underpinning it) painfully clear. Beyond 
knowledge and politics, the perennial question of identity was now revealing itself to 
be always also something more. 
 This chapter attempts to identify and understand the profound sense of unease 
that haunts the people of Darjeeling with regard to belonging in India.3 It is not, 
however, a study of belonging; rather it is a study of the anxieties of non-belonging. 
These anxieties have fueled the various quests for ethnic rebirth and ‘tribal’ 
recognition featured elsewhere in this dissertation. Pervasive anxieties over 
belonging—and by extension, ‘identity’—lie at the root of these groups’ recent 
anthropological self-concern. Here though, I shift attention from questions of 
knowledge to questions of belonging in an effort to understand the anxieties that have 
prompted and animated this ‘age of ethnology’. The question of anxious belonging 
here emerges as a crucial counter-attention to this study’s overarching focus on 
‘found’ anthropology. 
                                                 
2 It is estimated that at least 1164 private homes were destroyed during the GNLF movement (1986-
1988). Estimated deaths totaled 297. Samanta 2000: 54. 
3 The issue of belonging in Darjeeling has been raised in two recent papers by Thapa and Dhakal in a 
recent edited volume Indian Nepalis (2009). Both Thapa’s and Dhakal’s analyses are somewhat 
provisional, but raise the important issue of the longstanding desire amongst the people of Darjeeling to 
belong within the Indian nation-state. Hutt has also made brief mention in his work on the Nepali 
diaspora that, “The deep-seated sense of insecurity felt by Indian and Bhutanese Nepalis is not well 
understood, but is an important factor in the political and ethnic turmoil of the regions they inhabit,” 
(1997: 119). In light of Hutt’s point, my analysis concentrates greater attention on the affective 
dimensions of non-belonging and its complex historical conditions in Darjeeling. 
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 To understand the anxieties of non-belonging that haunt the people of 
Darjeeling, one must venture a critical consideration of affect and history in the hills. 
From the outset it is important to recognize that the quandaries of knowing affect are 
daunting even for most phenomenologically attuned ethnographies. Affect and history 
is thus a particularly odd coupling of attentions, fraught with further epistemological 
impasses and challenges. Nevertheless, as I intend to show, history and affect are 
inseparable, thereby making historiography integral to the study of affect, and vice 
versa. 
 To recognize the nature of anxious belonging in Darjeeling, we need a lucid 
conception of affect. This requires cutting through an often-confusing scholastic din 
over the idea of affect to get clear on what we mean by the term. For reasons that will 
become clear in the pages to come, I believe affect is best known through its 
conjuring. Consequently, I choose not to define affect from the outset. Instead, I aim 
to conjure it through a particular selection and arrangement of materials. Each 
fragment presented here, I will maintain, is pregnant with affect, but, as will become 
clear, the forms of its actualization differ in each instance. This divergence helps us 
understand and incorporate the mercurial nature of affect into our conceptualization of 
it. As its resolution sharpens, the concept will, in turn, afford a unique understanding 
of the affective underpinnings of ethnological self-concern in Darjeeling. Through this 
approach, I hope to bring us to a place where we can both sense and understand 
anxious belonging in Darjeeling as a phenomenon of affect properly conceived. 
 In a moment by a fire with a man so angry that he could hardly look at me, 
much less speak to speak to me, on account of the ire coursing through his body, I 
most strongly understood the depth and power of the anxiety in question. Surely 
though, it had been there all along, moving in the shadows of my recognition. In the 
months following that night, I would see it again and again, in intense flare-ups and 
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more subtle intonations. Tacking back and forth between archival and ethnographic 
work, I began to recognize more and more of that night in history, and more and more 
of history in that night. Particular events from within the historical record began to 
resonate in new, yet eerily familiar ways with my experiences of the contemporary. 
Several episodes in the 1850s and 1860s in particular bear an uncanny resemblance to 
the alarm I sparked in the winter of 2007. It is worth then turning to the early years of 
these populations in Darjeeling, when seemingly similar crises and anxieties shaped 
life in the hills. 
Rumors and the White Elephant of Jung Bahadoor Rana. 
 In October 1864, the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, one H.C. Blake, 
sent the following letter to the Political Department of Bengal: 
“To the Secretary: 
I have the honor to inform you that considerable excitement exists among the 
Nepalese laborers and Emigrants in this settlement in consequence of Jung 
Bahadoor [Rana’s, the prime minister of Nepal] approaching visit to our Terai. 
Reports have been sent in by the Police to the effect that he is building and 
repairing the Forts on our Frontier and that his brother is in the neighborhood 
with 1900 men. 
2. I have explained that Jung Bahadoor is on a shooting expedition and will 
probably enter our Terai with the permission of Government. 
3. The coolies and others are reported to be selling their property at a loss and 
leaving in large numbers. For this, two reasons are given: one that there will be 
war in this District in the cold weather, and the other that I have recently given 
up to the Nepalese Government two subjects of that government on its 
requisition. 
4. Many of the Nepalese Laborers and settlers are refugees, and I have no 
doubt that they fear that Jung Bahadoor’s visit is made with a view to 
obtaining the extradition of such persons. 
5. I have now sent a trustworthy Nepalese Police Office to all the places where 
these reports prevail with instructions thoroughly to explain matters and quiet 
the people. 
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6. I may here mention that the fact of Jung Bahadoor being about to enter our 
territory was only accidentally communicated to me on my mentioning these 
reports, and that it would be well in the future that such information should be 
officially communicated to me in good time, or occasions may arise in which I 
may be puzzled to act.”4 [emph. added] 
With regard to the anxiety of the laborers, the record trails off. However, files in Delhi 
explain that the notorious Prime Minister had his sights set on a fabled white elephant 
rumored to be foraging in the Darjeeling foothills.5 Jung Bahadoor made almost yearly 
forays into Indian territory in quest of game, and he seldom traveled light.6 On this 
particular trip his entourage was reported to include 600 cavalry, 7 regiments of 
infantry, 700 elephants, two guns, and just for good measure, two Europeans.7 That the 
coolie populations of Darjeeling would notice such a force is thus no surprise. What is 
intriguing is the response it triggered. Why were coolies selling their property at a loss 
and fleeing? 
 Ever since the 1830’s, when the British began developing Darjeeling as a 
sanatorium, and later as a tea-growing district, colonial administrators tacitly 
encouraged the immigration of labor from Nepal.8 Feudal conditions in Nepal and 
wage labor in India created apt push-pull factors, and soon thousands of sought after 
‘sturdy hillmen’ were pouring across the border.9 Given the proximity and the 
                                                 
4 Bengal, Political, Political Proc 27-28 Nov 1864. [emph. mine].  
5 India, Foreign, July 1864 132-133 Political A; India, Foreign Nov 1864, 152-154 Political A. 
6 India, Foreign, 2 Mar 1860 243-255 FC; India, Foreign July 1864 132-133 Political A. 
7 India, Foreign, Dec 1864, 206-8 Political A. 
8 India, Foreign, Aug 1837 139-140; India, Foreign, 28 June 1841 135-6 FC. 
9 The British were well aware of the dire conditions in Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim, and recognized that 
these ‘push factors’ could work in their favor. In fact, the British even used the moral card of slavery as 
a means to justify their tacit immigration policies. The Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, A. 
Campbell, writes (1841) “As the Darjeeling tract was on its cession to us almost uninhabited we could 
only look for accession to its hill people to immigration from the surrounding state of Sikkim and the 
neighboring countries of Bhootan and Nipaul. In all of these states hereditary slavery exists to a great 
extent and the purchase and sale of human beings is being daily practiced... Under this state of things it 
will readily appear to the Governor General in Council that almost all the hill people who have settled 
at Darjeeling are by usage of our neighbors claimable from us. It will also be evident that in admitting 
the propriety of such claims, the British government would in many cases be directly countenancing 
slavery, and in such cases as the one in hand, it would be unjustly interfering with the right that all men 
should have in peace and good faith.” India, Foreign 28 June 1841 135-6 FC. 
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anthropological types that flowed in, Nepal was, for the British, an ideal and decidedly 
ethno-logical labor pool. But there was a problem; the Nepali Durbar did not 
approve.10 
 Thus while the planters relegated the dirty work of moving bodies across 
borders to informal sardāri labor recruiters, the entire system operated in a realm of 
quasi-legality, which obviated the possibility of formal papers, acknowledgment, or 
bona fides of any sort. To this day, many Gorkhas (including those in the village 
where I lived) still lack proper papers. (This is precisely why they reacted so strongly 
to one of my survey questions about household ownership.) From the outset then, this 
history of migration was a history that could not officially exist. This explains why the 
archive remains relatively silent on the laboring peoples of Darjeeling.11 Any traces of 
this history, any residues of quasi-legality, by juridical rule would have to be rendered 
on a different register. 
 The panic surrounding Jung Bahadur’s hunting trip was not unprecedented. 
Similar outbreaks of anxiety flashed across the hills throughout the earlier decade of 
the 1850s as well. Typically triggered by Nepali military maneuvers near the border, 
                                                                                                                                            
 Explaining the increasing in-migration in the 1850s, A. Campbell opines in 1855, “A further 
influx is expected… The immediate cause of this continued migration is, as formerly reported, the 
excessive demand made on the people for begaree or uncompensated labor,” which Campbell goes on 
to explain was mainly done at the behest of the state. India, Foreign, 27 April 1855 63 FC. On forced 
labor regimes in Nepal, see Holmberg & March. 1999. For additional information on the ‘push-pull’ 
factors driving the 19th century migration from Nepal to Darjeeling, see Hutt 1998, 1997: 109-113; 
Pradhan 1991; Samanta 2000: 20-22; Sinha & Subba et al 2003: 14-17. 
10 A. Campbell (1858) reports of “bad feelings on the part of the Nipal Durbar towards the British 
government”, and of a rumor circulating through the labor populations of orders by Jung Bahadoor 
Rana to return to Nepal immediately. Campbell notes, “With these orders of the Nipal Durbar it is clear 
that the orders are directed against the increase of our own laborers,” India, Foreign, 31 Dec 1858 2522-
6 FC. 
11 In comparison to other tea growing districts of India such as Assam, Cachar, and Sylhet, there is a 
great paucity of archival information on the tea plantation labor of Darjeeling. Official tea districts like 
Assam, Cachar, and Sylhet were under far more governmental regulation. Darjeeling planters, on the 
other hand, preferred to remain beyond the government’s purview. This would slowly change toward 
the end of the 19th century, but by then the paradigms of informality were established in the plantations 
of Darjeeling, leaving little paper trail behind them. Academic studies of Darjeeling tea-estates include: 
Bhowmik 1981; Chatterjee 2001; Nag 2000; Subba 1985. 
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the fright and flight of labor was a source of anxiety for the colonizers in its own 
right.12 This may explain why the archive affords us the following rare glimpses of a 
more sentient labor force: 
 October of 1854, the Deputy Commissioner of Darjeeling, A. Campbell, alerts 
government of “universal” rumors of an invasion by Nepal, inducing “much alarm 
among the population generally, but especially among the Nipalese who are settled 
here, and those who are employed as working coolies.”13 
 November 1854: Campbell continues, “The alarm amongst the Nipalese 
subjects employed here has been very great. It rose to such a pitch on the first instant 
that about 500 men employed on the government works were not to be found, and 
their sardars were in despair of getting them back to their work.”14 
 September 1858: Campbell describes rampant rumors of a proclamation by 
Jung Bahadoor Rana that “all the Nipalese who do not return to their country before 
the end of the Durga poojhā shall be shut out from ever going back to Nepal and shall 
be considered in the light of British subjects, or as enemies in the approaching 
                                                 
12 India, Foreign, 29 Dec 1854, 22-34 SC; India, Foreign, 31 Dec 1858, 2522-6 FC; India, Foreign, 30 
Dec 1859, 1431-1446 FC/SUP. 
13 Letter 154, 29 Oct 1854, India, Foreign, 29 Dec 1854 22-34 SC. 
14 Letter 568, 9 Nov 1854, India, Foreign, 29 Dec 1854 22-34 SC. This chapter’s primary concern is the 
affect of the Nepali-Indian peoples. However, one can’t help but notice the intensity of concern on the 
part of the British colonials in these reports. On the one hand, the British were constantly worrying 
about the loss of labor. On the other hand, the archive suggests that the anxiety of the coolies may have 
jumped the subjective divisions of Empire to affect the colonials as well. As Campbell noted during this 
particular crisis, “My assurances are by no means satisfactory at present. A good number of Nipalese 
have already absconded and the European visitors are by no means comfortable under the influence of 
all the current reports of invasion.” Ibid.  
 Did the colonials see the coolies as knowing something they did not? Was the affective 
contagion that well articulated or was it of another order of transmission? As might be expected, several 
years later, colonial anxieties spiked even more pointedly in the milieu of the Mutiny. Again Campbell 
offers clues to the affective state of colonials in Darjeeling: Regarding the various rumors of invasion, 
extradition and embargo that “came pouring in from Nipal--a source over which I have no control-- and 
[were] quickly disseminated by the Nipalese servants among the Europeans here in the most 
exaggerated forms… I confined myself to endeavors to trace the origin of the news and to giving the 
European community the strongest assurance of my disbelief in these rumors.” India, Foreign 30 Dec 
1859 1431-1446 FC/SUP. 
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invasion of Darjeeling from Nipal.” This time 1000 laborers fled in the span of two 
days. To where, the British did not know.15 
 October 1858: Under what he terms the “pressure of failing labor”, Campbell 
reports hearing further that “Jung Bahadoor had issued a proclamation to all Nipalese 
wherever located that now or never was the time to return to their allegiance; if they 
wished to be of use to their native land, and not to forfeit by protracted absence all the 
most cherished privileges of Nipalese subjects. The whole native population became 
uneasy at these rumors, the sappers got alarmed, and the European community did so 
also.” From October 9th-19th, 700 more men on government hire, gone.16 
 Though it remains difficult to ascertain if and how the precariousness of the 
circumstance were rationalized by the immigrant laborers, these spates of anxiety in 
the 1850s suggest several things. First, they demonstrate how, by the time he crossed 
into Darjeeling territory in pursuit of his fabled white elephant (1864), Jung Bahadoor 
Rana was already a spectral presence in the coolie imagination—a figure apparently 
capable of great subjective coercion. Second, the archive’s exaggerated and recurring 
attention to the flight of labor bespeaks an associated anxiety on the part of the British 
colonials—albeit one emanating from a different motivational [read: capitalist] logic. 
Third, these outbreaks of alarm inflect the picture of plantation life in the hills with an 
anxiety that is notably lacking in the standard, romanticized, colonialist histories of the 
‘hill-station’. Together, these instances remind us of the unstable place that the 
populations of Darjeeling have had in India since their earliest migration to the area. 
Thinking through the living conditions of these colonial laborers, we see that theirs 
was indeed a precarious, liminal, dwelling. Betwixt and between feudal and imperial 
                                                 
15 “Campbell to Secretary of Bengal” India, Foreign 31 Dec 1858 2522-6 FC. 
16 India, Foreign 30 Dec 1859 1431-1446 FC/SUP. 
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capitalist modes of production, no longer Nepali and not yet Indian subjects, status of 
any sort was tenuous at best.17 
 Furthermore, extradition was a real, albeit rare, possibility. Along with formal 
cases of extradition18, the archive tells harrowing stories of Nepali raiders crossing into 
Darjeeling in the dark of night to recapture escaped slaves.19 In the official and demi-
official reports of these cases, the Britisher’s ambivalence toward the Gorkha subject 
is on full display. At once, the colonials wished to claim these people as ‘British 
subjects’, yet they recognized they had little recourse to do so. Such were the 
conundrums of quasi-legality. 
 Drawing back, what then can we say about the relation between the panic 
surrounding Jung Bahadoor’s pursuit of the white elephant in 1864 and that which I 
caused in the village in 2007? First, there is a similar emotion articulated in both—
namely, the fear of being shipped back to Nepal. Accordingly, these two instances 
might well be placed in a history of emotion, the type of which Lucien Febvre 
announced long ago when he and Marc Bloch were pushing the envelope of 
historiography with the imaginative projects of the Annales school.20 But a history of 
emotion is not the type of history that I am trying to write. In drawing out a linkage 
between these events of 1864 and 2007, it is not this fear that I have in mind. The 
linkage I sense is of a different order, and begs a different question: From whence 
does this fear emanate? That is, of what is it an articulation? 
                                                 
17 Here I am working with classic anthropological notions of liminality and rites of passage. See Van-
Gennep 1965; Turner V. 1967, 1969. 
18 India, Foreign, Jan 1864 222-223 Political A; India, Foreign July 1866 63 Political A.; Bengal, 
Judicial Proc 206-209 Aug 1868. 
19 India, Foreign, Aug 1868 219-220 Political A; Bengal, Judicial Proc 200 Aug 1868; India, Foreign 
Aug 1868 404-5 Political A; India, Foreign Feb 1869 9 Political A; India, For Mar 1878 1-8 Pol A. 
20 See in particular Febvre’s 1941 essay “Sensibility and History: how to reconstitute the emotional life 
of the past.” The Annales School began in 1920. 
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 To answer this, we must follow the lead of Brian Massumi in beginning to 
recognize affect as something other than emotion.21 Various anthropologists of 
emotion have taught us to think about emotions as culturally specific patterns of 
expression. The question of affect, I believe, must be distinguished from these models 
of emotion. The next section affords precisely this analytic cleavage. It moves us 
beyond the pattern of fear that lends the events of 2007 and 1864 their apparent 
similarity, and invites us to see the affect anxiety as of a different order than fear—or 
any other emotion for that matter. In this light, the next section further elucidates this 
history of affect, or what may now come into view as an affect of history itself. 
The Suitcases of Kharag Bahadur Singh. 
 Being Gorkha in India comes with certain baggage. When 20th century Nepali-
Indians began making identity claims under the appellation ‘Gorkha’ they confirmed a 
dangerous slippage of terms. Already imbricated in the colonial nationalist imaginary, 
were the ‘Gurkha’, of the famed ‘martial race’ regiments of the British Indian army, 
who, as history tells us, rescued the British in their most desperate moment of need.22 
Both during the Mutiny of 1857 and through the seditious twilight of the Raj, the 
                                                 
21 Massumi 1996. I discuss Massumi’s conceptualization of affect, as well its problems, later in the 
chapter. 
22 Following the late-colonial British spellings, ‘Gurkha’ (with a ‘u’) refers to the military ranks of 
Gorkha (i.e. Nepali speaking peoples). ‘Gorkha’ (with an ‘o’) refers to civilian populations and 
conforms to contemporary emic spellings. The Gurkhas involvement in the Mutiny is well documented. 
Des Chene (1991) and Farwell (1984) offer particular accounts of their deployment against the 
mutineers. Primary materials tracing their involvements include: India, Foreign 27 Nov 1857 35-42 
S.C; India, Foreign 25 Sep 1857 487-88, 490 SC; India, Foreign 29 Jan 1858 384-386 SC. The Gurkhas 
involvement in the Mutiny (along with other anti-sedition deployments) has also been written into the 
popular historical canon of India. See for instance Jawaharlal Nehru’s The Discovery of India 
(2002/1946). 
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‘proverbially loyal’, ‘fierce and humble’23 Gurkha would be relied upon to uphold—
and when necessary enforce—colonial discipline.24 
 Essentialism met its limits though on November 14, 1930, when the 
increasingly paranoid British Indian state cracked the case of one Kharag Bahadur 
Singh, a Gurkha of Dehra Dun suspected of sedition.25 Upon his arrests at the Delhi 
train station, his suitcases were confiscated and searched, revealing a network of 
nationalist propaganda aimed specifically at civilian and military Gorkhas across 
India. His campaign promised a significant “breach…at the very centre of the 
Government’s stronghold of loyalism,” and moreover prophesied that “Government’s 
faith in the proverbial loyalty of the Gurkhas will receive a rude shock as in the case of 
the Garhwalis since the Peshawar incident.”26 The ensuing investigation found scores 
of propaganda, proposals, and correspondence with the brass of the Indian National 
Congress party, including Motilal Nehru, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Vallabhbhai Patel.27 
These letters stressed the urgency of an “authoritative declaration on behalf of the 
Congress that the Gurkhas were their own brethren forming an integral part of the 
Indian community”.28 The Congress leaders further promised equitable minority status 
for Gorkha peoples in an independent India, as well as the qualified backing of 
                                                 
23 Essentializations of the Gurkha soldier are rampant beyond reference. These terms are some of the 
more common caricatures of the Gurkha soldier. This form of essentialization ties in directly with this 
dissertation’s interest in ‘found’ forms of anthropological knowledge.  
24 Hutt has commented as well on the framings of Gurkhas as anti-nationalists (1997: 121). 
25 India, Home, Political F 14/9 1931. 
26 Ibid.  
27 Pertinent documents seized included: 300 copies of the pamphlet titled “The Eight Days Interlude” 
written in English, Urdu, and Hindi containing “objectionable statements and speeches made by Pt. 
Jawahar Lal Nehru”; Correspondences between Singh and [Gorkha] candidates for Congress work; a 
letter dated November 4, 1931 from C.M Singh of Darjeeling (Conservative Office); additional 
Congress pamphlets including “The Eleven Terms of Mahatma Gandhi” written in Nepali; account 
books; a letter dated November 12, 1930 from Motilal Nehru to Vallabhbhai Patel urging him to draft a 
letter guaranteeing Gorkha rights in a Swaraj Government and promising a Rs. 820/month allowance 
for Singh’s project; proposals for a Publicity Department in Calcutta and a bi-weekly Congress bulletin 
in Nepali; as well as proposed tours and propaganda distribution in the following target areas: Karachi, 
Lucknow, Benares, Darjeeling, Shillong, Jullundur (Reserve Batallion), Ranchi (Military Police), Dehra 
Dun, Lansdowne, Almora. Dharamsala, Simla, Calcutta, and Dibrigarh. Ibid. 
28 As was paraphrased by the Government of India, Ibid. 
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Congress for Singh’s secret campaign to woo the Gurkha troops and people away from 
the paternalistic British.29 
 The British took notice. In fact, they were already on-guard against such 
developments. Four circular orders had been issued in September 1930, just two 
months before Singh’s arrest, prohibiting all Gurkha sepoys and officers from joining 
the Congress.30 Now, with their suspicions confirmed, it did not take long for them to 
respond. By December 12, 1930 the Intelligence Bureau had labeled Kharag Bahadur 
Singh an “extremely active and dangerous agitator who was capable of doing 
considerable mischief among the Gurkhas” and recommended that it was “advisable to 
warn all Governments who have considerable Gurkha populations residing within 
their limits …to keep a bright look out for the appearance of any propaganda, either 
spoken or printed among their Gurkha populations.”31 
 Six of Kharag Bahadur Singh’s parcels eventually made their way to the 
Gorkha bastion of Darjeeling, and it was there in the post office on March 12, 1931 
that they were seized. Inside, the British found hundreds of pamphlets written in 
Nepali to both military and civilian Gorkhas of India. The arguments of the 
propaganda were agonizing. One pamphlet, “A Letter From a Gurkha Jail Pilgrim” is 
particularly affective and thus warrants closer analysis. It reads as follows: 
OM BANDE MATRAM 
What is the religious duty of the Gurkhas belonging to both the civil and the 
military in the religious war which is being fought for the attainment of 
Swaraj? 
1) You people eat the salt of India and therefore you should serve her. Don’t 
sing the praises of the English, who do not feed you. 
                                                 
29 Motilal Nehru read Singh’s proposal to Jawaharlal Nehru while in jail. The latter regretted not being 
able to fully fund the elaborate plans of Singh (specifically those expenditures required for his proposed 
‘Publicity Department’). Ibid. 
30 Circulars were found in Singh’s suitcases. Ibid. 
31 Intelligence Report signed 13.12.30 by D. Petrie. Ibid. 
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2) To be faithful to the English is synonymous to slaughtering the Bharat 
[India]. 
3) To serve the English is to enjoy a luxurious life by selling the country. 
4) Serve your motherland instead of serving the English. 
5) It is better and respectable to become the bear and the monkey of Ram 
Chanderji, instead of becoming the soldiers of Rawana. 
6) The true religion of the soldiers is to protect the life and the property of the 
public. It is irreligious to kill children and unarmed people. 
7) The soldiers should obey orders which are in keeping with law and religion. 
They should [not] carry out orders based upon lawlessness and injustice. 
8) You people have sold your life in lieu of ten or twenty rupees but not your 
religion. 
9) Always remember that religion is superior to wealth, public is superior to 
the ruler, and paradise is superior to hell. 
 Particular facets of the pamphlet sharpen its affective capabilities. From the 
outset the entire plea is couched in overtly religious idioms, leaving little doubt that 
this was not only a decision to be made in mind, but also in heart and soul. The 
reference to the Gurkha troops who had “sold their life but not their religion” by 
serving the British draws immediate attention to the questionable nationalist loyalties 
of the Gorkhas. At the same time, it refigures this martial history not as a source of 
pride, but one of shame. Repeatedly, the pamphlet emphasizes that the moral lines 
being drawn were not, and could never be, contiguous with those of Empire; it was 
above all a “religious war being fought for the attainment of Swaraj”. In the loaded 
language of salvation, the propaganda harps upon allegiance, then takes a sudden turn 
into more recent nationalist history in order to evoke a certain sense of historical guilt 
within its presumed readership. 
10) What have you gained by giving your lives for the English, if you will do 
something even slightly conducive to India you will be in comfort and will go 
to paradise. 
11) The Gurkhas did not display any bravery in opening machine-gun fire 
upon the audience in a meeting of Amritsar, Punjab in April 1919. The 
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Gurwalis did not open fire on a precession in Peshawar in June, 1930. By not 
thus obeying an unjust order, they exhibited real chivalry. They were sentenced 
to transportation and to imprisonment, but were called religious heroes, and 
they made a name. 
(12) In the Mutiny of 1857, the Gurkhas and the Sikhs deprived the Indians of 
the Swaraj they had won and gave it to the English. Now the Sikhs have made 
amends for their error and they are fighting for the achievement of Swaraj. 
The Gurkhas too should rectify their mistake and help India. 
13) The eyes of the country, the world and the deities are at present focused 
upon the Gurkhas. They should not commit blunders, should not abandon their 
religion, and should not allow their names to be slurred. 
Given the political zeitgeist of the moment, this indexing of then-contemporary 
nationalist history is especially pointed. 1930, the year of Kharag Bahadoor’s arrest, 
was a time of rising anti-colonial fervor. On January 26th, 1930 the Indian National 
Congress announced its Purna Swaraj, the Declaration of Independence from British 
Rule. And on March 12th of that same year, Gandhi embarked on his legendary Salt 
March in symbolic protest of the salt tax and British rule more generally. For both the 
British Raj and an increasingly agitated public, the climate of sedition was heating up. 
 Further, it had been just a decade since Brigadier-General Dyer and his soldiers 
which included members of the 1st/9th Gurkha Rifles had marched into the Jallianwala 
Bagh in Amritsar, Punjab (April 13th, 1919) and opened fire on thousands of unarmed 
civilians, killing hundreds. It had been a mere matter of months since the members of 
the 2/18 Garhwal Rifles had refused similar orders in Peshawar (April 23, 1930), 
electrifying the movement for Swaraj with an immediate precedent of defiance. Of 
course, the cornerstone of defiance was already established by the Sepoy Mutiny of 
1857, but again, for the Gorkhas, this was anything but a moment of nationalist zeal. 
Quite the contrary: at one point the Gurkhas were reported to be the only native force 
still fighting for the British in their desperate attempt to control Delhi.32 As the 
                                                 
32 Des Chene 1991, 123. 
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pamphlet frames it, the problem with the Gorkha’s place within the emergent nation 
was one of inappropriate loyalties. What was even more concerning than their ties to 
Nepal was their historical allegiance to the British. Whereas other ‘martial races’ like 
the Sikhs “had made amends for their error”, insofar as the Gurkhas had yet to “rectify 
their mistake”, their loyalties—and thus their moral belonging within a soon-to-be-free 
India—remained in question. 
 The propaganda addresses Gurkha troops directly, but, importantly, it does not 
stop there in assigning guilt. As the concluding lines proclaim, all Gorkhas were 
responsible for the misdeeds of “military brethren”; all Gorkhas were capable of 
rectifying those mistakes. The conclusion reads as follows: 
TO CIVILIAN BRETHREN 
Civilian Brethren! It is your religious duty to make amends for the work 
supplied by military brethren. It is your religious duty to bandage the injuries 
inflicted on account of their mistakes. As the result of the injustice, and 
irregular acts perpetrated by the Indian soldiers and civilians, today sixty 
thousand of our Indian Brothers, Sisters, [and] the infirm[ed] children are 
incarcerated in jails. The result of the tyranny and oppression practiced by the 
English government has been that many English ladies and gentlemen are also 
pondering over the subject of Swaraj for the Indians. In order to wash out the 
sins of the Gurkhas and to maintain their dignity, Mr. Kharag Bahadur [Singh] 
joined the battle with fifty Gurkhas out of their number of 10 lakhs, like Sri 
Lakshman. Those people are at present shut up in a corner of the jail. Gorkha 
youths! Don’t [you] feel pained? These people (the imprisoned Gurkhas) are 
looking at you from the big gates of the jail. Get up and say that you are also 
coming. The Gurkhas are chivalrous and they should come forward to destroy 
the British Government. They should soon come out in order to remove the 
sufferings of mother India, to uphold the dignity of the Gurkhas, to better the 
lot of their progenies and in order to pave their way for settling in India. Come 
soon. 
From: A Gurkha Jail Pilgrim.33 
 In making the link between the civilian and military constituencies of Nepali-
speakers in India—that is, in holding the Gorkha peoples accountable for the history 
                                                 
33 Translation Intelligence Bureau; Italics mine: India, Home, Political F 14/9 1931. 
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of the Gurkha troops—the propaganda glosses the decision at hand as more than a 
matter of morality, destiny, religion, or salvation. It was also the opportunity to make 
right the identity of the Gorkha peoples in India. Throughout the pamphlet, note how 
smoothly the moral and religious idiom slips into one of identity. For example, Point 
13: “[The Gurkhas] should not commit blunders, should not abandon their religion, 
and should not allow their names to be slurred.” Time and time again the argument 
waylays the mercenary identity of the Gurkha, while accentuating the true moral 
“chivalrous” qualities of the ideal Gurkha subject. In this logic of appeal, “coming 
forward to destroy the British Government” was not merely a nationalist decision, but 
one also to “uphold”—even, “rectify”—“the dignity of the Gurkhas”. As this plea 
makes explicitly clear, these frames of reference (nationalism and ethnic identity) 
were problematically entangled. 
 In weighing the heavy burden of history that these calls place upon the 
conscience of the Gorkha subject, we must remember that this propaganda was 
confiscated in the Darjeeling post office in March of 1931. I have found no evidence 
to suggest the circulation of these pamphlets in the hills, and more generally, there is 
very little evidence of nationalist activity in Darjeeling. It is therefore difficult to know 
precisely to what degree the pleas of the “Gurkha Jail Pilgrim” may have resonated 
with the people of the hills. At the same time, we must remember that these pleas were 
written by Gorkhas to Gorkhas. That they would so viscerally index a profound guilt 
of history within, I think, lends a special credence to their suggestions of such an 
interiority. So too does it charge their appeal with a purportedly inter-subjective affect 
to be felt and acted upon by all Gorkhas of India. Despite their confiscation, the 
parcels of Kharag Bahadoor Singh clearly landed up in Darjeeling with an especially 
heavy burden to bear. 
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What is Affect? 
 The aforementioned episodes of 2007, 1864, and 1930/1 generated a host of 
powerful emotions ranging from fear cloaked as anger (in the crisis in the village), 
fear and loathing (in the panic of Jung Bahadoor’s hunting trip), and historical guilt 
(in the suitcases of Kharag Bahadoor Singh). These emotive responses were born out 
of specific historical and socio-cultural conditions—particularly those of a nationalist 
variety. In this regard, they largely affirm the common model within the anthropology 
of emotion that views emotions as culturally patterned.34 Viewed in this light, they 
suggest emotive patterns that continue to attend the ‘identity’ question in Darjeeling 
today. However, the study of emotion is not the primary objective of this essay. 
Rather, it is to fathom a field of incipience that gives rise to these scenarios and 
charges them with intensity—a field that links and encompasses these emotive 
moments. In Darjeeling, what links these events and countless other articulations of 
‘identity’ is an underlying anxiety, the instigating condition of which is the question of 
                                                 
34 How episodes like these produce and/or elicit specific emotions remains a key question for both the 
anthropology and history of emotion (Bourke 2003; Febvre 1973; Weinstein 1995). Eschewing those 
understandings that posit a universal pallet of emotions for the human subject, the social sciences of 
emotion beckon detailed investigation of the dialectical processes through which agents and socio-
cultural contexts do their emotional work on the sentient subject. From such studies we shall begin to 
understand emotions and emotional experiences as not only psychologically and/or physiologically 
rooted, but also socially, culturally, and historically produced. Lutz and White offer a helpful, although 
somewhat dated review of “The Anthropology of Emotions,” (1986) Annual Review of Anthropology 
(15), in which the various anthropological and psychoanalytic models of emotion are examined and 
classified. Concerning the relation of affect to emotion: a commonly held conception in the 
anthropology of emotion is the two-tiered model, in which affect is seen as ‘under’ emotion. This model 
of layers was established early in the history of psychoanalysis and has since weathered many 
alterations. Universalist understandings of emotion often root the ‘universal pallet of emotions’ in this 
underlying layer of affect. My ethnography questions this link. Nevertheless, as will become clear in the 
coming review of literature, the general idea of a two-tiered model does, to a certain extent, withstands 
the test of time. However within this scheme, the model becomes extremely vague and contentious at 
two points: first, on the relation between the two layers; and second, on the origin and causality of the 
layers. Again Lutz and White (1986) provide a helpful inventory of anthropologies and psychologies 
that have deployed this type of model. More recent treatments of emotion and affect can be found in 
Boellstorff & Lindquist 2004; Brennan 2004; Campbell & Rew 1999; Lindholm 2005; Massumi 1996; 
Mazzarella 2005, 2009; Oatley, Kelter, & Jenkins 2006. 
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belonging in India. This anxious belonging, I suggest, must be understood as affect, 
not emotion. What then is affect? 
 To date, scholarly discussions of affect have tended toward obfuscation, even 
mystification. In more and less veiled ways, psychoanalysis has dominated these 
discussions. Freud’s theories of affect, by his own admission, were suspect. In his 
Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1915-1917) he described his thoughts on 
affect as “not very assured”, as “a first attempt at finding our bearings in this obscure 
region.”35 Freud’s views on affect, and in particular anxiety, underwent significant 
revisions throughout his career leaving him largely dissatisfied with his own 
explanations. Amid his protracted confusion, certain threads remain constant though—
some of which are redeemable, others of which are highly problematic when brought 
to bear on the people of Darjeeling. 
 Freud makes an interesting distinction between anxiety and fear that serves as 
a useful starting point for distinguishing between affect and emotion. “Anxiety (Angst) 
has an unmistakable relation to expectation: it is anxiety about something. It has a 
quality of indefiniteness and lack of object. In precise speech we use the word fear 
(Furcht) rather than anxiety (Angst) if it has found an object.”36 Lacan later 
complicated this model by positing the unforgettable aphorism: “Anxiety is not 
without an object”.37 (I will return to this aphorism momentarily, as it is useful in 
                                                 
35 Freud, S. 1966: 492. 
36 Freud 1966: 491. (Lectures presented from 1915-1917). 
37 Harari (2001:34) explains that Lacan’s “not…without’“ aphorism “accounts for the obscure, 
imprecise condition of the object at hand”. The key here is Lacan’s ideas of the ontological in-
betweenness of the object of anxiety--at once not present, but not without ontology. Through an 
extremely complex system of logic, Lacan would extend this line of thought toward yet another 
aphorism: that anxiety arises when lack lacks. Along the way he offers a fascinating explanation of the 
relation between anxiety, action and certainty--a reading that awaits further explication with regard to 
Arjun Appadurai’s explanation of ethnic violence in “Dead Certainty: Ethnic Violence in the Era of 
Globalization” (1999). Lacan’s views on anxiety are highly developed, but I am unconvinced that they 
can be fully applied to the type of data my research has generated. Doing so would make me 
uncomfortable because I have neither the data nor the clinical expertise to interpolate the psyches of my 
research subjects as Lacan did his patients. Furthermore, I am trying to move the discussion of affect 
away from certain psychoanalytic propensities, while retaining key insights (which I discuss in the main 
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understanding anxieties at hand in Darjeeling.) But what is important here is that, for 
Freud, fear is an articulation of anxiety in the face of an imminent threat, whereas 
anxiety exists as an affective state irrespective of an immediate object or threat. For 
our purposes, fear then is emotion, an organized (or ‘patterned’) response oriented 
toward an object, while anxiety is affect, a condition of intensity without organized 
progression or object. Fear then is to anxiety as emotion is to affect. 
 Freud, Lacan, and the psychoanalytic school more generally, clearly define 
anxiety as an affective state. “And what is affect in a dynamic sense?” Freud asks, “It 
is in any case something highly composite. An affect includes in the first place 
particular motor innervations or discharges and secondly certain feelings.”38 Freud’s 
willingness to see affect (and thus anxiety) as both mental and physiological is crucial 
if one insists on the Cartesian duality of mind and body. In the common 
psychoanalytic conception, affect bridges the physical and the psychic; it is both 
somatic and mental.39 However, where Freud’s views become problematic is with 
regards to the origin of affect and anxiety. In his early work, Freud attributed affect 
and anxiety to the repression of libido.40 In later work (1925), Freud revised his views 
to at least partially open up the causality of affect: 
“Anxiety is not newly created in repression; it is reproduced as an affective 
state in accordance with an already existing mnemic image. If we go further 
and enquire into the origin of that anxiety—and of affects in general—we shall 
be leaving the realm of pure psychology and entering the borderland of 
physiology. Affective states have become incorporated into the mind as 
                                                                                                                                            
body of text). Incorporating Lacan here would surely plunge the discussion even further back into the 
psychoanalytic intellectual milieu. Lacan’s analysis of anxiety may be found in the unpublished 
Seminar X: L’Angoisse (1962-3), which is best accessed in English via Roberto Harari’s (2001) book 
Lacan’s Seminar On ‘Anxiety’. For a critique of Lacan’s treatment of affect, see Andre’ Green’s The 
Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse (1999). 
38 Freud 1966: 491. 
39 For elaboration see Charles Sheperdson’s ‘Forward’ to Harari (2001: xxxix). 
40 See Lecture XXV “Anxiety” in the Introductory Lectures. 
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precipitates of primaeval traumatic experiences and when a similar situation 
occurs they are revived like mnemic symbols.”41 
According to Freud, the prototype for this “primaeval traumatic experience” was birth. 
This opinion, along with his enduring insistence on the generative role of repressed 
libido, places the origin of affect and anxiety squarely within the realm of a seemingly 
universal species-based human psychology. In my opinion, such a view is untenable 
because it wrongly obviates the ways that the circulation and production of affect are 
socially conditioned. 
 Freud’s 1925 revisions do however offer an important insight—namely, that 
affect functions upon precedent. If anxiety is about expected danger, we must inquire 
further into the genesis of such expectation. Freud would undoubtedly root this genesis 
in the innate drives and subsequent repression within the patient. The anthropology or 
history of affect must, I think, search out different origins. We must socially 
historicize it. From what conditions does anxiety arise? What generally is it about? If 
we can answer these questions, then we can begin to recognize how anxiety—and 
affect more generally—is socially, historically (re)produced. The anxiety that links 
and encompasses all of the episodes addressed in this paper is unequivocally about 
belonging in India. 
 It is here where Lacan’s notion that “anxiety is not without an object” becomes 
especially useful. What Lacan is trying to point out with this perplexing grammatical 
construction is that the key issue of anxiety is the indeterminateness of its object. 
While anxiety may be about something, that something does not need to be wholly 
present or perfectly coherent. Yet neither is the ‘object’ of anxiety wholly absent. 
Even when not presently at hand in Darjeeling, the question of national belonging is 
seemingly always there, ready to take shape in a variety of forms. In 1864 and 2007 it 
                                                 
41 Freud, S. 1959: 119. 
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manifested as a fear of possible extradition. With the ‘Letter from a Gurkha Jail 
Pilgrim’, it was the questionability of the Gorkhas’ loyalty—and thus their moral 
belonging within an emergent, free India—that was framed as the crux of their 
membership in nation. 
 In the analyses to follow, I will discuss other instances and forms through 
which anxious belonging has shown itself in more recent years. Traversing from these 
histories into the present, we find multiple, partial, causal ‘objects’ for the people of 
Darjeeling’s anxieties over ‘identity’ and belonging. These include real and imagined 
instances of extradition, real and imagined xenophobic prejudices, racism, enduring 
class inequalities and a host of other troubling facets of the past and present. These 
unsettling precedents are seemingly always present for the people of Darjeeling. In 
this regard, Lacan’s perplexing aphorism begins to make a good deal of sense; as 
certainly, the people of Darjeeling’s anxieties about their ‘identity’ and belonging in 
India are ‘not without’ just cause. 
 In this regard, the “Letter from a Gurkha Jail Pilgrim” is a brilliantly affective 
document. It cuts to the heart of Gorkha identity and asks the reading Gorkha subject 
to rethink, even re-feel, the ‘brave’ history of the Gurkhas as a source of shame not 
pride. The once stable identification of the ‘loyal’, ‘martial’ Gurkha is here refigured 
as a source of collective embarrassment.42 By playing the ‘identity’ card, the pamphlet 
at once creates and plays upon an amorphous sense of unease with regard to belonging 
in India. It manifests anxiety, reaps credence from it, foments it. Above all, it taps into 
this unease as a field of mobilizing potentiality. It does so by first eliciting a sense of 
historical guilt, an emotion presumably laden with affect (i.e. intensity). It then seeks 
to transform this affective energy into the revolutionary desire to join the nationalist 
                                                 
42 My thanks to William Mazzarella, whose comments on this chapter helped me develop this point. An 
excellent analysis of the essentialist paradigm of ‘bravery’ in the context of Nepali nationalism can be 
found in Onto 1996. 
 146 
movement to overthrow the British. In this way, the pamphlet works through emotion 
to access affect, the expectation being that the affective intensity conjured by guilt will 
be redirected and channeled into a different emotion—ideally the passionate desire for 
swaraj. In so doing, the vignette of the suitcases and their evocations of historical guilt 
help us isolate affect as a topic of study by asking us to analytically sever any assumed 
contiguity of affect and emotion. Following the important work of Brian Massumi, 
affect in this case comes into view as the region of anxious intensity out which 
emotions emanate.43 For Massumi, affect is embodied, unqualified intensity. Emotion, 
on the other hand, is culturally mediated qualification of that intensity; “It is intensity 
owned and recognized”.44 Through these lenses, the fears of being sent back to Nepal 
and the historical guilt of the Gorkhas then appear as articulations—or ‘qualifications’, 
as Massumi would have it—of this resonating field of anxiety about being-in and 
being-of India. 
The Question of Knowing Affect. 
 Massumi’s writings on the “autonomy of affect” raise important considerations 
for this dissertation’s concerns with knowledge and belonging—particularly his 
distinction between affect and the realm of semantics, semiotics, epistemology, etc. 
For Massumi, affect is raw, embodied intensity—a distinct register of human life. But 
in Massumi’s view, affect is not only ontologically distinct from the dimension of 
knowledge/discursive mediation; it is, in essence, “autonomous” from it.45 But he also 
                                                 
43 Massumi, 1996.  
44 Ibid, 221. 
45 As William Mazzarella has noted: “Massumi is asking us to imagine social life in two simultaneous 
registers: on the one hand, a register of affective, embodied intensity and, on the other, a register of 
symbolic mediation and discursive elaboration.” Mazzarella 2009. Elsewhere, Massumi explains further 
how emotion fits into this model: “An emotion is a subjective content, the socio-linguistic fixing of the 
quality of an experience which is from the point onward defined as personal. Emotion is qualified 
intensity, the conventional, consensual point of insertion of intensity into semantically and semiotically 
formed progressions, into narrativizable action-reaction circuits, into function and meaning.” Massumi 
1996: 221. 
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notes, “The problem is that there is no cultural-theoretical vocabulary specific to 
affect.”46 This, I will maintain, is not only a problem of lexicon, but also of semeosis 
and ontological differences between affect and knowledge. Here is where Massumi’s 
formulation raises important, if at times overly hermetic, epistemological barriers. For 
if we accept Massumi’s ideas that affect is unqualified intensity, a pure potentiality 
that is only actualized and/or captured through culturally mediated expression, then 
how would we ever know it? Because in its very moment of actualization, would it not 
have already instantly become something else? Could we fathom such a thing? To 
understand the mercurial sensitivities of the people of Darjeeling with regard to 
belonging in India, I believe we have to—-with qualification. 
 The critical question for this thesis on belonging and knowledge then becomes: 
What is the relationship between affect (understood as pure intensity) and the 
discursive (semiotic, semantic, cultural, symbolic) register? Massumi is unclear. At 
times, his championing of the “autonomy” of affect seems to posit a relation of pure 
difference. Yet according to Massumi, affect is always coming into social being 
through discursively mediated expression. Here Massumi’s model suffers from similar 
deficiencies as Freud’s: First, while Massumi discusses the circulation and 
“actualization” of affect, he accounts for neither its origins nor causality. In his model, 
affect is seemingly always out there and on the move, ready to be tapped or 
“captured”. Second, if affect is as “autonomous” as Massumi would have it, then there 
would be little possibility of semiotic and semantic phenomenon generating their own 
affective effects. Such a view would hold scant analytic space for a dialectic of 
knowledge and affect. Or to put it into the terms of this dissertation, we would never 
be able to understand how knowledge itself produces affect, and how affect, in this 
                                                 
46 Ibid. 
 148 
case anxious belonging, can become an impetus for, and animator of, specific kinds of 
knowledge (in this case, anthropological knowledge). 
 In sum, Massumi offers a compelling distinction between affect and emotion 
that pushes us to fathom a realm of being that is not of knowledge, and yet is often 
there with it. I share with Massumi a will to study knowledge’s beyond, because like 
him I sense its profound impact in the world. However, Massumi mystifies affect in a 
way that renders any anthropology of affect epistemologically and methodologically 
ill equipped to apprehend the posited “autonomous” ontology of the term’s referent.47 
Because of this, his theory of affect begs further critique. 
 The charged history of ‘identity’ in Darjeeling asks us to rethink the 
relationship between the registers of affect and discursive/epistemic/semiotic 
mediation. Along with William Mazzarella, who himself offers a compelling critique 
of Massumi, I will argue that we must “resist a universal separation between the ‘rules 
of formation’ that govern meaning and affect,” while simultaneously acknowledging a 
relative difference in their formation.48 Maintaining a relative ontological distinction 
between these respective registers of social life is crucial if we are to recuperate affect 
as a topic of anthropological and historical analysis. Refigured accordingly, we open 
up a space for understanding affect’s dialectical constitution through time. From here, 
we can begin to understand how specific discursive, social, and material conditions of 
history can generate particular affects among particular populations. This empirical 
approach promises to work against Massumi’s notion of the ‘autonomy of affect’, but 
                                                 
47 Massumi himself seems to acknowledge the mystification at hand, yet he remains unfettered by the 
prospect; he admits, “At this point, the impression may have grown that affect is being touted as if the 
world could be packed into it. In a way, it can and is…. The affective atoms….are autonomous not 
through closure but through a singular openness. As unbounded ‘regions’ in an equally unbounded 
affective field, they are in contact with the whole universe of affective potential, as by action at a 
distance. Thus they have no outside, even though they are differentiated according to which potentials 
are most apt to be expressed (effectively induced) as their ‘region’ passes into actuality. Their passing 
into actuality is the key. Affect is the whole world: from the precise angle of its differential emergence.” 
Massumi 1996: 235. 
48 Mazzarella 2005: 48-9. 
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without relinquishing a healthy skepticism toward any professed commensurability 
between affect and discursive form. What I am advocating then is a ‘middle-way’ 
approach that can (a) expose the dialectical, historical constitution of affect, while (b) 
resisting the logic that this form of raw, intensity could ever be fully resolved, 
satisfied, and/or captured through discursive mediation. Mazzarella sees a similar way 
forward. “Rather than seeking to recuperate an emergent non-alienated state,” he 
notes, “We might instead productively pervert Massumi’s terminology, and 
acknowledge that the condition of our becoming is indeed a negatively dialectical one, 
in which we are always moving between immanence and qualification.”49 
 Indeed, the imperfect play between immanence and qualification—between the 
affects of anxious belonging and identification—may be understood to be the engine 
of identity politics in Darjeeling. Along these lines, this dissertation may be read more 
broadly as an examination of the constitutive links and important disconnects between 
belonging and ethnologically-effected practices of identification. The affects and 
history discussed in this chapter have clearly prompted the people of Darjeeling’s 
recent turn to anthropological knowledge, but how exactly ethnic revitalization, 
‘tribal’ recognition, or the attainment of any other discursive or juridical form could 
ever fully resolve the anxieties embodied by the people of Darjeeling remains a 
fraught—and to date, unanswered—question in the hills. 
 Contra the models of Freud, the intensity of feeling that attends being-Gorkha 
in India is not sequestered in the depths of an individual’s psychological history. Nor 
does it exist in a realm of pure autonomous being as Massumi might have it. Rather 
this affective complex remains in constant dialogue with socio-historical conditions, 
                                                 
49 Locating Massumi’s presumed “autonomy of affect” within a poststructuralist tradition that has 
largely disavowed dialectical social onto-logics of any kind, Mazzarella gestures to the deleterious 
impact such a conception of affect could have on the social sciences. He asks: “Rather than positing the 
emergent as the only vital hope against the dead hand of mediation, why not consider the possibility 
that mediation is at once perhaps the most fundamental and productive principle of all social life 
precisely because it is necessarily incomplete, unstable, and provisional?” See Mazzarella 2009. 
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often re-generating its very own hypersensitive conditionality. Like a wave-length 
resonating between the nodes of history and the present, the ambient anxiety over 
‘being-in’ and ‘being-of’ India has reverberated with different amplitudes according to 
the conditions of any given Now. The episodes discussed in this chapter are some of 
the more amplified moments of this history. Studying affect in such moments of 
heightened intensity offers a productive way of “rubbing history against the grain”, as 
Walter Benjamin would have it.50 Through these lenses, we see that history does more 
than predetermine the present in Darjeeling. Instead, unsettled matters of the past 
continually refigure and perturb the present in new, unexpected ways. The crisis I 
caused with my survey in 2007 is a recent, regrettable, example. Turning to other 
facets of Darjeeling’s recent past, we see further ways that these anxieties over 
belonging in India do not just emerge from history. They also, in a sense, make it. 
Agitation. 
 In the 1980s, history and affect erupted into the present. As the leader of the 
Gorkha National Liberation Front, Subash Ghisingh, explained: 
“The growing fears of the Gorkhas had spread like a cancer. No ordinary 
medicine would cure this malady—it was a very, very old disease. There was 
just one capsule which could clean the system of this affliction—Gorkhaland. 
On April 5, 1980 our first cry for Gorkhaland pierced the skies and made the 
once tranquil hills resound with rebellion. The night before I gave the call for a 
separate state, I had a ‘miracle’ dream and vision asked me to go ahead. The 
Gorkha would be successful.”51 
 Ghisingh spoke these words on October 2nd 1988 less than two months after 
signing the Memorandum of Settlement that effectively ended the three-year violent 
                                                 
50 Benjamin 1968: 257. 
51 Interview given by Ghisingh in The Illustrated Weekly of India, October 2, 1988. 
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‘agitation’ for Gorkhaland, a homeland that was never to be.52 Ghisingh, like the 
people he represented, had been called many things: ‘anti-nationalist’, ‘foreigner’, 
‘traitor’, etc,53 but the classic anthropological characters of the shaman and the 
trickster are far more apt. Given his propensities for the mystical, it is unlikely 
Ghisingh himself would shed these labels like he did xenophobic pejoratives: “Me! An 
anti-nationalist!” he once exclaimed, aping an epithet he described as “far removed 
from reason. For, weren’t we just longing to be called Indians?”54 
 Born of belonging’s lack, ‘Gorkhaland’ was and remains beyond all else a 
longing-to-be—an embodiment that cannot be understood sans the framings of nation 
and the affective wizardry of Subash Ghisingh. For there, in the ambiguous nether-
regions of national belonging, we find the sorcerer and his magic. Like the healer of 
Levi-Strauss’s fascination, Ghisingh was a master of abreaction55, a capturer of 
malady who could affect the traces of a “very, very old disease” and affect both its 
symptoms and its notional cure. As the preceding analysis has shown, the seeds of dis-
ease were already sown. Under the spell of Ghisingh, they metastasized into what the 
man himself called a “cancer” of fear. 
 Born on the Manju Tea Estate in 1936 and having served briefly in the Indian 
army, Ghisingh rose from relative obscurity. A poet and author of over 21 novels, 
Ghisingh was rhetorically deft. After dabbling in politics throughout the 1960s and 
1970s, Ghisingh finally found his calling in the quest for Gorkhaland.56 With a style 
                                                 
52 Studies of the Gorkhaland Movement include: Magar 1994; Samanta 2000; Sarkar 2000; Subba 1992; 
Timsina 1992.  
53 See Lama’s Gorkhaland Movement, a compilation of relevant material published by the Darjeeling 
Gorkha Hill Council (1996: 61). 
54 Ibid. 
55 Levi-Strauss writes, “In psychoanalysis, abreaction refers to the decisive moment in the treatment 
when the patient intensively relives the initial situation from which his disturbance stems, before he 
ultimately overcomes it. In this sense, the shaman is a professional abreactor.” Ghisingh was both an 
abreactor and a guide for this sort of psycho-political channeling. Levi-Strauss, 1963: 191. 
56 In 1968, Ghisingh floated his first party, the Nilo Jhaṇḍā, which concentrated on rights for hill 
peoples. Neither the party nor Ghisingh achieved much success at the time. On Ghisingh, see Lama 
2006; Magar 1994.  
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uniquely paternal and bizarre, Ghisingh seized upon ambiguity, produced it, played 
with it, and harnessed it, so as to yoke the affective power of uncertainty to the wagon 
of ethnic destiny.57 He fixated in particular on Clause 7 of the Indo-Nepali Treaty of 
1950, which granted “reciprocal” rights to Nepalis domiciled in India and vice-versa.58 
On June 2, 1985, Ghisingh took the stage in the hill town of Kurseong to deliver what 
would become the most famous speech of the Gorkhaland Movement. His rhetoric 
longwinded, poetic, and peculiarly soothing for a militant, Ghisingh informed the 
masses of the dangers of the juridical word: 
“This word ‘Reciprocal’ has become a blemish for we (Nepalese in India). 
This word indicates that we (Nepalese) have come to India after the 1950 
Treaty as immigrants. ….Accordingly, we are not bona fide citizens of India. 
Life and future is not secured here for us in India. ….We have simply been 
hired tenants in the country of Gandhi, Nehru, Sastri, Morarji Dasai, Indira 
Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi.”59 
The Indian Constitution states unequivocally that those residing in India at the time of 
independence (1947) were by law citizens. This would accordingly include the 
overwhelming majority of Darjeeling’s population. Yet despite the Constitution’s 
guarantee of their citizenship, Ghisingh, here (and through tireless re-iteration in the 
years to come) preached that their status was questionable at best.60 The vaults of 
                                                 
57 On the affective power of uncertainty within ethnic mobilizations see Appadurai’s “Dead Certainty” 
(1999). 
58 The ambiguous Clause 7 reads: “The Government of India and Nepal agree to grant, on a reciprocal 
basis, to the nationals of one country in the territories of the other the same privileges in the matter of 
residence, ownership of property, participation in trade and commerce, movement and other privileges 
of a similar nature.” Note: the clause makes no mention of citizenship. 
59 Transcript of ‘The Historic Speech’ available in Lama 1996: 22-27. 
60 Relevant clauses of Indian Constitution are Section 2, Article 5. As early as 1983 in his Memorandum 
Sent to the King of Nepal, Ghisingh was claiming that “under deep-rooted illusion [Gorkhas] have 
unknowingly considered themselves the true citizens or inhabitants of independent Union of India and 
India as their motherland or country since Bharat independence”. Lama 1996: 19. Contacting the king 
of Nepal proved to be a political blunder, as it only facilitated additional anti-nationalist accusations. 
Both in the 1983 Memorandum and the ‘Historic Speech’ in Kurseong, Ghisingh loops through the 
history of the Gurkha regiments. He touches upon their involvement in the Mutiny and other wars, not 
to invoke guilt, but to both recapture some of the symbolic capital of such service, and to problematize 
the colonial exploitation of the Gorkha peoples writ large. In these instances and countless others, 
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affective history now opened, Ghisingh then proceeded to rake over more recent 
wounds by reminding the people of the infamous words spoken in 1976, by then 
Prime Minister Morarji Desai, who in refusing to recognize Nepali as a national 
language of India, claimed that “Nepali is a foreign language spoken by foreigners in 
India.”61 Notice how Ghisingh links Desai and the Treaty of 1950, thereby conjoining 
prejudice and law in a sinister spin. 
“The former PM Shri Morarji Desai had understood about the controversial 
Indo-Nepal Treaty [clause] No. 7, so he had told that you people (Nepalese) 
were foreigners, your language was foreign. Morarji had said the truth, but the 
other PMs of India [presumably those that assured the Gorkha peoples of their 
citizenship] are telling lies. So we should be thankful to Morarji Desai who has 
opened our eyes.”62 
On July 27th, 1986 the GNLF ceremoniously burned the Indo-Nepali Treaty of 1950 at 
rallies throughout the hills.63 But the questioning of citizenship—and in particular 
Clause 7—would remain a centerpiece issue throughout the agitation, making 
‘reciprocal’ a household term.64 
 Ghisingh quickly became an icon of the hills and increasingly an operator on 
the national stage. As his fame grew he took his message to the Indian public: 
“Consider our situation,” he told India Today in late October 1986, “Morarji Desai 
described us as foreigners and said we were welcome to go back to Nepal. …We 
                                                                                                                                            
Ghisingh would explicate how the Gorkha peoples had fallen through the national cracks of 
decolonization, and once again become subjects of an internal neo-colonization by West Bengal.  
61 On the language movement in Darjeeling, see forthcoming dissertation by Chelsea Booth, Rutgers 
University.  
62 Lama 1996: 25. 
63 “Letter to Prime Minister of India, Sri Rajiv Gandhi” in Lama 1996: 40. 
64 Citizenship remained a hot-button issue throughout the Movement. Though there are a vast number of 
iterations of this issue; some exemplary ones are: ‘The Fate of the Indian Gorkhas is Burning’ 14 May 
1984 (Lama 1996: 16); ‘Frontline Interview’ Jan 1987 (Lama 1996: 103); ‘Postered Public Statement 
by Subash Ghisingh’ 3 Feb 1987 (Lama 1996: 115); ‘Letter to Rajiv Gandhi’ 22 July 1987 (Lama 1996: 
154); ‘GNLF Press Release’ 23 July 1987 (Lama 1996: 163). Indeed, in the first ‘Memorandum of 
Settlement’ Signed 25 July 1988 by the Home Minister of India and Ghisingh, the first point of the 
agreements was the ‘Citizenship Issue’. It was decided that a Gazette notification would be issued by 
the Indian government to ‘clarify’ the question of citizenship of the Gorkhas. Memorandum available in 
Lama 1996: 241. Gazette issued on 23 Aug 1988 available also in Lama 1996: 245. 
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Nepali-Indians who have nothing to do with Nepal are constantly confused with 
‘Nepalis’, that is, citizens of Nepal, a foreign country. But if there is Gorkhaland then 
our identity as Indian belonging to an Indian state, just like our identity, will be 
clear.”65 
 Four months later in a 13-page spread in The Illustrated Weekly of India, he 
was quoted as saying: “Can you imagine how we felt when Morarji Desai openly 
called us foreign nationals? We have given our lives for this country, we have fought 
wars and sacrificed our families, only to be accused of being traitors!”66 Here Ghisingh 
seems to tacitly index the troubling history of the Gurkha troops discussed earlier, 
which, as we saw earlier, was a mechanism of nationalist othering that no doubt fed 
into the notion that all Gorkhas were foreigners. While Ghisingh prove adept at 
tapping into sensitive histories, what is most notable about his rhetoric throughout this 
period was its repetition. Certainly, the 1970s and early eighties were a time of 
growing dissatisfaction in Darjeeling. Various political outfits such as the Pranta 
Parishad and the All India Gorkha League bespoke such frustration with similar 
demands for statehood.67 Ghisingh’s unique contribution was to inject a viral politics 
of fear into this milieu—a move that facilitated the GNLF’s affective capture of the 
public imagination. Over and over throughout the 1980s, Ghisingh and his party 
reminded the people of their historical sensitivities and socio-political vulnerabilities 
precisely by aggravating the very nerve endings in question.68 With each reiteration, 
those nerves became simultaneously more raw, more real. The affective wizard was 
not just summoning a sheer intensity of dis-ease, he was also producing it. 
                                                 
65 India Today. 66 October 31, 1986.  
66 The Illustrated Weekly of India. Feb 22, 1987. 
67 On the pre-agitation political climate, see Samantha 2000; Subba: 1992.  
68 Iterations of this sort are too many to cite. Those interested in repetition may find it in the Lama’s 
compilation (1996). 
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 Ghisingh thus emerged as a fomenter, diagnostician, and self-proclaimed 
healer of a self-described ‘identity crisis’ for the Gorkhas—an affliction with only one 
cure. And “Why the Name Gorkhaland?” he would ask in 1987 in The Voice of 
Gorkhaland. His answer? “[Because] only the ethnic name of any place or any 
land…can germinate the real sense of belonging in the conscience of the concerned 
people?”69 Clearly, like any good shaman, Ghisingh knew his domain of operation, 
and his craft was somewhat magical. A skeptic might thus ask: How would this 
become the case? How would receiving statehood resolve the crisis of identity? How 
would a state bring belonging? 
 I put similar questions to a new generation of Gorkha youth during the Fall of 
2007. High off the euphoria surrounding one of Darjeeling’s own winning the Indian 
Idol competition of 2007, and with the drum beat of Gorkhaland once again 
resounding through the hills, the young men could produce no direct answer. Instead 
they regurgitated with uncanny precision the narrative of under-development and 
discrimination spouted just a week before by the man who would finally bring down 
Ghisingh in 2008, Bimal Gurung.70 
Towns:  In your personal opinion, do you think you need your own 
state? 
Rajiv:  Yes, we have to have our own state. It is better to have our own 
state. Now in the district, you know, we have a great financial 
problem. Due to finance we  cannot  progress. We have great 
footballers and cricket players but they cannot go beyond 
Calcutta. It is the ploy of Bengal. It will be good if we have our 
own state. 
Towns:  I read in the newspapers that a leader from the All Gorkha 
Student Union, Mr. Giri, said “Our future is not secure in 
                                                 
69 The Voice of Gorkhaland. 25 Nov 1987. 
70 As will become clear momentarily, Bimal Gurung’s rise once again shifted the terms of ‘identity’ and 
its politics in Darjeeling. The remainder of this chapter examines the circumstances by which he 
usurped Ghisingh’s power. In the Conclusion of the dissertation I discuss in detail the re-emergence of 
the Gorkhaland Movement and its effects on the politics of ‘tribal’ recognition. 
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Bengal. We want our own state!” But my question is if 
Gorkhaland is a reality how will the security come? What is the 
meaning of security in the future? 
Rajiv:  We will not be under anyone. Like now we are under Bengal, 
but after Gorkhaland we will not be under Bengal. We will have 
our own police. Everything will be ours. We will not be under 
anyone. That is what is meant by security. 
Towns:  And in history, do you personally think that in India people 
have discriminated against the people of Darjeeling? 
Rajiv:  Yes, that’s the way it is. They say what we should do. They say 
all Nepalis are chowkidars [guardsmen]. That’s it. That’s the 
reason that in this region we are demanding Gorkhaland. 
Everyone bullies us because we are Nepalis. 
Towns:  So do you think if Gorkhaland were to come, this kind of 
discrimination would stop? 
Rajiv:  Hmmm. It should stop. 
Samir:  [chiming in simultaneously] It should. 
Rajiv:  I think we need it to stop. They should stop it. Maybe. 
It was an unfair question. But in fact, Rajiv responded as most did throughout my 
research, by fumbling for a reticent logic that steadfastly evaded articulation. And that 
is precisely what is most telling. 
 ‘Gorkhaland’ has become the telos, the ultimate realization, of affect’s 
embodied potentiality. A future. A promise-land. In the spirit of Hegel, it is a dream 
worth living, a dream worth dying for. But it remains to be seen whether it could ever 
perfectly quell the anxiety over belonging harbored by the people of Darjeeling. In the 
logic of a negative dialectic, such a perfect realization of affect may prove impossible. 
The social sciences and governments the world over would do well to understand 
ethnic radicalism in such terms—as embodiment, as the frustrated actualization of 
affect in the world. Before that, the case of the GNLF ‘agitation’ and the affective 
wizardry of Subash Ghisingh asks us to take seriously the social (re)production of 
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affect, to interrogate its socio-material grounds, to seek out agency and responsibility 
within its resonance. In short, to embrace affect in the dialectical historical-materialist 
spirit of Marx.  
Shape-shift. 
 The party began just after 6 pm. The voting booths that had sprouted up all 
over the hills under the aegis of opportunistic political parties were now officially 
closed. People poured into the streets. The promenade became a thicket of joy. Jeeps 
and motorbikes overflowing with youth began to parade through town honking, 
chanting, singing. Across the nation the votes had been cast. All that was left was to 
tally the inevitability of destiny. In just a few short hours, a Gorkha would become an 
‘Indian Idol’. 
 Just minutes before the winner of Indian Idol-3 (2007) was to be announced, 
Prashant Tamang was handed the microphone, and the opportunity to sing one last 
impromptu number before the final results were to be announced. A boyish 24, 
Prashant took the microphone and launched into “Bir Gorkhali”, an accapella ode to 
Gurkha warriors.71 On stage before thousands and on air before millions, Prashant’s 
off-the-cuff rendition was a bit awkward and not nearly as polished as his 
competitor’s, Amit Paul. But it appeared as heartfelt as it could be. One of 
Darjeeling’s own, for a celebrated moment, could bask in the national limelight. 
 Then just before 10pm, at the apex of a corporate, stilted crescendo of 
suspense, Bollywood star John Abraham reached into a magical box and confirmed 
what many already knew in their hearts: Prashant Tamang was this year’s Indian Idol. 
Overcome by joy, pomp, and circumstance, Prashant hugged everyone in sight, 
                                                 
71 ‘Bir Gorkhali’ was written and originally performed by the pop-rock band Mantra, based out of 
Darjeeling and widely acclaimed across Nepal. 
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repeatedly. Someone handed him a Nepali ṭopi (cap), which he immediately squeezed 
onto his perfectly sculpted hair. On stage the climax went off in rather unscripted 
fashion, but what would Sony, the event’s sponsor, care? Having ridden the 
marginalized identities of the two finalist to the tune of 7 crore sms mobile phone 
votes, a number that exceeded the entire populations of Darjeeling and Assam 
combined, the show was a smash hit. 
 Meanwhile, in Darjeeling firecrackers exploded across the hills. People 
frolicked in the streets and danced as live images of Prashant warped across jumbo 
public televisions in the background, almost like he was there, larger than life. Fans 
distributed sweets. Strangers hugged strangers. “This is one of the happiest moments 
of my life!”, “His victory gives strength to our community!” “The people of the hills 
have shown they have hearts of gold!” “This is a once in a lifetime opportunity! I want 
to make the most of it!” “Never before have the people celebrated so hard. The 
celebration will continue for long!”….words uttered in the frenzy.72 In suburbs like 
Singamari and elsewhere the Prashant Fan Club launched all night parties. Come 
dawn, there would be no problem: local schools, colleges, tea gardens, and most 
businesses were given holiday so that the carnival could continue. 
 Hailed as an ambassador of the Gorkha people, Prashant Tamang had become 
much more than an instant pop-icon. For the people of Darjeeling, indeed for Nepali 
speakers the world over, his victory was seen as a coming out party, a debutante of 
sorts, for the Gorkha peoples on the national stage. Born in the village of Toongsoong 
and a constable in the Calcutta police force, Darjeeling’s golden boy was now India’s. 
The fairy tale was real. 
--- 
                                                 
72The Telegraph, Sep 24, 2007. 
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 How quickly things can change in the world of affect. Little did the revelers 
know that in five short days 800 of them would find themselves pinned inside the 
Siliguri courthouse grounds, Gorkhas held hostage by the ballistics of a communal 
riot. 
 Even by September 25th, the euphoria of the 23rd, had morphed into outrage. 
The day after Prashant’s victory, Red FM DJ Ulta Pulta Nitin went on air and joked to 
the Delhi public that if all Nepali chowkidars (guardsmen) became Indian Idols, who 
would guard the private property of India?73 “Prashant Tamang has become Indian 
Idol,” he noted with a sarcastic laugh, “Tonight we need to guard our houses, malls, 
and restaurants by ourselves as there will be no Nepali people to guard these places. 
The whole night we will need to say ‘Jagtay Raho’!” He also announced, “All footpath 
momo shops will remain closed as the Nepali guy has become Indian Idol.”74 Of 
course, no one in Darjeeling actually heard these incendiary remarks; Red FM is a 
Delhi-based radio station. Nevertheless word reached Darjeeling and by the 25th, the 
Prashant Fan Club, led by GNLF muscle man Bimal Gurung, had declared a bandh 
(general strike) in the hills and effigies of Nitin were ablaze in the streets. 
 The outrage unabated, on the morning of September 28th, some 5000 Prashant 
supporters gathered in Siliguri to march an official complaint against Nitin and Red 
FM to the Siliguri court. Though the details remain uncertain, a minor skirmish of 
some sort broke out at the front of the procession in a crowded commercial strip near 
the courthouse. Almost instantly, the row spread along communal lines. Bengali shop 
owners emerged from their stalls with sticks and attacked the Gorkha protestors. 
About 800 Gorkhas, including 50 school children fled into the courthouse grounds, 
                                                 
73 See Satyadeep Chhetri’s “No Chowkidar!” where this stereotype is shown to be not only a figment of 
prejudicial imagination, but also of judicial law. In Himal 21:1 January 2008.  
74 Transcript and translation from Darjeeling Times, Sep 26, 2007. Earlier in the Indian Idol-3 season, 
Gorkhas had been offended when Prashant was made to dress as a chowkidar for one of his earlier 
round performances. 
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where they sought whatever shelter they could find from the barrage of bricks and 
rocks hailing down upon them. Outside, rumors spread that a pregnant woman had 
been kicked, that a sick man buying medicine had been beaten up, that a hospital 
patient had been bludgeoned, and soon the mob owned the streets of Siliguri. Tear-gas 
was ineffective. Unable to contain the situation the police vanished, leaving the 
hostages on their own to weather the storm. For eight hours they remained trapped 
inside the courthouse, as vehicles and motorcycles burned in the streets. The police 
tried slapping a Section 144 on Siliguri banning gatherings of four or more people, but 
the mob ignored the proclamation. The army and Border Security Forces were then 
called in to regain control. Finally, at 7:45pm the Gorkha hostages were freed. 
 The news broke in Darjeeling piece-mail. On Star TV and other national 
channels, looped video snippets of burning vehicles, projectile-wielding mobs, and 
police idling at a safe distance played incessantly, as reporters on the ground tried to 
make sense of what was happening. Simultaneously, the local channel, Darjeeling TV, 
aired live footage of the All Gorkha Student Union (AGSU) demonstrations going on 
in town. In these images, hundreds of hot-blooded Darjeeling youth were shown 
gathered, chanting with rage: “The police procession should give us justice! All those 
who slander the Gorkhas, watch out! Death to the Bengali Government!” The streets 
went dead as people clung to the safety of their homes waiting for more news. No one 
was sure whether a bandh had been officially called or not. But that didn’t matter. The 
fantasy had turned into a nightmare. 
 For myself and my friend Prakash, it was too much to watch. After an entire 
afternoon of being glued to the television, the fragmented reportage had become an 
agonizingly slow and heartbreaking drip of information. So we turned off the 
television and went for a walk. 
--- 
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 Bandhs in South Asia have a way of bringing with them an eerie peace. 
Without the intermittent drone and wobbling headlights of the endless stream of jeeps 
that typically ply Hill-cart road, the phātak is pleasantly quiet, and strangely dark. As 
we reach the crossroads, Prakash hails his old buddy Puran, who emerges from the 
freshly painted violet façade of his new store sporting a stylish three-piece beige suit. 
A budding entrepreneur who dabbles on the side in jazz and blues guitar, Puran, with 
his long pony-tale and laid-back style, cuts quite the figure as he ambles over, hand 
outstretched to greet us. 
 It would have been a great day for the grand opening of his new store, but 
history has said otherwise, so we get to talking. Puran tells us that earlier in the day he 
and his friends almost beat up a carload of Bengali men who waved and made a 
comment at a Nepali girl as they passed through the very stretch of road where we are 
standing. As he narrates, he bows up his chest then suddenly flinch-strikes at the air 
like these Bengalis were right there in front of him, close enough to feel his rage. 
 “What did they say to her?” I ask. 
 He doesn’t remember. “Normally I wouldn’t do such a thing, but at this 
moment, in the wave of the moment…” He can explain no more. 
 We discuss Prashant’s win, Nitin’s comments, the riot. Puran continues, “You 
see this is what happens when someone makes an irresponsible comment…people 
these days don’t have any respect for others’ culture. You know Jesus, he said that 
thing: treat others as you would treat yourself?” 
 I share with Puran my sympathy, but gently suggest to him how things could 
have been different had the people of Darjeeling not reacted so strongly to the 
comments made over the airwaves of Delhi. If they had only let it roll off their back… 
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 A man in the moment, Puran listens intently, then rejects the grounds of my 
perspective. “But you see, this Prashant Tamang thing is really about more than 
Prashant Tamang.” 
 Standing there in the middle of a dark empty road at 9 o’clock on a Friday 
night, this much is painfully clear. 
--- 
 Within a week, the leader of the Prashant Fan Club, Bimal Gurung quit the 
GNLF to float his own party. Twenty thousand people thronged to see the former 
muscle man of the GNLF launch the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha (GJMM)—in English, 
The Gorkha People’s Liberation Front. With bodies perched on beams of unfinished 
construction projects and the crowd extending as far as one could see into the 
labyrinthine bazaar, it was the largest public gathering in Darjeeling since the 
Gorkhaland Agitation of the 1980s. Not coincidently, as of this momentous rally, 
‘Gorkhaland’ was once again a movement. 
 By way of an almost unbelievable story of popular culture and local politics, 
Subash Ghisingh’s reign came to an end just four months later. Usurped and upstaged 
by Bimal Gurung, the affective wizard was beaten at his own game. Ghisingh’s 
unwillingness to officially support Prashant Tamang in the weeks leading up to the 
finals hurt the people of Darjeeling more than anything. Just days before the Indian 
Idol finale and with the ‘Old Man’ in Indonesia on a ‘tribal tourism’ research venture, 
posters went up in town warning, “If Prashant doesn’t win, Ghisingh will not be 
allowed to return to Darjeeling!” Betrayed by their paternal leader and strung-out from 
the emotional rollercoaster that followed Prashant’s victory, the public was on edge. 
Meanwhile having led the spirited campaign to Indian Idol victory, Bimal Gurung’s 
political capital was surging. So with the masses once again reverberating with 
anxiety, the muscular politics of the GJMM proved right for the time. Amid GJMM-
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organized hunger strikes, indefinite bandhs and sporadic inter-party violence, on 
February 29th 2008, Subash Ghisingh was forced to resign.75 
 No one foresaw the swiftness of Ghisingh’s demise, but when viewed through 
the analytic aperture of affect this amazing story in which a television show became 
the catalyst of profound political transformation is more believable. How quickly the 
euphoria of Prashant’s victory morphed into horror and anger. How quickly that horror 
and anger morphed into revived, embodied determination for Gorkhaland. With our 
senses attuned to affect, we can begin to sense a continuity coursing through this 
turbulent series of events. In this sequence, we see affect seeping into the present as 
incipient, mercurial form.76 One moment effusive joy, the next hot-blooded rage, the 
next unbridled determination: the power of shape-shift is one of affect’s manifest 
conditions. 
 Affect in this case comes into view as an amorphous field of anxiety, a sheer 
intensity of unease, that begins to resonate at the slightest question of belonging in 
India. In Darjeeling, this sheer intensity of unease is simultaneously ‘identity’s’ field 
of imminence and its amplitude. Whether agitated or latent, this anxiety over ‘being-
in’ and ‘being-of’ India seems to have always there underlining and undermining the 
conditions of possibility for the Gorkha subject. Simultaneously, it has proven a 
volatile action potential for a specific politics of anxiety that continues to dominate the 
                                                 
75 Those not familiar with contemporary Darjeeling might find this narrative confusing. While Ghisingh 
led the GNLF movement of the 1980s and took over as the Chair of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council 
(1988-2008) the public increasingly saw that his regime was propped up by the CPI-M government of 
West Bengal, and that he subsequently abandoned the call for Gorkhaland. For the last several years of 
his reign, Ghisingh was not even an elected official. His term ran out in March 2004. Since then 
Ghisingh continually received 6-month extensions from the CPI-M government earning him the 
nickname ‘Recharge Voucher’. For an excellent analysis of Ghisingh’s fall, see Niraj Lama 2008’s “A 
Dictator Deposed” (2008). On the twilight years of his reign, see Lama 2006. 
76 My word choice here is inspired by Massumi who writes of affect: “It is the edge of the virtual, where 
it leaks into actual, that counts. For that seeping edge is where potential, actually, is found.” (1996: 
236). 
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hills. To understand this circuitry, consider how quickly the Siliguri riots became 
affective grist for the political mill. 
 Just five days after the riots the All Gurkha Student Union (AGSU) 
announced: “The recent Siliguri riots have prompted us to speak out. The incident 
made us feel that the Gorkhas are not safe. We always have to prove our identity in 
this country. This is happening because we do not have our own land. More than the 
Sixth Schedule, the Gorkhas require their own land!”77 Within days, AGSU would join 
the GJMM to once again put Gorkhaland on the proverbial table. To answer William 
Mazzarella’s provocative question: “Affect, What is it good for?” these events offer 
one clear answer: politics.78 
 In studying affect, we must avoid the psychoanalytic tendency to view such 
events as misrepresentations or distortions of some underlying condition; rather, I 
believe we must understand such phenomenon as expressions of anxiety, or what we 
might call the social actualization of an intensity of unease that itself has its own 
socio-historical bases. The historicity of affect is seldom transparent; rather it waits, 
often veiled, ready for release into the present. As a region of incipient intensity then, 
affect is potentiality but not ‘pure’ potentiality—that is, affect is not as ‘autonomous’ 
as Massumi suggests. The historical moments presented here demonstrate how affect 
is not only tapped and captured, but also socially produced, reproduced, and 
conditioned. As we see in the events of the 1850s, 1860s, 1930s, 1980s, and even in 
the nearly instantaneous reworking of the Siliguri riots of 2007 into ‘history’, anxious 
belonging in Darjeeling is affect with precedent—if not always perfectly sound 
reason. This raises an important question: If affect is a region of yet to be actualized 
intensity that can manifest, morph, and shape-shift into a spectrum of discursively 
mediated emotional scenarios, then, to borrow phrasing from Mazzarella—is the study 
                                                 
77 The Telegraph Oct 4, 2007. 
78 Mazzarella 2009.  
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of affect “always arriving too late at the scene of a crime it is incapable of 
recognizing”? Yes and no. 
 In my own fathoming, this compilation of vignettes suggests two 
understandings of affect. One is that affect is something like an energy field that 
precedes articulation, an ontological region of intensity-as-potentiality. The other is 
that affect is a dimension-of social phenomenon. In the former conceptualization, 
affect as potentiality, we might only posit its existence. Conceptualizing affect in this 
way helps us understand the hair-trigger responses the people of Darjeeling have to the 
question of belonging in India—whether actualized as the sheer elation of Prashant 
Tamang’s victory, the horror that followed, or the rage with which the masses are once 
again hailing ‘Gorkhaland!’ But this view of affect as incipient intensity tends 
precisely toward the sort of mystification that this essay has taken issue with. Viewing 
affect only as potentiality-for social actualization renders the topic virtually impossible 
to study with any empirical rigor. 
 Methodologically, it makes more sense to also approach affect as an integral 
dimension-of the social world—integral, that is, to embodied dispositions, ‘memory’, 
and yes, politics. Affect here is the charge that attends and infuses discursive 
formations, semiotics, and knowledge—at once a unique register of social life, yet 
dialectically constituted by specific conditions of history. Conceiving of affect as a 
dimension-of the social world, we might sense the variant intensities of social 
phenomenon. For instance, we could say that the call for Gorkhaland is stronger 
now—that is, more affectively charged—than it has ever been. This conception invites 
a more phenomenological line of study that need not be estranged from historical 
materialist methods, but instead can be successfully integrated into them. After all, as 
we have seen in Darjeeling, affect is inextricably linked to specific discursive, 
material, and socio-political circumstances. Taken to be a dimension of study in its 
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own right, affect here can lend sentient amplitude to other methodological 
commitments. 
 From my own experiences of affect in Darjeeling, some of which are captured 
here, I believe that we can learn a great deal from conceptualizing affect as both 
potentiality-for and dimension-of socio-cultural practice. Both views capture 
something of the nature of affect; hence they are not mutually exclusive. With them 
we gain multiple starting points for an analytic pursuit of the elusive referent at hand. 
Beyond rigid analytics, such an open view may also help us tune-in to affect’s 
resonance. Importantly, the series of affective vignettes presented here does not ask us 
to choose one view or the other, but rather to embrace both conceptualizations. As 
students and beings of affect, I believe we could greatly expand our capacity to 
understand the social world and each other by learning to live with this touch of 
analytic ambivalence. 
Affect and Knowledge. 
 As a topic of study, affect presents many challenges and opportunities. The 
materials presented here hail from different methodological domains but make no 
claim to comprehensively capture the totality of experiences of anxious belonging in 
Darjeeling. While each fragment presents an actualization of affect in the world, affect 
is perhaps best fathomed as that vibratory resonance between the pieces themselves. 
Insofar as the parts presented here are key scenarios to the history of the people of 
Darjeeling, I have tried to conjure something of the anxiety that arises out of this 
history in order to question how affect and history bleed into the present in shaping the 
problems of ‘identity’ and belonging in the hills—as well as their sought solutions.79 
                                                 
79 This bleed should be kept in mind as the reader moves into other aspects of this dissertation. 
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 The first challenge of studying affect is to recognize it. As an ethnographer 
inspired by the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz, I feel this is best achieved in the 
realm of directly experienced social reality, where something like a true We-
relationship of consociates can be experienced.80 With rigorous reflexive care, 
Schutz’s critique of Weber’s interpretive sociology sets the methodological stage for 
an ethnography of affect. However, in important ways the modality of his platform 
also limits such a project. Schutz rightfully critiques Weber’s treatment of the 
interiorities of the individual subject. Specifically, Schutz phenomenologically 
dissects how subjective meaning is made by the subject, and how it may then be 
articulated and apprehended socially as objective meaning. In this way, Schutz charts 
a middle way between Weberian sociology and the phenomenology of Husserl and 
others.81 We must recognize though that Schutz’s attention to subjective meaning 
contexts offers an important shift, but not a radical break, from Weber. At the end of 
the day, both men were principally concerned with the making of meaning, with 
Schutz’s eyes, of course, calibrated to far more subjective detail. Such an approach, I 
believe, can only throw but so much light on the question of affect generally—or the 
pervasive sense of anxious belonging in Darjeeling, specifically. 
 As I learned through my anxiety-ridden experience with the samaj president, 
the strongest recognition of affect may be less a matter of meaning making in the 
Schutzian sense or objective knowing in the Kantian sense, than a matter of sensing.82 
Beyond Schutz, I want to pursue affect as that energy or feeling that is somehow 
always involved in, and yet psycho-existentially beside or with, the making of 
                                                 
80 Schutz 1967: 98-142. 
81 During the 1920s and 1930s, Phenomenology was a dominant front in the European intellectual 
climate (especially in Germany). Within the debates that raged then, the question of inter-subjectivity 
became especially pronounced, luring in the likes of Husserl, Heidegger, Levinas, Arendt and others. 
The influence of these debates is clear in Schutz’s work, which represents an attempt to sure up the 
phenomenological grounds for a philosophy of the social sciences. On ‘the controversy over inter-
subjectivity’, see Moyn 2005: Chapter 2. 
82 On Kant’s epistemological construal of knowledge, please refer back to Chapter I. 
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meaning.83 Such a pursuit pushes the envelope of socially scientific understanding 
toward knowledge’s beyond—into the realm of sense, sensing, sensation. 
 If we are willing to go there, such an ante can also move the study of affect 
beyond the strictures of the individual subject to embrace phenomena that Durkheim 
might have sensed as “collective effervescence” or Victor Turner might have 
experienced as “communitas”.84 This willingness to privilege—however 
provisionally—sense, sensing, and sensation as modalities of understanding could help 
us further understand how feelings like euphoria or rage sweep through crowds like 
waves, generating at times wonderful, and at others, horrifying consequences. 
Through the lenses of affect, such collective energies can be seen to be at once 
embodied by, yet transcendent of, the individual subject. Sensing affect, we may 
envisage these forces as wavelengths of real, embodied history capable of electrifying 
masses in seemingly capricious, potentially volatile extensions into the present. 
 If affect is indeed beyond but always somehow with and in relation to 
semiotics, semantics, and knowledge in the Kantian sense, then its most precise 
                                                 
83 Schutz, following Weber, was primarily concerned with subjective meaning, albeit in a much more 
phenomenologically concerned way. Both Schutz and Weber flirt with the question of affect but 
continually turn toward the question of meaning. Weber considers what he calls ‘affectual behavior’ to 
be a borderline case between his categories of meaningful and meaningless behavior. He writes, “Purely 
affectual behavior also stands on the borderline of what can be considered ‘meaningfully’ oriented, and 
often too, goes over the line. It may for instance be an uncontrolled reaction to some exceptional 
stimulus. It is a case of sublimation when affectually determined action occurs in the form of conscious 
release of emotional tension. When this happens, it is usually, though not always, well on the road to 
rationalization in one or the other or both of the above senses” (1978: 24) Here Weber seems to allude 
to a realm of affect that his ‘affectual behavior’ is moving from on its ‘road to rationalization’. His 
mention of sublimation bolsters the innuendo. Weber then explains that affectual action “does not lie in 
the achievement of a result ulterior to it, but in carrying out the specific type of action for its own sake. 
Examples of an affectual action are the satisfaction of a direct impulse to revenge, to sensual 
gratification, to devote oneself to a person or ideal, to contemplative bliss, or finally toward the working 
off of emotional tension. Such impulses belong in this category regardless of how sordid or sublime 
they may be.” (Weber, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft p.12, as cited in Schutz 1967: 18) However, the 
concern for both Schutz and Weber remains the subjective meaning of intentional action. Schutz’s 
critique of Weber reveals how Weber pulls up short at the question of subjectivity, and it is into this 
analytic void that Schutz develops his theory of subjective meaning making and the possibility of its 
inter-subjective knowing in his Phenomenology of the Social World. See also Weber 1978.  
84 Durkheim 1995; Turner, V. 1969. 
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recognitions may well come through alternative registers of a similar kind. In other 
words, affect’s recognition itself may be a matter of resonance, sensation and 
feeling—all of which are modalities of understanding that face perennial difficulties 
gaining purchase in normative academic circles. However, as I hope to have shown, 
the study of affect can also be grounded in more established methodologies, while 
remaining open to more unorthodox techniques of understanding. 
 Nevertheless, even if we are able to recognize affect ethnographically or by 
other means; even if we are able to historiographically track the hazy dialectic between 
what Schutz would call the “objective” conditions of history and the “subjective-
meaning contexts” through which history is lived, the study of affect inevitably arrives 
at the impasse of Representation. To be scholarly effective—perhaps even affective—
any portrayal of affect must consign itself to the terms of its own semiotic 
actualization—themselves, incomplete, limited, and open-ended. More than that, it 
must creatively embrace the possibilities of that moment. Here, in the domain of 
semiosis, the challenge becomes not merely to craft “objective meaning-contexts of 
subjective meaning-contexts” but also to present something of the virtual substance of 
affect.85 My attempts to represent history and affect through the materials offered in 
this chapter, necessarily, can only be but a portrayal and betrayal of the anxiety I 
experienced most intensely on that dark night with the samaj president. So at that, I 
shall try to leave my treatment of anxious belonging in a more gracious way than I 
stumbled into it: by allowing it a peace that history itself seems to have denied to those 
who embody it—by simply letting it be. 
 
                                                 
85 Schutz 1967: 241. 
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CHAPTER III. 
Durga and the Rock: 
Rethinking the History of ‘Tribal’ Recognition in India. 
 In Darjeeling, as throughout much of India and South Asia, Durga Pujā is 
traditionally a holiday of great public celebration.1 Though understood to be of Hindu 
origin, it has typically been celebrated by individuals across the religious spectrum of 
the Darjeeling hills. Annually a time for visiting family and friends, Durga Pujā has 
always proven an apt alibi for libations and celebratory spirits of all kinds. Presiding 
over the merry-making from her sumptuous pandals2 has always been the fierce, 
compassionate, and, at this time of year, particularly bloodthirsty Hindu goddess 
Durga. 
 In 2006 though, instead of unveiling the ornate idol of Durga that is typically at 
the center of the spectacle, the local administration, the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill 
Council (DGHC) rolled out an enormous stone (shilā) plucked from the bed of a 
nearby river by a local shaman (jhankri) sanctioned by the DGHC and its caretaker 
Subash Ghisingh.3 Chosen for its spiritual prowess, the stone was then ensconced on 
stage at Chow Rasta, the town plaza, in its own pandal of opulence. For days, shamans 
adorned in full ritual attire hovered around the rock shaking in trance, as suited 
bureaucrats monitored the proceedings from deluxe VIP chairs. Musical troops were 
                                                 
1 The multi-day holiday is known in Darjeeling by various names: ‘Dusshera’ as it is called elsewhere 
in India, ‘Dasain’ as it is known in Nepal, and, of course, ‘Durga Pujā’, the name emanating from its 
resplendent observance in the state of West Bengal. Its celebration in Darjeeling has indeed been a 
confluence of these traditions and others, making for a rather fluid affair in which lines of distinction 
give way to the flood of conviviality that fills the holiday season. 
2 Pandals are temporary stages erected to house the idol of Durga. They are often ornately designed and 
may reach heights of several stories. 
3 The ceremony began on September 28, 2006. Ghisingh formal title was ‘caretaker’ because at this 
point he was not an elected official. His elected term ran out in 2004, after which he was given 
consecutive 6-month extensions by the Government of West Bengal to continue administering the 
DGHC. 
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brought to the stage to sing specially arranged devotional songs. These were then 
broadcasted across town at mind-numbing pitches. Processions came and went, as did 
politicians, party loyalists, tourists, and everyday passer-bys. Through it all, the shilā 
sat dumbly on stage enwreathed in incense, flower garlands, and vermillion, just as 
Durga would have in previous years. This year, however, it was the rock—the 
centerpiece of a bizarre, ostensibly ‘animistic’, misc-en-scene. 
 The ritual was one of many put on by the Department of Information and 
Cultural Affairs (DICA) of the DGHC throughout 2005, 2006, and 2007. It was no 
secret that these displays were part of Subash Ghisingh’s ongoing efforts to bring 
Sixth Schedule status to the hills, thereby securing it limited autonomy as a designated 
‘tribal area’ as per the Indian constitution. In December of 2005, Ghisingh, the Centre, 
and the state of West Bengal signed a tripartite Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) to 
bring Darjeeling under the purview of the Sixth Schedule, but the details of the plan 
remained hazy. By constitutional design, the Sixth Schedule incorporates existing 
tribal political institutions into autonomous District Councils with powers to regulate 
forest and property rights, social customs, and local administrative structures (for 
instance, the appointment of headmen and chiefs).4 But how this provision originally 
intended for the tribal populations of the Northeast would take form in Darjeeling 
(which to date was only 32% ‘tribal’ by official Scheduled Tribe recognition and 
which lacked any ‘tribal’ political institutions) remained to be seen. 
                                                 
4 On the Sixth Schedule, see Articles 244(2) and 275(1) in The Constitution of India. Antecedents to the 
‘tribal’ based exceptionalisms of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules include: the Scheduled Districts Acts of 
1874; The Government of India Act of 1919 (Sec. 52-A(2)) that established ‘Backward Tracts’; and The 
Government of India Act of 1935 (Sec. 91 & 92) that demarcated ‘Excluded’ and ‘Partially Excluded 
Areas’. These acts based the need for special forms of governance on the purported aboriginal, frontier, 
and/or ‘backward’ conditions of the said areas. Importantly, Darjeeling has traditionally fallen within 
this ambit of exceptionalism. Darjeeling was declared a Scheduled District under the 1874 Act, a 
‘Backward Tract’ in the 1919 Act, and a ‘Partially Excluded Area’ under the 1935 Act. A useful 
synthesis of these policies, as well as those pertaining to Scheduled Tribes may be found in Ghurye’s 
The Scheduled Tribes of India (1963)  
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 Numbers aside, the Sixth Schedule promised a qualified form of ethnic-based 
sovereignty. Were it to be implemented, Darjeeling would remain within the borders 
of West Bengal with the district magistrate, police, and certain other administrative 
instruments remaining under the control of the state government. The MoS did, 
however, guarantee a “self-governing council… to fulfill economic, educational, and 
linguistic aspirations and the preservation of land-rights, socio-cultural and ethnic 
identity of hill people.”5 Certainly, the Sixth Schedule was not Gorkhaland, but it held 
promise nonetheless. Despite the wording of the MoS which stated unequivocally that 
the Sixth Schedule would be the “full and final settlement” to the question of 
sovereignty in Darjeeling, many believed the Sixth Schedule bid was part of 
Ghisingh’s master plan to achieve Gorkhaland—or, at the very least, a stepping stone 
for future generations. 
 As of the Fall of 2006, there was considerable work to be done to make the 
Sixth Schedule a reality in Darjeeling. As the details of eligibility and governance 
were being worked out in closed-door meetings in Kolkata and New Delhi, Ghisingh 
redoubled his mission to prove the ‘tribal’ identity of his constituency. The 
supplanting of Durga with the rock was one of the many tactics Ghisingh deployed 
toward this end. Yet who was to be convinced of ‘tribal’ authenticity in Darjeeling 
remained largely an open question. The government needed to be convinced, but 
apparently so too did the people of Darjeeling. 
 In the latter years of his reign, the ‘Old Man’, as Ghisingh came to be known, 
had grown extremely reclusive—some would say paranoid, even mad. On the rare 
occasions he emerged from his headquarters high on the Lāl Khoti hill, it was typically 
to spout the latest findings of his studies of the lost ‘tribal’ identities of the Gorkha 
peoples. On October 11, 2006 Ghisingh’s identical bulletproof Ambassadors rolled 
                                                 
5 Clause 5 of the Memorandum of Settlement signed December 6, 2005. 
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into the town of Lebong, where he was to inaugurate a new community hall. After the 
requisite performances of ‘tribal’ culture by local dance troops, the Old Man took the 
podium to begin a rambling diatribe on the links of culture and politics. “We are hill 
tribes!” he proclaimed to the thousand or so Gorkha National Liberation Front 
(GNLF) cadres gathered, “‘Tribal’ means it is of ancient times. It is not modern. Our 
civilization, our culture, our tradition, all that we have here in Darjeeling are of ancient 
times. It could never be lost, or destroyed.” 
 Ghisingh then went on to accuse not only the “Britishers” but also 
“international spy agencies” such as the ISI, CIA, and KGB of trying to destroy their 
‘tribal’ culture.6 Ghisingh stared down these imagined foes with great bravado, 
reminding the audience that: 
“In reality, it could not [be destroyed] because our people did not stop the 
chant of the shamans. Their cultures and traditions, they did not forget; they 
continued with those. Like the shilā pujā and the kul pujās. They did not stop 
practicing anything. The Indian Government may have knowingly or 
unknowingly tried to break us. But this could not be broken…. Though my 
blood is still hot. I have kept it under control. Locking horns with the 
Government of Bengal and Delhi is not going to work. The way forward is the 
kind of politics I am doing these days. In today’s context of the Sixth 
Schedule, it is the policy of protecting the tribals. Not a separate state of 
Gorkhaland but security for the tribals!” 
Ghisingh’s appeal to the “security of the tribals” was but the newest articulation of a 
politics of fear and uncertainty he had mastered decades earlier during the Gorkhaland 
Agitation. But whereas in the 1980s, Ghisingh harped on the vulnerability of the 
                                                 
6 Espionage was a recurrent paranoia of Ghisingh’s. His 2004 letter to the Prime Minister of India titled 
“International Spy Agencies” claimed Darjeeling was suffering from “tremendous pressure of the top 
international conspiracy and its terrorist activities without any proper help of justice of the State 
Government and the Central Government of India.” (Ghisingh to Singh, Oct 6, 2004. Printed in Hills 
and Mountain Forum, ed. Mahendra P. Lama). Ghisingh frequently blamed such agencies like the CIA 
and ISI of trying to divide and destroy the Gorkha peoples. Earlier in his career, Ghisingh’s accusations 
included claims of systematic human rights abuse by the British of Gorkhas (See Memorandum to the 
King of Nepal, Dec. 23, 1983), as well as claims against the Government of West Bengal of “genocide 
and apartheid crimes” on the Gorkha peoples (“Telegraph to Prime Minister of India, May 5, 1986). All 
available in Lama 1996. 
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‘Gorkha’ in India, now it was the ‘tribes’ who needed security. Shifting his sights 
from Gorkhaland to the Sixth Schedule thus entailed the supplantation of the 
previously hallowed appellation ‘Gorkha’ by the more anthropologically savory and 
political viable ‘tribal’ identification. 
 As Ghisingh mesmerized and confounded the masses, his administration and 
firebrand GNLF cadres took the message to the streets. Public rituals were engineered. 
Attendance and dress codes were mandated. And pressures spoken and unspoken were 
put upon communities and individuals to fall into ethnological line. The heavy-handed 
politics that had become the signature of GNLF power since the 1980s now was put to 
work as a different form of compulsion—a different kind of stick, if you will—
propelling the people toward the constitutionally-based carrots of ethnological 
distinction. 
 Few denied the political motivations underpinning of the DGHC’s fashionings 
of ‘tribal’ identity. As a resident anthropologist, I was often summoned to public 
rituals like that in which Durga was replaced by the rock. While my presence, in the 
eyes of DGHC officials, may or may not have lent credence to these vivid displays of 
‘tribal’ identity, the veneer of authenticity was thin at best. In one such moment, I was 
sitting with the Vice President of the Municipality on the side of the aforementioned 
stage where the rock still sat dumbly. With hundreds of spectators looking on (but out 
of earshot), even he conceded the transparency of the cultural orchestrations at hand. 
The Vice President explained, “We started bringing the rock last year. We have to 
prove that we are not Hindu. We worship an ancient religion of bon. It came before, 
and Hinduism only came later; it was imposed on us. Our ancestral religion, you know 
this kul ritual, is animistic. Bon means animism. The shilā is animism, nature 
worship.” 
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 The Vice President’s confessions of the obvious merely reiterated a maxim that 
reverberated in the administrative halls of the DGHC, in the offices of ethnicities 
seeking Scheduled Tribe status, in the press, and on the street: to be ‘tribal’ one 
mustn’t be Hindu. The fashionings of ‘tribal’ culture were obviously stilted affairs. 
Yet it was nevertheless the case that even as the Vice President confessed to me the 
underlying motives of the anthropological pomp and its political circumstance, a 
steady stream of GNLF devotees—men, women, rich, and poor—ascended to the 
stage to bow before the rock and receive its blessings. 
 From where I sat stage left, I was in no position to judge the sincerity of their 
moment with the shilā, only to note the political import of the ethnological forms in 
which they were partaking. 
The History of a Category and its Discontents. 
 This chapter questions how ethnological distinction has become a platform for 
liberal rights and recognition in modern India. My aim is to historicize the systems of 
recognition in which the people of Darjeeling are currently ensnared. In exploring the 
collusions of anthropology/ethnology and colonial rule, this analysis will necessarily 
travel what have by now become familiar grounds in the field of colonial studies.7 But 
it navigates this history with a different sort of awareness. Importantly, one need not 
mine the oeuvres of postcolonial critique to realize the conditioning effects of the 
taxonomies of the census8, the ‘ethnographic state’,9 and liberal thought on 
contemporary identity politics.10 These historical objects pepper the ‘found’ 
anthropologies of Darjeeling. In the claims of aspiring communities and the 
                                                 
7 On colonialism and anthropology, see Asad 1973; Bremen & Shimizu et al 1999; Cohn 1987, 1996; 
Uberoi, Sundar, & Deshpande et al 2008; Dirks 2001, 2004; Dudley-Jenkins 2003; Haller 1971, 1971a; 
Pinney 1991; Salemink & Pel et al 2000. 
8 Academic treatments include Cohn 1996; Kaviraj 1992; Anderson 1983,1998.  
9 Dirks 2001, 2004. 
10 Exemplary studies include Guha 1989; Mehta 1999; Metcalf 1995. 
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government agencies handling their cases, these facets have already been rendered in 
genealogical accord. My historiography therefore follows suit. 
 I concentrate on taxonomies of colonial rule—in particular the category of 
‘tribe’ (or ‘tribal’).11 However, this is not, I hope, another ‘colonial constructions of’ 
argument. Arguments on the colonial constructions of caste, race, and gender have 
opened up critical understandings of the ways in which colonial knowledge conditions 
contemporary identity politics.12 Extensive attention has been directed in particular at 
the colonial constructions of ‘caste’—the work of Nicholas Dirks (2001) being the 
most forceful. Yet, the figure of the ‘tribal’—Hinduism’s other Other—has remained 
largely beyond the pale of this line of critique. On the surface it would appear the most 
colonial of categories. But as I shall demonstrate here, once that surface is scratched, 
the history of the category itself becomes a morass of nebulous conceptions and 
broken epistemologies, making the genealogical project especially problematic. As I 
will show, it is precisely the discontinuities, contradictions, and uncanny returns 
within the epistemic history of this category that have made the designation ‘tribal’ the 
peculiar calling-card for liberal rights and recognition that it has become for hundreds 
(and perhaps soon, thousands) of communities in India today. 
                                                 
11 Though ‘tribes’ have in large part evaded the line of critique charted by Dirks and others, there have 
been some scattered articulations of this sort. See for instance Karlsson 2000; van Schendel 1992; as 
well as various papers given as part of the ‘Tribes of Mind’ panel at the 2006 EASAS meetings. Peter 
Pels (2000) has written a excellent essay on the ‘aborigine’ category in mid-19th century Indian 
ethnology. There is a large body of literature about the ‘tribal’ problem in India, most of it written after 
independence. And in this work there is frequent mention of the colonial roots of the category itself. But 
these studies have not probed the history of this category in the way that has been done for the 
construction of ‘caste’. I believe the history of the category poses particular methodological difficulties 
that have subsequently affected its critique. Exemplary readings on the ‘tribal problem’ in India may be 
found in the essays of Thapar’s edited volume, Tribe, Caste, and Religion (1977), Bhattacharya’s 
“Recent Trends in Acculturated Tribes in West Bengal” (1996), Singh’s The Tribal Situation in India 
(1972, and Helm et al’s Essays on the Problems of Tribes (1968). Excellent historical critiques of the 
category of the ‘tribe’ in the African contexts can be found in Fardon (1987) and Binsbergen (1985). 
12 On colonialism and caste, See Bates 1995; Bayly, S. 1995, 1999; Dirks 1987, 2001, 2004. On 
colonialism and race, see Epperson 1994; Ranger 1982; Robb et al 1995; Young 1995. Related studies 
on gender include: Bannerji 2001; Burton 1994, 2003; Ghosh 2006; Mani 1998; Sangari & Vaid et al 
1990; Sarkar 2001. 
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 Though I am interested in the history of the ‘tribal’ category, following the 
recent work of Ann Laura Stoler, I am equally concerned with the epistemic anxieties, 
misgivings, and uncertainties that shrouded its institution.13 Alongside colonials’ 
sometimes-rampant pretensions of rationalist certainty, were troubling doubts about 
knowledge, its representational precision, and, by extension, its administrative utility. 
These doubts about (and attending) colonial knowledge were instrumental in shaping 
the trajectory of human classification throughout the colonial and postcolonial eras—
especially in regard to the checkered construct of the ‘tribes’. In exploring these 
affective histories of ‘colonialism and its forms of knowledge’, I seek to develop a 
‘historical negative’ of colonial discursive constructions—one that considers not 
merely the inscribed categories and concepts of colonial anthropology, but also the 
greater social, affective milieu of their production. Questioning these social and 
affective dimensions of colonial knowledge production allows us to understand 
colonial knowledge as something other than the monolith it is often made out to be. 
The historical negative I develop here exposes the persuasions and ever-shifting 
social, political, and intellectual circumstances that shaped ethnological knowledge 
production in colonial India. Following Stoler, I argue that it is only by reading the 
archive “as both a corpus of writing and as a force field that animates political 
energies and expertise, that pulls on some ‘social facts’ and converts them into 
qualified knowledge” that we can appreciate the checkered fate of the category ‘tribe’ 
and those subjects that have hitherto fallen under its sway.14 
 When evaluated over the long durée, the imbrications of the category ‘tribal’ in 
colonial governance were less methodical, programmatic and monolithic than one 
might think. Its definition and analytic usefulness were in constant doubt. Moreover, 
the grounds of questioning were constantly shifting. The term was used rather 
                                                 
13 Stoler 2009. 
14 Ibid: 22. On ‘developing historical negatives’ see Ibid, Chapter IV. 
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haphazardly through much of the 19th century. However, as it came to bear increasing 
administrative weight, the category was subjected to heightened scrutiny. In turn, 
‘tribal’ and ‘hindooism’ (against which it came to be diametrically opposed) became 
the source of traceable epistemic angst. Despite its apparent staying power, when we 
train our eyes to epistemic anxiety, the history of the category appears internally 
differentiated, dynamic, and unstable. The protean grounds of the category were 
furthermore linked to the shifting contours of the newly emerging academic discipline 
of anthropology. The resiliency of the ‘tribal’ category owed more to its widespread 
usage, amorphous definition, and ability to change with the times than to any assumed 
fixity of what the term actually meant. As I will illustrate momentarily it was a curious 
mix of epistemic uncertainty, rational hubris, and the desire for systematic calculation 
that steered the checkered journey of the ‘tribal’ figure through the twilight of the 
British Raj. 
 By the 1930s and 1940s, when Indian lawmakers began to assume the reins of 
governance, the category’s reputation lay in shambles. Historically marred by past 
ethnologies of ill repute, the British had deemed the category “worthless” and had all 
but given up on its analytic and administrative utility. Yet precisely when it seemed 
the death knell of this problematic category would finally be sounded, the bits and 
pieces that remained were gathered and liberally reworked by the likes of Ambedkar, 
Nehru, and their fellow ‘architects’ of independent India. Their discursive re-
assemblage of the ‘tribal’, as well as the grids of modern recognition in which this 
figure became fossilized, would condition the possibilities for millions in the post-
1947 era—including the people of Darjeeling. 
 In considering their contemporary conditions—their anxious sense of 
belonging in India, their enduring struggles for rights and recognition, and the 
ethnological forms they have in turn invested themselves in—it is worth asking: Why 
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the cultural engineering to eradicate the influence of Hinduism, a religious tradition 
that until very recently was held in high-esteem by these groups? Why the finagling of 
ST applications and the epistemic sleights of hand in their representations of 
themselves?15 Why the mandates of singularity and exactitude? Why the performative 
evocation of ‘animism’, ‘primitiveness’ and the like? In short, why the rock and not 
Durga? 
 These details of the ‘ethnologies of the governed’ call for a careful study of the 
history of epistemic forms. Yet the epistemic history I seek here entails more than a 
close study of the categories, concepts, and logics of human classification through the 
colonial and postcolonial era. Along with these inner-workings of knowledge, it also 
examines the socio-political and subjective contexts within which, and to which, these 
discursive forms were applied in knowledge practice. To understand the contemporary 
socio-political possibilities, impossibilities, hopes, and dreams attached to ‘tribal’ 
recognition, it is crucial that epistemic history not confine itself solely to what is 
‘epistemological’—in Charles Taylor’s sense of the term.16 That is, it must question 
more than the techniques and discursive forms through which representational 
knowledges of colonial subjects were created. Augmenting this important line of 
questioning, I believe there is much to be learned by attending to the affects that haunt 
and animate particular knowledge forms. It is through an attention to the more 
                                                 
15 I discuss these issues in the previous chapters. 
16 In referencing Taylor, I suggest that a history of epistemic forms and practice cannot rest merely with 
the discursive accretions of knowledge (categories, concepts, etc), nor can it rest merely with the 
question of knowledge as a form of representation to an object that is ‘out there’. The latter concern of 
colonial misrepresentation has been a mainstay of postcolonial critique ranging from Said to Fanon and 
beyond. Charles Taylor notions of ‘overcoming epistemology’ entail moving beyond the 
epistemological construal that sees “knowledge as the inner depiction of an outer reality.” For the 
history at hand, I believe there is much to be learned by heeding his call and examining the more 
embodied affects that attend the discursive forms of knowledge. Such an approach allows us to engage 
with the question of knowledge not merely as a question of representation in which knowledge is seen 
as phenomenon removed from its objects and agents, but instead knowledge-production as a dynamic 
process that is always entangled within the discursive and non-discursive dimensions of social and 
subjective life. For Taylor’s critique of epistemology, see his Philosophical Arguments (1995), 
especially Chapters I-IV.  
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affectual facets of history that I historicize the grids of intelligibility through which 
‘identity’ is being made and remade, cognized and recognized today.17 Historical 
anthropology is, I believe, well suited to such an endeavor. This essay thereby seeks to 
‘people’ a genealogy with the aspirations, anxieties, and confusions that attended 
colonial knowledge production, and which have since transmuted into distinctly 
postcolonial forms. 
 I begin with a seminal figure not only to colonial ethnology, but also to the 
people of Darjeeling both then and now. 
Foundations: ‘Broken’ and ‘Unbroken’. 
 In 1819, a budding colonial official received his first appointment in the East 
India Company (EIC). His name was Brian Hodgson. Of impeccable pedigree (he 
studied at the East India Company College at Haileybury before doing a year of 
training at Fort William in Calcutta), Hodgson was sent to serve as Assistant 
Commissioner of Kumaun. There he worked under George William Traill, who like 
Hodgson was a young man, adventurous in both mind and body. Largely left to their 
own wares on the North-West frontier, throughout 1919 and 1920 Traill and Hodgson 
explored their jurisdiction by foot, interacting with the locals in their native tongue, 
garnering first hand information with an ethnographic rigor that would stay with 
Hodgson throughout his career. Their findings were written up in a variety of forms: 
for example, “A Statistical Account of Kumaun” (1822), which was also the basis of 
the administrative handbook of the province (1820); a scholarly article in Asiatic 
Researches (1828);18 the content of Kumaun’s Settlement Reports (1842-1848);19 the 
                                                 
17 On ‘grids of intelligibility’, see Dreyfus and Rabinow’s discussion of Foucault’s notion of dispositif 
(1982:120-122). Additional readings of dispositif can be found in Foucault 1980 and Stoler 1995: 11, 
36.  
18 “Statistical Sketch of Kumaun,” Asiatic Researches, Vol. XVI. Calcutta, 1828. References listed here 
cited in Hunter 1896: 52. 
19 No.1. The Official Reports of the Province of Kumaun. Agra: Secundra Orphan Press, 1851. 
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content on Kumaun in Atkinson’s Statistical Survey of India (1877),20 as well as the 
Imperial Gazetteer of India (1886). As W.W. Hunter notes in his biography of 
Hodgson many years later, “The habit of systematic enquiry into the population, their 
history, language, social institutions and economic conditions which Traill impressed 
upon Hodgson in his first year of service became the keynote of Hodgson’s whole 
official career. It is surprising how long a really good piece of work lives in India.”21 
When he conducted this work, Hodgson was just nineteen years old.  
 In 1820, Hodgson was appointed as Assistant Resident in Nepal, later 
becoming the Official Resident from 1833 to 1843. An agent of the Empire in a 
technically non-colonized land, Hodgson’s responsibilities were ambiguous and 
difficult. Yet he managed the ambivalent relationship between the EIC and politically 
tumultuous Nepal with remarkable acumen. During his time in Kathmandu, Hodgson 
also became a committed scholar of the Himalayas and its people. It is said that in his 
last meeting with the Nepali Durbar before leaving his post in 1843, the Raja burst 
into tears.22 Though he resigned from the EIC that same year, his ties with Nepal were 
firmly established. After a brief hiatus in England, he returned to India to take up his 
studies once again. He found his new home in Darjeeling, where he lived from 1845 to 
1858. Now free from the burden of administration, but not from his tireless dedication 
to the Empire, Hodgson continued the scholarly work he had begun while in 
Kathmandu. He was a naturalist, religious scholar, and collector extraordinaire, but it 
was his ethnological obsession with the ‘tribes’ of the Himalayas that is of importance 
here. 
                                                 
20 Atkinson, E.T. 1877. See Imperial Gazetteer (volumes on North-Western Provinces), dated August, 
31, 1877. 
21 Hunter 1896: 52. A recent volume edited by David Waterhouse (2004) has shed light on Hodgson’s 
multifaceted scholarship in the Himalayas. Of particular interest there is Martin Gaenszle’s essay 
“Brian Hodgson as Ethnographer and Ethnologists” where a useful overview of Hodgson’s ethnological 
work can be found. Gaenszle 2004. Biographical information on Hodgson also available in Pels 1999.  
22 Ibid: 234. Hodgson’s appointment ended when he fell into disfavor with Lord Ellenborough who 
dismissed him from his post. 
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 As early as 1832, Hodgson began studying the ‘martial tribes’ of Nepal for 
their potential as soldiers for the British Indian army.23 Throughout his writings 
Hodgson bandied the term ‘tribal’ about rather haphazardly. In this regard, he was not 
unlike other colonials of his era. In the parlance of the time, the term ‘tribe’ meant 
anything from what we might today call ‘race’, ‘nationality’, ‘community’, or ‘group’. 
That said, Hodgson writings on the ‘martial tribes’ and ‘hill tribes’ of Nepal took a 
more pointed form.24 He was particularly concerned with harnessing the ‘martial 
spirit’ of the ‘tribes’ into the service of imperial rule. Hodgson worried that if the 
innate martial spirit of the Nepalis was not marshaled for productive purposes, it 
would lead to a perpetually unstable frontier for British India. Hodgson was, 
moreover, adamant that Himalayan ethnicities like the Khas, Gurung, and Magar 
embodied traits of soldiers far superior to those of the plains where religious taboos 
(especially those of castes) were increasingly understood to interfere with the duties of 
soldiery. Though Hodgson was expressly concerned with the religious habits (or lack 
                                                 
23 Hodgson’s “Classification of Military Tribes of Nepal” [Hodgson Collection; MSS 6, Vol 6/1/1-12]. 
Convincing the EIC of the military worth of the ‘martial tribes’ of Nepal was a longstanding project of 
Hodgson. Up to and through the Mutiny of 1857, he wrote repeatedly on not only the desirability of 
these ‘martial tribes’ for the British Indian army, but their necessity. His ideas proved prescient of the 
events of the 1857 Mutiny, in which Gurkhas were instrumental in helping the British overcome the 
Mutiny. Following the lessons of the Mutiny, the British upped the Gurkha regiments considerably. See 
Des Chene (1991) and Hunter 1896: 259-60). Additional writings by Hodgson on the value of the 
‘martial tribes’ include: “Letter dated July 8, 1833” in [Hodgson Collection--MSS 7/20/119-122] and 
the essays written in the 1840s organized under the title, “Tribes of Hillmen” [Hodgson Collection; 
MSS 7 Vol. 5/1/1-78]. 
24 An excellent analysis of the 19th century intellectual history out of which Hodgson’s classificatory 
rubrics emerged may be found in Gaenszle 2004. Though Gaenszle does not deal with the exact 
categories that I am concerned with here, his analysis provides some helpful contextualization for 
understanding Hodgson’s notion of what constitutes a ‘tribe’-- ‘broken’ or otherwise. Peter Pels has 
also written on how Hodgson did and did not fit in with the Orientalist thought and practices of his 
time. In particular, Pels makes the notable point that Hodgson shifted the primary object of study from 
‘foundational texts’ to ‘aboriginal bodies.’ Pels further emphasizes how the concept of ‘race’ 
undergirded Hodgson’s classificatory rubrics and his turn to ethnological methodologies. Pels 1999. 
Though Hodgson was clearly concerned with ‘racial origins’, it should be noted that his work with the 
‘martial tribes’ and ‘hill tribes’ of the Himalayas concerned not only their ‘racial’ qualities, but also 
their linguistic and socio-cultural practices. In other words, Hodgson’s ethnological interests extended 
well beyond the question of racial origins. On Hodgson and his collections, see also Dhungel 2007. 
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thereof) of the “martial tribes”, there was no clear antagonism between ‘tribes’ and 
‘Hindooism’ (and/or ‘caste’) within his ethnological renderings. 
 Hodgson’s interests were, however, heavily influenced by concerns over race 
and origin. One of the more interesting distinctions he relied upon was that between 
‘unbroken’ versus ‘broken’ tribes. ‘Unbroken tribes’ included groups like the 
Gurungs, Magars, Khas, etc. They were recognizable, bounded communities—discrete 
‘ethnicities’, we might say, with traceable socio-cultural forms and history. ‘Broken 
tribes’, on the other hand, were those groups “whose status and condition… 
sufficiently demonstrate that they are of much older standing…[with a] remote past 
too vague for ascertaining.”25 Hodgson depicted ‘broken tribes’ as on the verge of 
extinction. They lacked the cultural vitality, coherence and function of the ‘unbroken’, 
‘martial’, and ‘hill tribes’ of the region that would become the fancy of both 19th and 
20th century Himalayan anthropology.26 Accordingly, Hodgson devoted little time to 
the ‘broken tribes’. They were compromised, ‘broken’ forms of an ideal-type—in 
other words, subjects too ‘vague’ for either scholarly or imperial use.27 
                                                 
25 Hodgson here explains the meaning of ‘broken tribes’ in reference to the ‘Vayu’ community of 
Nepal, who were for him a prime example of a ‘broken tribe’. See Hodgson, B. 1857. “Comparative 
Vocabulary of Languages of the Broken Tribes of Nepal. Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. 
Calcutta: XXVI. Pp. 317-522 ( 293).  
26 The labyrinthine topography and human landscapes of the Himalayas have long been seen to offer a 
lucrative field of ethnological study. As the 19th century bureaucrat cum ethnologist W.W. Hunter 
noted, “The Mountains…furnished the asylums for these human survivals of a prehistoric age…[and 
were thus] an unrivalled field for the study of such tribes” (1896: 284). As compared to the evolutionist 
bent expressed by Hunter, 20th century anthropological engagements with the Himalayas began with a 
more structural functionalist interests in the seemingly bounded ethnicities of the hills. Anthropological 
interests shifted considerably in the latter decades of the 20th century as Nepal became increasingly 
accessible to ethnographers. In many ways, the history of Himalayan anthropology can be read as an 
allegory of the development of the discipline of anthropology.  
27 Later colonial ethnologies, such as E.T. Dalton’s Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal (1872) adopted the 
‘broken tribes’ designation, often clubbing it with the designations ‘hinduised aborigines’ and ‘semi-
hinduised aborigines’ to denote groups that belied the conceptual purity of the ‘aboriginal tribes’, ‘hill 
tribes’, ‘martial tribes’, etc. that were quickly becoming the fancy of burgeoning ethnological 
imaginations. W.W. Hunter, in the section on Darjeeling in The Statistical Account of Bengal (1875), 
directly cites Hodgson’s notion of a three-fold division of Himalayan tribes into ‘unbroken tribes’, 
‘broken tribes’, and ‘tribes of craftsman’ (124). Hunter’s work also contained the increasingly common 
rubric of ‘semi-hinduised tribes’.  
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 As a pioneer of colonial ethnology, Hodgson developed his methodologies and 
taxonomies at a time when the ethnological impulse was far more faint and scattered 
among colonial officials than it was after the jarring events of the Mutiny.28 His 
techniques were nevertheless instructive for those that followed in his footsteps. 
Hodgson’s reliance on literate upper-caste research assistants and informants 
demonstrated the utility of such collaboration in information gathering. In the latter 
decades of the 19th century, this relationship became pivotal to the social production of 
ethnological knowledge. Moreover, Hodgson’s tireless attention to detail anticipated 
the empiricist and positivist bents that drove the giants of colonial ethnology like 
Hunter, Risley, Latham, Dalton, Grierson and others. As ethnology emerged as a 
science unto itself from the 1860s onward, many of these leading figures looked back 
to recognize Hodgson as a standard-bearer of the ethnological cum colonial 
enterprise.29 Though he remains an underappreciated figure in the history of South 
Asian anthropology, his legacy extended throughout the colonial era,30 and even into 
the postcolonial articulations of ‘ethnographic state’. To this day, his insights are 
called upon to bolster the ethnological claims of the Government of India—including 
the very reports determining the people of Darjeeling’s eligibility to become 
Scheduled Tribes of India. 
 Regarding the history of contemporary systems of recognition and their 
dynamics in Darjeeling, Hodgson’s significance is two-fold. First, Hodgson’s 
                                                 
28 Early in the 19th century the EIC began seeking more systematic knowledge gathering. Buchanon’s 
general survey work in Mysore and Colin Mackenzie work as the first Surveyor General are examples; 
see Metcalf (1995: 25.) Kim Wagner’s work (2009) on the thugees demonstrates some early 
ethnographic endeavors of the EIC. Throughout the pre-Mutiny era, however, these ethnological 
enquires were far less systematic than they became after the Mutiny. 
29 Latham hailed Hodgson’s essay “On the Kocch, Bodo, and Dhimal Tribes” as “a model of an 
ethnological monograph” (cited in Hunter 1896: 289). Hunter wrote the biography The Life of Brian 
Hodgson (1896), championing his role as an ethnological pioneer. Risley relied upon Hodgson’s work 
in his book The Tribes and Castes of Bengal (1891). 
30 Hodgson’s work was lauded by preeminent scholars throughout the middle and later decades of the 
19th century including the likes of Baron Von Humboldt and Max Muller. See Hunter 1896: 286. 
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migration from Nepal to Darjeeling paralleled and was contemporaneous with the first 
wave of migrants who fled the feudal circumstances of Nepal to sell their labor in 
Darjeeling, which at the time was a rapidly developing hill-station. That Hodgson did 
most of his writing on the ‘hill tribes’ while living in Darjeeling must not be 
overlooked. Yet there is little in Hodgson’s personal papers and collections to suggest 
how he engaged with his fellow immigrants, either socially or through research. 
Nevertheless, his writings on the ‘hill tribes’ insured there would be no dearth of 
information on these groups when it came time for them to be entered into the 
classificatory rubrics of the ethnographic state. Thanks in no small part to Hodgson, 
these communities became one of the many darlings of colonial ethnology. Crucially 
though, in his formal writings it is difficult to tell whether he is referring to the 
‘Gooroongs’, ‘Muggars’, ‘Murmis’, ‘Kirantees’, ‘Newars’ etc,31 that he researched in 
Nepal, or whether his ethnological insights also emerged out of his shared experiences 
with them in the Darjeeling hills. In this referential ambiguity, Hodgson’s ethnology 
shares a certain epistemic affinity with these communities’ ethnologies of themselves, 
as well as those of the Government of India in which their longings for liberal rights 
and recognition ultimately rest.32 
 The second dimension of Hodgson’s significance is less direct. Hodgson’s 
commitments to his subjects, his methods, and ethnological rubrics left an indelible 
impression on many who followed in his paired ethnological and administrative 
footsteps. Yet in the ‘broken’ and ‘unbroken’ distinction we see subtle cracks already 
beginning to open in the epistemic foundations of ‘tribal’ recognition. The application 
of the category was in certain ways ‘broken’ from the beginning. The perceived 
devolution of ideal-types—the kind of which Hodgson captured with his notion of 
                                                 
31 These are the spellings typically used by Hodgson himself. 
32 Often in their ST applications (and in their ‘self’-representations more generally) there is an 
ambiguity whether the ethnological content has been gleaned from communities living in Darjeeling or 
in Nepal. Chapters I and IV examine these referential ambiguities. 
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‘broken tribes’—would dog colonial ethnology until its end. It was a source of 
constant epistemic doubt, worry, and reflexive self-concern. Precisely as a source of 
epistemic uncertainty, so too did it function as a catalyst for innovative, if forever 
problematic, ethnological forms and practice. 
Ethnology’s ‘Museum of the Races’.33 
 Since its founding in Calcutta in 1784, the Asiatic Society of Bengal was a 
forum for colonial intellectual pursuits. Its museum and library teemed with oriental 
curiosities collected from across the British Empire in South Asia. Brian Hodgson 
alone was responsible for over 180 submissions. Over the course of the 19th century, 
the Asiatic Society became a locus of ethnological knowledge production. 
 In August of 1865, the society’s members—which, at the time consisted 
predominantly of British colonials and high-caste babus—held their monthly meeting. 
Ethnology was at the fore of their concerns. The Hon’ble George Campbell opened the 
proceedings by hailing ethnology as “the most popular and rising science of the day”: 
“My object now is to suggest that taking ethnology in its broad sense: there is 
at our very door another and perhaps equally rich gold field almost wholly 
unexplored and in which a rich store of nuggets lies ready at hand…It seems 
strange that we should at this moment have in constant and immediate contact 
with us—working around us daily—men of a race and of languages wholly 
different from our own—a race certainly among the most interesting—perhaps 
the very oldest in the world; and that we should have scarcely any knowledge 
of them, physically, linguistically, or in any other way. Any day you may see 
working in the ditches of the maidan [the park just outside the Asiatic 
Society’s doors], perhaps working on the repairs of this very house, men whom 
the eye at once singles out as of an unknown race and of a form which I am, I 
confess, inclined to think, probably more closely than any other hands down to 
us something like what may have been the aboriginal Adam of the human 
species.”34 
                                                 
33 W.W. Hunter’s phrase, 1896: 284. 
34 Proceedings of the Asiatic Society [Aug 1865] 
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 Campbell’s enthusiasm was typical among India’s budding ilk of 
ethnologists.35 His racial, religiously inflected evocation of the “aboriginal Adam”, 
articulated, the ambient prejudices of colonial understanding at the time.36 In February 
of 1866, Campbell sustained his call for study of these living relics of mankind’s past 
by exalting India as “an unlimited field for ethnological observation and inquiry,” and 
explaining his personal efforts to bring “into the field several of the most learned and 
scientific men…to reap this abundant harvest.”37 
 A month later, Dr. J. Fayrer, a professor of surgery in the Medical College, 
captured the imagination of the Asiatic Society with a proposal to hold an 
‘Ethnological Congress’ to “bring together in one great ethnological exhibition, typical 
examples of the races of the old world, and that they should be made the subjects of 
scientific study.”38 Importantly, these examples were not to be the stuff of cultural 
artifacts and/or human crania, the collection of which was already under-way. They 
were to be living specimens, displayed in “booths or stalls divided into compartments, 
like the boxes in a theater or the shops in a bazaar.”39 As Campbell elaborated, each 
should be: 
“Classified according to races and tribes, should sit down in his own stall, 
should receive and converse with the public, and submit to be photographed, 
painted, taken off in casts, and otherwise reasonably dealt with in the interest 
of science…I hope, I need scarcely argue, that a movement of this kind is no 
mere dilettantism. Of all sciences, the neglected study of man is now 
                                                 
35 George Campbell eventually served as Lieutenant Governor of Bengal (1871-4). During the 1860s 
though, he was an active ethnologist, with his most notable contribution being his 1868 book Ethnology 
of India (published by the Asiatic Society). At the time of the discussions cited here, he was serving as 
Judge on the Calcutta High Court (1863-66). He published his memoirs in 1893.  
36 ‘Prejudices of understanding’ here works as a double entendre. First, it denotes the racial 
discriminations inherent in this world-view. Second, it calls to mind Gadamer’s conceptualization of 
“prejudices as conditions of understanding.” See Gadamer 1997: 291-307. 
37 Proceedings of the Asiatic Society [Feb 1866]  
38 Letter from Fayrer to J. Anderson (Natural History Secretary, Asiatic Society, Bengal) Proceedings 
of the Asiatic Society [April 1866]. 
39 This and the following quotation are taken from Campbell’s supporting arguments of Fayrer’s 
proposal. Proceedings of the Asiatic Society [April 1866] 
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recognized as the most important… When we better understand his nature, his 
varieties, and the laws of his development, we may better improve him…To 
solve the great questions of the day, we ought to know how and how far the 
varieties of our race are capable of improvement; what is the effect of 
intermixture of various races, and much more besides.” 
The members supported the proposal unanimously. The next step was to pitch the idea 
to the Government of Bengal. The proposal letter expressed the Asiatic Society 
members’ belief “that Dr. Fayrer’s proposition [was] based upon an appreciation of 
this great want…and [that] if carried out in an enlightened spirit and countenanced by 
the support of a liberal government, that Ethnology will enter upon a brilliant career of 
discovery.”40 The government responded by issuing instructions to all Commissioners 
to gather “complete and accurate lists of the various races of men found in the 
respective districts. They should state briefly in regard to each race the grounds, 
whether of language, physical conformation, or manners and customs, on which they 
consider it entitled to be classed apart.”41 However, that was the extent of the 
government’s support for the scheme. The proposal remained under consideration for 
years, but ultimately the Ethnological Congress was never convened.42 
 It is as a historical non-event that the Ethnological Congress reveals the most.43 
As an idea, the proposal illustrates the traction that the “science of ethnology” had 
gained in the colonial imaginary by the mid-1860s. But as an event that never 
happened, the Ethnological Congress offers a deeper reading of the shifting 
ideological contours of liberalism in 19th century India. 
                                                 
40 Letter 139; “Anderson to Bayley (Sec to Govt. of India, Home Dep)” Proceedings of the Asiatic 
Society [April 1866]. 
41 No. 40. Bengal, General. Proc 40 1866. 
42 The idea of the Ethnological Congress would be re-introduced several times. Its last archival trace is 
found in 1888, when Fayrer laments that though “the [scheme] has been generally approved of. All see 
the difficulties, but all equally recognize its value if carried out in a liberal and scientific spirit.” 
Nevertheless, despite its two decades in embryo, the proposal “is not yet sufficiently matured to assure 
us that any prospect of its early realization is practicable.” [Annual Presidential Address, Proceedings 
of the Asiatic Society 1888.] Much of the information gathered in the early stages of the project was 
synthesized by Dalton in his Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal (1872). 
43 On the analytic usefulness of historical non-events, see Stoler 2009: 106-8. 
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 Uday Mehta has argued that in reading the ideologues of liberalism in the 
colonies, “one gets the vivid sense of thought that has found a project.”44 If so, then 
that project underwent traumatic shifts on the administrated ground of India. Mehta’s 
readings of luminaries such as James Mill and his son J.S. Mill shows that despite 
British liberalism’s pretenses of radical universality, at its core it harbored particular 
prejudices that came to significantly affect the project of colonial rule in India. Per this 
reading, the Ethnological Congress evinces a liberal fascination with the inscrutable 
alterity of Indian populations. Its failure to become a real event may be further 
understood in terms of the shifting expectations, commitments, and applications of the 
liberal project in the post-Mutiny era.45 
 When the Mutiny of 1857 nearly turned the tables on imperial rule, it also 
checked the very moral logic of liberalism. If, as Metcalf has argued, the Mutiny 
showed that colonial subjects “did not, in the British view, pursue their own best 
interests, but obstinately clung to traditional ways, then the liberal presumption that all 
men were inherently rational and educable fell to the ground.”46 For the British, the 
traumas of 1857/8 forced a re-evaluation of the way liberal thought should (and should 
not) inform imperial governance. Importantly, many of the anxieties and the lessons 
learned took a decidedly ethnological form. That an upheaval as monumental as the 
Mutiny could be triggered by a detail so seemingly slight as a religious taboo barring 
the sepoys from using cartridges greased with animal lard, hammered home to the 
British their glaring lack of, and subsequent need for greater, ethnological 
understanding of their colonial subjects. In the emergent post-1857 colonial order, the 
                                                 
44 Mehta 1999: 12. 
45 Here I do not mean to suggest a monolithic liberalism, either of a European or Indian kind. What I 
find most interesting are precisely the negotiations of contradictions within the field of liberal thought, 
and their hesitant applications in the administration fields of colonial rule. For more on the 
contradictions of liberal thought, especially regarding colonial India, see Mehta 1999. 
46 Metcalf develops this idea through an analysis of the peasant uprisings in Oudh during the Mutiny 
(1995: 46-7). 
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‘problem of populations’ became not just a ‘challenge’ of liberal governance—as 
Foucault has framed it—but an imperial mandate, buoyed no longer by the mere 
fascination with the Indian other, but by the anxious need to penetrate his/her 
inscrutable alterity. Herein was constituted an affective impetus for anthropology’s 
becoming a form of colonial governmentality.47 
 Despite their appeals to the “enlightened spirit” of “liberal government” and 
the promise of exploring just “how far the great varieties of our race are capable of 
improvement,” the Asiatic Society’s Ethnological Congress was from its inception a 
figment of a dated liberalism. What the members missed in pitching the idea to 
government was precisely the newly minted, anxiety ridden, need for ethnological 
knowledge. Human difference had shown itself in far more real terms than could be 
displayed by “living specimens placed in booths and stalls and otherwise reasonably 
dealt with in the interest of science.” 
Ethnology: A Problematic ‘Science’ of Governance. 
 By the late 1860s, the British Raj sought ethnological projects of far greater 
administrative utility and ethnographic rigor than that offered by the intellectual 
                                                 
47 On governmentality, see Foucault 1979. In Foucault’s scattered writings on liberalism, he speaks of 
how the problem of population established the groundwork for the possible fields of the social and 
human sciences. (1988: 161). Elsewhere in his writing on biopolitics and biopower, he mentions 
economics, biology, psychiatry, medicine, and penology among these possible fields of reflexive 
science (1994: 224). Yet he never fully raised the question of anthropology—this despite having 
devoted considerable attention to Kant’s Anthropology (1978) much earlier in his career.The one 
glaring exception would come late in his life in what he called an apercu into the question of “The 
Political Technology of Individuals” in which he wrote, “The emergence of the social sciences cannot, 
as you see, be isolated from the rise of this new political rationality and from this new political 
technology. Everybody knows that ethnology arose from the process of colonization (which does not 
mean that it is an imperialistic science). I think in the same way that, if man--if we, as living, speaking, 
working beings-- became an object of several different sciences, the reason has to be sought not in an 
ideology but in the existence of this political technology which we have formed in our societies” (1988: 
162). I suspect that Foucault tended to not include anthropology within his discussions of biopower 
because anthropology somehow lacked the raw viscerality (e.g. the bio-aspects of life, birth, death, etc) 
that was the object of biopolitical attention. That said, the career of anthropology in India certainly 
pushes the bounds of biopolitics in productive ways. 
 191 
musings of an Ethnological Congress. In 1869, W.W. Hunter was appointed Director 
General of Statistics and tasked with standardizing the Imperial Gazetteers of India. 
The Government framed the project as “a work of great practical utility to the Officers 
of the Government” and an “important instrument in developing the resources of the 
country.”48 Themes of inquiry were to include: topographical, ethnical, agricultural, 
industrial, administrative, medical, and others. 
 That the British relied on educated upper-caste (typically Brahman) informants 
to carry out such projects is well documented.49 In time, this partnership would 
drastically affect the analytic placement of ‘tribes’ within the Indian imaginary. As 
this working relationship developed, British conceptions of race coalesced with 
Brahmanical conceptions of caste. Aryan theories of the British, which held that 
Aryan races, epitomized by the figure of the Brahman, gradually spread across the 
subcontinent encountering and absorbing darker-skinned aboriginals, fused beautifully 
with Brahmanical sensibilities of the varnic caste order and its mythical historical 
bases. The ‘view’ that emerged through these colluded sensibilities located the 
‘tribes/aborigines’ at a remove from a purported orthodoxy of Hinduism. An example 
of this rendering is found in Dalton’s statements on ‘Hinduised Aboriginals and 
Broken Tribes’ in his Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal (1872). He writes, “In 
ascribing fanciful origins to the aborigines, the Aryans to a certain extent admitted 
them into their own families as bastard relatives of their own and of their gods. There 
is says, Menu, no fifth class from which impure tribes could have been born.”50 In this 
overlay of British and Brahmanical theories, ‘tribes/aboriginals’ were analytically 
subjected to (and/or negatively defined against) totalizing Brahmanical schemas. 
                                                 
48 Bengal, General, 1-2, Feb 1869. 
49 See for instance, Bandyopadhayay 2004: 144; Dirks 2001: 200-225; Metcalf 1995: 11, 106; Pels 
2000; Raheja 2000. 
50 Dalton 1872: 123. 
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Purity thereby became dually inflected: racially (as per the British construal) and 
ritually (as per the Brahmanical construal). 
 From this confluence of British and Brahmanical worldviews emerged two 
versions of the ‘caste: tribe’ binary. In the first, a synchronic version, ‘tribes’ were 
counter-posed to Hindu ‘castes’ as Hinduism’s other Other (i.e. not Muslim). This 
religiously determined opposition thus established diametric ideal-types.51 As 
concepts, Hindu ‘castes’ and aboriginal ‘tribes’ functioned as what Robert Young has 
called “the pure fixed and separate antecedents” which analytically framed the 
dynamics of hybridity encountered in colonial life.52 These empirical forms gave rise 
to a second, diachronic, version of the ‘caste: tribe’ binary. Here ‘tribes’, insofar as 
they bore the trace of Hindu influence, were deemed to be inevitably in the process of 
being absorbed into the Hindu fray.53 Apparent syncretic socio-cultural forms were 
thus apprehended as transgressions of the ‘pure antecedent pasts’ established by the 
first version. Tribes baring the syncretic trace were thus understood to be tribes-in-
transition, or as would become the standard denotation in the late 19th century, ‘semi-
hinduised tribes’.54 
 These were general frameworks—rules of thumb, if you will—of colonial 
ethnological knowledge in India at the time. However, when deployed in the actual 
enumerative practices of the state, these rubrics became incessantly perturbed by the 
specificities of the populations in question. As early as 1872, when the first (yet 
partial) census of India took form, the categories had already become problematic. In 
                                                 
51 Accordingly, in the first comprehensive census of India (1881), ‘aboriginals’ were enumerated under 
“Populations Classified by Religion”. 
52 Young 1995: 25. 
53 In the 20th century, this diachronic version would go by the name ‘sanskritization’—a term coined by 
the famed anthropologist M.N. Srinivas in 1952. 
54 This category, along with other awkward neologisms like ‘hinduised aboriginals’ and ‘semi-
hinduised aboriginals’ were standard categories in ethnological writings of India at the time: See 
Dalton’s Descriptive Ethnology of Bengal (1872); W.W. Hunter’s Statistical Account of Bengal (1875) 
and the Imperial Gazetteer; as well as the Census of India, 1881. Later I discuss the extended debates 
over hybridity within the contexts of census enumeration. 
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his Report on the 1872 Census, Census Commissioner Beverly raised the profound 
question of ‘what is a hindoo?’. He wrote, “What then is to be the test of faith which is 
to define the real hindoo from the semi-hindooised aboriginal?...Without some such 
test no two men will agree in the classification of numerous aboriginal tribes and 
castes in India who profess hindooism in some or other of its multifarious forms.” 
Beverly cites the problematic examples of “savage tribes [in lower Bengal] who have 
renounced their barbarism” but in adopting Hinduism have “debased the Hindoo 
religion from the Vedic monotheism of the middle land… Hindooism has been 
lowered from its purer type in order to meet the necessities of the indigenous tribes 
whom it is made its home.” 
 Beverly intervention seems to be of a most undermining kind. He evokes both 
versions of the ‘hindu caste: tribe’ binary, but attacks the entire construct at the most 
basic level. Notably, Beverly does not call for an abandonment of the binary, but 
rather for a better epistemic instrument—a “test of faith” as he calls it—to “define the 
real hindoo from the semi-hindooised aboriginal”. What is particularly interesting here 
is the ambivalence of Beverly’s intervention. He advocates finding an improved 
epistemic device for identifying populations mired in socio-cultural and religious 
inter-mixture. But the ontology of the “real hindoo” and by extension his perfect other, 
the ‘aboriginal/tribal’, are not called into question. It is hybridity that is the problem. 
Beverly’s remarks thus play upon a particular tension between conceptual and 
empirical form. The former is the domain of “real hindoos” and religions of a “purer 
type”; the latter is the messy domain of socio-cultural life where the “debased”, the 
“semi-hindooised”, and “multifarious forms” elude their ideational capture in ideal-
types. In not questioning the posited ontology of the “real hindoo” and the non-
syncretized “tribal”, only their epistemology, Beverly holds these pure antecedent 
pasts to be still at large in the hybrid murk of Indian life. For Beverly and his fellow 
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ethnologists/bureaucrats, hybridity posed the fundamental epistemological problem of 
the day. 
 Amid the rising credence of the “science of ethnology”, Beverly’s reflexivity 
remains somewhat jarring. Importantly, he was not alone. Throughout the 1860s, 70s, 
and 80s the categories, logics, and ethnographic techniques of colonial ethnology were 
shrouded in epistemic concern. Without question, the projects such as the census 
reified particular taxonomic understandings. And in doing so, they made rigid the 
‘fuzzy’ boundaries of Indian communities, as Sudipta Kaviraj has argued.55 But 
importantly, that reification was not lost upon those charged with establishing and 
continually improving colonial classificatory rubrics. Neither was the fuzziness of 
socio-cultural life itself. One need only evaluate the extensive reports that attended the 
decennial censuses to appreciate the debates that cropped up in and around the 
application of its rubrics. These reports and un-published proceedings recorded myriad 
frustrations from across India concerning the problems of mapping the indeterminate 
realities of socio-cultural life into the sanctioned rubrics of the colonial state. In these 
reports and correspondences, we see high and mid-level enumerators and 
administrators, as well as the occasional European ethnologist, all participating in, and 
fomenting, a growing field of epistemic concern. 
 Epistemic concern like that articulated by Beverly did not come from outside 
the development of ethnological knowledge in India. Doubt and anxiety were integral 
to its social production. Beverly’s intervention merely shows how early classificatory 
systems were cast in doubt. Tracking epistemic uncertainty is therefore not a project of 
tearing down histories of colonial knowledge construction. Rather it is a way to fray 
genealogies of knowledge-power and to people them with the agents, affects, and 
social circumstances that leant colonial knowledge forms their ever-tenuous analytic 
                                                 
55 Kaviraj 1992. 
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existence.56 As I shall show later, the accumulated affects of epistemic doubt 
ultimately led to the crumbling of ‘tribal’ category in the twilight of the British Raj, 
such that only epistemic fragments remained. The ways in which those remains were 
reformed and resurrected into a coveted postcolonial form prove startling not only 
from a historiographic point of view, but also from an ethnographic one. As dynamics 
in Darjeeling clearly illustrate, the ‘tribal’ category (and all that goes with it) has 
become a formidable force in reshaping the social, political, and subjective 
possibilities of the ethnic subject in India today. 
The Empiricist Edge. 
 In March of 1885, a “Conference on Ethnography of Northern India” was held 
in Lahore. It was not so much a conference as a meeting of three men with 
“considerable experience in similar enquiries”. Present were: Mr. D.C.J. Ibbetson 
(Director of Public Instruction, Punjab); Mr. J.C. Nesfield (Inspector of Schools, 
Oudh) and Mr. H.H. Risley (On Special Duty, Bengal). Several months earlier Risley 
had been appointed as Special Officer to oversee a systemic enquiry into the customs 
and physical characters of all castes and tribes of Bengal. The ‘conference’ in Lahore 
was to lay the groundwork for that enquiry.57 
 Risley, Ibbetson, and Nesfield sat together for four days. As Risley later 
explained, “The endeavor throughout was not so much to strike out new lines of 
inquiry as to adapt the methods already sanctioned by the approval of European men 
of science to the special conditions which have to be taken into account of in India.”58 
                                                 
56 Stoler makes a similar point in noting the way colonial taxonomies were continually “shuffled, re-
assigned, and remade.” 2009: 36. 
57 This enquiry later materialized in Risley’s The Tribes and Castes of Bengal, published in 1891. 
58 Risley 1891: vi. Proceedings from the conference are appended in Risley The Tribes and Castes of 
Bengal. Those proceedings along with extensive governmental correspondence regarding the enquiry 
are contained in file: “Special Enquiry into the Castes and Occupations of the People of Bengal” 
Bengal, Financial, Misc 1-55, March 1887. 
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During the course of the conference, the men produced a list of some 391 
ethnographic questions to guide Risley’s study. The Proceedings of the Conference 
began not with those questions, but rather with a one-page statement titled, 
“Suggestions Regarding Some Doubtful Points of Ethnographical Nomenclature.” It 
began as follows: 
“Much confusion is often caused by the indeterminate use of the various terms 
applied to the divisions upon which society is based. It seems that some 
attempt to define more precisely the nature of the groups to which these terms 
should respectively be applied might usefully be made…The group 
organization commonly follows one of two main types—(1) the caste, (2) the 
tribe. The former may be defined as the largest group based on community of 
occupation; the latter as the largest group based upon real or fictitious 
community of descent, or upon common occupation of territory.”59 
These definitions carried little weight in Risley’s future work. In fact, the statement 
largely served as a liberating qualifier, which freed the 391 questions that followed to 
focus almost solely on issues of caste. This obsession with caste (and its ostensible ties 
to racial origins) would become a signature of Risley’s future ethnology.60 
 To bolster his acumen and credentials, Risley solicited the opinion of esteemed 
European scholars. Max Muller, Francis Galton, E.B. Tylor, Sir Henry Maine, and 
Paul Topinard all commented favorably on Risley’s plans.61 Of these, it was Muller 
who gave the most extensive and critical feedback. He wrote to Risley: 
“As you truly observe, ‘many of the ethnological speculations of recent years 
have been based far too exclusively upon comparatively unverified accounts of 
the customs of savages of the lowest type,’ and as a result, the whole science of 
ethnology has lost much of the prestige which it formerly commanded. It has 
almost ceased to be a true science… and threatens to become a mere collection 
of amusing anecdotes and moral paradoxes.” 
                                                 
59 Bengal, Financial, Misc 1-55 March 1887. P.43. 
60 On Risley’s obsession with caste, see Dirks 2001, particularly Chapter 10.  
61 Bengal, Financial, Misc 1-55 March 1887. 
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“If I may point out some dangers which seem to me to threaten the safe 
progress of ethnological enquiry in India and everywhere else…Foremost 
among them I should mention the vagueness of the ordinary ethnological 
terminology which has led to much confusion of thought and ought to be 
remedied ferro et igne. You are fully aware of the mischief that is produced by 
employing the terminology of Comparative Philology in an ethnological sense. 
I have uttered the same warning again and again.”62 
Later, Muller singled out Risley’s unreflexive use of the term ‘caste’, and further 
warned against “allow[ing] ourselves to be deceived by the sacred law books.” (This 
seems to be a veiled attack on the British’s over-reliance on Brahmanical sources.) 
Interestingly, Muller never problematizes ‘aboriginal’ or ‘tribal’ (which is not 
surprising given its sparse usage in the proposed research dossier). He only notes 
being “afraid of words such as totemism, fetishism, and several other isms which have 
found their way into the ethnological sciences.”63 Despite the cautionary criticism, 
with regards to race Muller was far more encouraging: 
“In India we have first of all the two principle ingredients of the population—
the dark aboriginal inhabitants and their more fair skinned conquerors..[who 
along with ‘inroads’ made by other races, have been] mingling more or less 
freely with the original inhabitants and among themselves. Here, therefore, the 
ethnologist has a splendid opportunity of discovering some tests by which, even 
after a neighborly intercourse lasting for thousands of years, the descendents 
of one race may be told from the descendents of the others.”64 
What then were these ‘tests’ to be? How could ethnologists cut through the din of 
“neighborly intercourse lasting thousands of years” to trace racial origins? 
 Risley turned to the anthropometry of Drs. Paul Topinard and Paul Broca. He 
framed the epistemic problem (hybridity) and solution (anthropometry) as follows: 
“One of the main objects of the enquiry is to determine the race affinities of the 
leading caste groups of the people of Bengal before the advance of Hinduism 
                                                 
62 Ibid 16. 
63 All passages Ibid.  
64 Ibid. [emph. mine] 
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has obliterated all customs which give a clue to ethnic descent. Here I find 
myself continually met by the difficulty that people change within a 
comparatively short time their religion, their language, and their customs to 
such an extent that there is often no custom that can be safely pointed to as a 
test of Aryan of non-Aryan descent. In this difficulty it has occurred to me that 
recourse might possibly be had to measurement of the heads of the different 
castes.”65 
 In March of 1886, Risley submitted a statement to the government titled “On 
the Application of Dr. Topinard’s Anthropometric System on the Tribes and Castes of 
Bengal.” Here he threw the empirical acuity of anthropometry into high relief against 
the backdrop of “the great religious and social movement described by Sir Alfred 
Lyall as the ‘gradual Brahmanising of the Aboriginal, non-Aryan, or casteless tribes.’” 
In Risley’s view, even direct, ethnographic enquiry was likely to be duped by the 
hybridity at hand: 
“If we look merely to customs, ceremonies, and the like, we find in the 
majority of cases that the admission of a tribe into the charmed circle of 
Hinduism results after a generation or two in the practical disappearance of the 
tribe as such. Its identity can no longer be traced by direct enquiry from its 
members, or inferred from observation of its members.”66 
In pursuing his obsession with the historical origins of caste, Risley thus approached 
the contemporary—and by extension, its ethnographic engagement—with a certain 
skepticism. To Risley, caste was a ‘contagion’ that had infected and thereby obscured 
the pure forms of the past.67 Faced with this field of study so tainted by the 
confounding realities of hybridity, Risley proffered anthropometry as the cutting edge 
science needed to slice through the socio-cultural indeterminateness of India’s masses. 
                                                 
65 Demi-Official letter from Risley to W.H. Flowers (Director of British Museum, Natural History 
Department) written 9 June 1885. In Ibid 95. 
66 Letter No. 51 “From Risley to Secretary of the Government of Bengal” written 8 March 1886, Ibid 
83-4. 
67 Dirks 2001: 222. 
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 Risley’s hard-sell worked. The Government of Bengal approved the proposal 
in March of 1887.68 By July of that year, circulars containing ethnographic and 
anthropometric instructions were circulated to Risley’s research assistants. The latter 
measurements were to be conducted on jailed prisoners of selected castes. The project 
was thought to be a great success and its findings were published as The Tribes and 
Castes of Bengal (1891). From this study, Risley himself launched a lucrative career 
as the colonial ethnologist cum administrator par excellence. 
 Risley’s racial empiricism ruled the next two decades. His ethnology was 
without question one of great epistemic hubris. Yet through the optic of epistemic 
uncertainty, we can better understand the problem space from which Risley’s strident 
ethnology arose. Structuring this problem space were outstanding questions on the 
possibilities of classifying communities of hybrid socio-cultural and religious forms. 
The more the colonial government sought policies attuned to the nuanced diversities 
of colonial subjects, the more these concerns over classificatory precision would dog 
colonial governance.69 With a sharply empiricist edge, anthropometry thus became 
Risley’s antidote to the quandaries of hybridity. It was then from a general epistemic 
disquiet regarding the problem of recognition that Risley and his ethnology ascended 
to colonial prominence. 
Placing the ‘Tribal’. 
 It was never clear for the British where and how to classify the 
‘aboriginals’/’tribes’ of India. The first comprehensive Census of India in 1881, 
awkwardly placed ‘aboriginals’ under the heading ‘Population Classified by Religion’. 
                                                 
68 Letter No. 1033 “From E.N. Baker to Risley” dated 22 March 1886. Ibid. 
69 An example of this growing impetus for policy designed in accordance with the characteristics of 
specific populations and/or regions is the Scheduled Districts Act of 1874, which effectively exempted 
particular areas from standard rule based on their “frontier”, “backward”, and/or “ethnical” qualities. As 
I mention elsewhere, the 1874 Act presaged contemporary provisions for ‘tribal areas’ such as the Fifth 
and Sixth Schedules. 
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This drew immediate concern. In his official Report on the Census of 1881, W.C. 
Plowden called the classification “dubious”, explaining that “those whom I have 
grouped together under this term in the religious classification consist of the aboriginal 
tribes who, not having been converted to Christianity, or to Islam, or the Hindoo 
belief, retain, if they have any religion at all, the primitive cult of their forefathers, 
adoring nature under the various forms or images they have chosen to select as 
representative of Deity.”70 Plowden further complicated matters by quoting at length 
Beverly’s aforementioned doubts about determining ‘what is a hindoo’. Having laid 
out the problems, Plowden then explained what happened when census officials 
encountered religions unknown to them: 
“It was thought advisable to enter these as undistinguished by religion, or to 
show them as hindoos where it was open to question…Facts in India are found 
to justify this course and where the aboriginal tribes, with whom only the 
question arose, have been brought into close contact with hindooism, the 
demarcation between their beliefs and the lower forms of hindooism is so 
slight that we err little in following the course which has been adopted.”71 
Thus, in spite of its indeterminacy, ‘hindooism’ functioned dually as the default 
classification and dominant reference point against which ‘aboriginals’ were 
negatively determined. When and where clear-cut distinction was impossible, it was 
left to the individual enumerator to classify them either as the catchall ‘hindoo’ or as 
Hinduism’s pure Other. 
 Ten years later, in the 1891 Census, ‘tribes’ were again placed under ‘The 
Distribution of the Population by Religion’ section, only this time with a different 
valance. Here they were explicitly associated with the religious category ‘Animism’. 
Census Commissioner Baines explained, “The rules for enumeration were that under 
the head of Animistic should come all members of the forest tribes who were not 
                                                 
70 Census Report of 1881 published in 1883: 21. 
71 Ibid, 23 
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locally acknowledged to be Hindu, Musálman, Christian, or Buddhist, by religion. No 
general title for the religion of such communities was prescribed, but the enumerator 
was instructed to enter in the column reserved for this information the name of the 
tribe.”72 Elsewhere, the 1891 census redoubled the concentration on ‘castes’, further 
reifying its default centrality to the taxonomies deployed.73 That Risley’s work was 
beginning to circulate (and was repeatedly cited in the 1891 report) is not coincidental. 
 By 1901, the census was in its third generation.74 As was evidenced by the 
official Census Reports (1881-1901) and the hundreds of complaints launched by 
provincial officials, the British were deeply concerned with the failings of their 
categories. If the census was to measure decennial change and at the same time be of 
administrative use, it would necessarily have to rely upon precedent, while continually 
innovating, and improving its rubrics. The system of recognition that Risley inherited 
as the Census Commissioner of 1901 was a mess of residual and emergent 
anthropological sensibilities. Conceptually, it was incoherent. In practice, it was 
inconsistent, overly subjective, and highly problematic. And yet the scapegoat 
remained hybridity. Ever the empiricist, Risley wiped the slate clean by proclaiming: 
“Until physical measurements have been extended to the chief castes and tribes of 
India, and the results correlated with those ethnographic data which furnish a clue to 
                                                 
72 Ibid 158. 
73 Chapter V of the Census, “Ethnographic Distribution of the Population,” inscribed the ubiquity of 
caste with an opening section titled “The Spirit of Caste” that claimed in no uncertain terms the ubiquity 
of caste: “In treating of the religious and social divisions of the people this influence will be found 
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74 I begin counting with the 1881 census. The 1871/2 attempt was incomplete and problematically 
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probable origins, it is impossible to say whether any scientific classification of the 
population can be arrived at.”75 
 With endorsements from the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science it was recommended that additional ethnological enquiries be conducted in 
conjunction with the 1901 census.76 These were to involve ethnographic, 
anthropometric, and photographic techniques, the logic being that while “the census 
provides the necessary statistics; it remains to bring out and interpret the facts which 
lie behind the statistics.”77 As co-Commissioner of the 1901 census and then as 
Director of Ethnography of India, Risley oversaw the massive ethnographic operations 
tied to the census, and eventually published its findings as The People of India in 
1908. The work was in large part a continuation of Risley’s earlier work insofar as it 
re-inscribed a general obsession with caste and race. At the turn of the century, these 
concerns were entrenched in the ethnological cum bureaucratic imaginary of the 
British Raj. 
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76 See “Ethnographic Survey in India In Connection with the Census of 1901” in Man, Vol 1 (1901), pp. 
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77 Resolution 3219-32 Bengal, General, Misc File 6E-1 Proc B 69 Nov 1902 
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Ethnologies of Ill-Repute. 
 The shifting currents of ethnological thought soon began to erode Risley’s 
empiricist edifice. The 1911 census sustained the general practice of “lumping 
together as animistic” the “aboriginal tribes who have not yet been absorbed in the 
Hindu social system”. Moreover, it continued to lament the indeterminateness of the 
category ‘Hindu’ and the persistent problems posed by hybridity. The report noted, 
“The change takes place so slowly and insidiously that no one in conscious of it.”78 
Therefore, “the practical difficulty is to say at what stage a man ceases to be an 
Animist and becomes a Hindu. The religions of India, as we have already seen, are by 
no means mutually exclusive.”79 Although colonial officials increasingly chaffed 
against the suppositions of classification, the fact remained that mutual exclusion was 
to a certain degree the analytic modus operandi of census taxonomies. 
 That being the case, the 1911 census signaled change away from the paradigms 
of Risley. Whereas the previous censuses had only designated ‘tribes’ religiously (i.e. 
in terms of ‘Hindooism’ and ‘Animism’), the 1911 rendition of the heading “Caste, 
Tribe, and Race” altered the terms of distinction in stating, “A tribe in its original form 
is distinguished from a caste by the fact that its basis is political rather than economic 
or social.”80 This subtle change brought the census’s definition into line with the more 
technical definition that would be taken up throughout the early 20th century by 
European and American academic anthropologists. Along those lines, the 1911 census 
indexed a discipline of anthropology, which at the time was rapidly developing in new 
directions. Even once citing Franz Boas, the 1911 census report commented on the 
declining faith held in the anthropometric tactics of Risley, Topinard, Broca, and 
                                                 
78 Report on the Census of India, 1911: 121. 
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80 Ibid, 370. 
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others of their heady kind.81 But it did not go so far as to relinquish the understood 
entwining of caste and race. Instead, it merely bent the existing narrative to 
accommodate emerging anthropological sensibilities—viz. “It may be asked whether 
it is possible that, when so many existing castes have a functional origin, there should 
be any correspondence between caste and race. The answer is that the conqueror [read 
Aryans] would naturally have reserved for themselves the higher occupations, leaving 
the primitive ones to the aborigines.”82 That said, shifts were afoot. 
 As of 1921, the categories continued to crumble. ‘Animism’ became ‘Tribal 
Religion’. But as soon as that category was created, it was rendered “extremely 
problematic” on the grounds that it was “misleading” and lacking the standardized 
precision called for by a census.83 In what had then become the “Caste, Tribe, Race, 
and Nationality” section it was further explained that “primitive tribes are divided into 
tribes some of which have racial and others territorial origin.”84 The Official Report 
leveled an analogous critique of the category ‘Hindu’ calling it an “unsatisfactory 
category in the census classification of religion.”85 But although the report expressed 
interest in ridding the census of ‘caste’ altogether, it maintained that “caste is still the 
foundation of the Indian social fabric”.86 One gets the sense from reading these 
Reports and the anecdotal complaints that informed them that the whole classificatory 
apparatus had become entangled in ever-tightening knots, with precedent pulling on 
one end and emerging anthropological paradigms pulling at the other. 
 Beyond its accentuated expression of epistemic frustration, the 1921 census 
stands out in other ways. Notably, it exuded a second kind of reflexivity, this time 
oriented to the social life of the census itself. Acknowledging with great concern the 
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uptake of census classification in what was becoming an increasingly contested field 
of identity politics in India, the report reads: 
“The opportunity of the census was therefore seized by all but the highest 
castes to press for recognition of social claims and to secure, if possible, a step 
upwards on the social ladder. This attitude has been strengthened by the recent 
development of the caste sabbas or societies, whose purpose is to advance the 
position and welfare of the caste.”87 
These emergent politics of recognition posed particular problems for census 
administrators. As more and more groups in India looked to index and/or manipulate 
census data for their own purposes, these dynamics challenged the presumed at-a-
remove relation of the census to its subject populations. These developments call to 
mind Timothy Mitchell’s work on expert knowledge in colonial Egypt, where he 
argues that the census and other instruments of technocratic knowledge did not merely 
represent their objects of study; they transformed them, in effect making the very 
“facts that statistics wished to fix far more elusive and difficult to define.”88 The irony, 
as Mitchell would have us see, is that the practices of calculability had ironically made 
the populations under study simultaneously more “mobile, uncertain, and 
incalculable.”89 In this regard, the census reports show the census administrators 
themselves coming to terms with the ways that “expert knowledge works to format 
social relations, never simply to report or picture them.”90 The then-current identity 
politics in India were making that much imminently clear. 
 At the time, the term ‘Depressed Classes’ was in its ascendancy. First dotting 
the administrative blotter in 1916 when the Indian Legislative Council’s decided to 
include under this term ‘criminal and wandering tribes’, ‘aboriginals’, and 
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‘untouchables’, the category received a decidedly Hindu inflection when the 
Southborough Committee (1919) based the identification of Depressed Classes on the 
test of untouchability.91 As identity politics heated up for both the government and 
minorities alike, the resolve was sharpening to secure special rights and recognition 
for India’s minority groups. These stirrings of political society upped the epistemic 
ante considerably for those tasked with classifying populations and no doubt added 
socio-political weight to their longstanding epistemic difficulties. 
 The 1931 Report on the Census echoed the reflexive concern over reification. 
The Commissioner commented, “It has been argued that the census statistics of 
religion tend to perpetuate communal divisions; the census cannot, however hide its 
head in the sand like the proverbial ostrich, but must record as accurately as possible 
facts as they exist and there is no question of the existence of communal difference 
which are reflected at present in political constituencies.”92 Census officials proved 
socio-politically sensitive in other ways as well. Into their treatment of ‘tribal’ 
communities crept a sense of protectionism with a notably structural functionalist 
bent. ‘Tribes’ increasingly came to be seen as possessing distinct, isolated, and self-
sufficient socio-cultural systems. ‘Contact’ thereby emerged as a point of acute 
governmental concern. The 1931 report expressed the fear that communication and 
settlement near ‘tribal’ communities “substitutes conflict for contact. Not necessarily, 
that is, a conflict of arms but of culture and material interest.”93 Elsewhere the dangers 
of disturbing ‘tribal’ equilibriums were commented upon: 
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“It is easy to see how a combination of anti-tribal forces is likely to create a 
condition of excessive discomfort in tribal life, the most serious aspect of 
which is the complete breakdown of communal organization. A tribe living in 
comparative isolation will usually be found to have developed an adaptation to 
its environment which within certain limits approaches perfection, an 
adaptation which may have taken many millennia to accomplish and the 
breakdown of which may be the ruin of the tribe.”94 
This growing governmental concern with the well-being of ‘tribal’ communities poses 
what at first would seem to be a contradiction. Since government officials had clearly 
lost confidence in the representational accuracy and utility of ‘tribe’/’aboriginal’ 
designations, then to what conceptual form—and more importantly, why—did they 
direct their sentiments of care toward these ancient societies framed as living on the 
precipice of both “perfection” and “ruin”? Here we must think beyond the census to 
examine how the charged political contexts of India at the time influenced the 
production of both knowledge and late colonial policy. 
Emergent Politics of Recognition. 
 The prospects of governmental care for ‘tribes’ was greatly diminished in 1932 
when the Indian Franchise Committee declared that ‘Primitive and Aboriginal Tribes’ 
should not be included as ‘Depressed Classes’. At the time, separate electorates for 
Hindus and Muslims were being hotly debated by British and Indian political leaders 
at the now famous Anglo-Indian Roundtable Conferences (1930-32). In the first of 
these Roundtable Conferences (Nov 1930-Jan 1931) Dr. B.R. Ambedkar added a 
demand for separate electorates for Untouchables, (or what he was then calling, 
‘Depressed Classes’ and/or ‘Dalits’). Ambedkar’s tactics insured that the most 
downtrodden of Hindu castes would have a place at the proverbial table. The 
Communal Award was subsequently granted at the end of the Second Roundtable 
                                                 
94 Ibid, 506. 
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(Sep-Dec 1931), promising separate electorates for the Depressed Classes [read 
‘castes’]. Gandhi took issue with the Award on the grounds that it would divide 
Hindus. He then launched a fast until death in protest. Amid great pressure to save the 
life of the Mahatma, Ambedkar eventually conceded, leading to the signing of the 
Poona Pact in the Yerawada Jail on September 20, 1932. Instead of separate 
electorates, the Pact established reserved seats for Depressed Classes within a joint 
electorate. 
 The Roundtables were the centerpiece events of an especially formative time in 
the identity politics of India. The events leading up to and surrounding the actual 
meetings themselves were perhaps equally as pivotal as what transpired within the 
conferences. Along with shaping the Government of India Act of 1935, which was to 
serve as the final constitution of British-ruled India, the events of the early 1930s in 
many ways charted the trajectory to and beyond independence for not one but two 
South Asian nations (India and Pakistan). Relatedly, they also laid the groundwork for 
particular systems and politics of recognition that would transcend the coming 
transition from colonial to independent rule. 
 During the contentious years of the early 1930s, paradigms for the politics of 
minority began to take shape.95 By the time the India Act of 1935 was finalized, the 
‘Depressed Classes’ had become ‘Scheduled Castes’. Under this designation the 
welfare of India’s Scheduled Castes was placed fully within the ambit of the liberal 
government. That of the ‘tribes’ was another matter. Precisely when the issue of 
minority rights and recognition was coming to the fore, the fate of the ‘tribes’ slid 
quietly from view. As giants like Gandhi, Nehru, Ambedkar, and Jinnah wrestled for 
control of constituting a national polity, ‘tribes’ were largely dropped from the popular 
equations for a new India. 
                                                 
95 For an insightful reading of the establishment of these paradigms of the ‘politics of minority’, see 
Anupama Rao 2007. 
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 If the removal of the ‘tribes’ from the Depressed Classes dealt a political blow 
to those communities once classified under the term, then the 1941 Census sounded 
the death knell of the category itself. The Census Commissioner stated in no uncertain 
terms, “Every census has seen the old nuisance about tribal enumeration and 1941 saw 
communal activities at their height. The religious return in respect of tribes has never 
been anything but worthless.”96 The Report declared the “whole enquiry…unsound, 
and quite apart from the necessities which made the extraction of the general tribal 
figure desirable, it was time the whole question was put on something approaching an 
exact and scientific basis.”97 Though this was a convincing rebuke of earlier 
taxonomies, it nevertheless refutes ethnological distinctions of the past on the exact 
same grounds that Risley had before, and that Beverly had before that. It was, after all, 
similar calls for exactitude, scientific integrity, and the allaying of epistemic 
uncertainty that had propelled these earlier shifts in forms and techniques of 
classification. 
 The 1941 Census did away with ‘caste’ and supplanted the religious distinction 
of ‘tribals’ with a new category, ‘Community Origin’, in which “no opinion has been 
expressed on whether the number returned as tribes should be considered as 
assimilated to Hindus or not.”98 In making these changes, census officials showed a 
keen awareness of the diminishing status and visibility within the politically charged, 
protean contours of emergent politics of recognition. The Report framed the vanishing 
as follows: “With the abolition of caste sorting this year, it was essential to bring the 
figures for tribes into a community table if they were not to be lost sight of.”99 
                                                 
96 Report on the Census of 1941, 18. 
97 Ibid, 28. 
98 Ibid, 29. 
99Ibid, 20. Yeatts also notes that accounting for the tribes remained necessary due to the provisions for 
‘Reserved’ and ‘Partially Reserved’ areas (as per Sections 91 and 92) of the India Act of 1935, which 
placed predominantly tribal areas under the administration of the governors of the state within which 
the area was contained. These provisions were the antecedents of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules of the 
Indian Constitution, which created ‘tribal areas’ with limited sovereignty, again under the aegis of the 
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 Despite the admitted problems with the term itself, “not losing sight of the 
tribals”, had nevertheless become imperative for both moral and policy reasons. 
Sections 91 and 92 of the India Act of 1935 had created ‘Reserved and Partially 
Reserved Areas’ for regions inhabited predominantly by people of ‘tribal origin’. 
(These provisions later become the Fifth and Sixth Schedules.) It was therefore largely 
for administrative purposes that the 1941 Census instituted the ‘Community Origins’ 
distinction. Meanwhile, as various constituencies ramped up their demands for rights 
and recognition throughout the 1930s and 40s, the government continued to morph 
into a welfare state. As the pressures and ramifications of recognition mounted, 
mitigating against the “excessive zone of indeterminacy” which ethnological 
classification entailed thus became more than an administrative, epistemic, or 
scientific imperative; it was a political mandate.100 
 The Census Commissioner Yeatts himself noted, “The handling of 
indeterminate data requires a strict scientific attitude which cannot be expected from 
the ordinary citizen whose tendency is to attribute an absolute value to anything 
presented in figures. This is quite apart from any preconceptions that may be 
introduced from political or communal interests or anxieties, but where those are 
present, the case for presenting in the tables only [those] matters on which a 
reasonable determination is possible [becomes] enormously stronger.”101 Elsewhere 
Yeatts lamented the impossibility the religious classification of ‘tribes’, when “to the 
ordinary member of a tribe the word ‘religion’ has no meaning.” Even if such subjects 
were to understand the term, the hybrid realities of socio-religious life were such that 
“even an expert anthropologists might find it difficult to determine without some 
hours or days’ enquiry whether a particular individual, family, etc could be said to 
                                                                                                                                            
governor. In Darjeeling, it was the quest for the Sixth Schedule status that dictated the events described 
at the beginning of this chapter. 
100 “Excessive zone of indeterminacy” is the language of the 1941 Census. 
101 Ibid, 29. 
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have been more than half assimilated to the Hindu community… Our enumerators are 
busy men. They have not hours to spend on either an individual or a family. They have 
no expert knowledge and there is not automatic principle or guidance which can be 
afforded to them” in discerning between religious traditions.102 It was thus decided that 
the ‘Community Origins’ designation would offer an altogether safer and better 
analytic.103 
--- 
 Six decades of the census suggests the colonial career of the category ‘tribal’ 
was conditioned neither by coherency nor stasis so much as contestation, doubt, and 
continually unsettled grounds of understanding. The census and ethnological 
endeavors contemporaneous with it were, moreover, inflected with a level of 
reflexivity that has been underappreciated in the study of colonial constructions of 
knowledge. Colonial ethnologists cum bureaucrats were painfully aware of the 
reification inherent in their work—especially amid the rising identity politics during 
the latter decades of British rule. These intensifying politics of identification, 
classification, recognition only exacerbated their longstanding epistemic angst. By the 
time the British ceded the reins of their massive administrations of difference to their 
Indian counterparts, the category of the ‘tribal’ lay in shambles. Census officials had 
all but given up on its analytic worth. What remained were bits and pieces of 
ethnologies of the past previously torn asunder by the changing currents of 
anthropological and imperial thought.104 
                                                 
102 Ibid, 28. 
103 Accordingly, a brief numerical table (XIV) calculating the ‘Variation in Population of Select Tribes’ 
was added to insured that these marginalized groups would not vanish from administrative sight, even 
as their political visibility (and in turn, possibility) was slowly being pushed out of the nationalist view 
forward. 
104 Reading the career of the category ‘tribal’ within the history of the census offers a parable of sorts on 
the fate of disciplinary knowledge forms, and the problematic categories and logics they leave behind. 
The relationship between the census and academic anthropology was, of course, something more than 
allegorical. Chapter IV addresses these matters ethnographically. 
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 When juxtaposed to the contemporary dynamics of recognition in Darjeeling 
and beyond, the history at hand poses an interesting riddle for postcolonial studies: If 
the genealogy of the category ‘tribal’ lay in shambles as the British began their 
imperial withdrawal, if on the eve of independence it had been declared “worthless”, 
then how has it come to be the case that today the category carries so much weight? At 
present there are over 700 communities benefiting from their designation as Scheduled 
Tribes of India. There are an estimated 1000 more desperately seeking this coveted 
status. As I have tried to show elsewhere in my writing, modern systems of 
recognition can radically reshape the political, social, and subjective possibilities of 
ethnic subjects—be they in Darjeeling, Assam, Rajasthan or elsewhere. Reviewing 
these most current irruptions in the politics of recognition on the subcontinent, we 
must ask how it is that, so long after the self proclaimed “dubious” and “worthless” 
colonial ethnologies ceased to be, people continue to die in the streets to become 
‘tribal’? For those of us who consider ourselves students of both the colonial and the 
contemporary, the challenge in historicizing today’s systems of recognition lies in how 
to hold in view both their obvious coloniality and their perplexing postcolonial forms. 
Here, it is worth refreshing the original question: Why the rock and not Durga? 
The Anthropology of Dr. B.R. Ambedkar. 
 The Cultural Research Institute (CRI) is located in a vacuous government 
building on the outskirts of Kolkata. Inside the CRI’s offices, communities’ 
memorandums, ST applications, and ethnographic reports flutter incessantly from 
beneath the paperweights that pin them to the bureaucratic table. Among the files 
waiting out the bureaucratic durée are those of the aspiring ‘tribals’ of Darjeeling. In 
the concrete stairwell of this mildewed monolith hangs a lone portrait of Dr. B.R. 
Ambedkar. Disproportionately small, the portrait seems too modest to preside over the 
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happenings of the department, but it is there nonetheless—hanging quietly on a barren 
concrete wall. 
 It is especially apt that Ambedkar’s image would deck the stark interior of the 
CRI. On the one hand, as the Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee, 
Ambedkar oversaw the formation of policies that granted exceptional powers of 
recognition to the Indian government—the responsibilities of which, in West Bengal, 
fall largely to the social scientists of the CRI.105 Likewise, the affirmative action, tribal 
sovereignty, and related fruits of positive discrimination enshrined in the Indian 
constitution created lucrative incentives for communities to mobilize identity for 
political purposes. Hence the stacks of applications clogging the anthropological 
wings of government. 
 On the other hand, Ambedkar’s activism for the Depressed Classes (Dalits) 
established key paradigms for the politics of minority in South Asia. His steadfast 
critiques of social, political, and economic inequality, his subsequent calls for positive 
discrimination, and his tactics of community mobilization, all became exemplary 
measures for an increasingly dynamic, increasingly participatory, political society in 
20th century India. (These were the dynamics referenced by the census officials 
earlier). Reading Ambedkar as both bureaucrat and activist, we may thus learn a great 
deal about the history of identity politics in India. Reading Ambedkar as organic 
anthropologist, we may learn even more. 
 Ambedkar was a luminary of acute, if problematic, anthropological 
sensibilities. Though he maintained that positive discrimination should draw its 
impetus from disadvantage, not difference,106 he continually ventured into socio-
cultural terrain to buoy his calls for special privileges for Depressed Classes. His 
                                                 
105 The CRI in Kolkata is analogous to the Tribal Research Institutes (TRIs) found in other states. It was 
established in May of 1955, with the TRIs coming up in other states over the decade to follow. 
106 Rodrigues makes this point in his thoughtful introduction to The Essential Writings (2002). 
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arguments, many of which were characteristically ethnological, took the form of 
scathing critiques of the Brahmanical logics through which Hindus justified their 
castigation of Dalits. In her incisive readings of Ambedkar, Anupama Rao has 
examined how he forged an antagonistic alterity between high caste Hindus and 
Dalits.107 This was precisely the alterity that drew Gandhi’s ire in the wake of the 
Communal Award, leading to his fast, and eventually the Poona Pact. Carving out a 
sense of alterity from within the Hindu fold was a lynchpin in Ambedkar’s mission to 
establish and mobilize a pan-Indian minority known as the Depressed Classes/Dalits. 
 There is, however, another degree of alterity lurking in Ambedkar’s worldview 
that has hitherto yet to be addressed, but which was instrumental in shaping the 
trajectory of positive discrimination in postcolonial India. By his own admission, 
Ambedkar’s politics virtually disavowed the ‘tribal’/’aboriginal’ peoples of India. 
Ambedkar justified this by proclaiming, “The Aboriginal Tribes have not as yet 
developed any political sense to make the best use of their political opportunities and 
they may easily become mere instruments in the hands either of a majority or a 
minority and thereby disturb the balance without doing any good to themselves.”108 In 
other words they, were ‘not as yet’ ready to be responsible participants in the world of 
liberal democratic rights. Ambedkar’s phrasing calls to mind Dipesh Chakrabarty’s 
eloquent critique of the ‘not yet’, historicist logics through which particular peoples 
have been relegated to what he calls the “waiting room of history”.109 Only here, we 
see how historicist logics and what we might call anthropo-logics worked hand and 
                                                 
107 Rao 2007. 
108 “Communal Deadlock and a Way to Solve It (1945).” in Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and 
Speeches (BAWS). Bombay: Gov. of Maharashtra, 1979. 
109 Chakrabarty 2000. Johannes Fabian has made a similar argument. However, Fabian focuses 
primarily on how academic anthropology denies coevalness to its object communities. See Time and the 
Other. 1983. 
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glove in ordering Ambedkar’s modernist vision of India.110 ‘Tribals’ were not only 
Hinduism’s other-beyond-mention, they were modernity’s as well. 
 It is striking that one of India’s most strident and recognizable spokesmen for 
the disadvantaged could so easily push the ‘tribals’ from the pale of political rights. 
Such exclusionary logic would seem to be a glaring contradiction in Ambedkar’s 
politics. In fact, it is. And as such, his exclusion of the ‘tribes’ exposes a more 
profound paradox at the heart of liberal thought—especially as it took form in colonial 
India. The political scientist Uday Singh Mehta has carefully examined these 
contradictions of liberal ideology. Mehta argues that liberal universalism was 
predicated on what he calls an “anthropological minimum”. He explains, “The 
exclusionary basis of liberalism…is so not because the ideals are theoretically 
disingenuous or concretely impractical, but rather because behind the capacities 
ascribed to all human beings exists a thicker set of social credentials that constitute the 
real bases of political inclusion.”111 As Mehta unpacks the precepts of liberalism’s 
claims of ‘universal’ political inclusion, he rightly pinpoints the anthropological nature 
of such presuppositions. “Central among these anthropological characteristics or 
foundation for liberal theory,” Mehta tells us, “are the claims that everyone is naturally 
free, that they are, in the relevant moral respects, equal and finally that they are 
rational.”112 Mehta thus asks us to probe the anthropological underpinnings of liberal 
thought—especially as it took form in the colonies. 
 Mehta develops his insights on liberalism and empire through close readings of 
liberals like James and John Stuart Mill, Thomas Macaulay and others. These early 
                                                 
110 I distinguish these ‘anthropo-logics’ from the ‘ethno-logics’ mentioned earlier in the thesis on the 
grounds that these modern sensibilities entailed more than mere logics of what constitutes a 
recognizably ‘ethnic’ community. Instead, these anthropo-logics appeal to a more Kantian view of 
‘anthropology’ insofar as they involve broader, more philosophical, presumptions about “Man as a 
citizen of the world”. See Kant’s Anthropology (1978:3). I address these issues later in my discussion of 
Mehta’s notion of the ‘anthropological minimum’. See also Middleton (forthcoming). 
111 Ibid, 48. 
112 Mehta 1999: 52. 
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19th century luminaries were engaged with India a century before Ambedkar’s time. 
And yet there is a similar exclusionary logic at work in Ambedkar’s dealing with the 
‘tribals’: they lacked the requisite “political sense” to be responsible, fully 
participatory citizens of the coming nation-state. 
 These opinions are especially peculiar, given other aspects of Ambedkar 
corpus. Elsewhere in his writings, Ambedkar expressed clear skepticism toward the 
juridical project of ethnological classification, even once noting: 
“However desirable or reasonable an equitable treatment of men may be, 
humanity is not capable of assortment and classification. The statesman 
therefore, must follow some rough and ready rule, and that rough and ready 
rule is to treat all men alike not because they are alike but because 
classification and assortment are impossible.”113 
At other more subtle moments, Ambedkar even proved wary of the limitless demands 
that identity-based politics could put on the nation-state. In his view, identity was not 
necessarily something to be cultivated by the state.114 However, once present it had to 
be addressed and accommodated. When and where he conceded to bring the question 
of religious, cultural, and linguistic identity into the ambit of government, he did so 
with ambivalence—the most obvious example being his shifting opinions on the 
possibilities of Pakistan.115 
 When these stately opinions are weighed against the actual practices of 
Ambedkar, glaring contradictions arise. Ambedkar’s forays into socio-cultural critique 
were precisely designed to shape the identity and recognition of the erstwhile, 
politically disparate Untouchables. Ambedkar sought to endow these scattered 
                                                 
113 “Annihilation of Caste” in The Essential Writings of B.R. Ambedkar (2006). Also available in 
BAWS 1979: Vol. 1. 
114 See in particular “Thoughts on Linguistic States” (1955) in BAWS VOl.1 and Pakistan or the 
Partition of India (1940/1946) in BAWS Vol. 8, especially Chapters 11 & 12 that address “Communal 
Aggression” and “National Frustration”, respectively.  
115 For instance, in his “Thoughts on Linguistic States” (1955) he opines, “This scheme of dividing 
India in the name of Linguistic States cannot be overlooked. It is not so innocuous as the Commission 
thinks. It is full of poison.” BAWS Vol. 1:143.  
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populations with a socio-cultural and historical coherency that could in turn generate 
within this constituency a sense of community, while giving to this constituency a 
recognizable community form. Once mobilized and perceived as a political 
community, the Depressed Classes under the guidance of Ambedkar became a force to 
be reckoned with. 
 Ambedkar’s activism was thus at odds with his ideals of liberal universalism. 
His jettisoning of the ‘tribes’ from equal participation in a world of democratic rights 
further contradicted his opinions of the inherent “impossibilities” of human 
“classification and assortment”. Both in his activism for Dalits and in his exclusion of 
the ‘tribals’, Ambedkar leaned on ethnological mechanisms to justify two forms of 
alterity: the first was an antagonistic alterity carved from within the Hindu fray; the 
second, was one of a more radical kind, which rendered the ‘tribes’ beyond Hinduism, 
beyond modernity, and beyond the domain of liberal rights. In all cases, 
anthropological judgments snuck in the backdoor of Ambedkar’s view of India, 
unannounced, yet silently shaping the imagination and policies of an embryonic 
nation-state. 
 In harboring this view, Ambedkar was not alone. His fellow ‘architects’ of 
modern India maintained likewise dispensations—both stated and unstated. 
Eventually, affirmative action would emerge as the tonic of the ‘tribal’s’ historical 
incipience, but only after intensive (and exceptionally telling) negotiation. When read 
with an ethnographic eye, these negotiations, which I now examine, bespeak a 
distinctly Indian form of liberalism, replete with its own prejudices of understanding. 
In time, these ethnological cum liberalist presumptions would become normative, as 
ideologies of secular nationalism came to shape the policies and political possibilities 
of difference in postcolonial India. 
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The Constituent Assembly Debates. 
 The Constituent Assembly was first convened on December 9, 1946. Nearly 
three years later, on November 26, 1949, its 207 members finally settled on the first 
Constitution of India. The debates that transpired in the interim ranged from banal 
deliberations over juridical detail to fierce, and at times exceptionally personal, 
ideological attacks. 
 On September 5th 1949, the Assembly met to finalize provisions for ‘tribal 
areas’ as per the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Some notable excerpts 
follow: [italics mine] 
 Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena initiated the debate by proclaiming, “The existence 
of the Scheduled Tribes and the Scheduled Areas are a stigma on our nation just as the 
existence of untouchability is a stigma on the Hindu religion. That these brethren of 
ours are still in such a sub-human state of existence is something for which we should 
be ashamed.”116 
 A.V. Thakkar questioned the ‘tribals’ capacity for self-rule on accounts that 
they were “too shy.” He went on to say, “Therefore the more we are able to know of 
these tribes the better it is for the country as a whole and to assimilate those tribal 
people as fast as we can in the whole society of the nation as we are now.” 
 Biswanath Das questioned, “What are we doing now? We are creating another 
virus, a racial virus in Tribal Councils, Scheduled Areas, and the rest. Sir, why not 
save the country from the troubles arising from the distinctions between adibasis 
[aboriginals] and nonadibasis… As long as you keep recognizing such terms, you keep 
on fanning difference.” 
                                                 
116 All passages quoted from the Constituent Assembly Debates on the 5th and 6th of September, 1949. 
Transcription available in Government of India; Constituent Assembly Debates, Official Report, 1950.  
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The following day, the Assembly members shifted their attention to the Sixth 
Schedule—which dealt with ‘tribal areas’ in Assam and other northeast states. The 
debates got personal. 
 Kuladhar Chaliha of Assam began, “If you see the background of this Schedule 
you will find that the British mind is still there. There is the old separatist tendency 
and you want to keep them away from us. You will thus be creating a Tribalstan, just 
as you have created a Pakistan.” Chilaha’s history was not off base; there was a long 
history of exceptionalism for the areas populated predominantly by ‘tribals’. 
Antecedents to the Fifth and Sixth Schedules may be found in: the Scheduled District 
Acts of 1874; The Government of India Act of 1919 (Sec. 52-A(2) which established 
‘Backward Tracts’; and The Government of India Act of 1935 (Sec. 91 & 92) which 
demarcated ‘Excluded’ and ‘Partially Excluded Areas’. These policies based the need 
for special forms of governance on the purported ‘aboriginal’, ‘frontier’, and/or 
‘backward’ conditions of the said areas. The ethnic justification for special forms of 
governance obtained less in the formal measures of these Acts, and more in the 
presumptions of what constituted the ‘backward’ nature of these tracts. The Fifth and 
Sixth Schedules, on the other hand, stated clearly that these were to be recognized as 
‘tribal areas’. Granting ethnic based sovereignty to such populations was clearly 
alarming for some of the members of the Assembly. 
 Brajeshwar Prasad opined, “To vest wide political powers into the hands of 
tribals is the surest method of inviting chaos, anarchy and disorder throughout the 
length and breadth of this country.” 
 R.K. Chaudhari concurred with both of them and took the opposition a step 
further by accusing Ambedkar, who was the presenter of the draft under consideration, 
of “wanting to perpetuate the British method so far as the tribals are concerned. We 
want to assimilate the tribals.” 
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 Rev. Nichols Roy of Assam at this point intervened: “I myself being a hillman 
know what I feel. It is said by one honourable gentleman that the hill tribes have to be 
brought to the culture which he said was ‘our culture’, meaning the culture of the 
plainsman….You say, ‘I am educated and you are uneducated and because of that you 
must sit at my feet’. That is not the principle among the hill tribes. When they come 
together they all sit together whether educated or uneducated, high or low. There is 
that feeling of equality among the hill tribes in Assam which you do not find among 
the plains people.” 
 This infuriated Chaudhari, himself a high-caste Hindu: “Why do you make 
propaganda against our people? Do we not dig earth in our villages and raise houses? 
Why do you vilify our people?” 
 Roy quipped back, “I am telling facts!” 
 Kuladhar Chalisa commanded Roy, “Please withdrawal your remarks!” His 
objection was not sustained by the president, at which point Ambedkar tried to steer 
the conversation back on track. 
 Ambedkar stated, “I am speaking of Assam and other areas for the moment. 
The difference seems to be this. The tribal people in areas other than Assam are more 
or less Hinduised, more or less assimilated with the civilization and culture of the 
majority of the people in whose midst they live. With regard to the tribals in Assam 
that is not the case. Their roots are still in their own civilization and their own 
culture…” 
 But the hotheaded Chaudhari was not done. He retorted, “Is the Honorable Dr. 
Ambedkar entitled to make insinuations against us?” 
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 Soon after this seemingly out of bounds personal attack on Ambedkar,117 the 
spat gave way again to the details of finalizing the provisions. The Sixth Schedule was 
finalized the following day (September 7th, 1949). 
 As Rev. Roy from Assam astutely pointed out, the issue here was as much 
about the ‘tribals’ as it was about the majority, the de facto ‘we’, against which they 
were being defined. Who was the ‘we’ that should be ashamed of the ‘tribals’, their 
“sub-human brethren”? Who was it that had been vilified by the remarks of Roy and 
the rather innocuous ones of Ambedkar? In the genesis of a national polity, who was 
to be the illustrious first-person of the nation? This was the subtextual issue 
undergirding the arguments over how to govern the ‘tribes’. 
 The Constituent Assembly was in many ways a crucible of modern nation 
making. It subsequently elicited persuasions—political, ideological, ethnological, and 
otherwise. The debates carried an overarching liberal, modernist spirit. The perceived 
exceptional nature of the ‘tribal’ subject accordingly prompted extended discussion, 
specifically about whether and how to extend nationalist universals to those who fell 
below the anthropological minimum. This naturally prompted the second line of 
questioning which set off the row between Chaudhari, Roy and others. In the nuances 
of their quarrel, and throughout the more cordial deliberations over the future of 
‘tribes’ and ‘tribal areas’, there arose signs of a re-emergent Hindu-centricity. 
 The presumptions of a Hindu-dominated system of recognition were well 
established by the logics of colonial classification. But they were also tied to then-
contemporary demographics and dynamics of a nation still working out the traumatic 
                                                 
117 That Chaudhari would take such offense to Ambedkar’s statement that the tribals of Assam merit 
extra attention on the grounds that they are less ‘hinduized’ is intriguing. Ambedkar’s statement (at 
least in transcription) seems devoid of accusation, yet Chaudhari quipped back, “Is the Honorable Dr. 
Ambedkar entitled to make insinuations against us?” Chaudhari’s ire seems directed at something 
besides Ambedkar’s words. That he calls him out by name suggests that it is perhaps Ambedkar’s very 
subject position, not merely as the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, but also as a Dalit, an activist, 
and consummate critic of Brahmanical culture. Was it these facets of Ambedkar’s personhood that 
Chaudhari, himself a high-caste Hindu, found so insinuating? 
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effects of Partition. While Partition split a nation in two, caste politics from the 1920s 
onward also did much to divide the Hindu world internally. The alterity claimed by 
Ambedkar on behalf of the Depressed Classes at once reified the Hindu center, while 
effectively redoubling the alterity and liberal exclusion of the ‘tribes’. As was the case 
in colonial days, but somehow different, both the ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of a national 
polity once again came to be defined in terms of a Hindu order. 
 Moreover, it is remarkable how hybridity—once the bane of colonial 
classification—suddenly gets proffered by members of the Constituent Assembly as a 
proactive solution to the radical alterity of the ‘tribals’—viz. “We want to assimilate 
the tribals.” In this new valence, hybridity was no longer an epistemic problem; it was 
a socio-political process to be encouraged, a way of centripetally pulling ‘tribes’ in 
from the forested margins of an ethnological imaginary to an appropriately modern, de 
facto Hindu, center. So it was claimed by assimilation’s protagonists. The logical 
opposition took the form of protectionism, through which special governance was seen 
to be justified by the exceptional ethnological qualities of the ‘tribes’, which rendered 
them vulnerable to the impress of modern life. The positive discriminations of the 
Indian Constitution in large part split the difference between these two options. But 
irregardless of the questionable successes of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules in 
protecting the traditions of ‘tribals’, or the questionable successes of reservations and 
affirmative action to assuage STs’ entry into the mainstream, the frameworks of ‘the 
tribal problem’, as it came to be known, were already well-formed by the time of 
decolonization. 
 The Constituent Assembly debates signal an important shift in the history of 
‘tribal’ recognition. Whereas the British had all but given up on the category, with 
Ambedkar and his modernist contemporaries we see a decidedly Indian recuperation 
and re-formation of earlier understandings of what constituted the ‘tribal’ subject. 
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These recuperations were neither wholesale, nor could they have been. The taxonomic 
schemas ready-at-hand in the 1940s were anything but a coherent system. They 
instead constituted an array of ideological and epistemic fragments—‘imperial debris’ 
of a conceptual kind, as Stoler would have it.118 Yet given the feverish pitch of identity 
politics in the decades leading up to independence in 1947, the classificatory system of 
governance bequeathed to Ambedkar and his contemporaries was under great duress. 
For the architects of independent India, re-administering difference was thus both a 
responsibility and a great opportunity. These were the prevailing conditions in which 
the epistemic remains of the ‘tribal’ figure were gathered and fleshed out anew in a 
decidedly postcolonial form. The terms of ‘tribal’ distinction are today far more rigid 
than they ever were during the era of colonial ethnology. 
‘Tribes’ by Law. 
 In the post-1947 era, the ‘ethnographic state’ was significantly reprised. In 
1949, when the Constitution was in its final drafts, orders were sent by the Ministry of 
Home Affairs to all provincial governments to prepare lists and information on 
Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward Classes.119 It was 
imperative that these lists be finalized before the 1951 census so that the said groups 
could be accurately counted. The next year, the Constitution (Scheduled Tribes) Order 
of 1950 was released listing the communities to be recognized as Scheduled Tribes, as 
                                                 
118 Stoler 2008. 
119 There were several other developments pertaining to ‘tribes’ during this time. In 1945, the 
Anthropological Survey of India (ASI) was created with a concentrated attention to the study of tribal 
communities. Despite its notoriety and historical precedents, the ASI plays little role in the 
contemporary systems of recognition for STs. Also of note during this period was the Ayyangar 
Committee’s 1949 recommendation to repeal of the Criminal Tribes Act, which had been on the books 
in various forms since the 19th century. The Ayyangar report determined that “the provisions which 
‘seek to class particular classes of people as Criminal Tribes, are inconsistent with the dignity of free 
India’“ The listed Criminal Tribes were subsequently ‘denotified’ by The Criminal Tribes Act of 1952. 
See also Ayyangar Report on Repeal of Criminal Tribes Act of 1924, Gov. of India, 1949. 
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per Article 342 of the newly minted Constitution of India.120 Importantly, neither 
Article 342 nor the Scheduled Tribes Order of 1950 mention any criteria by which 
tribes were determined. 
 By 1953 the Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes was advocating 
for the establishment of research institutes designed to gather information on ST 
communities. These institutes were to be “manned by social anthropologists, [who] 
should study all the aspects of tribal life with a view to preserving the good points of 
tribal culture and advising the state governments on the right approach to the various 
problems concerning the STs and also in chalking out welfare schemes for them on 
scientific lines.”121 The Commissioner’s Report in 1953 went on to say: 
“The problem of the STs [is] different from but not as complicated as that of 
the SCs, for there is no deep-rooted prejudice against them in society. The STs 
have been pushed back to the jungles and the hill areas and have been 
altogether neglected both by the Government and the society for centuries. 
Thus they are in a way cut off from the society and have been living in areas 
inaccessible but with the advantage of keeping their culture intact…The STs 
will naturally take more time in coming up to the level of the SCs in their 
assertion of their rights, and therefore, Government help and encouragement 
are very necessary in the initial stages.” 
Again, no mention is made regarding ‘tribes’ vis a vis Hinduism; officially, the 
opposition obtained only in the distinction Scheduled Castes versus Scheduled Tribes. 
A key aspect of the 1953 report and others like it was its concentration on the unique 
“culture” of the tribes. This concern, coupled with that of “tribal welfare”, began to 
dictate much of the government’s involvement in ‘tribal’ life. 
--- 
                                                 
120 In addition, Article 338 established a Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Tribes to oversee and 
administer tribal-oriented governance from the Centre. 
121 “Report of the Commissioner for SC and ST for 1952” Government of India, Ministry of Home 
Affairs, 1953. 
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 Just a few years after the Constitution’s enactment, problems had already 
arisen with ST enumeration. Members of parliament were convinced that the list put 
forth in 1950 excluded groups that were deserving of ST and SC status. A subsequent 
Revision of the Lists was carried out in 1954. Still, there were no official criteria. 
 Finally, in June of 1965 an Advisory Committee was convened under the 
Chairmanship of B.N. Lokur to revise the list once again. The Lokur Committee, as it 
came to be known, laid down the official criteria. As of 1965, they were and remain: 
  a) Indication of primitive traits, 
  b) Distinctive culture, 
  c) Geographical isolation, 
  d) Shyness of contact with the community at large, and 
  e) Backwardness. 
 As has been the case in Darjeeling, these criteria—and in particular their 
demands of cultural distinctiveness and singularity—spawn their own peculiar (and at 
times, troubling) social dynamics. It is a telling antinomy that in an era of increasing 
hybridity and inter-cultural flow, the strictures of recognition would demand empirical 
evidence of such pure conceptual types, yet they continue to insist on distinctiveness 
in the most rigid terms. ‘Tribes’ are to have distinct cultural attributes and live in 
isolation from the rest of society, as though both culturally and socially their ways of 
being were sealed off from the murk of the modern mainstream. For communities such 
as those in Darjeeling whose political and socio-cultural world has been dominated by 
hybrid forms, and perhaps for communities everywhere, meeting such clean-cut 
demands is exceedingly difficult. As I have shown elsewhere, the criteria and carrots 
of ST recognition in Darjeeling have led to extensive cultural engineering projects that 
carry with them profound, if unintended, social and subjective effects.122 
                                                 
122 Middleton & Shneiderman 2008.  
 226 
 The Lokur Committee’s decision to establish official criteria of recognition for 
‘tribal’ subjects was a watershed moment in the history of the category. For groups 
struggling to fit themselves into the amorphous categories of the state, the criteria 
offered a fixed prescription for attaining ST status and all that goes with it. This 
postcolonial fixing of the ‘tribal’ category put a capstone on the contentious, 
convoluted history of the term, effectively smoothing over the epistemic messiness, 
contradictory logics, and anxieties of the category in its colonial forms. The way was 
thus paved for all-too-easy presumptions of the category’s ostensibly unilinear, 
monolithic colonial construction.123 My concerns with any such reading are two fold: 
first, the argument is to a certain extent historically incorrect; second, by investing 
causal weight in the problem of colonial knowledge, such an argument obviates what 
happened to ‘tribal’ recognition in the postcolonial era. 
 There are major contrasts in the social and juridical career of the category in its 
colonial versus contemporary forms. In many ways, the Government of India is even 
more bluntly positivists in its ethnology than was Risley with his racial empiricism. 
By law and in practice, the Government of India now holds ‘tribal culture’ to be out 
there, waiting to be found—a certifiable reminder of modernity’s past. The very 
presumption that ‘distinctive culture’, ‘primitive traits’, and ‘backwardness’ could be 
certified, itself confirms the empiricist propensity. At the same time, it reifies and 
gives tacit political sanction to the pejorative, historicist valuations of the ‘tribals’ 
purportedly certifiable qualities. In such a calculus of historical progression, ‘culture’ 
stands in as the fixed variable and is thus no variable at all—not through time and 
certainly not within a given community on any given day. 
                                                 
123 This kind of critique seems to be gaining a foothold in the contemporary scholarship of ‘tribal’ India 
(see Karlsson 2000; van Schendel 1992; as well as various papers given as part of the ‘Tribes of Mind’ 
panel at the 2006 EASAS meetings.) Articulations also appear in the contemporary Indian press (for 
instance, Sanjib Baruah’s Op-Ed ‘Reading the Tea Leaves’ in The Telegraph: Dec 10, 2007). 
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 Notably, the formal criteria make no mention of ‘tribals’ vis a vis Hinduism. 
This is a conspicuous absence. Why then have ethnic groups in Darjeeling worked so 
hard to purify their culture of the Hindu trace? Or to return to the original riddle: why 
would Ghisingh and his administration supplant Durga with a rock, their most 
hardened symbol of primitive, animistic, recognizably ‘tribal’ character? 
 Formal policy offers few clues. The radical alterity between ‘tribes’ and 
Hinduism lies elsewhere: not so much in the laws and official forms of postcolonial 
knowledge, as in their perceptions and practice. With regard to ‘tribes’, the Indian 
Constitution, the official “Modality for Scheduling Tribes, 1999”, and the Lokur 
Committee criteria are all properly ‘secular’; they do not positively discriminate 
‘tribes’ by religion. In practice, however, there arises a crucial cleavage between the 
letters of law and the practices, perceptions, and experiences of ‘tribal’ recognition. 
Finding an answer to ‘why the rock and not Durga?’ necessitates a coming to terms 
with the ways in which particular paradigms of ethnological distinction have saturated 
the socio-political imagination in India writ large. In these more informal realms of the 
ethnological imaginary, oftentimes the details matter dearly. 
Crestfallen Eyes. 
 It is 9am in Darjeeling and the Phulpāti parade of 2006 is about to begin. 
Stretching as far back along Hill Cart Road as the eye can see, members of various 
ethnic associations and their cultural troops are assembled. In compliance with the 
“instructions” sent out by the Department of Information and Cultural Affairs (DICA), 
everyone is dressed in their most authentic ethnic attire. In any other year, the seventh 
day of the Durga Pujā would be celebrated in great splendor with Phulpāti offerings 
being made to Durga. In any other year, costumed representatives of the goddess 
herself would dance through the parade furiously wielding their knives symbolically 
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cutting through whatever obstacles may come. But today, under specific orders from 
Ghisingh, the parade is to be a show of Darjeeling’s verifiably ‘tribal’ character. The 
parade is slated to snake through town, culminating ultimately at Chow Rasta, where 
the rock, not Durga, awaits. DICA officials do their best to coral the unwieldy crowd, 
as last minute participants join the thousands waiting to march. Drums from various 
cultural troops sound up and down the road, as loudspeakers blare unintelligible 
instructions. Banners are unfurled, flags are hoisted. Amid the cacophony, dancers’ 
bodies begin to move ahead of schedule. The crowd surges forward in anticipation. 
The officials of DICA stand in front, arms outstretched trying to hold back the crowd 
for one last moment until everything is in order. 
 About 50 meters back stands a group of young girls and their mothers. The 
girls, who look to be between the ages of eight and ten, are wonderfully dressed up. 
They sparkle in beautiful gold jewelry. Their black eyeliner is applied thick and heavy, 
the overindulgent touch of young beauticians making themselves up for the year’s big 
show. They are dressed in headscarves and saris of beautiful, deep red hues. 
 Suddenly, the people standing in front of them begin to move. This is it, the 
parade is setting out. Not more than ten paces in, though, they are face to face with the 
leader of the whole show. He is in front of them, putting space between them and 
those in whose footsteps they were following. He begins shouting something at the 
girls’ mothers, waiving his hands about. With the drumming, singing, and sheer mass 
of bodies it is hard to make out what he is saying. But his face clearly expresses 
disproval. The mothers begin to step sideways, not in the flow of where they were to 
go. The girls look up through their makeup with eyes that were seconds ago big with 
excitement, but now are full of confusion. From the gravel-pile on which I stand, I can 
only imagine what is running through their heads: What is happening? Who is this 
man? Why is he holding us up? Why is mother stepping out of the parade? Before any 
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solid answers quell their confusion, their mothers grab their hands and forcibly pull 
the girls out of the parade, across the grimy railroad tracks and through the barrier of 
spectators. As they flee, the man continues waiving his arms, steering them out. 
Behind him, the gap in the parade quickly sutures itself, and the man disappears to 
continue on with his duty. The spectators with whom I am standing on the gravel pile 
express their outrage at what just happened. “This is such a political thing,” they say. 
Meanwhile, as the parade marches on without them, the mothers are left there at the 
side of the road to explain to their daughters that they have been banished because 
their appearance was deemed by the authorities to be too ‘Hindu’. 
 That man was Ram Bahadur Koli, the recently appointed Executive Officer of 
DICA. As with the substitution of the rock for Durga, his removal of the girls from the 
parade was part of his administrative duty to coordinate, demonstrate, and otherwise 
render for all to see the ‘tribal’ culture of the hills. If Darjeeling was to achieve Sixth 
Schedule status, then unequivocally ‘tribal’ displays such as the parade and the rock 
were absolutely necessary. So it was believed by Ghisingh. It was towards that end 
that Ghisingh had courted the services of Mr. Koli just months before the holiday 
season. In the years prior to his appointment, Koli had earned himself a budding 
reputation as a local scholar. His periodic essays in the local papers on the cultures, 
customs, and histories of Darjeeling’s ‘tribal’ communities were well-known. When 
not researching and writing, Koli had devoted himself to the social wellbeing of 
Darjeeling’s primary Dalit communities (the Kamis, Damais, and Sarkis) of which he 
was a member. In fact, he, along with several other GNLF loyalists, had recently 
formed a new ethnic association, The Gorkha Janajati Ka.Da.Sa Sangh, with the 
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expressed interest of converting these groups from Scheduled Castes (a status they had 
enjoyed since 1950) to Scheduled Tribes.124 Such were the times. 
 Mr. Koli took to his job with great vigor, letting no detail go unnoticed in his 
realization of Ghisingh’s ethnological will. Indeed, it was as much an honor to be 
allowed entry into Ghisingh’s mystical inner-circle, as it was to be rewarded for his 
ethnological expertise with such sudden power. The executive office, chauffeur and 
car—a Gypsy SUV no less, the ultimate sign of power in the hills—and a modest 
bureaucratic salary only sweetened the deal. The job, however, wore on Mr. Koli 
quickly, as public resentment against Ghisingh’s cultural ploys began to focus on 
DICA and its Executive Officer in particular. At the center of a political maelstrom, 
Mr. Koli’s health declined rapidly, as did his enthusiasm for this particular brand of 
ethnology. Increasingly when I visited his offices, I would have to make my way 
through hawkish journalists hovering about awaiting an audience with Mr. Koli. Now 
the cultural mouthpiece of the GNLF, his name was no longer appearing in the papers 
as a purveyor of knowledge, but instead as a defender of a performative, and at times 
utterly ridiculous, orthodoxy. Months into his tenure, he would admit to me how bad it 
had actually gotten: Ghisingh had installed a one-way direct-line telephone from his 
office high on the Lāl Khoti hill straight into Mr. Koli’s office. Orders were coming 
from above and there was little that could be said otherwise. 
                                                 
124 Koli’s Gorkha Janajati Ka.Da.Sa Sangh organization was formed in 2006 with conspicuous backing 
from the GNLF. Their objective is apparent in their name, which translates as The Gorkha Ethnic/Tribal 
Kami, Damai, Sarki Society. Here the untouchable Kami, Damai, and Sarki castes are represented as 
‘janajatis’ meaning ethnicities and/or tribes. The organization’s efforts to convert the Kami, Damai, and 
Sarki communities from ST to SC status met significant opposition from the All India Nepali Scheduled 
Castes Association (AINSCA) (est. 1947) which feared the communities could lose all designation 
through such finagling. Op-ed debates between rival factions opened up in the papers, and soon local 
party politics mapped onto the division, with AINSCA receiving backing from the new GJMM party, 
while Koli’s Ka.Da.Sa Association was backed by Ghisingh’s GNLF. At least one assault related to the 
controversy occurred (on March 17th 2007 in Chyanga, Panighatta) when a supporter of AINSCA was 
attacked by GNLF supporters in the course of trying to convene a local branch meeting. Himal Darpan 
March 20, 2007. 
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 I came to know Mr. Koli as an exceptionally kind and sensitive man. Watching 
him carry out his responsibilities and weighing the ill affects it caused for both him 
and for the people he was tasked with disciplining, I was continually pained by the 
rather crude apparatus of knowledge-power of which he had become a part. Despite 
his high-profile administrative status, Koli was not unlike many of the other ‘culture 
makers’ I had witnessed. Like the elite leaders of various ethnic associations who 
pressed ‘tribal culture’ upon their constituents in the name of Scheduled Tribe 
recognition, he was explicitly concerned with engineering culture and reinventing 
tradition. And like these other leaders, Koli’s authority as an administrator of 
ethnological right braided local dynamics of class and political clout, with an ability to 
operationalize historically entrenched systems of anthropological knowledge. That 
these men’s expertise arose from this confluence of forces enabled them—at least 
provisionally—to forcibly set the terms of ‘tribal’ identification in the hills. The tactics 
at hand were notably crass—certainly much more so than the subtle mechanisms 
Foucault trained our eyes upon in his celebrated studies of discipline and knowledge-
power.125 But they were tactics leveled upon the population nonetheless. 
 These tactics of identity politics spoke to the frayed histories explored in this 
essay. However, the ethnographic details also challenged the official histories of 
ethnological governance in India. Despite the fact that neither the Constitution of 
India, the Lokur Committee’s official criteria, nor any other public policy made formal 
mention of ‘tribes’ relation to Hinduism, that particular radical alterity was so widely-
held that it had become an unquestioned maxim of the quests for ST status and the 
Sixth Schedule. 
 Irrespective of its secular, highly ossified status today, it is clear that the 
category of the ‘tribe’ has escaped the officialdoms of law and the archive to run wild 
                                                 
125 Foucault 1977, 1980. 
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on the open discursive terrain of the public imaginary. At large in the public 
imagination, the meanings and valuations of the term are abundant. Typically not even 
the ethnic leaders stewarding the ST application process know its official criteria. 
Those who do have learned primarily in the course of the application process itself. 
This says nothing of the average villager, who is often presumed to—and/or asked 
to—embody its confusing, checkered history. 
 Importantly, any division between the formal realm of governance and the 
informal realm of public understanding easily dissolves in the classificatory moment. 
In official statements, government officials reiterate the secular logic that “religion is 
no bar to being a ‘tribal”. But in practice, government anthropologists and 
administrators alike are acutely concerned with ‘tribes’ relation to Hinduism. As I will 
show in the following chapter, these vested concerns obtain throughout government in 
both subtle and conspicuous ways. Documents obtained from one high level source in 
Delhi denied ST certification to one group of the Darjeeling hills on the following 
grounds: 
“Though [the community in question] had tribal origin, with the passage of 
time and due to their contact with exogenous people and their contacts with the 
Hindu tradition, they are gradually assimilating into the Great Tradition. It will 
be then a retrograde step if they are included into the list of Scheduled 
Tribes.”126 
 When coupled with the more ambient paradigms of the popular imagination, 
statements such as this justify the aspiring communities’ decision to accentuate their 
animistic tendencies while burying any traces of Hinduism. Though it is tempting to 
write-off such performative tactics as opportunistic pandering, a more sensitive 
interpretation might understand these stilted identifications to be symptomatic of the 
                                                 
126 Ethnonym removed for confidentiality purposes. This was not a final ruling. For additional analysis, 
see Chapter IV. 
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ways in which particular forms of anthropological knowledge have taken root in 
modern India. 
Ethnology, Colonialism, Postcolonialism. 
 In Gadamerian terms, the ruling from Delhi may be said to evince certain 
prejudices that condition the understanding and administration of difference in India 
today.127 By denying ‘tribal’ status on the grounds of the community’s assimilation 
into the ‘Great Tradition’ of Hinduism, the verdict raises the specter of hybridity in a 
uniquely postcolonial form. The groups cannot be recognized as ‘tribal’ because their 
socio-cultural attributes are empirically in violation of conceptual ideal-types—
namely the diametrically opposed. pure antecedent pasts of Hinduism and ‘tribes’. The 
ruling simultaneously presumes a Hindu center (i.e. the Great Tradition) apart from 
which ‘tribes’ are opposed, but progressing towards. Except there is an added value to 
this binary. ‘Tribes’ are not merely assumed to be in transition to Hinduism; the 
transition itself—and by extension the endgame of Hinduism—come to be positively 
marked. Hence the language of a “retrograde step” if they were to be recognized as 
Scheduled Tribes. In such prejudices of understanding, the figure of the ‘tribal’ fulfills 
in one fell swoop Hindu modernity’s conjoined demands of alterity and anachrony. 
 Without question, the dark hues in which ‘tribes’ have been painted into the 
hills, interstices, margins and otherwise negative spaces of modernist India’s portrait 
of herself owe much to the racial fascinations of 19th century ethnological thought. But 
so too are these renderings colored by the opaque salience of a contemporary Hindu 
national order. In weighing these involutions of culture and state, it is worth 
remembering Gramsci’s cautionary insight that “every state is ethical in as much as 
one of its most important functions is to raise the great mass of the population to a 
                                                 
127 On ‘prejudices as conditions of understanding,’ see Gadamer 1997: 291-307. 
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particular cultural or moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to the needs of 
the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the ruling 
classes.”128 If this is true, then to follow Gramsci one step further, for both the 
recognizers and the recognized in contemporary India “The question is this: of what 
historical type is the conformism, the mass humanity to which one belongs?”129 The 
anthropologies ‘found’ here—whether of Ambedkar, DICA, aspiring STs, or the 
purportedly secular anthropological wings of the Indian state—assume their answer to 
be cast in shades of saffron.130 
 It is significant that Gramsci framed the problem of hegemony as a question of 
knowledge. For him, “The realization of a hegemonic apparatus, in so far as it creates 
a new ideological terrain, determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of 
knowledge: it is a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact.”131 The question driving this 
analysis is that of “methods of knowledge”, and in particular the epistemic doubts, 
concerns, and anxieties that attended them throughout their colonial and postcolonial 
development. Although these conditions steered the convoluted course of ethnological 
knowledge in colonial India, that course took a marked turn in the postcolonial era. 
Whereas the final decades of British rule saw a gradual deterioration of epistemic 
conviction with regard to the knowability of ‘tribals’, the postcolonial trajectory 
proceeded in an opposite direction. The ontology of the ‘tribes’ was re-instituted, as 
was the epistemic conviction through which they would be recognized and governed. 
This trajectory reached its apotheosis in the Lokur Committee 1965 ossification of the 
                                                 
128 Gramsci 258. 
129 Ibid, 324. 
130 For the reader unfamiliar with the cultural politics of India, saffron is traditionally the color 
associated with the rise of the Hindu right. An excellent analysis of the emergence of Hindu nationalism 
(hindutva) can be found in Blom-Hansen’s The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Nationalism in 
Modern India (1999). 
131 Ibid, 365. 
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formal criteria of ‘tribal’ recognition. The category and the system of recognition in 
which it was situated have since conditioned the possibilities of millions. 
 There is no denying the colonial pasts of ‘tribal’ recognition, but today that 
figure has made its uncanny return in subjects and contexts wholly different than in 
the days of colonial ethnology. In its contemporary form, we confront what was once 
familiar.132 However, as students of both the colonial and the contemporary, we must 
acknowledge that today this category is structured by different sensibilities and 
generative of markedly different socio-political effects. These contrasts ask us to think 
carefully about bringing received paradigms of colonial critique to bear on 
contemporary dynamics. In the post-1947 era, the circumstances and agents of an 
erstwhile ‘dominance without hegemony’ have shifted.133 The questions must 
therefore also shift from ones of ‘colonialism and its forms of knowledge’ to questions 
of knowledge production in the postcolonies. The figure of the ‘tribal’ now roams a 
radically transformed national terrain, from which arises the contours of a 
correspondingly new problem-space for the study of contemporary India.134 
Re-questioning the Contemporary. 
 The tactics through which the people of Darjeeling have sought the Sixth 
Schedule and ST status illustrate the degree to which the ‘ethnology of self’ has 
become a viable political technique of communities. Identifying the ethnic self in and 
through existing systems of recognition has become a powerful vehicle for defining 
these communities and announcing their demands upon the nation-state. An historical 
critique of such possibilities, while it may necessarily begin with questions of the 
colonial, must also contend with more recent histories. In Darjeeling specifically, this 
                                                 
132 See Freud 2003: 151. 
133 See Ranajit Guha’s seminal essay, “Dominance Without Hegemony and its Historiography,” 1989. 
134 On problem-spaces and their ability to generate guiding questions of critique, see Scott 1999. 
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involves coming to terms with both the failings of Gorkhaland Movement of the 1980s 
and certain developments of the affirmative action system at the national level, which 
in time significantly bolstered alternative avenues to rights and recognition. 
 The ‘Gorkha’ identification, under which the Gorkhaland Movement organized 
itself, has proven problematic at a number of levels. At the time of the ‘Agitation’ 
(1986-1988), Subash Ghisingh proved himself adept at fomenting the people’s anxious 
sense of belonging in India. Despite the fact that these groups had migrated from 
Nepal to India long before independence, he convinced them that their citizenship and 
thus security were in doubt. Ghisingh belabored this precarity, but was also steadfast 
in promoting a distinctly Indian identity for the Gorkhas. “We have nothing to do with 
Nepal,” he insisted; what was needed to make “our identity as Indian, belonging to an 
Indian state… clear” was Gorkhaland.135 But insofar as the history of the peoples of 
Darjeeling were tied to Nepal, as were the linguistic and socio-cultural practices that 
lent this community its coherence—the ‘Gorkha’ appellation often re-inscribed the 
very ambiguity it aimed to resolve. 
 Furthermore, as a catchall ethnonym for a conglomerate comprised of 
numerous Nepali-speaking ethnicities, the ‘Gorkha’ identity lacked the ethnological 
singularity demanded by established channels of recognition. The failure of the 
Movement to achieve a separate state of Gorkhaland brought with it the painful 
realization of these shortcomings. In the wake of the Agitation, people in Darjeeling 
themselves came to see the ‘Gorkha’ ethnonym as a banner that was less than 
felicitous in the greater schemes of Indian recognition. In the years following the 
Agitation, many began seeking other avenues to rights and recognition, which they 
eventually found in the form of ST status—a prospect buoyed by developments at the 
national level. 
                                                 
135 India Today. 66 October 31, 1986;  
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 At the all-India level, the administration and politics of difference have 
undergone marked shifts since the 1970s. In 1974, funds began to flow from the 
Centre to ‘tribal areas’ and ST populations in the form of ‘Tribal Sub-Plans’. These 
funds were initially allocated to 180 Integrated Tribal Development Projects (ITDPs) 
and Tribal Research Institutes (TRIs) spread throughout the country.136 To identify the 
most vulnerable of the marginalized, the government carved out another designation—
that of ‘Primitive Tribal Groups’ (PTGs)—in 1975-6.137 Like regular STs, only in an 
accentuated sense, PTGs would be the targets of extensive development and welfare 
projects. Documenting the schemes for ‘tribal’ populations from the 1970s to the 
present is beyond the scope of this analysis. What is important, however, is the ways 
in which these initiatives signaled the Indian state’s growing commitment to more 
ethnically attuned forms of governance. Throughout the 1980s and 90s, the 
anthropologically oriented branches of government necessarily would grow in 
accordance with the expanding complexity and liberal ambitions of the welfare state 
as it pertained to ‘tribal’ populations.138 
 The Mandal Commission (1979-80) and its aftereffects have been rightly 
documented as pivotal moments in India’s affirmative action system.139 The 
                                                 
136 These fell within the funding provisions of Constitution Article 275(1). Prior to these schemes, were 
the Multipurpose Tribal Development Projects implemented as part of the First Five Year Plan (1954). 
In the Third Five Year Plan, Tribal Development Blocks were created. The strategy again shifted in 
1972 to the current Tribal Sub Plans under the guidance of the esteemed anthropologist Prof. S.C Dube, 
who chaired the Expert Committee appointed by the Ministry of Education and Social Welfare that 
designed the scheme.  
137 The criteria for PTG status were established as: i) pre-agricultural level of technology; (ii) very low 
level of literacy; and (iii) declining or stagnant population. 
138 The proliferation and fission of this bureaucracy happened at both the Centre and state-levels. In 
1990, the Commission for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes was formally constituted. In 2003 it 
subsequently split to become (1) The Commission of Scheduled Castes, and (2) The Commission of 
Scheduled Tribes. See Constitution Article 338 and 338a. Meanwhile, at the state level, Tribal Research 
Institutes (like the CRI in Kolkata) were bolstered by grants allocated via Article 275(1). As the Tribal 
Sub Plans became more robust in their scope, they pulled these institutions into an ever more 
technocratic and welfare oriented administration of ‘tribal’ populations. 
139 Social commentaries on the Mandal Commission Report and its implementation by Prime Minister 
V.P. Singh are abundant. For a concise overview of these, see Dirks 2001: 275-296. 
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Commission’s recommendations to increase the affirmative action quotas for SC, ST, 
and Other Backward Classes (OBCs) in government offices and public universities 
from 27% to 49.5% have proven to be at once contentious but formative of minority 
politics. As commentaries on the paradoxes of positive discrimination, the protests, 
self-immolations, and violence surrounding the attempted increase of ST, SC, and 
OBC quotas in 1990 and 2006 speak for themselves.140 
 With regard to recent history in Darjeeling, the timing of these events is 
important. The Mandal Commission Report and its aftermath punctuated a gradual 
escalation of the postcolonial welfare state dating back to the Constituent Assembly 
Debates, Nehruvian secularism, and the subsequent evolutions of the postcolonial 
developmental state. It did so precisely at the time when the people of Darjeeling were 
emerging from the throes of the Gorkhaland Movement and in desperate need of 
alternative vehicles for ethno-political mobilization. The expansion of provisions for 
‘tribal’ populations made the promise of ST status more attractive. The contentious 
events surrounding the quota increases, moreover, thrust the paradoxes and 
possibilities of reservations into the national limelight. In Darjeeling, these 
possibilities captured the public imagination. 
 In 1989, just a year after the Gorkhaland Movement, the Tamangs of 
Darjeeling submitted for ST recognition.141 Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, other 
ethnic groups followed in their footsteps. The Tamangs, however, remained the 
vanguards of these quests, relying on massive street demonstrations, countless 
delegational visits to the Centre and Kolkata, bandhs, and hunger strikes to 
substantiate their claims. They, along with the Limbu, eventually achieved ST status in 
                                                 
140 The 1990 events were sparked by Singh’s implementation of the Mandal Commission’s 
recommendations. Those in 2006 arose when it was announced that a 27% quota would be established 
for OBCs in institutions of higher learning. Each led to protests across the country. 
141 The Tamangs had earlier (in 1981) submitted an ST application, but they abandoned that effort 
during the Gorkhaland Movement when the ‘Gorkha’ identity held sway. 
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2003. In the meantime, others like the Gurungs and Rais had joined the race. By 2006, 
all remaining ‘left-out’ communities were actively trying to become STs.142 These 
newfound forms of engagement with Indian political society143 galvanized a budding 
ethnic renaissance among these groups. These ethnic makeovers increasingly took 
form through unmistakably ethnological conceptual forms and practice. This was due 
in no small part to the fact that these communities’ entry into political society was 
conditioned by, indeed was contiguous with, the ‘tribal’ ideal-type. 
 Even Ghisingh, who in the 1980s rebuked the idea of the Sixth Schedule 
claiming, “We are not tribals…Such a status is bestowed upon people who are 
uncivilized, very backward, whose men go around naked and whose women go bare 
breasted. But we are advanced people. We are civilized. Look at me, I wear a three-
piece suit and shoes,”144 had come to reconsider the available options. Whereas in the 
1980s he fought for the security of the ‘Gorkhas’, now he preached that of the 
‘tribals’. His anthropologically laden diatribes—and, of course the replacement of 
Durga with the rock—showed him to be the consummate champion of Darjeeling’s re-
found ‘tribal’ identity. His ethnological meddlings were accordingly articulated—and, 
when necessary, enforced—with the expressed intention of bringing Sixth Schedule 
status to the hills. 
 The politics of ‘tribal’ recognition in Darjeeling have yet to take the violent 
forms that erupted in Rajasthan and Assam in 2007.145 Those events serve as timely 
                                                 
142 The self-described ‘left-out’ communities included Magar, Sunwar, Khas, Damai, Kami, Sarki, 
Thagmi, Newar, Bhujel, Thakori. In 1950, when the original list (The Constitution Scheduled Tribes 
Order) was published, four communities (Bhutia, Lepcha, Sherpa, Yolmo) out of the approximately 20 
ethnicities that make up the Gorkha community were afforded this designation. The Tamang and Limbu 
were written into the Constitution as Scheduled Tribes per ins. Act 10 of 2003.  
143 See Partha Chatterjee’s recent formulations of political society (2002, 2004).  
144 Frontline Aug 9-22, 1986. 
145 In May of 2007, the Gujjar Agitation swept across Rajasthan and beyond, leaving 26 dead in its 
wake. Frustrated by unrequited demands for recognition as a scheduled tribe (ST), Gujjar protesters met 
grave ends as police opened fire on the crowds. The violence soon struck a communal chord, causing 
more casualties as Gujjars clashed with Meenas, a dominant ST community opposing Gujjar demands 
for ST status. In November 2007, the issue erupted again in Guwahati, Assam, when a mob turned on 
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reminders of the potential brutality of ‘tribal’ recognition. In light of these events and 
the perennial demands of existing and aspiring STs, some promising signs have 
recently emerged. In 2006, a draft of “The National Tribal Policy for the Scheduled 
Tribes of India” was circulated to both government officials and related civil society 
bodies inviting views, comments, and suggestions. The draft openly acknowledged the 
burdens put upon the state for ST recognition. Point 21 reads, “There is an 
increasingly clamor from many communities to get included as STs…Adding new 
communities to the list reduces the benefits that can go to existing STs and is therefore 
to be resorted to, only if there is no room for doubt.” The draft expressed a sustained 
interest in cultural protectionism noting, “The survival of this diverse tribal culture, 
ethos, and way of life is increasingly under threat in a liberalized and globalised 
economy.” Finally and crucially, the draft opined, “The criteria laid down by the 
Lokur Committee are hardly relevant today…Other more accurate criteria need to be 
fixed.” The draft thus signaled a budding and greatly needed reflexivity. But it many 
ways, it retained the epistemic conviction of its postcolonial predecessors: STs are 
only to be included if there “is no room for doubt”; “more accurate criteria need to be 
fixed”. It says nothing of what such “fixed” criteria would entail, but presumably they 
would remain of an ethnological register. 
 Similar, but more radical changes were suggested by the Chopra Commission 
in 2007. Specially appointed to address the grievances of the Gujjar community in 
Rajasthan where violence had recently erupted around their claims for ST status, the 
Commission (headed by Justice Jasraj Chopra) conducted extensive field studies of 
Gujjar communities. After examining 147 villages, surveying 450 more, recording 
2000 statements, and receiving 14,632 memorandums, the Chopra Commission 
                                                                                                                                            
adivasis demanding ST status after the protesters went on a vandalizing rampage. When order was 
finally restored, hundreds lay injured in the streets with at least two dead. Passage excerpted from 
(Middleton & Shneiderman 2008). 
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released its highly anticipated report on December 17, 2007. The report recommended 
against including Gujjars in the list of Scheduled Tribes. However, and more 
importantly for the concerns of this paper, it made the notable suggestion that “the 
state government should convey to the Centre that a national debate should be initiated 
on the existing norms for according ST status to any community. It should impress 
upon the Centre that certain criteria should be abrogated as they had become 
outdated.” It further opined, “Current norms should be replaced by quantifiable criteria 
which will be relevant in the present context. The new criteria must stand judicial 
scrutiny, thereby enabling future commissions or committees appointed by the 
government to examine the issue with exactness and reliability.”146 The Commission’s 
critique in large part undercut the entire dispute that it was charged with settling. But 
in calling for a “national debate” over the very criteria of ‘tribal’ recognition, the 
Chopra Commission cut to one of the core problems of systems of positive 
discrimination that are based upon socio-cultural attributes. 
 To date, no changes have been made to the Lokur Committee’s 1965 criteria. 
Thinking through the circumstances of Darjeeling, it seems the political desires of 
existing STs and those coveting ST status may prove the ultimate resistance to any 
such changes. These politics are powerfully endowed with hope, expectations, and 
senses of ‘identity’. Facing the socio-political, material, and affectual resources 
invested in these paradigms of ‘community’, the government will be hard-pressed to 
radically shift the terms of recognition. The struggles in Darjeeling for rights, 
recognition, and a desperately sought sense of belonging in India evince just how 
much has come to ride on these ways of knowing, constituting, and recognizing 
communities of and within the nation-state. Without question, antecedents to these 
dynamics are to be found in colonial governance. But so too do these contemporary 
                                                 
146 The Chopra Commission Report as sited in The Hindustani Times. Dec 18, 2007. 
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dynamics beckon new kinds of questions and new modes of analysis in their own 
right—and in their own time. The issue they raise for future research, if I may put it so 
succinctly, is that of finding ways to engage with the contemporary as something more 
than a coda of the colonial. Ultimately, that may prove a challenge for the students, 
administrators, and various communities of India today. 
Conclusion: Beyond Castes and Tribes. 
 The politics of tribal recognition—whether in Darjeeling, or in the more 
bloody contexts of Rajasthan and Assam in 2007—provide timely reminders of the 
social effects of epistemic forms. Since by law, the Scheduled Tribes of India must 
exude the requisite criteria of ‘primitive traits’, ‘distinctive culture’, ‘geographic 
isolation’, ‘shyness of contact’ and ‘backwardness’, certification of these ‘tribal’ 
qualities has thus become a gateway to affirmative action rights and recognition, and 
in some cases ethnic-based sovereignty. Given all that hangs on this distinction (and 
here I believe we must include both the intended and the unintended consequences of 
this taxonomic designation), it is worth questioning the epistemic surety with which 
‘tribes’ are presumed to exist. The very fact that the ‘tribal’ character could be 
certified at all illustrates the conviction with which the postcolonial state has posited, 
reified, and sanctioned the socio-political ontology of the ‘tribal’ subject. That 
certifiability in and of itself is a powerful call for concentrated study of the dynamics 
of postcolonial knowledge production. However, beyond the certifying of ‘tribals’, 
there remains a more fundamental, radical question.  
 If the positive discrimination of ‘castes’ and ‘tribes’ is predicated on the 
epistemic certainty of their ethnological form, then it is worth thinking deeper about 
how the policies of secular nationalist India reify not merely the ontology of said 
populations, but also the ontology of ‘identity’ more generally. In venturing this rather 
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Nietzschean line of questioning147—that is, ‘beyond castes and tribes’—we must 
measure the promises that liberal government has bestowed upon populations exuding 
particular ethnological attributes. Pursued in the context of India, such a critique 
prompts a radical questioning of identity at two levels. First, how do colonial and 
postcolonial ethnologies continue to condition the opportunities and socio-political 
forms of ‘castes’ and ‘tribes’? And second, how have these histories of ethnological 
rule shaped the very problem, possibilities, and impossibilities of ‘identity’ and 
‘community’ as they are known and experienced today? Of these, it is perhaps the 
concern for the historically construed impossibilities of ‘identity’ which holds the 
most promise for deepening our understanding of not only the hopes and dreams 
invested in modern reckonings of ‘identity’, but also the anxieties and the often dead 
certain ways they come to be redressed in the contact zones of human difference.148 
 
                                                 
147 See Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil (1990). 
148 On ‘dead certainty’ and ethnic violence, see Appadurai 1999. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
Across the Interface of ‘Tribal’ Certification: 
From State Ethnography to an Ethnography of the State. 
 Monsoon fog sweeps across a mountain road dripping and pocked with the 
season’s rains. The ghostly serenity of this morning is cut only by the steady drone of 
diesel engines, as two government jeeps ply their way through the hills. From the back 
of one of these jeeps, I watch the three heads of the men in front of me loll back and 
forth to the a-rhythms of the winding road. A head careens off a headrest; a chin digs 
into a slouching chest; an ear finds an unwelcoming shoulder. Asleep, but without 
comfort, this morning there is little rest for the weary. They are anthropologists of the 
Cultural Research Institute (CRI) of the Government of West Bengal. They have been 
sent to Darjeeling from Kolkata to certify the anthropological traits of ten 
communities who have applied to become Scheduled Tribes of India (ST). By design, 
the findings of this official Ethnographic Survey will determine whether or not the 
groups in question attain the affirmative action benefits guaranteed to ST 
communities. Today is the final day of their study. 
 Within an hour, the diesel drone rattles to a stop, and the anthropologists 
awake from their slumber to find a community waiting to greet them, waiting to 
convince them that they are the proper ‘tribal’ subjects of Indian anthropology, 
waiting for recognition. Just as they have done in the days before, these 
anthropologists muster the energy to face another day in the field. When they climb 
down from their jeeps, they do so as both honored guests and adjudicators of 
unbending ethnological forms. They are treated accordingly. Ethnic association 
leaders immediately step forward to welcome the anthropologists. The locals, for the 
time being, mill about in the background, not yet the center of ethnographic attention. 
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In the hours to come they will barrage their certifiers with a confusing, stilted array of 
empirical ‘data’ specially designed to satisfy the criteria of ‘tribal’ recognition. 
 When the study gets underway, the locals will perform their ostensibly ‘tribal’ 
traits in rag-tag clothes while ethnic leaders wearing suits and ties roam the perimeter 
with cell-phones in hand, orchestrating the encounter. Throughout the day, these 
leaders will vie to control who is spoken to, what is said, and what information gets 
inscribed in the notebooks, questionnaires, and various other ledgers of the Indian 
state. The anthropologists, for their part, will navigate this ‘field’ with a protocol that 
bespeaks the bureaucratic realm from whence they came. There is no denying the 
politics of the ethnographic moment; too much hangs in the anthropological balance. 
But amid this ethnographic mise-en-scene where so much is contrived, there is little 
epistemological ground to stand on. Nevertheless, a precise ruling is demanded—even 
coveted. Such were the stakes of the encounter depicted in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. The Ethnographic Interface. 
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Toward a Meta-Ethnography. 
 Politicians, the press, and ethnic leaders framed the Ethnographic Survey 
(2006) as a pivotal moment for the ethnic groups under investigation, and possibly for 
Darjeeling more generally. At the time, Darjeeling was poised to become a ‘tribal 
area’ as per the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. But with only 32% of its 
population recognized as STs, serious doubts remained. Popular logic held that if this 
form of sovereignty were to be brought to the hills, Darjeeling needed to become more 
‘tribal’. The Ethnographic Survey of 2006 came to be seen as a crucial step in that 
direction. Indeed, it was geared precisely toward certifying the remaining non-ST 
communities of the hills.1 
 I was not part of the Ethnographic Survey in any official sense. My access to 
the Survey came by way of my then ongoing ethnography with the people of 
Darjeeling. At the time, I was working closely with several ethnic associations and 
communities as they pursued ST status. Like them, I learned of the study just over a 
week before it was to begin. I was therefore able to attend these communities’ 
‘Emergency Meetings’ in the stressful days prior. And as it turned out, one of the 
villages chosen for study was just below the one where I had been living for months. I 
was thus familiar with many of the ethnic leaders and community members involved. 
It was by their invitation and in their vehicles that I originally arrived at the 
Ethnographic Survey. 
 However, as the Ethnographic Survey got under way, it opened up new 
ethnographic perspectives. The ethnographic interface itself emerged as an important 
object of my own ethnographic analysis. After all, what happened there would in all 
likelihood decide the fate of these communities’ ST aspirations. Yet over the ten-day 
                                                 
1 The Gurungs and Rais were not evaluated in the Survey of 2006. Their ST applications were much 
older and were thought to be on the brink of completion. Therefore they were not included among the 
‘left-out’ communities studied in this Survey. 
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study, my attention came to incorporate more than the groups with whom I had up 
until then been working. I also began to engage ethnographically with the civil 
servants—the anthropologists, that is—tasked with certifying these groups. During 
and after the Survey, my relationship with the CRI team deepened considerably, 
altering my understanding of state anthropology along the way. In time, this 
‘ethnography of the state’ became a crucial, second line of investigation, continually 
augmenting my concurrent work with the people of Darjeeling. 
 The jeep ride with the dozing anthropologists marked my initial crossing-over 
from the recognized to those who recognize. Crammed into the far back of that jeep, I 
found myself ‘an anthropologist among the anthropologists’, weighing the prospects 
of studying both sides of ‘tribal’ certification simultaneously. This chapter presents 
my findings from this ethnographic movement—this sustained crossing back and forth 
over the ethnographic interface of the Indian state and the aspiring ‘tribals’ of 
Darjeeling. It is in short an ethnography of state ethnography—or what I shall call a 
‘meta-ethnography of the state’. 
 This meta-ethnographic analysis speaks to emerging discussions in the social 
sciences on ‘para-ethnographic’ knowledge practices. Holmes and Marcus opened the 
conversation with a series of articles exploring how particular knowledge agents—in 
their case, technocrats specializing in economic research—make use of ‘para-
ethnographic’ techniques (namely, short ‘anecdotal’ accounts of personal experiences 
with ‘informants’) to augment their quantitative research.2 For these technocrats, the 
utility of para-ethnographic knowledge spikes precisely when and where other 
knowledge forms fail.3 In other words, para-ethnographic insight is valued precisely 
                                                 
2 On para-ethnographics, see Holmes & Marcus 2005, 2006, w/ Westbrook 2006; Westbrook 2008; 
Boyer 2010. 
3 Holmes & Marcus 2006: 34. Also on knowledge failure, see Miyazaki & Riles 2005. 
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for its anecdotalness—i.e. its marginal positionality—vis a vis more normative 
knowledge forms. 
 Despite clear affinities, my meta-ethnographic findings diverge in important 
ways from such depictions of para-ethnographic knowledges. For one, the role that 
ethnography plays in ‘tribal’ certification is anything but ‘anecdotal’. Ethnographic 
certification instead functions as the consummate exercise of normative—and 
decidedly ethnological—systems of recognition in India. By design, the ethnographic 
certification of ‘tribal’ communities is to confirm the empirical existence of 
established conceptual forms of human difference. A community is to be certified as 
‘tribal’ if and only if it fulfills criteria A,B,C,D, & E. Importantly, it is not merely the 
criteria that reify these ethnological schemas, but also the hyper-inductive epistemic 
structure of certification itself. 
 As was the case in the days of the colonial ‘ethnographic state’, ethnography 
remains a modality of governance in postcolonial India.4 And it is precisely because it 
is central to the administration of difference that the involution of ethnography and 
governance deserves critical attention. As I will try to show in the following pages, the 
dynamics that accrue in and around the ethnographic interface of ‘tribal’ certification 
raise important questions about the integrity of systems of positive discrimination as 
they are currently construed. Indeed, many of the paradoxes of the secular nationalist 
project may be found in the minutia of ethnographic practice—whether in the tactics 
of the studied, or the techniques, categories, and logics of state anthropology. It is 
therefore necessary to examine the details of ethnographic knowledge production on 
both sides of the ethnographic encounter. Doing so, the rather straightforward question 
of what happens when state anthropologists arrive to study communities seeking ST 
                                                 
4 Dirks 2001, 2004. 
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status, soon opens out into a series of more complicated considerations about the 
administration of difference in India today. 
 The chapter is written in two parts. The first, longer, part takes a close look at 
the dynamics of state ethnography. I begin by sketching the problem of certification as 
it obtains in the recognition of Scheduled Tribes. Having come to terms with the 
paradigmatic structures of certifying ‘tribes’, the analysis then plunges into the morass 
of the ethnographic moment to explore the strategies through which state 
anthropologists and their subject populations navigate the exigencies of ethnographic 
encounter. 
 In the second, shorter, part of the chapter, I examine the post-field production 
and circulation of ethnological/ethnographic knowledges within the Indian state. I do 
so by following the applications of Darjeeling’s aspiring STs as they are ‘written-up’ 
and processed by various agencies of the government. Tracking these files sheds 
important light on the structures and ethnological persuasions of the Indian state. As 
they move through government, state ethnologies face numerous difficulties, 
stemming largely from the conditions of ethnographic knowledge production and the 
oftentimes-incongruent demands of policy making. The pitfalls and potentials of this 
‘soft science in hard places’ prove inseparable from the actual dynamics of 
ethnographic encounter. 
 The chapter accordingly concludes with a discussion of the links between the 
dynamics of the ‘field’ (discussed in the first half of the chapter) and the checkered 
fate of ethnographic knowledge as it is pressed into the service of government 
(discussed in the second half). As I shall argue, it is only by studying these facets of 
state anthropology simultaneously that we can fully appreciate how particular 
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ethnological paradigms have become at once a platform for liberal rights and 
recognition and a mechanism of governmentality and moral regulation.5 
The Problem of Certification. 
 For the aspiring STs of Darjeeling, the path to recognition passes through the 
paradigm of certification. The logistical and conceptual structures of ‘tribal’ 
certification accordingly determine much of what happens in moments like the 
Ethnographic Survey of 2006. It is subsequently necessary to develop an analytic for 
the study of certification more generally. 
 For the anthropology of knowledge, this is a timely problem. Certification’s 
social, economic, and political footprint is now one of considerable expanse. 
Moreover, it seems to be expanding. Professional, national, and transnational bodies 
are increasingly endowed with the power to certify everything from the integrity of 
goods and service (for instance, certified ‘organic’ and ‘fair-trade’ products); to the 
nature and domain of technocratic expertise (viz—Certified Public Accountants, 
Certified IT Architects, etc); to the structures and translatability of institutional forms 
(for example, the accreditation of educational facilities). In these arenas and many 
others, certification has come to be the ultimate stamp of compliance with formal 
standards of all kinds. Despite its ascendancy, anthropology and related social sciences 
currently suffer a lack of concentrated attention to certification as a distinct 
phenomenon. 
                                                 
5 I return to Corrigan and Sayer’s notion of ‘moral regulation later (1985: 4). Regarding Foucault’s 
considerations of ‘governmentality’: ‘tribal’ certification and recognitions of various kinds clearly 
function as a means of shaping and controlling populations. However, the Foucauldian attention to 
knowledge-power, I believe, methodologically limits a close interrogation of the actual practices of 
certification. The governmentality optic merely draws out what is endemic to recognition (and ever-
more ossified in the form of certification)—namely the reification of normative schemas of distinction. 
Foucault 1979, 1980. 
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 In the contexts of scheduling ‘tribes’ in India, certification functions as an 
acute subtype of recognition. Elizabeth Povinelli’s work on the ‘cunning of 
recognition’ perhaps most closely elucidates the conditions and opportunities that the 
criteria of ST certification impress upon minorities struggling for rights in the liberal 
order of India today.6 Yet we lack ethnographic attention to the actual practices of 
certification, the relation of conceptual to empirical forms it entails, and the socio-
political possibilities to which it gives rise. Such a deficiency renders us unable to 
appreciate how the fate of a minority may ultimately boil down to the slightest detail 
put forth on the day of their ethnological reckoning. This being the case, it is worth 
spending a moment to examine certification in the most general of terms. 
 To sketch the problem briefly, several characteristics need mention: First, 
certification entails a particular relationship between empirical and conceptual forms. 
By design, the empirical qualities of the object of certification (be it a product, 
community, skill, or institution) are weighed against established standards (otherwise 
known as criteria). The overarching question is thus one of compliance. Second, it is 
typical that the expert certifier(s) and those being certified ascribe to—and are heavily 
invested in—the established criteria. Indeed, the participants’ professional, market, 
and socio-political ‘identities’ are often predicated on the standards under which the 
entire encounter organizes itself. Reification of the established criteria is therefore 
automatic to the circumstance of certification. Third, certification often involves ‘on 
the spot visits’ or ‘on-site inspections’ through which expert certifiers rely on first-
hand experience to determine eligibility for certification. Depending on the subject 
matter, these inspections may well be ethnographic in nature. But while they 
champion immediacy as a necessary condition for gleaning the ‘as-is’ qualities of the 
                                                 
6 Seminal essays by Charles Taylor, “Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition” (1992), and 
Marx, “On the Jewish Question” (1843/1978), certainly shed light on at least some of the socio-political 
conundrums in play as well. 
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object under investigation, the actual dynamics of certification are nevertheless 
heavily determined by established schemas—both conceptual (as in the criteria) and 
practical (as in the formally delineated methods of inquiry). In their reasoning then, 
certification practices are hyper-inductive. The certificate—whether of ‘accreditation’, 
‘formal recognition’, ‘approval’, or ‘verification’—thus marks the endgame of this 
peculiar interplay between empirical and conceptual form. It stamps in definitive 
terms the compliance between the object and the established criteria. 
 For the aspiring STs of Darjeeling, exhibiting compliance with the official 
criteria of recognition holds immense promise. As per India’s affirmative action 
system, STs are guaranteed significant advantages including employment quotas in 
governmental posts, lower standards of admission to education, eligibility for special 
tribal development packages, and hosts of entitlements and advantages of various 
kinds.7 But to attain these fruits of positive discrimination, a community must 
demonstrate their complicity with the official criteria. Established in 1965 by the 
Lokur Committee, these are: (a) Indication of primitive traits, (b) Distinctive culture, 
(c) Geographical isolation (d) Shyness of contact with the community at large, and (e) 
Backwardness. 
 Within the ST application process, no day is more pivotal than that of the 
Ethnographic Survey. For the studied, face-to-face interaction with the government’s 
anthropologists is as daunting as it is potentially lucrative. The immediacy of the 
moment allows them to demonstrate in the most vivid of ways the socio-cultural 
attributes that they believe entitle them to ST status. Ethnographic interaction 
                                                 
7 Special development programs for STs were first implemented during the First Five Year Plan (1954) 
under the title Multipurpose Tribal Development Projects. In the Third Five Year Plan, Tribal 
Development Blocks were created. The strategy again shifted in 1972 to Tribal Sub Plans under the 
guidance of Prof. S.C. Dube. This structure remains today and focuses on the “improvement of living 
standards, education, healthcare and skill upgradation of the tribal people.” More recent initiatives have 
also focuses on Women and Child Development. Information available in Ministry of Tribal Affairs 
Annual Report 2006/7, Government of India. 
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furthermore gives them a chance to establish rapport with the agents of the state, and, 
as I shall show later, to quite literally plead their case. From the government’s side, 
‘tribal’ certification is overtly predicated on the truth-revealing possibilities of 
ethnographic study.8 This reliance on ethnographic immediacy, coupled with the 
anthropological expertise of certifiers, in theory, mitigates the skewing effects of 
mediation and misrepresentation that desperate communities could resort to to bolster 
their cases. 
 Immediacy, however, is not without its politics—as recent work by William 
Mazzarella and others has shown.9 Indeed, a veritable politics of (im)mediation shaped 
much of what transpired within the Ethnographic Survey. Ethnic leaders steered 
anthropologists to certain subjects and away from others. They peered over the 
shoulders of anthropologists, checking what was being recorded in their notebooks, 
and how it was being recorded. (See Figure 3 and Figure 4.) 
 
Figure 3. Ethnic Leader, Anthropologist, and Shaman. 
                                                 
8 The bureaucratic processes of ‘tribal’ certification were formally established by ‘The Modality for 
Scheduling Tribes, 1999,’ available in The National Commission for Scheduled Tribes’ Handbook 
2005. 
9 Mazzarella 2006. Others such as Dominic Boyer and Patrick Eisenlohr are currently working on 
similar issues (edited volume in production). 
 254 
Vagaries were to be explained, and whenever possible covered over. Educated ethnic 
association elites translated and mediated the responses of locals, often bending 
statements to the demands of recognition. At other times, these ṭhulo mānches (big 
men) denied the local’s voice outright, thereby casting their village constituents into 
the role of subalterns at the very moment they held them forth as living embodiments 
of ‘tribal’ character. 
 
Figure 4. Monitoring/Mediating Data. 
The anthropologists resented—but were necessarily reliant on—ethnic leaders steering 
their gaze this way and that, mediating everything from interview responses to the 
anthropologists’ lunch (which was of course ‘authentic indigenous’ cuisine). What 
became unmistakably clear in this delicate, sometimes contentious, tussle for control 
over the very means of ethnographic knowledge production, was that the politics of 
the moment were operating precisely at the epistemological level. All parties were 
acutely concerned with how the community was to be known. But this was no ‘free’ 
epistemic field. Instead, the ways in which the community was to be shown, known, 
and adjudicated were determined by the structures and criteria of ST certification.  
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 In examining these dynamics of ‘tribal’ certification, this study refigures the 
by-now proverbial encounter of ‘the anthropologists and the tribals’. Doing so, it is 
worth calling to mind a mandate from the discipline’s past. Long ago one of the 
founders of American anthropology, Franz Boas, preached to his students the 
importance of questioning what the researcher brings with him/her to the study of the 
Other. The imperative has since been re-articulated many times over in the various 
‘reflexive’ turns of the social sciences. But to think meta-ethnographically, it is worth 
asking whether, at our current moment, we might profitably flip the script on Boas’s 
directive to consider what the studied bring with them to the proverbial table of 
ethnological reckoning. To understand the dynamics of ‘tribal’ certification, venturing 
such an analogue, I believe, is imperative. Along these lines, it is worth turning to the 
anxious events leading up to the arrival of the government anthropologists in 
Darjeeling. These last minute preparations reveal many of the hopes, expectations, and 
strategies that the aspiring STs of Darjeeling carried with them into the Ethnographic 
Survey. Many pertained to the ethnographic moment itself; others hailed from deeper 
histories. 
Emergency Meeting. 
 News spread quickly that the anthropologists were coming. Just over a week 
prior to their arrival, word was sent from Kolkata to Darjeeling that a spot-visit was in 
the works. Whereas other communities seeking ST status had waited years if not 
decades for such a visit, the pending status of the Sixth Schedule had, it was assumed, 
expedited this particular Ethnographic Survey. 
 Just two days before the anthropologists were to arrive, an ‘Emergency 
Meeting’ was convened by the leaders of the respective ethnic associations to 
determine the most effective strategy for being studied. The session was held under 
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the aegis of the Gorkha Janjati Manyata Samity (GJMS)—The Gorkha Tribal 
Recognition Committee—an umbrella organization recently formed to represent the 
collective interests of these ‘left out’ communities. The GJMS being without an actual 
office, the meeting got off to a scattered start with ethnic leaders roaming the grimy 
halls of the Old Supermarket Building in search of others. I made my way into one of 
the offices where several leaders familiar to me had gathered. Removed from the view 
of others, they promptly requested that I provide whatever information I could on their 
ethnic group. Such academic renderings of their ethnic self, they hoped could be put to 
authoritative use in their representations to the government. Having already shared 
some of my earlier work on their ethnic contemporaries in Nepal, as well as a 
bibliography of academic sources, I told them there was little else I could provide. 
Clearly though, they wanted more out of their affiliation with me. 
 Having parried their pleas, I ventured back out into the halls. Soon small 
clusters of men in dapper tweed coats, three-piece suits, and polished shoes formed in 
various rooms where small talk, rumors, and old-boy jokes flowed freely. Eventually, 
we were let into a nearby language institute, where the 25 or so ethnic association 
leaders took their seats in rows of tables typically used for pupils. My research 
assistant and I found a discrete place in the corner, from where we observed the 
entirety of the three-hour meeting. 
 To start, the General Secretary of the GJMS welcomed those present, framing 
their purpose as follows: 
“We are late. However, the GJMS and I welcome all the members of all the 
different communities. The agenda of this meeting is that, as we all know, the 
members of the CRI are coming to Darjeeling and will be conducting an 
inquiry with all the communities regarding their culture, traditions, etc. So 
since the CRI is coming I would like to say how we should present ourselves 
to them and what are our tribal traits. What should we exhibit, what we ought 
to present, this is what I would like to discuss today. It will be neither easy nor 
as simple as we think. It has to be deliberated and presented very cautiously by 
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us, and by the different communities. For instance, the issue of where the 
different communities would like to take the CRI team and make their 
presentation about their own culture, religion, tradition and customs. The 
details of all of this have to be finalized today.” 
He then turned the floor over to the Executive Officer of the Department of 
Information and Cultural Affairs of the DGHC.10 Mr. Koli explained how the ‘spot 
visit’ came about. Months earlier a delegation traveled to Kolkata with hopes of 
expediting the review of the ‘left out’ communities’ ST applications. The delegation, 
along with Darjeeling’s three MLAs,11 met various representatives and ministers of the 
government, including the CRI anthropologists themselves. “We asked them to come. 
We told them, ‘You have the files of all the communities with their demands for tribal 
status. These submissions must be gathering dust, so please bring them out from your 
shelves and come and make spot inquiries,’” Mr. Koli explained to the meeting. A 
second DGHC representative next took the floor to divulge more insider information: 
“There is one other very important thing: that is the Hindu dharma or our being 
Hindus. We have spoken about that earlier too and whether the Hindu dharma 
has been imposed on us or not. And also our being Gorkhas. That is also to be 
proved. These are the two important issues. Birth, death and ceremonies, we 
need to prove our ‘adivasi’ [aboriginal] traits in these three things. In this 
regard whatever little we have studied and what we know, we will have to 
present this. This is the opportunity for the communities to do their best. Our 
effort should be to score a goal in the first match so that the CRI won’t have to 
come back again and again. Whatever resources you have, we have to apply.” 
The two DGHC representatives then excused themselves, leaving the ethnic leaders to 
deliberate their strategies. With collaborative zeal, they discussed where the CRI team 
                                                 
10 Mr. Koli was in attendance both as a representative of the local DGHC administration and as the 
leader of The Gorkha Janajati Ka.Da.Sa Sangh, an organization he founded with the expressed interest 
of converting the Kami, Damai, and Sarki groups from Scheduled Castes (a status they had enjoyed 
since 1950) to Scheduled Tribes. Extended analysis of Mr. Koli and his role within the DGHC can be 
found in Chapter III. 
11 Members of the Legislative Assembly. 
 258 
should be taken, what rituals should be shown, which traits should be concealed, and 
how to best engage with the anthropologists. 
 It was at this point that an ethnic leader seated against the wall to my right 
secretly slipped me a note. Torn from the corner of a page, it read: 
“For how many days are you in Darjeeling? We could give you the authentic 
documents which prove that the Khas and Gorkhas are tribes according to the 
Mahabharata and some of the old epics?” 
Intent on not disturbing the meeting, I whispered to him that perhaps we could talk 
afterwards. Each of us quickly refocused our attention to the meeting. But the note, 
and in particular its claims of “authentic documents” proving a community’s ‘tribal’ 
character, shook me from my erstwhile fly-on-the-wall vantage point. Why would he 
care to show me these documents? Was I, the western anthropologist, to somehow 
corroborate, or be a comparative benchmark for, his research? Why the compulsion to 
prove to me his community’s worthiness of becoming a Scheduled Tribe? I would face 
similar, more difficult scenarios of implication in the days and months ahead. 
 After an hour of deliberation, the ethnic leaders began finalizing their list of 
‘model communities’ to be studied. As the secretary went down the roll eliciting each 
community’s final decision, someone piped up to suggest that each ethnic group might 
want to have back-up locations in mind, should the anthropologists demand a sudden 
change of course. Silence. The mere mention that the CRI team might want to see 
something other than the carefully chosen and equally well-prepared ‘model 
communities’ drew stunned, worried looks from those present. For several seconds, no 
one spoke a word. Eyes glanced from face to face searching for answers. Finally, the 
General Secretary broke the silence. “Well, in that case we will fail!” he erupted, “We 
ask them to go to one place and then they choose to go to another. In that case we will 
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not be able to fulfill their criteria.” It was a sobering moment for everyone in the 
room. 
 Later in the meeting, the General Secretary (GS) struck upon more deep-seated 
anxieties. He cautioned the leaders not to let their constituents make a mistake that had 
purportedly been made by similar Gorkha (Nepali-speaking) groups seeking ST status 
in Sikkim, the state north of Darjeeling: 
“In Sikkim, they were also demanding tribal status and when asked ‘To which 
community do you belong?’ they replied, ‘Nepali’. They were then told, ‘If 
you are Nepalis, then you should go to Nepal.’ We might also face such a 
situation if we are not careful. So what we are telling the anthropologists here 
in Darjeeling is that the Gorkha itself is a tribal community. Here we are trying 
to say the word ‘Gorkha’ or ‘Gorkhas’. But then, they [government officials] 
are trying to tell us that the Gorkhas are followers of Hinduism. Therefore 
Nepalis are foreigners and Gorkhas are Hindus. You need to note this point. It 
is very important. They are calling this a ‘diplomatic process’. [But] they are 
trying to make this Gorkha word a failure, so that it won’t fulfill the tribal 
criteria. This ‘diplomatic process’ will also become their policy to divide us…. 
Tomorrow, if we are destroyed, the entire Gorkha community will be 
destroyed. And this is what they want! That is why there is a delay for one and 
rush for another [seeking ST status]. The GJMS was formed by the beliefs, 
will, and understanding of all of us to stall the black days of the future for our 
community. For our tribe! For the entire hills! We have a moral and social 
responsibility to do this!” [very animated] 
That the GS would end with such an impassioned, firebrand flourish was typical of his 
character. In an earlier political life, he had fought as the commander of a guerilla unit 
of the Gorkha National Liberation Front. And as he often reminded me with pride, his 
unit was one of the last to surrender its arms to the Indian government. The struggle 
for Gorkha rights was therefore, for him, like so any others, deeply personal. Today, 
however, he carried on his person not the makeshift guns of struggles past, but a 
briefcase seemingly always overflowing with memorandums, academic books, and the 
latest findings of his ongoing research into the culture and history of his people. 
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 The GS’s biography and his words to the meeting signaled the histories and 
affects that these groups were bringing with them to the ethnographic encounter. Tied 
into the people of Darjeeling’s anxieties over belonging in India is a general 
suspicion—and for some, even a hatred—of Bengalis. Historically, these sentiments 
spawn from decades of internal neo-colonization of Darjeeling by Bengalis, most 
viscerally rehashed through the traumatic memories of the GNLF agitation in the 
1980s when military and para-military forces of the Government of West Bengal were 
involved in many of the atrocities of the separatist war. Ongoing discriminations 
between the ‘people of the hills’ versus the ‘people of the plains’ only extend the 
antagonism. For many, the fact that the district of Darjeeling remains within the state 
of West Bengal is a painful reminder of these histories of domination. For the GS and 
others it was not an insignificant feature of the Ethnographic Survey that the civil 
servants adjudicating their claims were themselves Bengali. That subject-position 
alone was seen as an egregious imposition of irony—one that re-aggravated feelings 
of political injustice and anxious belonging at the very moment when positive 
discrimination offered a modicum of historical retribution. 
 Thinking through these pre-field strategies and sensibilities, we see then how 
the dynamics of ethnographic encounter were largely prefigured long before the first 
‘tribal’ traits were performed and expertly recorded as ‘data’ in the files of the state. 
A Day in the Field. 
 Day One of the Ethnographic Survey began early on the morning following the 
CRI’s arrival to Darjeeling. For the community to be investigated, it began even 
earlier. Having the previous day drawn the unfortunate straw to be studied first, the 
Lekh Hitkari Ethnic Association (LHEA) had little time to prepare their ‘model 
community’. In the dead of the night before, ethnic leaders from around the district 
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raced to the remote village of Laharā Gāũ, some three hours drive on gruelingly 
deteriorated roads from Darjeeling town, to begin preparations. Come sunrise, many 
had been up all night coaching the locals and making the necessary arrangements. 
(Figure 5 shows the community on the day of the study.) 
 
Figure 5. The Subject Community. 
It was thus with great anticipation that the anthropologists arrived in their government 
hire jeeps. The ‘village’ community, which was actually an assemblage of villagers 
from around the area, greeted them in a mixture of tattered clothes and festival attire—
men to one side, women to the other. Ethnic association leaders immediately 
garlanded the anthropologists, as the crowd swarmed around them. Over the 
cacophony, the leaders did their best to impress upon their certifiers their intended 
plans. 
 The community sprung into action. Before the certifiers could get their 
bearings, they were whisked away to a ‘jungle house’ a kilometer up the road. There, a 
treacherous footpath led to a ‘primitive’ home, in which a man lived with his several 
head of cattle, chickens, and a small garden. The owner was bedecked in traditional 
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Nepali attire, brandishing a large khukuri (Nepali knife) in his waste-sash. But as the 
anthropologists began investigating the home, he spoke hardly a word. Instead, suit-
clad ethnic leaders—-many of whom the man had never met—conversed in Bengali (a 
language the owner could not speak) with the researchers about the particulars of the 
home. Their animated explanations quickly began to fill the hitherto blank pages of 
the CRI’s notebooks. 
 Upon their return to the village proper, the anthropologists found troops of 
young women singing folk songs and milling grain. The men, for their part, 
concentrated on the ritual next up on the docket: the goṭh-pujā. Here, the 
anthropologists were led to a manure-floored cowshed, where a local shaman had set 
up a small shrine. Smoke bellowed under the low-hanging roof, as anthropologists 
stooped inside to have a closer look at the ritual accoutrements—documenting the 
most minute of details. Again it was loud, so ethnic leaders had to sometimes shout 
their explanations into the ears of the anthropologists. With the shaman standing by in 
full-ritual regalia, several of the researchers engaged him directly—but because they 
did not speak Nepali, and he neither adequate Bengali nor Hindi, their conversations 
were translated by the ethnic leaders. With nearly a dozen people crammed in the 
shed, the scene grew all the more chaotic as a troop of adolescent boys began circling 
the cowshed with bows and arrow, howling savage cries into the thick monsoon skies. 
 A brief meal of indigenous snacks was then served by the women of the 
village. This quieter time, afforded ethnic leaders the opportunity to convey additional 
information. Having sampled the local fair and listened to a barrage of ‘native’ 
ethnological opinion, the anthropologists announced they would break off into two 
teams. One team would commandeer a house to conduct interviews throughout the 
afternoon; the other would follow the course of planned demonstrations. To translate, 
interpret, and otherwise mediate the locals’ interviews with ‘these big men of 
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government from Kolkata’, the Lekh’s foremost native intellectual stayed behind to 
help in whatever way possible. The rest of us began a long hike up the mountain to a 
cave where drums had already begun to sound. The profundity of the spectacle was 
just beginning to set in. 
 As we walked up the trail, the aforementioned General Secretary of the GJMS 
pulled me aside. Now that we were out of earshot of the anthropologists, it seemed he 
needed to get something off his chest. “Towns,” he began, “To fulfill this tribal 
criteria, this is a ridiculous thing! You know Hegel? Hegel said man has reached the 
heights of civilization. But now look at us! We are going back to the cave!” 
 It was an honest, if awkwardly timed, assessment. For him, the fact that his 
community would have to be ‘backward’, ‘primitive’, and all the rest in order to 
progress through the channels of positive discrimination was a paradox so glaring and 
so obvious that it could not go unacknowledged—at least not between the two of us. 
Nevertheless, he knew full well that if his community were to join the national 
mainstream as STs, they would necessarily have to satisfy modernity’s demands of 
anachrony, precisely as they were institutionalized and bureaucratically elaborated by 
the Indian state. Given our less than private location, I felt compelled to stymie this 
line of critique before others could hear. I quickly assured him that the irony was not 
lost on me either. Clearly though, given his personal history, there was no way I could 
embody the paradox with equal intensity. My acknowledgement seemed to satisfy 
him, though. So he grabbed me by the arm and we once again scurried up the trail 
together—to where else but the cave where his community waited to perform their 
‘tribal’ nature. (See Figure 6.) 
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Figure 6. The Mouth of the Cave. 
The hillside into which the cave was etched was far too steep to accommodate the 
hundred plus spectators gathered for the show. Space was nevertheless made so that 
the anthropologists and others like myself and the Lekh’s cameraman could be privy 
to what was about to occur: the Masta/Diwali Pujā. Inside the cave three shamans 
danced in full ritual regalia, barefooted, with their drums in hand. Their bodies shook 
to the syncopated rhythms; their eyes rolled back in their heads; they chanted their 
sacred texts in a signature cadence—all the signs of possession that I had come to 
recognize through my earlier work on Himalayan spirit-mediumship. This display, 
however, was especially virulent. 
 With anthropologists clinging to the rocks trying to get a better view, suddenly 
a charcoal colored goat appeared from the crowd. The shamans and their attendants 
quickly circled around it, focusing their intention. The drums intensified and shamans’ 
dance became wilder. Within seconds, the khukuri was raised overhead, coming down 
mercilessly on the goat’s outstretched neck, sending its decapitated head bouncing 
down the hillside. Several men immediately hoisted the still-writhing torso into the air, 
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and up to the lips of the shamans, who voraciously drank the spewing blood. Three 
times this scene played out as charcoal colored goat after charcoaled colored goat lost 
its life to the spectacle. Eventually the tour moved on, with the shamans continuing 
their trance in their now blood-speckled gowns. 
 Next up was the farmhouse, where various ‘primitive’ agricultural instruments 
and cookwares were assembled for viewing. But this was no static exhibition, for soon 
a full-fledged exorcism was underway. The rite of moch marne began just outside the 
house where a woman, purported to have undergone a miscarriage, was huddled over a 
hole dug into the ground.12 Above the hole hung an-upside-down chicken (still alive); 
in the hole lay the skull of a dead dog. On the porch behind her, another shaman had 
assembled a small shrine. With hundreds of villagers surrounding them, the 
anthropologists rushed to record the details of the ritual before the final act was 
completed. The cadence of the shamans’ mantras soon quickened though, and in one 
fell swoop, the chicken was beheaded, falling atop the dog’s skull. Suddenly villagers 
rushed in to kick and stomp dirt into the hole before the evil spirit could escape. 
Others carried the woman upstairs where should would lay ‘ill’ until the 
anthropologists were gone. 
 Following these swift events, the anthropologists once again toured the home, 
documenting the various artifacts laid out before them. Meanwhile, one of the 
researchers slipped away to a bench on a nearby path to set up an impromptu interview 
session with several of the village men. Relying on an ethnic association leader to 
translate, he drew questions from a printed form, as each interviewee dutifully 
provided their particulars (name, occupation, education, etc). During the 45 minutes or 
so it took for the researchers to gather their information, women occasionally (and 
                                                 
12 On a follow-up visit to Laharā Gāũ a year later, I learned that the woman had had her miscarriage 
months prior to the Ethnographic Survey. Tradition calls for the ritual to be conducted much sooner. 
Having not carried out the exorcism in the course of her normal life, the Survey apparently provided an 
apt venue to do so—however belatedly. 
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somewhat begrudgingly) stepped forth into the courtyard to dance for the cameras and 
ever-wandering ethnographic eye. Their performances were a bit lackluster, so the 
men took it upon themselves to recapitulate the performative zeal with a spirited round 
of deusi khelne—a call and response song and dance that engulfed the anthropologists 
with a parting taste of festival time in the hills. 
 Having completed their respective tasks, the two teams of researchers 
reconvened for a late afternoon lunch hosted by the LHEA. Only the CRI research 
team, ethnic association leaders, and other VIPs were invited inside. The fair was 
abundant, savory, and whenever possible ‘indigenous’, except of course for the bottle 
of Royal Challenge Whiskey which sat atop the tables. (The local hooch, it was safely 
assumed, would be a bit too biting for these government men from the city.) The 
anthropologists, citing official duty, refrained from the whiskey; other’s like myself 
lacked such an easy out and thus submitted to the Royal treatment. 
 The meal marked the end of a long, pivotal day for the Lekh community. By 
the time we emerged from lunch, most of the locals had returned home. The 
anthropologists were subsequently escorted down the hill to where their jeeps waited 
to take them back to Darjeeling town. With the sun making a welcome monsoon visit, 
the General Secretary, several others, and myself stuck around to unwind and revisit 
the day’s events. For everyone, it seemed a great relief that the CRI team was gone 
and that the study had finally ended. Eventually we too made our way back to the 
road, where our vehicles were waiting. Just before we left, several of the ethnic 
association leaders huddled together with a dozen or so local men—most of them 
branch representatives—to give a final word on their performances. The leaders from 
Darjeeling expressed great thanks for the locals’ wholehearted efforts, and while they 
could not prophesy the fate of their ST application, they were unanimously satisfied 
 267 
with the day’s events. With only the occasional hiccup, their strategy had been 
executed to virtual perfection. 
 And with that our vehicles started up, and we pulled away from the remote 
hamlet of Laharā Gāũ. For the Lekh, their moment to shine ethnographically was 
complete. As for the anthropologists of the CRI, their ethnographic obligations had 
only just begun. Come morning, they would begin anew with another study of yet 
another community seeking inclusion into the list of Scheduled Tribes of India. Such 
were the demands of ST certification. 
--- 
 From a meta-ethnographic perspective, this ‘day in the field’ deserves some 
extended consideration. First off, it is worth noting that, at the time of the study, 
neither the LHEA leaders, nor the villagers they selected for study knew what the 
official criteria of ST certification were.13 The performances put forth were therefore 
engineered toward perceived criteria. As the General Secretary’s reference to Hegel 
suggests, it was generally understood that ‘tribes’ should somehow exude 
‘backwardness’, ‘primitiveness’ and other anachronistic qualities; it was furthermore 
understood that they should portray a ‘unique’, ‘pure’, and somehow untouched socio-
cultural identity. And at all costs, they should not be Hindu. But given the super-
abundant meanings of the term ‘tribal’, satisfying the unknown criteria was largely a 
matter of performative guesswork. It was in the interest of covering all the perceived 
bases, that the Lekh chose to so vividly demonstrate their ‘savage’, ‘animistic’, 
‘primitive’ traits, while continually insisting on the uniqueness, singularity, and 
indigeneity of their practices. 
                                                 
13 This is one of the reasons why the leaders begged me to share whatever information I was able to 
glean from the CRI research team. It was only later in the application process when the groups learned 
of the official criteria. 
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 Given the rigidly inductive structures of certification, such excessive displays 
of ‘tribal’ qualities may seem off the mark. There is indeed an important disconnect 
between what these colorful performances were supposed to convey and the official 
criteria of ST recognition. But as the following section will show, while there are only 
five criteria for becoming ST, ‘tribal’ certification involves a multitude of informal—
and oftentimes highly subjective—factors. In ethnographic practice, the lines between 
the official and the personal, the formal and the informal, blur significantly. 
On Government Duty. 
 Officially, the task of ST certifiers is simple: Tribal Research Institutes (in 
West Bengal, the CRI) are to conduct ethnographic studies to verify the applicant 
community’s compliance with the criteria of ST recognition.14 Once the ethnography 
is complete, the certifiers are to write a report synthesizing their ethnographic findings 
with secondary sources (governmental and academic). Typically these reports 
incorporate materials submitted by the groups in question (consisting of native 
ethnologies often written exclusively for ST purposes, samples of language scripts, 
photos, video materials, as well as bibliographies and extensive referencing of 
academic sources). The report is then submitted to the state government—in West 
Bengal, via the Backward Class Welfare Department (BCW)—before being forwarded 
on to the Centre, where it is circulated through numerous departments and ministries 
before eventually being introduced as a bill in parliament. By design then, the 
expertise of certifiers is principally confined to the production of ethnographic 
knowledge. Once they submit their report to the state government, it becomes ‘a 
policy matter’, as they like to say, and is largely out of their hands.  
                                                 
14 Interestingly, the official ‘Modality for Scheduling Tribes, 1999’ says little about the actual 
ethnographic procedures for verifying the criteria—only that the criteria are to be verified. The process I 
chart here obtains within those states with TRIs. 
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 Certifying ‘tribes’ becomes infinitely more complex when put into practice. On 
top of the five criteria, the CRI drew up their own set of fifteen ethnographic 





Criteria for Scheduled Tribes 
a) Indication of primitive traits 
b) Distinctive culture 
c) Geographical isolation 







Figure 7. Juxtaposition of Official Criteria and the CRI’s Ethnographic 
Guidelines. 
The juxtaposition signals the mushrooming complexity as government anthropology 
moves from design to ethnographic practice. The CRI’s research protocol further 
included quotas of questionnaires, demographic tables, interview templates, and other 
predetermined mechanisms of study. These complicating factors say nothing of the 
inherently social and subjective dynamics of the ethnographic encounter. And yet—
and this is crucial—despite the myriad contingencies of ethnographic experience, the 
empirical observations by the very design of certification must be processed vis a vis 
the established criteria. Paradigmatically, these strictures of certification over-
determine the ways in which the community is engaged and rendered as an object of 
Ethnographic Survey Guidelines 
1. History of migration. 
2. Preparation of genealogical table (father’s side). 
3. Traditional Occupation and Present Day Occupation. 
4. Clan name, name of sub-clan, name of associated totemic 
objects of the community (title/surname used). 
5. Rites and rituals observed in connection with Birth, Marriage, 
and Death in detail. 
6. Village festivals observed throughout the year; participation of 
different communities, if present. 
7. Educational observations (% of lit, illit… etc) 
8. Infrastructural facilities within the studied area. 
9. Food habits. 
10. Family size and its present occupation. 
11. Land and land records. 
12. Traditional panchayat system. 
13. Magico-religious beliefs and practices/family 
deities/ancestral worship. 
14. Socio-religious ceremonies. 
15. Rights of inheritance.
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ethnographic knowledge. Not surprisingly, certain members of the research team chafe 
at this bit of hyper-inductive reasoning. 
--- 
 The second day of the Ethnographic Survey was held at a village on the tea-
estate where I was living. Throughout the morning, the community under investigation 
demonstrated their ‘tribal’ qualities, while the CRI team dutifully recorded their 
performances. Lunch was held at a community hall a few minutes walk from the 
clearing where the morning’s demonstrations had been made. The fair was standard 
Nepali dāl-bhāt, enough to feed an entire community. Inside, chairs lined the walls of 
the vacuous community hall, except for several, which were set around a table on the 
stage at the front of the hall. The researchers were to be served there. 
 To my chagrin, ethnic association leaders insisted that I too take my meal on 
stage with the other anthropologists. I pleaded to remain on the ground where the 
locals ate (some of whom were my neighbors), but ultimately I could not deny the 
leaders’ request. Thankfully, with the locals eating in small clusters on the ground, we 
were not the center of attention, but I was up there with them nonetheless. Talk was 
small and I ate rather uncomfortably. As lunch was coming to an end though, I noticed 
several (but not all) of the anthropologists quietly getting up from the table. They did 
not excuse themselves, nor did they act in accord with one another. Instead they 
absconded without either ado or notebooks. One by one, each proceeded to amble his 
way across the room and quietly find a seat amongst the locals. Their body languages 
suggested a certain humility as they leaned into ongoing conversations or struck up 
new ones. Within minutes they were fully engaged in conversation with the men, 
women, and children of the community. For once not hounded by pesky interlopers, 
from a distance these anthropologists seemed to almost vanish into the community. 
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 Meanwhile, the civil servants who remained on stage sat back in their chairs 
and began picking at their teeth. Already feeling awkward, I hurried to finish my meal. 
But before I escaped the stage, I took a moment to appreciate the vantage point. On 
my right, civil servants sat on stage, their bellies full, chatting amongst themselves at a 
comfortable remove from their subjects. To my left, on the ground below, civil 
servants—perhaps of a more ethnographic ilk—had found places among the 
community. From where I sat, there was no telling what linguistic struggles were 
being overcome, nor what was being discussed, but smiles and genuine 
communication were plain to see from across the room. The juxtaposition stayed with 
me as a poignant glimpse of the bureaucratic versus ethnographic dimensions of 
‘tribal’ certification—and in particular the different kinds of persons, personalities, 
and dispositions that ‘people’ these aspects of the state. 
 One of the researchers that pardoned himself from the protocols of certification 
that day—if only for a fleeting moment—was the Director of the CRI. Months later, 
he explained his calling in the following terms: 
“I am not an administrator. I am here for the research. It is part of my blend. 
Because to know these things, you have to know the essence of the field. 
Whether it’s an arranged or a natural situation, whatever. There are the cultural 
components, belief systems, ethical values attached to the materials that you 
are seeing, and all these things are all tied together, and to know them… 
[pause] You can’t just understand all of these things without getting in real 
touch with these aspects. Only through the flavor of the ethnos can one get into 
the situation.” 
Ethnographic research may have been “part of his blend”, but as the Director and 
certain of his colleagues would often lament, the requirements of certification—and 
government duty more generally—severely constrained their abilities to know the 
proverbial “essence of the field”. What is more, the formalism at hand clearly affected 
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how their subjects chose to represent themselves as the objects of research—thereby 
compromising the anthropologists’ romantic ideals of ethnography further. 
Polished Goats. 
 During the Survey and afterward, the anthropologists were deeply concerned 
by the contrived nature of the socio-cultural forms they were tasked with analyzing. 
Getting to the bottom of such obviously stilted affairs became a nearly impossible 
task. And yet, the duty of certifiers is precisely that: to arrive at a clear, well-
evidenced description of a community’s empirical fulfillment of the established 
criteria. 
 Several months after the Survey, the Director and I were sitting in his office 
discussing these issues when he guided my memory back to the first day of the Survey 
when the charcoal colored goats were sacrificed. “Most of those things we saw that 
day were arranged,” he told me: 
“Like up there in the cave with the sacrifice ritual of the three goats. You see, I 
touched two of the goats, and when I looked at my fingers, there was black 
stuff on my fingers. So what they had told me was that you had to sacrifice 
black goats. But you see, [leaning toward me and lowering his voice as though 
revealing a secret] they couldn’t find any perfectly black goats. So they had to 
put shoe polish on the goats. But you see a goat, when it is naturally black and 
one that is made to look black, they don’t look right. So that is why I touched 
the goats with my fingers!” [erupting in laughter] 
 Humor aside, the fact that aspiring communities would go so far as to polish a 
goat is remarkably telling. To best satisfy the criteria of ‘tribal’ recognition, the Lekh 
felt compelled to do exactly what their anthropologies said. Their anthropological 
representations to the government said that the goat should be black, and so it was 
made black. In this rather Baudrillardian moment, the simulacra of the ethnological 
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word came to precede its referent.15 In other words, ritual ‘practice’ was made to 
conform to its ethnological representation. As I have also shown in Chapter I, the 
primacy of representational form has become a signature feature of ethnic renaissance 
in the hills, as have the concomitant logics of ethnological singularity. Enacted within 
the contexts of the Ethnographic Survey, the beheading of a black goat was 
subsequently held forth as an emblematic component the Lekh’s socio-cultural 
singularity: viz—we, and only we, do it this way and only this way. The rite, 
performed in perfect accord with the ethnological word, subsequently became a 
metonym for a ‘culture’ uniquely their own. It signaled, as the criteria would have it—
‘cultural distinctiveness’. The gruesomeness of the rite would furthermore connote 
‘primitiveness’, ‘backwardness’, ‘animism’, ‘savagery’, ‘nature-worship’ and other 
qualities of the ‘tribal’ ideal-type as it has been formulated in India and beyond.16 
 Chicaneries like the polishing of goats are cause for serious concern on the part 
of government anthropologists, who themselves maintain their own ideals of 
‘authentic’ ethnographic data. (Recall “the essence of the field/flavor of the ethnos” 
comment from earlier). They frequently complained about how the mediational tactics 
of ethnic leaders impeded their access to the ‘real’ people. Contending with these 
politics of (im)mediation was tiring, frustrating work made worse by the clearly 
compromised nature of the data put before them. They complained on several 
occasions, “Nothing was raw. Everything was cooked.” In this Levi-Straussian 
inflected complaint we can glean their desire for data, if not perfectly ‘natural’, then 
certainly less politically ‘cultured’ than was being put forth in the stilted contexts of 
the Ethnographic Survey.17 Ultimately though, given the logistics and time constraints 
                                                 
15 See Baudrillard 1994, especially Chapter I, “The Precession of the Simulacra”. 
16 For a detailed history of this category, see Chapter III. 
17 Levi-Strauss 1964. 
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of the Survey, there was only so much that could be done to cut through the confusion. 
As one research team member put it to me:  
“You went there; you saw it. We were brought into an area where they had 
everything arranged. It was all arranged for us. They led us in. So if you come 
to visit my family and I introduce you to all of the people in my family and I 
have told them what to say to you, then what you see is what I want you to see. 
That is how it was! We only met the people they [the ethnic leaders] wanted us 
to meet. And they had told them [the villagers] what to say. So what could we 
do?” 
 The dubiousness of their material was not limited to the ‘field’ per se. 
Throughout 2006 and 2007, ethnic delegations from Darjeeling made frequent visits to 
the CRI’s offices in Kolkata, often bringing with them stacks of books and specially 
written essays ‘proving’ the ‘tribal’ character of their communities. These face-to-face 
exchanges between ethnic delegations and the CRI did indeed make a difference, but 
not always in ways intended by the delegations. The CRI researchers came to know 
certain ethnic leaders as pushy and full of cunning, whereas others were respected as 
earnest and helpful intermediaries. Some cases were flagged as inherently 
problematic, not because they did or did not comply with the ST criteria, but because 
of the questionable tactics of their leaders. Trust thereby became an important factor in 
weighing the integrity of any given community’s literary and ethnographic 
presentations. 
 Complementing this subjective ‘feel’ for their informants, the anthropologists 
also called upon secondary sources to crosscheck the authenticity of their data. Some 
material was deemed spurious; some was deemed acceptable. Ultimately though, the 
certifiers could not possibly corroborate every piece of evidence submitted before 
them. From time to time, they floated the idea of making a surprise visit to Darjeeling 
to check the ‘facts’ submitted before them. This, in turn, triggered several panic-
inflected rumors in Darjeeling that a surprise-visit was imminent. Ultimately though, it 
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never happened. The official Ethnographic Report was therefore written solely on the 
basis of the Ethnographic Survey in 2006, in which each community was allotted one 
day of ethnographic study.18 
The Problem of Hybridity. 
 At the point of ethnographic study, communities are acutely concerned with 
showing, and certifiers acutely concerned with knowing, those ethnological traits that 
render a community ‘culturally distinct’, ‘isolated,’ and discrete. Hybrid socio-cultural 
forms are subsequently deemed highly problematic. Both sides see them as adversely 
affecting the prospects of ST certification.19 Recall the Emergency Meeting: the 
communities under study were to avoid Hindu-inflected identifications of any kind. 
“To score a goal in the first match,” so the logic went, the studied would need to put 
forth the purist aspects of their identity. 
 A similar logic held for the anthropologists. For the certifiers, hybridity was an 
ethnographic problem. The Director of the CRI framed the issue as follows: 
“It’s a matter of if acculturation and assimilation have occurred. If the majority 
of the people have changed their way of life or not. Like if they still retain their 
ancestral worship, life rituals, and these sort of things. If all of these criteria are 
being changed, then they are no longer tribes, but if they have kept these traits, 
then they should get it [ST status].” 
The problem of hybridity—and in particular the blurry lines between ‘tribes’ and 
‘Hinduism’—has dogged ethnology on the subcontinent since colonial times.20 
                                                 
18 The text blended large amounts of secondary source data (academic, governmental, and native) with 
the ethnographic material garnered from the Survey of 2006. Often, these ethnographic and secondary 
source materials were indistinguishable. I return to the Report later in the chapter.  
19 As was shown in Chapter I, these logics extend beyond the ethnographic interface, where cultural 
engineering programs to eradicate the syncretic trace—especially that of Hinduism—have become 
central to ethnic revitalization in Darjeeling.  
20 As was argued in the previous chapter, the emergence of the ‘problem of hybridity’ was part and 
parcel to the development of increasingly technical rubrics for classifying colonial subjects beginning in 
the 19th century and extending well into the 20th. As Timothy Mitchell has argued through his work in 
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Empirically undeniable, the inherent messiness of socio-cultural life, to this day, 
continues to unsettle and perturb the state’s classificatory rubrics. 
 While observing the Survey, I could not understand the apparent fixation with 
seemingly trivial empirical details—be they etchings on a bamboo stick or the names 
of each herb used in ritual practice. To my eye, they had little to do with the five 
criteria being checked. But to the state anthropologists, they had a different epistemic 
value. Evaluated as possible retentions of a community’s pure antecedent [read: tribal] 
past,21 seemingly irrelevant ethnographic details transformed into nuggets of historical 
insight. “As a group moves from one point to another, from A to B to C to D, minor 
cultural traits are retained… They are retained in their present culture, maybe in 
rudimentary form, but they can be there,” the Director explained, “To see their tribal 
origin, you have to study the minutia, the very detailed differences.” Taken to be clues 
into the pure, original identities of the communities under investigation, ethnographic 
details thus became keys to unlocking the riddles of hybridity.22 
 Unlike the communities they studied, the anthropologists did not try to deny 
the inevitable mixing of cultures, religions, languages, etc, that communities undergo 
through time. Instead, they sought ways to cut through the classificatory obfuscation. 
Traces of ‘tribal’ origin were said to be present in the details of current socio-cultural 
practice. By a twist of allochronistic logic then,23 these contemporary relics of the past 
                                                                                                                                            
Egypt, technocratic knowledges often create their own intellectual problems vis a vis the object of their 
analysis. Hybridity has proven one such problem for colonial and now postcolonial anthropology. See 
“The Character of Calculability” in Mitchell 2002. 
21 Here I borrow wording from Young’s work on hybridity (1995). On the ‘tribe: hindu’ binary and its 
colonial and postcolonial valances, see Chapter III. 
22 This logic echoes through academic anthropology on the ‘tribal’ problem in India. Andre Beteille, for 
instance, has argued, “In today’s India, therefore, tribes which answer to the anthropologists conception 
of the ideal type are rarely to be found. What we find are tribes in transition…Only by going to the 
antecedents of a group can we say with any confidence whether or not it should be considered as a 
tribe.” Beteille 1977: 14.  
23 On allochronism, see Johannes Fabian’s celebrated work Time and the Other (1983). Though Fabian 
focuses primarily on how academic anthropology denies coevalness to its object communities, his 
insight is especially potent when brought to bear on state anthropology in postcolonial India.  
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were crucially part of what made any given community ‘culturally distinct’, ‘isolated’, 
‘primitive’, and ‘backward’—in sum, ‘tribal’. Per this logic, the essence of ‘tribal’ 
culture is ‘out there’ hiding in the modern day; it is merely a matter of deploying the 
right techniques, the right kinds of expertise to bring it to light. In this rational 
empiricist pursuit of ‘tribal’ origins, the anthropologists of the contemporary 
‘ethnographic state’ indeed share a great deal with their colonial predecessors.24 
Hinduism: The Elephant in the Room. 
“Moral regulation: a project of normalizing, rendering natural, and taken for 
granted, in a word ‘obvious’, what are in fact ontological and epistemological 
premises of a particular and historical form of social order.” 
—Corrigan and Sayer25 
 Several days into the Ethnographic Survey, the CRI researchers were once 
again led to a cave high on a hillside. To honor the sanctity of this ‘holy place’, 
everyone was asked to walk barefoot through the forest as we approached. When we 
arrived, the scene was far less dramatic than the shamanic sacrifice witnessed on Day 
One. The ‘cave’ was but a minor rock indentation. The shamanic priest who looked 
after the cave was not dressed in ritual attire. There was no drumming. And the crowd 
paled in comparison to the hundreds who had gathered for the vibrant display of the 
Lekh. Though the scene was far more subdued, the anthropologists were no less 
interested. In fact, the working environment was more conducive to their data-
gathering purposes. Seldom did ethnic leaders intervene, and for once the 
anthropologists could carry on a conversation without having to shout or shield their 
                                                 
24 This is not to suggest perfect continuity. As I argued in the previous chapter, there are important 
distinctions between colonial and postcolonial knowledge. 
25 1985: 4. 
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notes. With the priest patiently explaining the ritual ornaments tucked into the various 
crevices of the cave, the CRI’s notebooks filled with ease. 
 Months later this rather unspectacular scene came up in conversation at the 
CRI offices in Kolkata. Three members of the research team and I had been talking for 
some time about the Survey and what role (if any) religion played in determining ST 
status. The Director harked back to the setting of the small cave to describe the 
relationship of Buddhism, Hinduism, and ‘tribes’. 
Director: You went to that ‘gomba’ [Buddhist temple], and what did you 
see? There was the beautiful hillside, and us, remember, we had 
the naked legs. And what did you see in that little cave? 
Amit: If I may interrupt, you saw the trisuli [Shiva’s trident], and the 
mirror. These are all, of course, objects of Hinduism. 
Director:  Yes, so there was the tribal element out in the jungle. And then 
there was the Hindu elements. So [along with it being a 
‘gomba’] there were all three elements. There was  the 
coexistence. Or like [that day] down in the tea estate. There was 
assimilation there. You know where the trail went way down, 
and that person got hurt when the dog charged them? [I nod 
remembering] There were the bamboo carvings. The fine little 
etchings. Yes, well if it had been Hinduism it would have been 
different. But then there was the bridge [referring to a small 
bamboo model that was part of the ritual], and that is a Hindu 
thing. And also the egg. Do you know what the egg 
symbolizes? Two things: one is the fertility cult, and the other is 
Buddhism. 
Towns:  Okay, so this brings me to a big question. As anthropologists of 
the government whose job it is to classify people, how do you 
deal with mixture? That is, what challenges does it pose for you 
as you try to determine whether a group is tribal? 
Director:  Yes, this is a very relevant question for our work. Well, there 
are two things. The first is: To what extent the tribal 
characteristics have been maintained as yet in the current 
culture? And the second is whether these groups also maintain a 
position in the caste system, in the general Hindu caste system. 
In other words, whether there is a relevant hierarchy that we 
maintain, whether this is applicable. Because in the details of 
 279 
their culture, they might maintain their tribal traits. There is 
exclusivity in these fine aspects of their culture. It may just be 
as an undercurrent that this identity is maintained. It may just be 
an undercurrent. [emph. mine] 
Having spent considerable time researching the misgivings hybridity engendered for 
colonial ethnology, this was a question I had long wanted to put to the CRI research 
team. More so than their empiricist presumptions that ‘tribal’ identity was somehow 
hiding in the details, their response struck me most pointedly in their use of the first 
person: viz—the issue of whether the communities of Darjeeling maintained the kind 
of “hierarchy that we maintain”. The anthropologists with whom I was speaking (as 
was the case with the entire eight-member research team) were predominantly of 
upper-caste Hindu descent. Was then, the use of the first person ‘we’ a subtle indexing 
of a Hindu identity from and against which ‘tribal’ alterity was being rendered? Later, 
as the conversation turned to the history of the Gorkha peoples, the issue surfaced 
once again. 
Director:  [Within the history of the Gorkhas], there are dual religions in 
place, the Brahmanical and the tribal. The Great Tradition and 
the Little Tradition. [In the history of these groups in 
Darjeeling] there was religious assimilation, but due to lack of 
proper institutional support, a proper cultural assimilation 
couldn’t take place. It was, if I may say so, not a proper 
assimilation. 
Amit: Yes, they are trying to make their own Great Tradition with this 
‘Gorkha’ identity. So there is an attachment to that, as though 
it’s a form of Hindu practice. [In their past] they have been 
saying, ‘Let us all be known as Gorkhas to become part of the 
Hindu fold’. They think that it is to be boiled down as a melting 
pot, but it doesn’t work like that here. [emph. mine] 
Note, first and foremost, how the talk of ‘Great’ versus ‘Little’ traditions clearly marks 
Hinduism (or the Brahmanical) as the established center against which ‘tribal’ alterity 
(or lack thereof) is being judged. Second, note the concluding statement: “It doesn’t 
work like that here.” The deictic ‘here’ tacitly marks Kolkata—home of the Hindu 
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‘we’—as the orthodoxic center of ethnological distinction. Such statements casually 
deny Gorkha identity on the grounds that it violates the norms of the ethnological first-
person and his homeland. These, of course, were not official rulings in any sense of 
the term. Instead, they were off-the-cuff expressions of subjective sensibilities. But as 
the previous chapter illustrated, the Hindu-centricity of ethnological distinction has a 
deep history, which has subsequently conditioned contemporary prejudices of 
understanding.26 At once enabling and problematic, subjective sensibilities of this kind 
are endemic to ethnographic understanding writ large. Insofar as ‘tribal’ certification 
relies upon ethnographic techniques, they remain integral to the government’s 
administration of positive discrimination. 
 The official Modality states an ST “may profess any religion”.27 In a formal 
sense, it is classically secular. However, when we comb through the nuances of 
ethnographic knowledge production, religious sensibilities clearly inform 
anthropological judgment. That government anthropologists adjudicate difference 
through their own subjectivities, from their own subject positions, comes as no 
surprise. Reflexive anthropology has for a long time now harped upon this very issue. 
But when enacted through the ethnological organs of the state, classificatory 
prejudices transform ethnography into a mechanism of what Corrigan and Sayer have 
called moral regulation. Along these lines, ‘tribal’ certification becomes a means 
through which historically entrenched social orders are naturalized. At the point of 
ethnographic encounter, government anthropologists operate as the human face of 
state classification, at once animating and legitimating the state’s classificatory 
capacity with moral sensibilities that continually exceed the provisionally ‘secular’ 
                                                 
26 It was Gadamer who invited us to think about prejudices as something more than pejorative, 
blinkered ways of thinking. Gadamer’s framed prejudices in a more ethically neutral way; they are 
inevitable and necessary conditions of understanding itself. See Gadamer 1997: 277-307. 
27 Point 12.1.1(iv) of the Modality for Scheduling Tribes. 
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and formalist workings of positive discrimination.28 Understood accordingly, state 
ethnography functions as more than a means of recognition; it becomes an experiential 
arena for the instantiation of the state itself. Only the state does not appear here as the 
‘secular’, objective entity that it professes to be—but rather an ideological apparatus in 
and of itself.29 
 The aforementioned deictics, uses of the first-person, and off-the-cuff 
judgments offer subtle clues to these ideological underpinnings. Other clues are less 
subtle. Documents obtained from one high-level source in Delhi denied one 
community’s application for ST status on the following grounds: 
“Though [the community] had tribal origin, with the passage of time and due 
to their contact with exogenous people and their contacts with the Hindu 
tradition, they are gradually assimilating into the Great Tradition. It will be 
then a retrograde step if they are included into the list of Scheduled Tribes.” 
Clearly, this ruling represents a breakdown in secular logic—no matter how 
‘secularism’ is construed.30 Expressing logics of the ‘Great Tradition’, its vested 
teleology, and associated assessments of hybridity, the statement both echoes and 
recapitulates the persuasions casually hinted at earlier—albeit with far more authority. 
Even if we were to ignore the links between this ruling from Delhi and my 
conversations with the CRI team, the ruling clearly contradicts the policy that 
“religion is no bar to becoming tribal.” Whether articulated in the halls of government 
or on the street where anthropological distinction is often rendered on more corporeal 
                                                 
28 As Corrigan and Sayer emphasize, “Moral regulation is coextensive with state formation and state 
forms are always animated and legitimated by a particular moral ethos.” (1985: 4) 
29 Althusser 1971. The work of Althusser and Gramsci (1971) has been instrumental in tracing out the 
ideologies of the modern state. In many ways their radical critiques of modern states redeploy Marx’s 
original insight that the “ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas.” Marx (1978/1845: 
172).  
30 This ruling was not final. As I discuss later, the community’s application was sent back to the state of 
West Bengal for further review. As of 2009, the community’s case was still pending. As has been 
discussed in the debates over secularism in India (and elsewhere), secularism can take various forms. 
On these debates, see Nigam 2006. 
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registers, judgments of this kind should be of concern for a nation that at present is 
still struggling with its own ‘crisis’ of secular nationalism.31 
Recognizing the Nation. 
 As I discussed in Chapter II, the people of Darjeeling harbor deep-seated 
anxieties about belonging in India. Their proximity to, affinities with, and heritage in, 
Nepal have led to perennial questionings of their place within the Indian nation. Even 
their own leaders have convinced them that their Indian citizenship is dubious at best. 
These anxieties have fueled their longing for rights, recognition, and security as 
Scheduled Tribes of India. So too have they affected how these groups choose to 
represent themselves as objects of the state’s ethnographic gaze. 
 Recall the General Secretary’s warning at the Emergency Meeting to avoid 
identification as ‘Nepali’. In Darjeeling, the term is used primarily as a linguistic and 
historical identification; as a signifier of self, it is never used in a national sense. 
Nevertheless, to avoid confusion, and perhaps most importantly to avoid any 
resonance with discriminating logics that view Gorkhas (that is, the Nepali speaking 
peoples of India) as foreigners, the term was to be avoided around the anthropologists. 
The same held for the topic of migration. Some groups went so far as to deny any sort 
of migrational history from Nepal. These claims to autochthony were dubious at best 
and often times undermined the credibility of the given group’s application in the eyes 
of the anthropologists.32 Nevertheless, many ethnic leaders believed that presenting 
                                                 
31 The ‘crisis of secular nationalism’ has prompted considerable debates over the paradoxes of positive 
discrimination. An excellent overview of the debates (and the volatile identity politics that spawned 
them) may be found in Nigam 2006. 
32 In making these claims, groups borrowed from an emerging historical revisionist movement in 
Darjeeling. These native historians argue against the widely held understanding that most ethnic groups 
of Darjeeling migrated from Nepal beginning in the 19th century. They refute all British sources that 
claim the area was virtually uninhabited in the 1830s (save for the Lepcha, a few Bhutia, and a 
scattering of others). Their opinions are admittedly politically motivated. Not coincidentally, many of 
these historians are actively involved in their respective community’s quest for ST status. The CRI 
anthropologists, for the most part, refused to take such claims to autochthony seriously. 
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their constituents as ‘sons of the soil’ would bolster the chances of attaining ST status. 
Such an ascription would work to conceal the problematic transnational histories at 
hand, while appealing to the widespread imaginings of the wild, ‘aboriginal’, 
‘tribal’/’adivasi’. 
 Given the pervasive sense of anxious belonging in Darjeeling’s, the CRI’s 
historical inquiries struck a particularly sensitive chord. While the anthropologists dug 
through their history in Nepal primarily in hopes of tracing back to a pure antecedent 
‘tribal’ past, the communities being studied feared that the historical investigations 
were being conducted with more exclusionary designs. This was one of the many 
misunderstandings that spanned the ethnographic interface. Though over-indulged and 
misdirected, the people of Darjeeling’s fears were not wholly unfounded. 
 One day after the Survey, the Director and I began discussing why it was 
necessary to explore the history of these groups, even if that meant venturing into the 
history of Nepal. He began by telling me that “All the peoples of Darjeeling are 
immigrant peoples.” 
 To which I responded, “Do you think that will hurt their chances of becoming 
STs since their ancestors were immigrants and have origins in Nepal?” 
 “Maybe.” 
 I continued, “Because I know there is a lot of insecurity in Darjeeling about 
being labeled as immigrants. But if India is a relatively young country, and they were 
all in Darjeeling when the nation was formed…” 
 The Director cut me off before I could finish, “No,” he told me, “India is a 
very old country. It’s just our geographic borders have shifted recently.” 
 The comment caught me off guard. In no way was he denying Indian 
citizenship to the people of Darjeeling. That was clear. But his statement did seem to 
index a highly typical form of primordial nationalism. To say “India is a very old 
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country” skated blithely over the rocky decades of the 20th century through which 
British India became not one but two independent nation-states. Even in the most 
generous reading, the statement ventured a dangerous, but increasingly commonplace, 
conflation of the ‘nation’ and ‘civilization’. In the right-leaning politics of India today, 
this conflation tends toward auto-orientalism. Although the Director was not a man to 
profess Hindutva (Hindu nationalism), his opinions do bespeak the centricity of both 
Hinduism and the nation in the state’s systems of recognition.33 
 It stands to reason that inclusion into the list of Scheduled Tribes of India 
would be predicated on the concept of the nation. But for marginalized populations 
with transnational histories like those of Darjeeling, the truism is anything but inane. 
For them, the very issue of being-in and being-of the nation induces feelings of great 
anxiety. Thinking through their histories as well as those of their certifiers, the 
question thus becomes: Through what histories—colonial/postcolonial, national, and 
personal—are conceptions of the ‘nation’ being construed and subsequently employed 
in the practices of recognition? If agents of the state are unable to think historically 
sans the vehicle of the nation, then to what extent would that skew their ability to 
examine the transnational histories of contemporary citizens of the modern nation-
state? Importantly, these are not merely etic questions to be formulated meta-
ethnographically by researchers like myself. They were emic concerns, harbored by 
the very people who subjected themselves to the state’s anthropological scrutiny in 
hopes of winning its coveted recognition. 
Supplication. 
 Several days into the Ethnographic Survey, with his research team hard at 
work, the Director and I struck up one of our first conversations about our mutual craft 
                                                 
33On how conceptions of the nation subtend recognition within it, see Munasinghe 2002; Williams 
1989, 1991.  
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of ethnography. It didn’t last long. Soon a message arrived, notifying him that he was 
wanted for an important meeting. Not wanting to abandon our conversation, he invited 
me along. 
 We were led down a trail to a small one-room schoolhouse where two well-
dressed ethnic leaders were waiting. They greeted the Director nervously, and then 
had a quick word with the teacher. Seconds later, she and her Class II students vacated 
the schoolhouse. With the building suddenly empty, we found ourselves searching out 
seats amid rows of benches and long tables. One plastic chair sat at the front of the 
room, but the Director refused to sit there saying, “That is for a real teacher.” So we 
sat down together at one of the child-sized tables. 
 The ethnic leaders clearly had an agenda. But within seconds, the Director 
launched into a long lecture about state anthropology in India. Clearly, it was a 
continuation of the conversation we had begun just minutes before. 
“You see the type of anthropology that you practice in America and the type 
we are doing here in India, there is something different there. Ethnography is 
about capturing the minutia of culture…the very fine things. This coming to 
Darjeeling is nothing new. I have been here fifteen or so times. All of the 
people of the hills started submitting petitions to be recognized as STs back in 
2000, no maybe 1999… But you see ethnography is about the minutia. In 
America, or the UK, there are all the great writers there, whether it is Margaret 
Meade or Malinowksi. 
 [The ethnic leaders nod along, unsure of where this lecture is leading.] 
What we do as anthropologists is we are specialists in observation, so we 
observe these things. Whether it is participant observation or what have you. 
You know, participant observation like Malinowski! But here [today] we 
cannot do this. We have been given petitions from these hill communities and 
we have been sent here to perform studies, so how can we do participant 
observation? Like these rituals and things that you have laid out for us today, 
you see these are just ‘duplicates’ of culture. They are not the original culture. 
 [The ethnic leaders try to interject, but he speaks over them.] 
They are duplicates! They are not the original form of the culture. 
 [He is becoming argumentative, as the ethnic leaders again try to claim 
otherwise] 
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No, you see in the original you may only have three vases, or you may not use 
this or that type of fruit because of your economic condition. But today you put 
out seven vases, and all the different types of fruit. In the original form, you 
would not do this. And each thing has special relation to your culture or 
religion. You see this is not original… The only way to know what is the 
original is to do participant observation and stay with a community for some 
time. Like Malinowski. So you see, what is the role of the anthropologist? 
What is the role? He is not an administrator or a policy maker. These groups 
submit these petitions to the government, and then the files come to us and we 
have to go out into the field to observe these groups. You see if you file a case 
in a court of law, you submit it to the government and then you have a lawyer, 
and he is an advocate. So what is the role of the anthropologist? He is not an 
administrator or a politician. He is an advocate. We are advocates for these 
groups, [a thoughtful, agonizing pause] if the criteria are fulfilled.” 
“But sir, we are a vanishing tribe,” one of the leaders pleads desperately. 
 “No! I don’t agree,” the Director replies sternly, “This term vanishing tribe 
should be taken as a derogatory term. You are not vanishing. Your population is not 
decreasing. How can you say you are vanishing?” 
 The leaders struggle to find ground to stand on. “We have been so oppressed,” 
one of them states pleading for sympathy, “Look at me, I have graduated with a degree 
in mathematics, but I am the first and only one in my whole family who has done 
this.” 
 “Yes, he is the exception,” the other adds. 
 The Director listens to them, a cigarette in hand, shaking his head. He 
acknowledges their economic condition but tells them, “If you can light the fire of 
aspiration in your people, you will reap the fruits in the form of your children, and 
your tribe will not vanish. It is this ascriptive orientation that will lead to achievement. 
The main function of your association should thus be to motivate people. You have to 
do the role of the catalyst.” 
 The conversation grows tense, and their appeals more desperate. “Let me 
express our experiences here in Darjeeling. He and I, we are doing the role of catalyst, 
 287 
but we have been oppressed—economically and by population. So we are thinking 
that you can help save our community” 
 The Director continues shaking his head denying them. 
 “You are our savior! You are not our inspector,” the ethnic leader begs, his 
hands pressed together in prayer position. 
 “No!” the Director retorts with visible anger, “I am not a man to be prayed to!” 
--- 
 By this point, the conversation had taken a dark turn. Though the leaders 
begged for sympathy several more times, their pleas were futile. With nowhere left for 
the conversation to go, the meeting ended abruptly and awkwardly. As we got up to 
go, the ethnic leaders looked devastated. Their special meeting had gone very badly. 
 As we climbed back up the hill, the Director seemed especially irked. 
“Sometimes so much is said,” he told me as we labored upwards, “Perhaps I have said 
too much…but ahhh…” [giving it a shrug and carrying on up the trail.] 
 In the remaining days of the Survey, I personally witnessed the Director 
countenance several other scenarios along these lines. Ethnic leaders constantly 
wanted to have a private word with him, constantly wanted to pull him away from his 
research to persuade him by other, more affective means. Both artful and heartfelt, 
these demands were difficult to manage. They tugged on sensibilities that belied the 
prescribed formalism of state ethnography. And in this case, they elicited a likewise 
response. The tinge of regret—”Sometimes so much is said…Perhaps I have said too 
much,”—suggests as much. As I watched these exchanges, I could not help but note 
this decidedly humanized ‘face’ of the state. Inexorably social and undeniably 
political, the Ethnographic Survey was continually proving to be an interface in the 
most literal sense of the word—a face-to-face encounter of different desires, 
frustrations, responsibilities, and contending anthropologies. 
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 One of the anthropologies present was, of course, western, academic 
anthropology—and, like it or not, I came to stand in as its representative. I have little 
doubt that my presence in the schoolroom altered the interaction significantly. For 
one, it seemingly threw a wrench into the ethnic leader’s plans for convincing the 
Director of their ‘tribal’ eligibility. Likewise, I was clearly an impetus for the 
contentious lecture delivered by the Director. As was so often the case throughout my 
research, here again my professional identity seemed to instigate the performance of 
‘anthropology’ itself. Only this time, it was not the consummately ethnological stuff of 
ethnic song and dance being performed, but instead a powerful narrative of expert 
identity and ethnographic authority. 
 These implications merit further reflexive, historiographic, and ethnographic 
consideration. 
The ‘Foreign’ Presence. 
 As was discussed in the previous chapter, ethnologies of the colonial era were 
largely responsible for constituting the very possibility of ‘tribal’ recognition. 
Particular conditions of the postcolonial era have since shaped the matter of ‘tribal’ 
recognition into its current form. The ‘tribal problem’ as it has come to be known in 
overlapping academic and governmental circles has spawned extensive literatures 
since independence.34 Not unlike the arguments that cropped up during the Constituent 
Assembly Debates, the debates have formed under an overarching liberal modernist 
framework. On the one side have been the assimilationists, who believe that ‘tribal’s’ 
entry into the national mainstream should be facilitated by government. On the other 
                                                 
34 References are too extensive to lists. Exemplary studies include: S.C. Dube 1960; Ghurye 1963; 
Singh 1972; Thapar et al 1977; Gupta 1998; Chattopadhyay 1978; and Praharaj 1988 among others. 
The ‘tribal problem’ has been taken up in other contexts by the likes of Helm et al 1968; Sahlins 1968; 
Fried 1968, 1975; Southall 1970; Godelier 1977.  
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side, are the protectionists, who champion ‘tribal’ cultures as inherently valuable yet 
vulnerable self-contained systems deserving of governmental protection. 
 The policy that has emerged out of these debates has in large part tried to split 
these differences. Entering into these debates is not my concern. What concerns me 
here, rather, is the way in which the entire ‘tribal’ problem (and the government’s 
administration of it) has been structured by western modernist and academic 
discourses. The assimilationist’s versus protectionist’s positions bare the unmistakable 
marks of modernization theory and structural functionalism, respectively. We need 
only look to the criteria of ‘backwardness’ and ‘primitiveness’ on the on hand, and 
‘distinctive culture’ and ‘geographic isolation’ on the other to appreciate the lingering 
influence of these disciplinary tropes. 
--- 
 In the dynamics of ‘tribal’ certification, the influence of (western) academic 
anthropology plays out in other ways as well. Aspiring ‘tribals’ and government 
certifiers covet academic literatures on the groups in question. Throughout my time in 
Darjeeling, I was bombarded with requests for academic literatures on the ethnicities 
with whom I worked. Having access to a range of academic sources unavailable in 
Darjeeling, I became a conduit of ethnological texts—many of which went directly 
into the growing libraries of the different ethnic associations. “Please bring whatever 
you can,” they would tell me. When I would note that most of the literature on their 
ethnic group was based on research in Nepal, not India (the latter was my job), they 
opined that that was even better, as Nepal was the home of precisely the ‘original’, 
‘authentic’, and ‘pure’ ethnic culture which they sought. If the literatures were written 
by European or American scholars, they carried additional authority. 
 This engendered the rather bizarre but increasingly common circumstance in 
which native subjects turn to the writings of foreign anthropologists for the 
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authoritative word on their own ‘culture’. This is not to downplay the importance of 
native ethnologies; neither is it to cover over the critiques that these native ethnologies 
often level at their foreign counterparts. Instead it is to highlight what brand of 
knowledge is privileged within this system of recognition. It is not only the content of 
the ethnological word that matters here, but also the origins of one’s intellectual 
sources. When and where western academic sources can bolster a party’s ethnological 
claims, they are invariably co-opted—but not without a conspicuous citation. 
 The same holds true on the government’s side of things. The CRI researchers 
were continuously looking for more contemporary, western academic sources to 
augment the heavy dose of colonial ethnology and governmental sources upon which 
they typically relied.35 Again I was called upon to provide such sources. When the 
official Ethnographic Report was finally written, it contained extensive citations and a 
lengthy bibliography to substantiate its claims. These sources not only rounded out 
what was necessarily limited ethnographic content (bear in mind that each community 
was only granted one day of ethnographic study), they also lent the report an 
intellectual authority that would assuage its passage through the various organs of 
government where the file would be scrutinized for its intellectual integrity and legal 
standing. 
 In both state ethnology and the ‘ethnologies of the governed’ then, the 
academic citation plays a conspicuous role in substantiating the claims put forth. 
Especially when it hails from the western academy, the citation carries symbolic value 
                                                 
35 For both sides, governmental sources like the census and colonial ethnologies are inherently valuable 
insofar as they are the government’s word, so to speak. But given the convoluted rubrics used through 
the years, any claim that the census from, say, 1931 enumerated a given community as a ‘hill tribe’ is 
easily refuted by the census or colonial ethnology from another time, when the group was enumerated 
differently or not at all. Though they relied upon colonial histories and ethnologies, the CRI researchers 
at times expressed their dissatisfaction with colonial representations. Similarly, while they relied upon 
native anthropologies (often in classic cut-and-paste fashion), they looked upon native anthropologies 
with suspicion. Academic anthropologies, especially of the western variety, on the other hand were 
granted exceptional authority in the adjudications of identities ‘tribal’ and otherwise in Darjeeling. 
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in and of itself. Put to use in the certification of ‘tribes’, it comes to function 
something like ‘a symbol that stands for itself’—as Roy Wagner would have it—that 
is, a ‘relatively self-contained, self-signative’ marker of ethnological expertise, 
authority, and thus veracity.36 
 The de facto prestige of western academic anthropology affected my impact on 
the ethnographic interface in important ways. To conclude this examination of the 
ethnographic interface, let me then briefly recount what happened in the final 
moments of the Ethnographic Survey of 2006. 
 Having completed an all day ethnographic study replete with shamanic rituals, 
caves, and lengthy interview sessions, the community under investigation was about to 
bid farewell to the CRI team. Some thirty or so members of the ethnic group stood 
back as the CRI team prepared to climb into their jeeps. Since I had caught a ride to 
the site with the team, I too was just about to climb aboard, when from the crowd 
stepped forward the president of the ethnic association. There in front of the 
audience—the government anthropologists on one side and the local community on 
the other—he grabbed my hand in what would be a protracted, unrelenting handshake. 
“So Mr. Townsend,” he said to me but for all to hear, “Having seen the 
demonstrations of all the different communities, what do you say about our 
performance here?” 
 All eyes were on me, just as he intended. Standing there, his hand still 
clutching mine, it was clear that he wanted my expert opinion. More than that, he 
wanted the authoritative endorsement of a western academic anthropologist verifying 
that yes, his community was ‘tribal’. Realizing my compromised situation, I 
scrambled for a diplomatic answer. “Well in my opinion, I think the format is 
                                                 
36 Wagner 1986: 6. 
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somewhat unfair to everybody including the anthropologists and communities like 
yours,” I said. 
 Seeing that I was being elusive, he responded, “Well, just what is your opinion 
then? What do you think?”…still gripping my hand, unwilling to let go. 
  “Well having seen the others I would say that you have done well for 
yourselves, and that your community has done a good job today.” 
 Realizing he was not going to get the definitive answer he wanted, he cracked 
a smile and began shaking my hand vigorously, saying “Okay, thank you very much 
sir, thank you very much,” seemingly parlaying my response in his community’s 
favor. 
 Finally, he released my hand and I turned away, my eyes down, embarrassed 
by the expectations put upon me, and somewhat disappointed by my inability to help 
the people staring at me, awaiting some authoritative claim to bolster their case. Out of 
the corner of my eye, I saw as the anthropologists quickly diverted their attention 
away from me. Somewhat sheepishly then, I made my way toward the vehicles and 
bid ‘namaste’ to the local community before climbing into the back of the jeep—itself 
a compromised position. 
 As we rolled away, the CRI team began to poke fun at the situation I had just 
endured, laughing about how I had been put on the spot. The ribbing seemed to be an 
expression of their growing familiarity with me and perhaps an inclusion of me into 
their group. I feigned good humor until the jokes trickled off, and then settled in for 
what was to be a long ride home. Unlike the morning’s ride, which was filled with 
excitement to be ‘crossing-over’ the lines of ‘tribal’ recognition, the return trip left me 
only with the somber task of coming to terms with my own illusions of staying above 
the fray of my always-already anthropological subject matter. 
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Post-Field Dynamics. 
 The official Ethnographic Report, once complete, was a sprawling 200+ page 
document comprised of both qualitative and quantitative data. Because there is no 
template for these reports, the CRI was left largely to its own designs in presenting its 
findings. A short introduction described the nature of the study, after which followed 
one chapter per community. The descriptions borrowed heavily from the ethnological 
materials written and submitted by the communities. The chapters contained 
discussions of classic ethnological topics like: rites associated with birth, marriage, 
death, etc; religious belief and practice; dress; material artifacts; language; etc. 
Appended to these descriptions were numerical tables compiled by the statistical 
division of the CRI enumerating metrics such as population, average income, 
education levels, and literacy rates.37   
 The Report took nearly a year to complete. In the Fall of 2007, it was finally 
sent from the CRI to the Writer’s Building, where it would be processed by the 
Backward Class Welfare Department (BCW) of the Government of West Bengal. 
Now that it was a ‘policy matter’, the cases were largely out of the anthropologists’ 
hands. The institutional life of their ethnoological knowledge, however, was just 
beginning. From the CRI to the Government of West Bengal and on to the Centre in 
Delhi, the Report would begin a convoluted bureaucratic journey passing through 
numerous technocratic camps of government. Figure 8 maps the typical path of a 
successful ST application. 
                                                 
37 The quantitative portions of the report were based on a series of survey-forms sent out to the 
applicant communities. These are the same ‘census forms’ discussed in Chapter I. 
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Figure 8. The Bureaucratic Path of an ST Application. 
 Anthropologically speaking, the case faces its largest test in the Social 
Sciences Wing of the Office of the Registrar General (RGI), where a team of social 
scientists will crosscheck the ethnographic findings against available literatures on the 
community in question. These existing literatures often date back to colonial 
ethnology. When interviewed, a social scientist of the RGI explained: 
“Before independence there were these reports, because when they were taking 
the census, there would be supplemental ethnological enquiries. Like back in 
the 1890s, there was the Tribes and Castes of Bengal, published by, published 
by...[a searching pause]… His name was Risley. Yes Risley. And there you 
will find very detailed ethnographic information on all of these groups… What 
we do is try to see if these groups were traditionally tribal. Because nowadays 
you will not get that level of primitiveness, so what we do by consulting these 
literatures is to see the traditional tribal characteristics. So the question is: at 
that time were they primitive tribals?” 
 Should the social scientists of the RGI or any other government institution 
along the way find significant problems with the case, the file may be returned to the 
state level for further review, where it once again is taken up by certifying institutions 
like the CRI. To address the problems, the certifying body (CRI or TRI) conducts 
 295 
further enquiries and/or revises their earlier work. The file then is circulated through 
the system again. If it fails for a second time, the case will be terminated. 
 From start to finish, the process takes years, often decades. Lost, found, 
shelved, scrutinized, passed over, and passed on, the bureaucratic life of these files 
provides telling glimpses of the state, its technocratic complexity, and its seemingly 
interminable temporality. For groups waiting out the bureaucratic duree’, these 
conditions prove exceptionally difficult to manage. Considered in this light, tracking 
the fate of ST files reveals more than just a bureaucratic circuitry; it brings to light 
conditions that fundamentally shape how communities experience the Indian state. 
The Partial State. 
“The state is a unified symbol of an actual disunity. This is not just a disunity 
between the political and the economic, but equally a profound disunity within 
the political.” 
—Philip Abrams38 
 In July of 2005, the RGI found problems in two of the ST cases it was 
processing. The files belonged to two communities of Darjeeling who had applied for 
ST status in the 1990s (much earlier than the ‘left-out’ communities surveyed in 
2006). Nearly a decade after these groups’ cases were initiated, the RGI therefore 
returned their files to the CRI with fourteen points that needed to be re-addressed. 
Among these were outstanding questions of: the origin and dubious autochthony of the 
groups; evidence of religious, economic, and cultural change since the days they were 
“nomadic pastoralists, hunters, and shifting cultivators”; their lack of isolation in 
Darjeeling; the presence of modern amenities such as radios televisions, and cinemas; 
                                                 
38 Abrams 1988: 79. 
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and the aforementioned opinion that their “gradual assimilation into the Great 
Tradition” meant that it would be “a retrograde step” to recognize them as STs. 
 The CRI members were upset to have their work returned to them as 
unsatisfactory, but they addressed each point in earnest. Drawing extensively from 
their ethnographic work, the CRI’s response contested many of the RGI’s claims. 
Conceptually, where the RGI cited Dalton (1872), the CRI called upon Malinowksi, 
S.C. Dube, Pignede, and a lengthy bibliography of others to undermine many of the 
points put forth by the RGI. In their written response, the CRI opined, “Assimilating 
into the Great Tradition does not mean the eradication of Tribal characteristics.”39 
They took the RGI to task further by noting, “The question of retrogression…is 
perhaps value loaded and bias.” The revised Ethnographic Report went on to provide 
specific evidence substantiating the communities’ fulfillment of each of the five 
criteria for ST designation. Having laid out the case, the response closed with the 
“hope, [that] considering all the above points with empathy, the authority would agree 
with the recommendation of the State Government to include [these communities] as 
the two new Scheduled Tribes of the State of West Bengal.” 
 The exchange between the RGI and CRI evinces what may be deemed certain 
partialities of the Indian state. One the one hand, the mentions of the ‘Great Tradition’ 
and ‘retro-grade steps’ suggest a strong religious bent to these ostensibly ‘secular’ 
practices of governance As we saw earlier, these kinds of prejudicial partialities 
clearly inform the processes of ‘tribal’ recognition. On the other, the exchange 
between the RGI and CRI suggests the partiality of the state in a second sense: namely 
partiality as in not whole; incomplete; incoherent. Here we might recall Abrams, who 
                                                 
39 Dube 1960. Pignede 1993. Though Malinowski is referenced by name, the CRI response gives no 
other bibliographic information. 
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convincingly called the bluff on the state’s professed unity, coherency, etc.40 The 
discrepant opinions of the RGI and CRI, in this regard, signal the rampant 
inconsistencies, disconnects, and incoherencies that mark the ‘tribal’ recognition 
process. In highlighting these respective partialities, what is most intriguing is the way 
the biases and systemic disunities of the state enable and inform one another. 
Together, these respective partialities condition experience on both sides of ‘tribal’ 
certification. I will deal with the communities’ side of things first. 
 The aspiring STs of Darjeeling have learned the hard way about the prejudicial 
and systemic partialities of the state. The confusion, duree’, and paradoxes of the ST 
recognition process convincingly put to rest any held beliefs in a consistent, coherent, 
rational bureaucratic state.41 The biases and incoherency of the Indian state have 
instead proven to be the very conditions within which these communities must operate 
if they are to realize their aspirations of recognition and social justice.42 In turn, these 
partialities have proven equally as generative as they are limiting to the kind of 
identity politics that have emerged in Darjeeling and elsewhere. 
 Achieving ST status demands exceptional political agility—typically in realms 
from which these minorities have been, by definition, marginalized. Once they have 
cleared the hurdle of the Ethnographic Survey (itself demanding its own set of tactics), 
the challenge has proven two-fold. First, ethnic associations must locate their files (no 
easy task given the convoluted path charted above). Then they must develop effective 
                                                 
40 Abrams debunks the proclaimed unity of the state by retraining the study of ‘the state’ to the myriad 
political practices through which the idea of the unified, singular state gets produced. Others such as 
Blom Hansen and Stepputat, in their work on postcolonial states, have gone on to note that states are 
“amorphous and bereft of any unifying and encompassing rationale” (2001: 29). They subsequently 
push for research on how communities come to experience the state. As I argue here, experiencing the 
state often involves coming to terms with its fundamental biases and incoherencies—or what I am 
calling its partialities. See Blom Hansen & Stepputat et al 2001; Corrigan 1994; Corrigan & and Sayer 
1985. My own thoughts along these lines profited immensely from a discussion with Akhil Gupta in 
2008. 
41 On rational bureaucracy, see Weber 1978: 957-1002. 
42 Following Chatterjee, we may recognize these partialities as indelible aspects of Indian political 
society (2004). 
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strategies for lobbying the given department, ministry, collective, or individual. The 
tactics of the Tamangs (who achieved ST status in 2003) illustrated the need for 
political savvy, innovation, and, above all, persistence. They made 77 delegational 
visits to Delhi alone over a 22 year period, augmenting these efforts with hunger 
strikes, underground political networking, and the submission of various ethnologies 
of the ‘tribal’ self to relevant parties.43 For groups still struggling for ST status, these 
tactics set a powerful example on how to engage the various organs of the state in 
different places and with concordantly different techniques.  
 As intermediaries between the Indian government and their ethnic constituents, 
ethnic associations face the additional challenge of understanding and then explaining 
to their constituents the confounding status of their files. Here they are encumbered 
with the unenviable burden of making sense of the state’s incoherency. Delegations 
frequently return from Kolkata and Delhi with news that directly contradicts their 
previous updates. Amid their constituents’ rising impatience and unrequited demands, 
it is ethnic association leaders that often bear the brunt of the state’s inconsistencies. 
Despite associations’ pleas for patience and support, mounting frustrations may induce 
political tensions within ethnic groups—effectively translating the partialities of the 
state into the fabric of everyday life. 
 On the government’s side of things, consider again the exchange between the 
Cultural Research Institute and the RGI-Social Sciences Wing. We need not look 
further than the names of these agencies to appreciate the shared technology of 
governance they specialize in. Yet despite the fact that both agencies are staffed by 
anthropologists and other social scientists, we find each questioning the intellectual 
integrity of the other’s knowledge. The question thus arises: If agencies this closely 
aligned have troubles with agreement and mutual intelligibility, what may be said of 
                                                 
43 For more on these tactics, see Chapter I. 
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the epistemological and technocratic differences that ethnological knowledge must 
span as it circulates to the non-socially scientific branches of government? 
 The journeys of ST files are indeed marked by notable disconnects in 
communication, logic, and specialization as they move through the various 
technocratic camps of the Indian government. These ‘expertise gaps’—as I shall call 
them—open up at sites of sometimes-radical epistemological difference within the 
state’s bureaucratic structures. Blom Hansen and Stepputat have noted how along with 
the spread of modern forms of governmentality, “the practices and sites of governance 
have also become more dispersed, diversified, and fraught with internal 
inconsistencies and contradictions.”44 ‘Expertise gaps’ are one kind of these ‘internal 
inconsistencies’. They are part and parcel to the technocratization of modern states.45 
The irony is that these fracture in the state accrue in the name of an ever-specialized 
‘science’ of governance. Crucially though, while these ‘gaps’ debunk the myth of the 
coherent state, they are precisely the sites where individual agents imbue the secular 
state with religious and epistemological biases (viz: the teleological underpinnings of 
the “retrograde step” ruling). Viewed in this light, ‘expertise gaps’ prove integral to 
the state’s ideological functioning.46 
 The effects are palpable. To survive the long and complicated path to official 
recognition—itself fraught with crosscutting critiques leveled by various governing 
bodies—a community’s official Ethnographic Report must bridge numerous ‘expertise 
gaps’, some of them much more pronounced than that between the CRI and RGI. This 
challenge entails more than sustaining mutual intelligibility. It often involves 
                                                 
44 Blom Hansen & Stepputat 2001: 16. 
45 Though he does not refer to it as such, technocratic expertise plays a significant role in Weber’s 
analysis of bureaucracy (1978). Weber pegs the basis of bureaucracy to “the development of 
administrative tasks, both quantitative and qualitative” (968), but does not account for the 
communicative discrepancies that obtain between expert camps within the state. Timothy Mitchell 
offers a rigorous examination of the development of technocratic governance in Egypt (1988, 2002). 
46 Althusser 1971. 
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explaining and defending the very nature of ethnographic knowledge production more 
generally. The fate of ST files, and the experiences of the anthropologists who produce 
them, suggests mixed results at best.  
Soft Science in Hard Places. 
 Late in 2007 (toward the end of my fieldwork) I found myself whiling away a 
warm Kolkata day at the CRI. As it usually did when I came around, conversation 
turned to Darjeeling. I wanted to know what had become of the Gurung’s file, now 
that it had been rebuked by the Centre and returned to West Bengal for re-assessment. 
Having waited more than a decade for a definitive answer to their ST bid, the Gurungs 
with whom I worked in Darjeeling were asking the same question. Rumor had it that 
there was some sort of ‘problem’ with their application, but only a few ethnic leaders 
knew the extent of the rejection. The Director brought me up to speed: 
“Well, I submitted the reply [to the RGI] within four months [in February of 
2006], and after so much work, you see what happened. The man says, ‘Okay 
this is a policy matter, so I will take that.’ [mimicking the man taking a pile of 
documents from his hands and putting it on a shelf] And what did he do? He 
shelved it! It has been a year and nothing. The groups want to know what has 
happened to the report. And they ask me. And I am so frustrated because I do 
all of this work and then what happens? It is shelved. But you see, this is all the 
political circumstances, because they have their political issues. To tell you the 
truth I am so frustrated. You can call this an expression of my frustration.” 
 The Director’s “expression of frustration” soon segued into the lack of 
progress on the cases from the 2006 Ethnographic Survey (examined in this chapter): 
“These policy makers have their own political issues. So [the Ethnographic 
Report] is in their hands now. They have not done anything with it. It is 
difficult because all these associations come here and pressurize us because we 
are who they know. We are the ones who they met during the Survey and all. 
But it is the bureaucrats at the Writers Building that have it.” 
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 “Yes,” Amit concurred, “The local bureaucrats have their own political games 
they are playing.” 
 This was November of 2007, fifteen months after the Ethnographic Survey, 
and still the Report had yet to be sent to the Centre. Why had it not cleared the 
Government of West Bengal? Everyone assumed the delay was tied to the pending 
Sixth Schedule issue. Granting the ten left-out communities ST status would be a key 
measure in making ‘tribals’ the demographic majority in the hills. (Recall that, to date, 
Darjeeling’s population was only 32% ST.) The expedited timing of the Ethnographic 
Survey in 2006 suggested the cases were being fast-tracked as part of a larger political 
agenda. But now, with the file unaccountably being held at the Writer’s Building, no 
one, not even the CRI members, could rule out the possibility of a back-door deal, 
either to make these groups STs, thereby sweeping through the increasingly 
controversial Sixth Schedule, or denying both outright.47 Along with the people of 
Darjeeling and myself, the CRI members, thus it seemed, could not ‘know’ beyond 
certain closed-doors of the state. Such were the difficulties of studying—and, 
apparently, being agents of—the state.48 
 Responding to Amit’s mention of the ‘political games’ being played by local 
bureaucrats, the Director further griped, “They just want us to go up there and write 
reports based on what politics they have in mind. Instead of the actuality of what is 
there, so that is where the problem arises.” 
                                                 
47 I have no evidence of such back-door-deals being made in other cases. What I should stress here is 
that even the civil servants of the CRI did not rule out this possibility. 
48 Here I borrow phrasing from Abrams seminal essay, “Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State” 
(1988) to suggest how the conditions of state secrecy also apply to those who work for the state. If, as I 
have argued earlier, the state is partial, then here we see this partiality translating into the CRI civil 
servants’ inabilities to know and influence events beyond their bureaucratic cum expert jurisdiction. 
Their access and integration into the state is, in other words, partial. Interestingly though, even as the 
coherency of ‘the state’ is disrupted, its mystique (even ‘within’ bureaucratic life) lives on by way of 
deferral: decisions are being made/ ‘political games’ are being played behind proverbially closed doors. 
 302 
 But as we saw with the polished goats, the ‘actuality’ of the field is admittedly 
dubious when it comes to certifying ‘tribals’. Yet despite the field’s problems—its 
epistemological quandaries, its politics, its over-determinedness, logistical fetters, 
etc—the ethnographic field was theirs nonetheless. Accordingly, it was a ground of 
expertise worth defending. 
 Amit opined, “You see the real problems arise when they [the policy makers] 
want us to create data to fit their decisions. Because that is what they do! They want us 
to go up there and take our surveys and they want us to provide reports that fit their 
politics.” [becoming more and more animated] 
 With the Director and Amit playing off of each other’s frustration, it was clear 
that, for them, political pressure within the state became unbearable precisely at the 
moment it encroached upon the hallowed ground of their expertise, ethnography. 
Remaining in the political dark was one thing; subjecting one’s craft to political 
pressures was another. What quandaries lay in the ‘field’ was their problem and would 
be dealt with accordingly; but when bureaucrats tried to sway or undermine the 
anthropologists’ ethnographic commitments, they crossed sacred lines.49 
 When asked for an example, they spoke of a superior within the Government 
of West Bengal who had recently won his post despite lacking any formal training as a 
social scientist. Aping this figure of technocratic otherness, the Director explained: 
“He even said so himself: ‘This anthropology is not like aviation. It is not a 
skill.’ So he goes up there and visits a community and within ten minutes just 
by looking at someone says, ‘Yes he is a tribal….so make the report and make 
them tribal, what’s the problem? It’s as easy as that. Anyone can do it, this 
noting down of what rituals they do. Write the report and make them tribals. 
Why can’t you just make them all tribals?’ That really happened! He really did 
that! So they just want us to provide the data for their policies, so actually this 
whole process is just a hoax! That’s what it is!” 
                                                 
49 These dynamics of defending one’s field of expertise against encroachment/transformation are 
reminiscent of Bourdieu’ work on professional expertise within the university. See Bourdieu 1984, 
particularly Chapter IV “The Defense of the Corps and the Break in Equilibrium.” 
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A hoax: it was as a potent choice of words. I had always thought more along the lines 
of ‘ethnographic ruse’. Certain ethnic leaders in Darjeeling preferred ‘eye-wash’ or 
‘dekhāwaṭi’. In weighing the Director’s words, it is difficult to ascertain the degree to 
which ‘hoax’ referenced the difficulties of fieldwork or those he and his staff suffered 
as government practitioners of soft science. Knowing him as I did, and considering the 
earlier parts of the conversation, I sensed all of these factors were fueling his 
frustration. To serve under a ‘bureaucrat’ who so clearly lacked appreciation of the 
nuances of ethnographic knowledge production, who could chide ‘This anthropology 
is not like aviation. It is not a skill,’ was an insult to the CRI team. Furthermore, that 
such a bureaucrat would use his position to exert political influence upon their 
ethnographic practice was taken to be a grievous affront to both the integrity of their 
craft and their expert identities. 
 Indeed, as soon as the word ‘hoax’ had left the Director’s lips, Amit confirmed 
as much crying out, “This is an identity crisis for us! An identity crisis!” 
 The Director, for his part, simply closed his eyes and began rubbing his 
temples in agony, “I am just so scared for the discipline these days. Because all the 
bureaucrats…[long pause, eyes still closed]… To be quite frank with you, at this point 
I am just counting down the days until my retirement.” 
 Having served the department for 32 years, the Director was slated to retire in 
March of 2011. Knowing he had a sick wife at home and had recently been passed 
over for promotion, I sensed his anguish as he uttered these words. Exhausted of 
emotion, the conversation trailed off soon thereafter. It was, after all, getting late, so 
we called it a day and began gathering our things. As several of the CRI members and 
I struck out for our respective bus journeys to various corners of Kolkata, the Director, 
like he did everyday, began his commute home. At the end of a long day at the office, 
a jam-packed bus-ride across town, then a 45-minute train ride, and finally a 5km 
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bicycle ride would take him from the concrete monolith of the CRI to the village he 
called home. 
Conclusion. 
 Backed by a lifetime of experience on the frontlines of ethnography and 
governance, the Director’s commentary—spoken and unspoken—offers a fitting way 
to end this analysis. As he made clear, the dynamics of the ethnographic interface and 
the post-field conditions of state anthropology inform and undermine one another in 
important ways. Accordingly, this chapter has examined these respective domains of 
state anthropology with an eye toward understanding the links between them. 
 The Ethnographic Survey of 2006 was a moment of great promise both for the 
groups under study and for Darjeeling writ large. The lure of positive discrimination, 
as well the pending status of the Sixth Schedule, shaped much of what happened 
within and around this classificatory moment. Examining the practices of ethnographic 
knowledge within these politically laden contexts, we see, furthermore, how the 
paradigmatic structures of certification structured the ethnographic encounter in 
crucial ways. With researchers and ethnic associations alike expressly concerned with 
the criteria to be checked and fulfilled, the entire encounter thus became an 
exceedingly “cooked” affair, rife with politics—many of which were geared precisely 
toward controlling the means of ethnographic knowledge production. 
 Caught in the middle of this tussle were, of course, the designated objects of 
the study, the everyday residents of the given model community. Scrutinized by 
anthropologists and likewise held forth by ethnic associations as the certifiable 
examples of the ‘tribal’ subject, they became the consummate anthropological objects: 
the real-types that confirm the ideal-types; the living embodiments of ‘distinctive 
culture’, ‘geographic isolation’, ‘primitiveness’, ‘shyness’, ‘backwardness’ and all the 
 305 
rest. Yet precisely at the moment they were thrust into the crosshairs of the 
ethnographic gaze, their voice and ability to challenge the conceptual schemes mapped 
onto them were seemingly eviscerated by the exigencies of recognition. Exempli 
gratia status here entailed its own degree of subalternity. Such were the politics of 
ethnographic (im)mediation. 
--- 
 What then may be learned in pursuing an ethnography of the state through a 
study of state ethnography? Examined from the meta-ethnographic perspective, 
‘tribal’ certification may be best understood as a site through which ethnological 
knowledge and the state reify and mutually constitute one another. Through 
ethnography, the state becomes a real presence in people’s lives by the profound act of 
adjudicating their socio-political identity. Meanwhile, ethnography substantiates 
official classificatory schemas by ostensibly confirming the empirical (human) 
existence of these normative conceptual forms. As a state process, ethnography 
subsequently becomes a mechanism of moral regulation, at once naturalizing what are 
in fact historical and ideological forms of social order. Importantly, this naturalization 
and reification happens as much through the paradigmatic structures of certification as 
it does through the inherently informal, social, and subjective conditions of 
ethnographic knowledge production. In effect, these formal and informal adjudications 
of alterity smuggle back into the system many of the historical inequities and 
prejudices that positive discrimination has been designed to counter. 
 That ‘tribals’ could be ethnographically certified at all speaks volumes about 
the ways in which ethnological knowledge has come to saturate postcolonial 
governance and modern socio-political imaginaries. Importantly though, the 
testimonies of both the recognized (“To fulfill this tribal criteria…is a ridiculous 
thing!”) and the recognizers (“You can call this an expression of my frustration.”) ask 
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us to see state ethnography as a deeply paradoxical affair—at once fraught with 
promise and impossible demands. 
 For aspiring communities it mandates and reifies ethnological forms that are 
virtually impossible to fulfill. And yet, it is the nevertheless the case that in Darjeeling, 
these schemas have become prescriptive of ethnological difference, at once shaping 
communities’ practices within and beyond the point of ethnographic study.50 So too 
have the terms and conditions of recognition reified existing relations of power over 
and within marginalized groups. 
 In related but different ways, government anthropologists are also enabled and 
plagued by the conditions of ‘tribal’ certification. Where ethnography is uniquely 
equipped to document the complexity and contingency of socio-cultural life, the 
strictures of certification deny the craft its deductive capacities. In fact, the contingent 
and opaque conditions of ethnographic understanding make the knowledge vulnerable 
to precisely the kinds of attacks and manipulation that the CRI anthropologists have 
faced from technocrats of other epistemic and political orientations (viz: “This 
anthropology is not like aviation. It is not a skill… Write the report and make them 
tribals.”) In the face of such critiques, the ‘you are there, because I was there’51 
authority of ethnographic knowledge faces difficulty in defending itself against those 
who question the objectivity and scientific basis of the craft. Even when it is able to 
holds its own, policy-minded bureaucrats often demand more black-and-white answers 
than this soft science is apt to provide. 
 In sum: the involution of ethnography and governance engenders paradoxes on 
both sides of the interface of ‘tribal’ certification. Yet despite its problems and 
                                                 
50 The irony here is that when pressed into the service of governance, ethnological knowledge has 
proven transformative of the ‘real’ objects of its analysis. This is an argument made by Mitchell in his 
work on cartographic knowledge in colonial Egypt (2002). While this chapter focuses primarily on the 
dynamics of the ethnographic encounter, Chapter I has shown how these prescriptive logics have played 
out in the ongoing movements of ethnic revitalization in Darjeeling. 
51 Clifford 1983: 118. 
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impossibilities, state ethnography is nevertheless a site of great possibility for civil 
servants and aspiring minorities. For anthropologists, it affords a stable, if not 
luxurious, career. As one of the CRI members admitted to me with a chuckle and wry 
grin, “Anthropology in India is a colonial product…and we are its subjects. But we 
don’t mind.” For aspiring STs, ethnographic certification of their ‘tribal’ identity 
stands as a rite of passage into the world of liberal rights, recognition, and perceived 
social justice. As I was told time and time again in my work with the people of 
Darjeeling, attaining ST status would be nothing short of the apex achievement of 
their ongoing ethnic renaissance. 
 By attending to the various demands and opportunities of ‘tribal’ certification, 
I have tried to show the ethnographic interface to be just that: a meeting-place of 
various subjects, subjectivities, epistemic practices, and tactical logics. Doing so, I 
have found it necessary to look at more than simply the knowledge practices of 
government anthropologists and their subjects. I have also sought to account for the 
strategies, politics, fears, and aspirations that inform both sides of their ethnographic 
encounter. It is precisely as an interface—at once inherently social, subjective, and 
political—that ‘tribal’ certification offers its most compelling glimpses of the ways in 
which human difference is being rendered (and rewarded) in India today. Examined 
accordingly, state ethnography comes into view as not only an instrument of positive 




On Finding Anthropology 
“The uncanny (das Unheimliche, ‘the unhomely’) is in some ways a species of 
the familiar (das Heimliche, ‘the homely’).” 
—Freud 19191 
 Things change quickly in Darjeeling. Others do not. By the final months of my 
fieldwork (Fall of 2007) Subash Ghisingh and the GNLF were in serious jeopardy. 
Once the savior of the Gorkha people, Ghisingh and his political wizardry had become 
increasingly threadbare. The Sixth Schedule, which at the outset of my research 
seemed a political boon for the GNLF, had now started to become a political liability.2 
Throughout 2007, the public had begun to question exactly what kind of autonomy 
this designation would bring. Certainly it was no Gorkhaland. Moreover, if it really 
was to be a “full and final settlement” as the MoS stated, then neither could it be a step 
in that direction. As the critiques mounted, people began to question Ghisingh’s 
capacity—and indeed commitment—to deliver the kind of rights and recognition they 
longed for. The Old Man’s increasingly bizarre and imperious ethnological agendas to 
make Darjeeling ‘tribal’—Durga and the rock being but one example—had many 
questioning his very sanity. 
                                                 
1 Freud 2003 (1919): 134. 
2 The details of the Sixth Schedule were extremely opaque. At times, even Ghisingh seemed unaware of 
what exactly it would mean to bring this form of ‘tribal’-based sovereignty to Darjeeling. The year 2007 
saw several initiatives to study the details of the Sixth Schedule. A “Citizens Social Forum” was held 
consisting of prominent intellectuals, politicians, and bureaucrats to scrutinize the plans and make the 
concerns public. Intellectuals ran numerous articles in the local papers, while concerns were 
increasingly voiced by the public. Ghisingh and the GNLF did not take kindly to these initiatives. 
Indeed, the critiques had to be leveled with considerable tact so as to not appear subversive to the ever-
paranoid GNLF eye. Meanwhile, Ghisingh continued to work on the details of the Sixth Schedule 
behind closed doors in Delhi and Kolkata in hopes of pushing it through parliament before the local 
critiques gained traction. The bill finally reached parliament in December of 2007 but was immediately 
shelved with an order for additional inquiries to be made. In Darjeeling, it was presumed that the order 
for additional inquiries were born out of the said critiques. To date, the bill remains in limbo.  
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 Then, on September 23rd, 2007, popular culture twisted fate. When Bollywood 
star John Abraham reached into his magic box and declared Prashant Tamang, a ‘son 
of Darjeeling’, to be Indian Idol 2007, he triggered a most unlikely watershed in 
Darjeeling politics. For one fleeting moment, the Gorkhas it seemed had finally won a 
claim in the nation. Yet within a matter of days, jubilation turned to rage, as epithets 
led to protests, and protests to ethnic riots in the streets of Siliguri—once again 
reminding the people of Darjeeling of their liminal place in the nation.3 
 From these experiences arose Bimal Gurung and the Gorkha Janmukti Morcha 
(GJMM)—the Gorkha People’s Liberation Front. Borrowing a page from Ghisingh’s 
book, Gurung seized the moment, harnessed the anxieties at hand, and redirected them 
toward the consummate object of political desire: Gorkhaland. The newly founded 
GJMM party immediately went to work framing the Sixth Schedule and ‘tribal 
identity’ as the fantasies of a madman, Ghisingh, who had grown out of touch with the 
people. The two parties thus began a protracted battle for control over an increasingly 
torn public. Massive rallies were staged by both parties drawing participants from each 
and every village. Soon, administrative officials began resigning and/or shifting 
loyalty to the surging GJMM. Local GNLF branches were disbanded, renamed, and/or 
replaced by GJMM equivalents. The familiar green, yellow, and white flags of the 
GNLF were taken down; in their place was mandated the new flag of the GJMM—it 
too green, yellow, and white. Confusions grew by the day. Hot-blooded youth began 
prowling the hills in jeeps chanting “Gorkhaland! Gorkhaland! We want Gorkhaland.” 
Inter-party skirmishes foretold greater violence to come. Agitated in ways unseen 
since the 1980s, Darjeeling seemed on the brink of political upheaval. Yet no one was 
sure exactly when and how the tables would turn. These were the uncertain conditions 
in which I left the field. 
                                                 
3 I discuss this sequence of events in depth in Chapter II. 
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 Important transformations followed soon thereafter. Within months, the 
GJMM usurped the longstanding power of Subash Ghisingh and the GNLF. The 
regime change has brought likewise shifts in the politics of ‘identity’, recognition, and 
belonging—many of which bear directly on the subject matter (and subjects) of this 
thesis. At first glance, these shifts seemingly challenge many of this dissertation’s 
findings. But when analyzed carefully, the ‘new’ regime in Darjeeling appears 
revolutionary neither in its politics nor its fashionings of ‘identity’. Instead, these 
recent developments prove to be but the latest articulations of the ‘age of ethnology’ in 
Darjeeling. It is this perpetuation that concerns me here. 
 To bring out the continuities at hand, let me then briefly revisit two scenes 
from my time in Darjeeling, and one from since I left. Recapitulating the themes 
developed in this study, these scenes provide some concluding glimpses of 
ethnological knowledge at work in the hills. They, moreover, move the analysis 
toward the present in Darjeeling and beyond. With an eye toward the future, the 
dissertation thereby concludes with an open-ended discussion of the various kinds of 
anthropological knowledge being perpetuated in the world today, and what we—all of 
us—might make of them going forward. 
 For now though, a scene from my first year in Darjeeling. 
Water and Oil. 
 In the Fall 2006, the enthusiasm for making Darjeeling ‘tribal’ was at an all 
time high. The Sixth Schedule seemed well on its way to becoming a reality, and with 
the recent visit of the CRI to Darjeeling, there was reason to believe that the remaining 
‘left-out’ communities would soon be conferred ST status. Both ‘fronts’ were 
exceptionally dynamic. Still, the local administration and the various ethnic groups 
seeking ST status were leaving nothing to chance. On the occasion of Phulpāti, the 
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local administration called for an elaborate display of ‘tribal’ identity. Upon the orders 
of Ghisingh, the Department of Information and Cultural Affairs (DICA) issued 
invitations requesting the presence of all ethnic associations and their members—who, 
as it turned out, were by and large eager to comply with the ‘tribal’ imperative. 
 Come the morning of Phulpāti, thousands had gathered just outside of town for 
what was to be a veritable parade of ‘tribes’. Almost all ethnic groups were in 
attendance with their performance troops and an ample contingency of their members. 
As was made clear to the young girls with crestfallen eyes (from Chapter III), this 
parade was not to evince any signs of Hindu influence whatsoever. DICA would 
insure compliance with a heavy hand. Whereas just a mile down the road, the 
Darjeeling Police Unit (under the aegis of the Government of West Bengal) was 
sponsoring its annual Phulpāti celebration replete with Brahmans, sacrifice, and idols 
of the blood-thirsty Durga, these facets of Hinduism were to have no place in the 
‘tribal’ parade. Instead, the ethnic groups would proudly display their unequivocally 
‘tribal’ identity. With thousands of participants no longer able to contain their 
enthusiasm, the parade of ‘tribes’ thus began its boisterous march through town on its 
way to Chow Rasta where the infamous rock awaited its purported devotees. 
 The ‘tribal’ parade arrived late in the morning. Jeeps with loudspeakers blaring 
and GNLF banners flying overhead led the way. Slowly, the procession worked its 
way into Chow Rasta where a massive audience awaited. Following the lead vehicles 
were shamans bedecked in full ritual attire, various troupes of ethnic performers 
dancing and dressed in their signature styles, and a train of ethnic association members 
stretching far back into the recesses of town. Given the size of the parade and the 
equally impressive size of the crowd gathered to witness it, the parade inched its way 
slowly through the audience toward the center of Chow Rasta, where a performance 
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area had been cordoned off with rope. It was here that ‘tribal’ culture was to be 
displayed for all to see. The rock meanwhile sat dumbly on the stage above. 
 Just minutes later, the bag-pipes of the Darjeeling Police Marching Band 
announced the coming of a second parade—this one originating from the Hindu 
celebration put on just down the road from where the parade of ‘tribes’ had begun. 
Though the numbers could not compare to their ‘tribal’ counterparts, the thunderous 
roar of the marching band, accompanied by the iconically enraged idols of Durga 
made for a rather formidable foe. The clashing sounds of the bag-pipes, the drums, and 
the blaring loudspeakers lent the confrontation an even more frenetic feel. Tourists and 
locals alike began jockeying for position. I, for one, found a perch atop a concrete 
pillar, clinging to a lamppost for balance. With people scrambling to and fro, the scene 
grew increasingly chaotic as the crowd surged this way and that. For a moment it was 
unclear how exactly the encroaching parade would proceed. Then something peculiar 
happened. DICA officials (the very organizers of the ‘tribal’ parade that had already 
arrived) jumped forth to manage the showdown. Holding their arms out wide, they 
quickly put themselves between the parade and the audience, creating space between 
the two. At first glance it seemed as though they were trying to help their rivals. But as 
the officials struggled to keep separation between the crowd and the encroaching 
parade, their intentions were laid bare: they were acting as human shields to 
hermetically seal off the Hindu parade from the masses. If the Hindu parade were to 
enter their carefully contrived space of ‘tribal identity’, it would necessarily do so as 
‘matter out of place’, at once polluting and dangerous.4 
 The DICA officials were grossly overmatched by the moment. As Durga cut 
away her obstacles and the giant sling of offerings known as the Doli followed her 
suspended horizontally on a pole, the crowd surged forward. Suddenly individuals 
                                                 
4 Douglas 1966: 166. 
 313 
began darting out from every direction, tossing offerings into the Doli and diving 
under the sling to receive the cherished blessings of Durga. The audience erupted in 
cheers, as individuals flitted back and forth across the ill-fated barriers, smiles 
beaming. The crowd pressed in more and more, cheering on their fellow revelers, as 
more and more individuals took their chance and made a break for the Doli. Amid the 
clamor, the DICA officials did not buckle in their intention—indeed, their duty—to 
maintain distinction. Their arms outstretched, they sidled along with the enemy parade 
as it made its way slowly through the throng of people. The parades—one ostensibly 
‘tribal’, the other ostensibly ‘Hindu’—slid through and around one another like water 
and oil, their distinctiveness penetrated only by the desires of individuals and the 
unruliness of the present. 
 At the time, the scene struck me as exemplary of the times. Seen through the 
lenses of my research, it bespoke how ethnological knowledge was and was not 
affecting life for the people of Darjeeling. On the one hand, the water and oil logics of 
distinction demonstrated the ways in which the imperatives of singularity, purity, and 
authenticity were coming to structure the knowing and fashioning of modern ‘identity’ 
in the hills. In this regard, the scene was indicative of how ethnological schemas were 
being politically impressed upon the realm of the social. But on the other hand, the 
clash of the two parades told a different story—namely, of the inability of ethnological 
schemas to contain, corral, and capture the multifarious dynamics of socio-cultural 
life. Just as it was individuals that created the ostensible barriers between different 
ethnological types, so too was it individuals that broke through these quite literally 
human barriers of ethnological form. Coming early in my research, the scene set a 
striking example of both the imposition of ethnological forms and their imminent 
limitations in shaping the social world to their likeness. 
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Water and Oil II. 
 A year later, similar logics and tactics were in play as the incumbent GNLF 
and the upstart GJMM vied for control over the hills. Fresh off the Indian Idol-ethnic 
riots saga (discussed in Chapter II), the public was especially on edge. Having 
launched his new party on October 7th, 2007, Bimal Gurung and GJMM were gaining 
steam. With the holiday season fast approaching, the GJMM made their position on 
‘tribal’ identification strikingly clear. Whereas in earlier years Ghisingh and the GNLF 
had used the local administration to enforce ‘tribal’ culture (including the eradication 
of Hindu influence from public view, dress-codes, and the engineering of ‘tribal’ ritual 
practice), Bimal Gurung and the GJMM invited the people to celebrate Durga Pujā, 
Diwali, and the various holidays of the 2007 season in their ‘traditional’ way—in 
other words just as they always had: in their usual festival garb, with vermillion sindur 
streaking their hair in the familiar Hindu way, with ṭikās on their forehead, and, of 
course, with Durga watching over them all. Letters were subsequently issued to the 
various ethnic associations requesting their participation. And posters were pasted on 
the town walls, defining and inviting authentic practice. The public meanwhile found 
themselves caught in a political crossfire. Cultural lines were clearly being drawn. 
 No different that the year before, the GNLF again called for an exuberant 
display of ‘tribal’ culture on the occasion of Phulpāti 2007. The parade of ‘tribes’ was 
to follow the same route as in 2006, ending again at the sacred rock, sitting on its 
pandal in Chow Rasta. That same morning (October 18th), the upstart GJMM called 
for its own procession: only in this parade, people would be ‘free’ to wear whatever 
they liked; Durga would be there wielding her knives; and the people would be 
encouraged to sing and dance her praises. Ethnic groups (many of them who either 
were, or wanted to become, Scheduled Tribes) were cast into awkward positions, as 
was the populace writ large. Not knowing ‘which way the political wind was blowing’ 
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as they liked to say, many found ways to back out of both processions. Others made 
their political loyalties clear by joining one or the other. 
 At about 10:00am, the two parades struck out from their respective corners of 
Darjeeling—one ‘tribal’; the other celebrating in the local, Hindu-inflected tradition. 
Following their own circuitous routes, each was to eventually arrive at Chow Rasta. 
For nearly two hours, the parades snaked through the streets of Darjeeling town, 
carefully avoiding one another. I spent much of the morning following each parade, 
noting who was participating and how. This was, after all, a test of sorts for ethnic 
groups’ cultural and political allegiances. With cultural/political divisions carving up 
the polity, the numbers and enthusiasm of both processions paled in comparison to the 
parade of ‘tribes’ the year before. After some time following the two parades, I headed 
to Chow Rasta where they would inevitably confront one another. 
 The ‘tribal’ parade arrived first. Just like the year before, jeeps flying GNLF 
banners led the way with their loudspeakers pumping out commanding decibels. 
Unlike the year before though, the parade was less than robust. Following the lead 
vehicles, only a paltry showing of shamans, ethnic associations, and their constituents 
followed. The rock was of course waiting once again to greet them, but the vibrancy of 
the parade was clearly diminished. 
 Minutes later the GJMM parade arrived with idols of Durga cutting her path 
through the crowd. The numbers were even less than the ‘tribal’ parade, but the 
showdown was no less telling. As Durga and the Doli penetrated the space of ‘tribal’ 
identity, once again space was carved out for this polluting and politically dangerous 
presence to move through without incident. As the crowd parted, Durga and the Doli 
were followed by hundreds of drunken young men, their shirts removed, dancing 
wildly, drunk, and dazed alongside the furious icons of Durga—all of them moving to 
the surging drumbeat of the GJMM. These were the subjects that would form the 
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lifeblood of the new party. These were the dissatisfied young men that would soon 
begin prowling the streets with their calls for Gorkhaland. For now though, just as 
they had all morning, the two parades moved through and around one another like 
water and oil—keeping a safe and impenetrable barrier of distinction. 
The ‘New’ Regime. 
 The serpentine journey of the parades and their eventual confrontation at Chow 
Rasta portended the political upheaval to come. On February 28, 2008, shortly after I 
finished fieldwork, Subash Ghisingh was forced from office—ending twenty years of 
GNLF rule in the hills. The GJMM stormed to power over the local administration, 
effectively running off GNLF loyalist and demanding political conversion for those 
who wished to retain their posts. Similar effects rippled through everyday life, where 
political conversion and Gorkha ‘identity’ quickly became the order of the day. Under 
the authority of the GJMM, a second Gorkhaland Movement has been launched, 
radically disrupting life in the process. 
 The changes bear upon this research in important ways. For one: the synergy 
between the two fronts of ‘tribal’ becoming has been eviscerated. On the first front, 
there have been no significant changes in the ethnic groups bids to become Scheduled 
Tribes of India.5 They remain committed as ever to this form of recognition. On the 
second front—-that of making Darjeeling a ‘tribal area’ as per the Sixth Schedule—
there has been considerable change, however. When Ghisingh was forced from office, 
with him went the prospects of the Sixth Schedule. The bill has since slid into political 
limbo and is unlikely to be recuperated given the transformations afoot. 
 Under GJMM rule, cultural politics have shifted markedly. Gone are the 
GNLF’s attempts to engineer the ‘tribal identity’ of Darjeeling writ large. Replacing 
                                                 
5 As of September 2009, there has been no notable progress of their applications on the side of 
government. 
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them are the GJMM’s declarations of ‘Gorkha identity’ and its perpetual crisis. This 
recent turn has introduced new contradictions to the identity politics of Darjeeling. 
Whereas earlier, Ghisingh’s GNLF administration and individual ethnicities were each 
pursuing their own form of ‘tribal’ identity and recognition, now the aspiring STs find 
themselves largely at odds with the new GJMM administration and its mandates of 
Gorkha identification. Mobilizing the resources of the local administration and 
augmenting these powers with palpable socio-political intimidation, the GJMM has 
subsequently re-asserted ‘Gorkha identity’ and its crisis in non-negotiable terms. To 
this crisis, there is said to be one and only one remedy: Gorkhaland. Exercising a 
familiar carrot and stick logic, the GJMM has proclaimed socio-cultural singularity to 
be a requisite for achieving Gorkhaland. The local administration has subsequently 
recommitted itself to producing a singular ‘identity’ for all of Darjeeling’s people—
only this time it is not ‘tribal’ but ‘Gorkha’. If anything, the tactics of the GJMM have 
proven more severe than those of their predecessors.6 
 The GJMM is now demanding nothing short of Gorkhaland. Unlike the 
guerilla tactics deployed during the 1980s, the GJMM has declared this Agitation to be 
a ‘non-violent’ movement. Yet the channeling of Gandhi has only gone so far. Since 
the GJMM has come to power, the hills have been marred by rampant inter-party 
violence, unsubstantiated imprisonments of political rivals, and palpable political 
intimidations of various sorts. Not the least of these political tactics has been the overt 
pressure to conform to particular ethnological paradigms. Whereas before, the 
administration mandated ‘tribal’ cultural performance, ‘tribal’ religious practice, 
‘tribal’ dress, etc, the orders of today are for authentic and pure ‘Gorkha’ culture, 
‘Gorkha’ religious practice, ‘Gorkha’ dress, etc. From the 1980s until now, the 
pendulum may have swung from ‘Gorkha’ to ‘tribal’ and now back again, but the 
                                                 
6 I return to these tactics later in the conclusion. 
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paradigms through which ‘identity’ is being fashioned remain largely the same. Herein 
lies the troubling perpetuation. 
 Despite the political tumult of the past thirty years, ‘identity’ remains by and 
large the only game in town. For the people of Darjeeling, the concept reaches both far 
and deep. It summons histories of suffering, inequality, and anxious belonging that 
date back to their arrival in 19th century colonial India. Yet the idea of ‘identity’—and 
in particular that of ‘Gorkha identity’—does more than summon these affects of 
history. It sublimates them into a near millenarian determination for rights, 
recognition, belonging—the true realization of which, many believe, shall arrive only 
with the promise-land of Gorkhaland. Belying words, these feelings suffuse the 
discursively produced forms of ‘identity’—be it that of the ‘Gorkha’ or the overtly 
ethnological notion of the ‘tribal’—with an intensity that is unarguable. Indeed, the 
opposition is hard-pressed to get a word in otherwise, lest they be labeled enemies of 
Gorkhaland. Internal critiques of development, administrative efficacy, justice, and 
corruption are hamstrung in combating the lure of Gorkhaland. Such critiques are 
subsequently funneled into, or else trumped, by the crowing of ‘identity’ and its 
perpetual crisis in the hills. The political spectrum has thus been reduced to a virtually 
singular obsession with ‘identity’ and its rightful recognition. 
 When the GJMM first emerged in 2007, many savvy commentators predicted 
the new party would amount to nothing more than old wine in new bottles. To date, 
even if we could look beyond the familiar faces and colors of this ‘new’ regime, the 
adage has proven largely true. Under the auspices of the GJMM, the “style in which 
the community is imagined”—as Anderson would have it—may have shifted from 
‘tribal’ to a resurgent notion of the ‘Gorkha’, but these contending ‘styles’ have been 
fashioned through the same operative logics and techniques of social implementation. 
Conspicuously ethnological in nature, these most recent developments are alarmingly 
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consistent with the findings put forth throughout this thesis. These dynamics suggest 
that it is the perpetuation of particular paradigms of thought and practice, more so than 
the ephemeral banners under which people agitate, that beckons critical attention in 
the contemporary study of identification, recognition, and the politics thereof. 
 There is no denying the impress of modular ethnological forms upon the 
people of Darjeeling. Following Anderson, the tactics of ethnic associations, the 
GNLF, and now the GJMM clearly participate in what may be seen as normative—
and increasingly global—epistemologies of identity. And yet, lived tradition, the 
affects of history, and the sheer contingency of socio-cultural life continue to inform, 
contest, and undermine these prescriptive designs of the ethnic subject. These 
dynamics have generated innumerable tensions for the people of Darjeeling. Coming 
to terms with these tensions involves finding analytic space to heed the points of both 
Anderson and Chatterjee.7 That space, my ethnography suggests, is none other than 
the lifeworlds of contemporary subjects. Turning there, we may come to see the 
tensions between modular and lived forms of community life to be endemic to modern 
‘identity’ formation in Darjeeling and beyond. 
 By focusing on these tensions, my research has ventured a different set of 
questions concerning the real pressures exerted upon communities and individuals to 
conform to established ideal-types, the opportunities and unintended consequences 
that arise through such compulsions, and the fascinating (and sometimes troubling) 
ways that subjects are finding relation to normative schemas of human difference. 
Thinking historiographically and ethnographically about these matters, we can begin 
to appreciate the emergent ‘instrumentality’ of ethnological knowledge in Darjeeling, 
while at the same time retaining a healthy skepticism towards its claimed efficacy in 
                                                 
7 For more on these debates, please refer back to this dissertation’s Introduction. 
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fully representing—and even remaking—the ethnic subject. Here it is worth 
remembering Richard Handler’s cautionary point that: 
“Nationalism and ethnicity are social phenomena constituted not merely by 
cultural differences, but by a Western theory of cultural difference. Moreover, 
the culture theory of nationalist ideologues and ethnic leaders neatly matches 
that of mainstream anthropology, which envisions (and authoritatively depicts) 
a world of discrete, neatly bounded cultures. Given such deep-seated 
agreement between scientist and native, outsider and insider, observer and 
object, students of nationalism and ethnicity must take special care to ensure 
that their respect for their subjects’ world view does not degenerate into a 
romantic desire to preserve inviolate the other’s subjectivity.”8 
Handler’s intervention remains as instructive as it was prescient for the study of 
‘found’ anthropology. Along these lines, my findings productively unsettle the “deep-
seated agreement” of which Handler speaks. This owes largely to my ethnographic 
willingness to engage with, and give voice to, subjects that empirically challenge the 
paradigms of recognition at hand. In this regard, the anthropology offered in these 
pages differs markedly from those that it has studied. In this way, I hope these findings 
may contribute to a broader refunctioning of ethnography9—one that can recalibrate 
the possibilities of anthropological knowing for both ‘scientists’ and ‘natives’ alike. 
For now though, the forceful reification of particular ethnological forms goes on 
relatively unabated in Darjeeling. 
 This merits a final return through Darjeeling. 
                                                 
8 Handler 1985: 171. 
9 Much of the recent work on para-ethnography has been taken up with an eye toward the ‘refunctioning 
of ethnography’. Sharing similar concerns, my findings speak to interests articulated by Holmes and 
Marcus 2005, 2006; w/ Westbrook 2006; Boyer 2010; and Westbrook 2008. 
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Blackface. 
 On the eve of holiday season 2008, the now-dominant GJMM announced a 
strict dress code to be in force from Durga Pujā through the end of Diwali.10 Turning 
against the ‘tribal’ imperative of years past, the dictate proclaimed the official and 
only authentic dress of the Gorkhas to be daurā suruwāl for men and chowbandi choli 
for women. The order sparked immediate protests from groups like the Tamang, 
Lepchas, and others, who noted that as discrete ethnicities (and formally recognized 
Scheduled Tribes) they had their own authentic ethnic attire; and that, moreover, they 
maintained their own socio-religious practices, which did not allow for the celebration 
of holidays like Dusshera and Diwali. Thus in no way would they adhere to the 
GJMM’s mandates of pan-Gorkha singularity. 
 The GJMM President Bimal Gurung responded to the dissenting groups as 
follows: 
“Lepchas, Sherpas, and Tamangs want to wear their respective dresses, but I 
insist that they wear daurā suruwāl because being the inhabitants of this place 
they are Gorkhas… I am not interfering in your faith or culture like Subash 
Ghisingh and neither asking you to shed blood for Gorkhaland. We have to 
prove that we share no cultural or linguistic affinity with West Bengal and 
hence are demanding a separate state… These communities should don the 
traditional Gorkha attire to show solidarity with the Gorkhaland Movement.”11 
After several days of controversy, exceptions were eventually granted to these 
communities.12 The order was subsequently relaxed from a “compulsion” to a 
“request”. Terminology notwithstanding, the GJMM redoubled its efforts to ensure 
compliance. The Nari Morcha (Women’s Wing of the GJMM) organized a “Dress 
                                                 
10 This was precisely two years after the exuberant GNLF-led displays of ‘tribal’ identity in the Fall of 
2006, and one year after the respective parades of the GJMM and GNLF (mentioned earlier) snaked 
their way around one another in the streets (Fall of 2007). 
11 “‘Gorkhaland’ to have a dress code?” The Statesman. Sep 11, 2008; “The Gorkha dress code of 
discord,” The Statesman. Sep 12, 2008.  
12 “Dress code row goes on.” The Telegraph Sep 23, 2008; “Dress code relaxation for Lepchas.” The 
Statesman, Sep 13, 2008 
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Code Road Show” to demonstrate authentic Gorkha dress. Signaling their growing 
propensity for moral policing,13 the campaign was then taken door-to-door to impart 
first-hand lessons of proper Gorkha attire. It was furthermore made known that GJMM 
cadres found not wearing the prescribed attire would be suspended from the party for 
three months. Considering the widespread compulsion to join the GJMM, this rule 
extended over an exceptionally large swath of the population. 
 On the morning of October 14th, in the thick of holiday festivities, a poster 
went up in Darjeeling warning the public that violation of the dress code would be 
equated with opposition to Gorkhaland. Importantly, the poster bore the signature of 
the Gorkha Janmukti Yuva Morcha, the Youth Wing of the GJMM. Just hours later, 
havoc broke out on the streets as a gang of GJMM cadres rushed about Chowk Bazaar 
brandishing paintbrushes and buckets of paint, blackfacing violators of the dress code. 
Those not wearing the ‘traditional’ attire immediately fled public spaces to the safe-
haven of their private homes.14 
 As news of the incidents spread, outrage rippled through the community. By 
late afternoon, the leadership of the GJMM uniformly condemned the incident—
taking to task the rogue doings of their alleged party cadres. The Secretary of the party 
promptly issued a statement denouncing the incident, but not without reiterating its 
logic: “Those wearing traditional dresses,” the statement claimed, “Are helping a 
cultural revolution, which is aimed at establishing the difference between us and the 
rest of Bengal.” 
                                                 
13 “GJMM ‘road show’ to enforce dress code.” The Statesman. Oct 13, 2008. Since the GJMM has risen 
to power the Nari Morcha has become one of its more austere bodies. At the forefront of the current 
Gorkhaland Movement, their operations have increasingly taken the form of policing: often quite 
literally blocking traffic for protests; gherao-ing offices (organized harassment); conducting hunger-
strikes; administering threats to the opposition; and the creating of ‘jails’ in which to ‘imprison’ drunk 
men. See “Drunks go to ‘Jail’ for 7 Hours”, The Telegraph. June 2, 2008. 
14 On the blackfacing incident, see “Faces Blackened after dress code defiance.” The Telegraph. Oct 15, 
2008; “Dress code diktat keeps people in doors” The Statesman. Oct 16, 2008. These events sparked an 
online discussion of prominent journalist, intellectuals, and activists from Darjeeling, the thread of 
which I found extremely helpful in piecing together these events. 
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 A new poster was subsequently pasted directly over the Youth Wing’s earlier 
warning, condemning the vulgar acts of blackfacing that had transpired earlier in the 
day. Faced with such sudden public backlash, GJMM leaders were clearly trying to 
distance themselves from the incidents. The facts of the matter, however, proved not 
so easy to paste over. Pictures of the incidents that emerged in the days after clearly 
showed leading members of the administration among the dozen or so well-dressed 
older men administering the black-face to unsuspecting citizens, shaming them for 
their non-compliance with the mandate of Gorkha ‘identity’, marking them in the 
darkest way—and just as the ‘Youth’s’ poster warned—opponents of Gorkhaland. 
Fundamentalist Knowledges. 
“Ethnic absolutism. This is a reductive, essentialist understanding of ethnic 
and national difference which operates through an absolute sense of culture so 
powerful that it is capable of separating people off from each other and 
diverting them into social and historical locations that are understood to be 
mutually impermeable and incommensurable.” 
—Paul Gilroy15 
 Ethnic absolutism has never been far from the subject matter of this work. 
Neither have the kinds of violence to which it often gives rise. To appreciate this 
nearness in the emic sense, we need only recall from this dissertation’s Introduction, 
the memorandum submitted to the government on behalf of the ‘left-out’ communities 
seeking ST status. The “Prayer for Inclusion”, as it was titled, promised “chaos” and 
“inevitable unrest” should the government not provide a satisfying answer to “this 
burning and seriously sensitive matter.” Reprised here, these firebrand warnings are 
especially noteworthy in that they were penned by the very ethnic leaders who so 
stridently preach socio-cultural singularity to the Indian government and to their 
                                                 
15 Gilroy 1990: 115. 
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ethnic constituents. In their warnings we catch glimpses of a darker side to ethnic 
rebirth, jātitwa, pure ‘identity’, and the like. Indeed, many of the dynamics described 
in this thesis, when read with a wary eye, signal something more sinister on the 
horizon. It is worth thinking a bit more then about the links between knowledge and 
fundamentalisms of various kinds. 
 Gilroy’s definition of ethnic absolutism points us in a useful direction. It is the 
“reductive, essentialist understanding of ethnic… difference,” and the “absolute sense 
of culture” that seals communities apart in hermetic fashion—not unlike say, water 
and oil. Building upon Gilroy, the problem that arises is one of fundamentalist 
knowledges. Defined here, fundamentalist knowledges are those that posit an absolute 
commensurability between conceptual and empirical form—or in more 
anthropological terms, between conceptual and socio-cultural form. In the context of 
ethnic absolutism, this relationship between the conceptual and the socio-cultural is 
operationalized in two ways. On the one hand, ethnic fundamentalists evoke particular 
understandings of the social world in order to define the self and other in terms of 
absolute distinction. This is what Gilroy points to when he speaks of ‘essentialist 
understandings of ethnic…difference’. Fundamentalist knowledges here function as a 
way of understanding the world. On the other hand, fundamentalist logics hold that the 
socio-cultural world (in its empirical form) must conform to these conceptual designs. 
Thus, when and where socio-cultural life overruns the normative schemas mapped 
onto it, the perpetrators are held in violation of the correct order of things and made to 
suffer accordingly—be it as ‘heretics’, ‘mixed-bloods’, the ‘culturally impure’ or 
enemies of whatever the ‘cause’ may be. Here fundamentalist knowledges forcibly 
order the world. We may say then that fundamentalist knowledges are those that 
predicate themselves on the imminent commensurability of conceptual and human, 
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empirical form. They define the world-as-it-must-be. Such knowledges are at the core 
of fundamentalist projects—ethnic and otherwise. 
 Importantly, the credence of such absolute claims does not emanate solely 
from the minds of fundamentalists themselves. Rather, these knowledges are 
oftentimes supported by the systems of recognition and value in which fundamentalist 
knowledges take root. ‘Tribal’ recognition in India is a case-in-point. This form of 
positive discrimination does not just privilege singular socio-cultural forms, it 
demands them. What is more: these forms must fulfill particular ethnological tropes 
(e.g. ‘cultural distinctiveness’, ‘isolation’, ‘primitiveness’, ‘backwardness’, etc), and 
be rendered through established anthropological practices (ethnography, secondary 
source research, certification, etc). While academic anthropology has now generally 
accepted ‘culture’ to be contested, temporal and emergent,16 this view offers little 
purchase in the contemporary politics of identification and recognition. The fluid, 
contested version of ‘culture’ simply does not ‘cut’ as sharply as a static, fixed notion 
of ‘culture’. For aspiring ‘tribals’, cultural variance, hybridity, and other 
transgressions of ‘pure’ ethnological forms are sure to undermine their chances of 
attaining recognition and all that it brings with it. This is why the aspiring ‘tribes’ of 
Darjeeling have chosen to downplay—if not outright deny—traces of the inevitable 
crosspollination of cultures. From these ethno-logics of purity and singularity spring 
the all too familiar programs of cultural purification and social engineering that we see 
in Darjeeling—not to mention the more grotesque phenomena of ethnic cleansing that 
have appeared elsewhere. Assessing the agents and contexts of ethnological 
knowledge production in Darjeeling, we see that it is not just the champions of ‘tribal’ 
identity that mandate a perfect commensurability between conceptual and socio-
cultural form. The strictures of recognition, in similar fashion, tolerate little in the way 
                                                 
16 Clifford 1986: 18-9. 
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of slippage between these realms. No matter how much they betray the experiential 
complexity of life, these are the hard realities of recognition in India and much of the 
world. 
 Fundamentalists, of course, have their own ways of resolving the tensions 
between conceptual and empirical forms. Where subjects are not (empirically) what 
they should be (conceptually), the powers-that-be may quite literally and forcibly 
make them that way. In Darjeeling, this has been carried out through epistemic 
maneuvers whereby the socio-cultural (and even demographic) vagaries of a 
population are smoothed over, tidied up, or otherwise removed from ethnological 
representation.17 Or, they may be taken up through other registers of control. The 
blackfacing incident of 2008 is a prime example of how the commensurability of 
conceptual and empirical forms may be negotiated (and not negotiated) through 
overtly social and political means. Whether inscribed on the page or the ethnic body, 
fundamentalist knowledges offer a potent way of fixing the self and other into 
relations of absolute ethnological difference. 
 We would do well to evoke Liisa Malkki’s point that the objects of 
ethnological knowledge (i.e. humans) are uniquely equipped with the power to 
“categorize back”.18 But the realities of ethnic revitalization in Darjeeling are that the 
impositions of ethnological form operate through oftentimes-insurmountable gradients 
of political power, class inequality, and ethnological expertise.19 Its saturation of 
                                                 
17 Analyses of these tactics can be found in Chapters I, III, & IV. 
18 Malkki 1995: 8. 
19 Consider, for instance, the three school-room scenes discussed elsewhere in this thesis. In the first, a 
booted-and-suited Tamang ethnic leader marched into a tea-estate village to preach the imperative of 
socio-cultural and hence political singularity. Given the lauded achievements of his ethnic association 
(including the attainment of ST status in 2003), villagers tried, but were ultimately ill equipped to 
challenge him and the structure he represented with any real consequence. The second school-room 
scene found twenty-some ethnic leaders—all educated, upper-class, men—huddled together in an 
‘emergency meeting’ formulating a strategy on behalf of their constituents as to how they should 
ethnographically satisfy the government’s criteria. The third and final scene, saw the Director of the 
CRI lecturing ethnic leaders on the history of anthropology and the questionable integrity of their 
ethnographic demonstrations. Men who were deemed cultural experts within their community could 
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common-sense aside, the institutionalization of ethnological knowledge in India—
manifest most palpably in governmental systems of recognition—has endowed 
particular kinds of representation and certain ‘styles’ of community with 
unprecedented socio-political potential. For the average person, ‘categorizing back’ 
against this discursive juggernaut and its local agents may be neither possible nor 
desirable. Many could not compete if they tried. Even were they to escape the 
politically and materially loaded contexts of recognition, alternative forms of 
belonging and community simply lack the terms—and the terms, the political 
sanction—to stand up against the normative lexicon that ethnology has bequeathed to 
the contemporary. 
 Locating fundamentalist knowledges at the heart of ethnic absolutism is one 
thing. Challenging them is another. The ability to make claims about and on behalf of 
the self is a crucial instrument for the pursuit of rights of all kinds. As a means to 
articulate, represent, and produce the self, it deserves utmost protection. We must also 
not forget that the ‘freezing’ and abstraction that occurs when empirical content is 
rendered in conceptual form is endemic to identification and subject-formation writ 
large. Deconstructionist and poststructuralist analyses can belabor the built-in 
instabilities of these knowledge-making processes, but when brought to bear on 
minority’s struggles for rights, recognition, and social belonging, analytic devices of 
this kind should be used with extreme caution. Following Chatterjee, it would be as 
                                                                                                                                            
hardly get a word in otherwise. Instead they were to left begging for ST status. “You are our savior! 
You are not our inspector,” they pleaded.  
 Each of these scenes may be read as articulations of a greater system of ethnological thought in 
India. Tellingly, each entailed its own degree of subalternity. Whether the tea-estate villagers, those 
ethnic constituents who were not present at the Emergency Meeting but would nevertheless be held 
forth as the ‘tribal’ examples in the days to come, or the ethnic leaders left desperate and dumbfounded 
by the Director’s diatribe: in each of these instances subjects are made unable to ‘speak’—in the 
Spivakian sense. (Spivak 1988). In its social actualization, the language of ethnology here does not give 
voice to its subjects, but rather takes it away. In multiple ways then, these interactions signal the 
political, economic, and expertise derived inequities through which systems of ethnological thought are 
impressed upon subjects in Darjeeling. It is only apt that they would unfold in the classroom—the site 
of knowledge-power par excellence. 
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“unrealistic and irresponsible to condemn all such political transformations as divisive 
and dangerous” as it would be to undermine the grounds upon which subjects 
(collective and individual) are seeking to produce themselves.20 That said, the 
propagation of obligatory ethnological ‘truths’ over a people deserves to be red-
flagged and scrutinized. Prescriptive ethnological schemas and mandated syntheses of 
conceptual and socio-cultural form remain hallmarks of ethnic absolutism. They call 
for careful critique. And it is here where the anthropology of knowledge offers 
important insights into the problem of ethnic absolutism. Through its lenses, ethnic 
absolutism and fundamentalisms of various kinds may be seen to boil down to the 
fundamentals of knowledge and the troubling ways epistemic forms are pressed upon 
the social world. 
--- 
 Encounters with ‘found’ anthropology hold lessons for all parties involved—
whether ethnic leaders, government bureaucrats, born-again ethnics, disinterested 
villagers, or academically trained anthropologists like myself. The differences and 
similarities at hand may be both exciting and unnerving. Senses of the uncanny may 
be mutual. As a research platform, these encounters present both an impetus and 
opportunity to remind ourselves and others of the possibilities and impossibilities of 
anthropological knowing. The questions that arise concern how we—all of us—
navigate and translate between the great enframers of this craft: be it between the 
general and the particular; the conceptual and empirical; ideal-types and real-types; or 
at a most basic level of social understanding, between the self and other. Entering into 
these interactions, we would be well-served by carrying with us Judith Butler’s point 
that “if translation [between these realms] remains a necessity, then this act will be one 
                                                 
20 Chatterjee 2004: 75. 
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that works precisely through failing to establish a radical commensurability between 
the terms it seeks to relate.”21 
 In the long term, advocating for such a tolerance between conceptual and 
socio-cultural form may, in fact, help refigure the very problem of ‘identity’ itself. As 
Butler continues: 
“It is this kind of impossibility and necessity that constitutes the kind of 
reading that does not always return us to the ground we already knew. The rift 
in the subject is paradoxically its capacity to move beyond itself, a movement 
that does not return to where it always was, identity as movement in the 
promising sense.”22 
The starting point for a study of “identity as movement in the promising sense”, in 
other words, can be subjects themselves. In this light, Butler’s point can be read as 
something of an ethnographic axiom. Indeed, the method offers an effective counter to 
fundamentalist claims over the subject by providing real-world evidence of the ways 
subjects are constantly moving beyond themselves in their processes of perpetual self-
production. Through the ethnographic looking-glass, we can find—and perhaps most 
importantly convey—how subjects are always in flux and lacking definitive closure. 
Mitigating against those exempli gratia logics that hold forth the subject as the 
exemplary proof of the normative anthropologies of the day (e.g. “Ahhh…you see. 
There is a tribal community!”), the task here may be not so much to advocate the 
synthesis of ethnography and anthropological theory, but rather to reconstitute their 
distinction. Precisely because of its deductive and descriptive capabilities, 
ethnography may help offset those fundamentalist anthropologies that claim a collapse 
of the empirical and conceptual in their subjects. Given the grim perpetuation of 
                                                 
21 Butler 1995: 447. 
22 Ibid. 
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fundamentalist knowledges in the world today, working against such logics may well 
have humanist repercussions 
Anthropological Futures. 
 In his recent book Against Race, Paul Gilroy charts a compelling, if utopian, 
vision for what he calls a “planetary humanism”. Central to this new humanism, 
Gilroy avers, will be a “postanthropological version of what it means to be human.”23 
I take exception. 
 The historical underpinnings of Gilroy’s idea are sound. The discipline of 
anthropology has played an important role in naturalizing various schemas of human 
classification—many of which continue to upset the humanist agenda. But to equate 
‘race’, ‘caste’, ‘tribe’, ‘gender’ and the like with ‘anthropology’ itself is to confuse 
particular facets of anthropological thought with the general kind of knowledge (and 
discipline) from which they emerged. Confining the ‘anthropological’ to these terms 
or any others, we are left with a rather hopeless, occluded notion of ‘anthropology’. 
This, it seems, is the understanding of the ‘anthropological’ that Gilroy jettisons from 
the humanist horizon. 
  My concerns are three-fold: First, this view of ‘anthropology’ ignores the 
explosion of interests within the discipline of anthropology over recent decades. 
Second, it blinds us to anthropological developments beyond the walls of the 
academy. And finally, shackling anthropology to its admittedly problematic pasts 
forecloses its abilities to help shape a more desirable future. Contrary to Gilroy’s 
suggestions of a “postanthropological” age to come, I maintain that anthropology—
and in particular ethnography—can be an integral part of the humanist project. Staying 
true to our subjects, the method is uniquely poised to bring to light hitherto 
                                                 
23 Gilroy 2000: 15. By ‘postanthropological’ Gilroy seemingly means ‘postracial’, though elsewhere he 
mentions ‘ungendered humanism’. 
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unrecognized ways of being-in-the-world of great social promise. From them, we may 
learn starting points for a new humanism. The question going forward is: what 
particular kinds of anthropological knowledge will we endow to the future? 
 Modern systems of recognition and identity politics suggest that the world will 
be haunted by the ghosts of anthropological pasts for a long time to come. Any 
attempt to think our way out of this anthropologically-effected present must be 
realistic. Across the board, the vested interests are formidable. Quandaries abound. It 
would be utopian and irresponsible to propose wholesale changes. The ways forward 
instead will be necessarily slow, dialogic, and fraught. 
 ‘Found’ anthropology offers a humble place to begin. Precisely as a confluence 
of different anthropologies—themselves replete with diverse social, political, and 
epistemic commitments—here we enter into an arena for mutually deliberating the 
epistemic qualities and social possibilities of anthropological knowledges. If I may 
speak from my research experiences in Darjeeling, semblances of the disciplinary self 
are likely to be found lurking in the other. But here, the uncanny need not cast such an 
ominous shadow over these encounters. Instead it marks an opportunity to talk about 
and across the various similarities and differences of our anthropological mindsets. In 
venturing these conversations, there is no reason to believe that anthropology cannot 
sustain its ethnographic commitments to its subjects. Whether ‘ours’ or ‘theirs’, 
anthropology’s strongest appeals to the present may well lie in its ability to give voice 
to the myriad ways people world their worlds. Here, anthropology (however 
conceived) has a promising role to play in helping realize new “versions of what it 
means to be human.” 
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On Final Words. 
 These chapters on knowledge and belonging in Darjeeling do not tell a 
singular story, but rather a set of stories about a people and a kind of knowledge that I 
recognize as ethnological in a specific sense and therefore anthropological in a broader 
sense. A simpler story was waiting for me in Darjeeling—a story of ethnic 
revitalization, ethnic rebirth, newfound senses of ethnic belonging, etc. This story of 
‘identity’, singular and pure, wanted to be told and indeed was told to me in terms that 
were potent and seductively familiar. My research, however, does not corroborate any 
such story. Instead, my findings steadfastly resist any singular conclusion—any final 
words, as it were—on the ways ethnological knowledge is affecting social belonging 
in Darjeeling. 
 To deny a definitive relationship of knowledge and belonging, however, is not 
to deny the causal links between the people of Darjeeling’s anxieties about belonging, 
‘identity’, etc and their newfound fascination with ethnological knowledge. Anxieties 
over belonging in India have galvanized their struggles for rights, recognition, and 
ethnic awakening. And, as an integral part of these quests, ethnological knowledge has 
opened up new social, political, and subjective possibilities. For certain individuals, 
anthropologies of the ethnic self have even conjured senses of belonging long denied 
by their history in India. However, in telling stories of ethnic renaissance in 
Darjeeling, a fundamental difference emerges between my anthropology and many of 
those that I encountered in the field. Unlike the champions of ethnic rebirth who 
wielded their own theories of ethnic subject-formation, my anthropology posits no 
singular relation between ethnological knowledge and the ethnic subject, only 
relations. Some of these I have tried to present here.  
 Given the divergent goals of our work and the different systems of recognition 
by which our anthropological renderings of the people of Darjeeling will be judged, 
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my anthropology without question can better afford to bear the contingencies, 
complexities, and vagaries of life in Darjeeling than can those of aspiring ethnic 
groups. My deductive findings challenge the kinds of anthropological knowledge 
practiced by and upon the people of Darjeeling. But let me be the first to admit that 
my findings are not solely a deductive outcome of my research. The different ‘stories’ 
I tell in these chapters have emerged out of the interests and methods through which I 
engaged the circumstances at hand. By focusing on the social life of ethnological 
knowledge and its relations to belonging, my approach largely skirted around the 
heuristic requirement of ‘identity’ itself.24 Resisting ‘identity’s’ lure was for me a 
necessary step toward questioning the constitutive relation of anthropology to the 
problem itself.25 Neither taken-for-granted, nor presupposed, ‘identity’ and its 
reification were thus not built into the frameworks of the enquiry. In this regard, my 
research has diverged significantly from traditional ethnic-based studies. 
 From the start, my multiattentional approach has involved 
incommensurability.26 Neither in a philosophical sense, nor in my ethnographic 
findings, do knowledge and belonging resolve perfectly into one another. The 
epistemic and affectual dimensions of life in Darjeeling are indeed mutually 
constitutive, but never in an absolute sense. Rather, anxieties over belonging seem to 
always be there with the ethnologies of Darjeeling—animating, exceeding, and 
otherwise unsettling the various attempts at conceptual capture of ethnic subjects. In 
significant but never singular ways, ethnological knowledge continues to shape not 
only what it means, but also how it feels to be a (ethnic) subject in Darjeeling. 
                                                 
24 This is an issueframed by Judith Butler, who suggests that “reading identities as they are situated and 
formed in relation to one another means moving beyond the heuristic requirement of identity itself.” 
Butler 1995: 446. 
25 Along these lines, this work enters into a scattered conversation seeking ways to rethink ‘identity’ as 
we know and ‘find’ it today. The radical critiques of Paul Gilroy (1990; 1993; 2000) and Fanon before 
him (1967); the work of Judith Butler (1995) and Derrida (1998); and to a certain extent Marx 
(1843/1978) have asked us to rethink ‘identity’ in various ways. 
26 This is an important facet of multiattentional methodologies. See Boyer 2010. 
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--- 
 Thinking through the optics of knowledge and belonging, we are left to wonder 
what the future holds for the people of Darjeeling and the various other subjects of 
ethnology. The intended and unintended ways that ethnological knowledge has come 
to shape life in Darjeeling seemingly returns us to Marx’s deceptively simple insight 
that “objectification is the practice of alienation”. Likewise, we may recall Fanon who 
asked us to consider how systems of objectification introduce their own degrees of 
misrecognition, over-determination, and alienation from the ways subjects might 
otherwise choose to be. In the Fanonian sense, it may be uncanny indeed the way 
subjects are made strangers unto themselves. Clearly, anthropologies of the ethnic self 
have generated new possibilities for the people of Darjeeling. But in weighing how 
these knowledge forms can engender rights, recognition, and senses of belonging to a 
nation, a community, and a veritably ‘ethnic’ self, it is worth considering also how this 
‘age of ethnology’ has ushered in its own kinds of misrepresentation, misrecognition, 
and non-belonging. In its prescriptive forms, ethnological knowledge may well close 
down as many possibilities as it opens up. 
 To conclude: the lessons of ‘finding’ anthropology remain an open-book. For 
academic anthropologists, coming to terms with these forms of knowledge may 
unsettle notions of who we are, what we do, and how we should be known. Certainly, 
finding anthropology has induced similar feelings among the people of Darjeeling. 
Nevertheless, for them, particular paradigms of ethnological thought are now indelible 
and highly politicized facets of life. That salience alone gives pause to seriously 
consider the potential and realized effects of anthropological knowledge in the world 
today. 
 Given the forces that animate and haunt the contemporary, getting beyond this 
current ‘age of ethnology’, should we wish to do so, will not be easy. It will require a 
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careful questioning of those forms of anthropological knowledge that continue to 
condition the styles, possibilities, and impossibilities of modern communities in India 
and beyond. Coming to terms with the anthropological present may well be an 
important step in charting a more humanist anthropological future. In fact, when given 
the slightest turn toward the future, the ‘problem’ of ‘found’ anthropology transforms 
into a site of great possibility. After all, if anthropological knowledge can be so clearly 
found in the lifeworlds of contemporary subjects, then along with them, we might 
think creatively and critically about what kinds of recognition we are able to develop 
for the future and how these may affect the horizons of human possibility. In such a 
future stirs the possibility that we—all of us—may discover social forms and forms of 
anthropology beyond recognition. 
 Whatever this reckoning holds, the endeavor should prove to be something 
more than academic. 
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